CAR Central African Republic: Fragile, failed and forlorn

[jmm99]

UN peacekeeping has evolved considerably over the last 15 years or so.

Agreed; from mid-1993, doing a cursory look through folders and files on part of my HD - e.g.:

Peace Enforcement (folder); USIP Peace Enforcement Course (folder); and (files, as named on HD) 1993 Implications for UN Peacekeepiing; 1993 The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma; 1996 Airpower and Peace Enforcement; 1997 From Peace Enforcement to Conflict Termination Operations in Africa; 1997 Allen - Lessons From Somalia, The Dilemma Of Peace Enforcement; 1998 Peace Enforcement - The Real Peace Support Challenge in Africa; 2003 Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement; 2006 Peace Enforcement Operations in the DRC 2003-2005; 2007 CRS Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations RL33557; 2009 UN Charter Basis for Astan PEO.

The online full title of the 2009 file is: Case Study on “Afghanistan”, in Blanca Antonini & al, Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII, Madrid: FRIDE, 2009 (by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh)

Since today is my 40th wedding anniversary and I'm used to listening , it's only appropriate that I yield the floor (momentarily) to a strong, assertive woman.

Case Study on “Afghanistan”
pp. 56-57

2. What does Chapter VII really mean?

Of the three streams of resolutions for Afghanistan, ISAF and the sanctions regime were designed under the Chapter VII umbrella, while UNAMA, in virtue of being a political mission in support of the government, was not technically a Chapter VII intervention. The UN did not have police, military components or security installations, even though it did have military advisers. ISAF, however, was not accountable to the UN, despite its being authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII.

According to an internal memo at the DPKO viewed by this project team, there is a lack of clarity about the legal basis for peacekeeping operations and the operational implication of the Security Council invocation of Chapter VII. Historically, Chapter VI was the reference for traditional peacekeeping operations and Chapter VII for enforcement-oriented operations. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of explicitly invoking Chapter VII (Chapter VI has never been invoked) or mandating peacekeeping forces to perform specific tasks without specifying the chapter, but drawing on the language in Chapter VII. Invocation of Chapter VII denotes the legal basis for action and signals firm political resolves as well as reminding the parties and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effects to its decisions. Yet, as the memo noted, in reality the Council does not need to refer to a specific chapter of the Charter when adopting or extending resolutions for UN peacekeeping operations. The missions should be guided not by references to the chapters involved but by the tasks specified in their mandate, by the accompanying rules of engagement and by other directions pertaining to the use of force and international humanitarian law.

In cases like Afghanistan’s, where the UN delegated its responsibilities to a regional organisation, however, the defeating factor was that even when Chapter VII was invoked, the UN had no authority. In cases when UN authorisations happen after the use of force, as was the case in Afghanistan, where OEF operations had already started before ISAF was created, the invocation of Chapter VII may in fact mean little. The real alliance-building and decision to act happened outside of the Council’s negotiations. In this sense, invocation of Chapter VII becomes associated with forceful action. The result is the overstretching of peacekeeping in situations where there is no peace to keep — Afghanistan squarely applies in this category.

The use of Chapter VII in a resolution is supposed to invoke legitimacy and consensus from national actors. Yet, as national actors are hardly consulted in the preparation of mandates, and, as is often the case, national actors, especially in situations of regime change, may not be sufficiently accountable, the question is raised about the issues of sovereignty and national consensus. From the point of view of the national government, reference to Chapter VII does matter. Haiti, for example, had asked for the removal of references to Chapter VII in the Security Council resolutions in order to maintain investor confidence. In the case of Afghanistan, as the government, created through the UN-led Bonn process, gained capacity, legitimacy and sovereignty, it increasingly became critical of the use of force in its territory, especially in discord and in the absence of coordination with its own national forces.

Italics are where I believe we agree; bold are what I think are important points (possible discussion points) made by ST in her Case Study on “Afghanistan”.

At SWC, I've dealt with some Chapter VI, peacekeeping, and Chapter VII, peace enforcement, issues;

chapter vii charter - 13 posts
peacekeeping - 26 posts
peace enforcement - 56 posts

but more often on rules of engagement;

rules engagement - 80 posts
ROE - 74 posts
ROEs - 100 posts
SROE - 13 posts
SROEs - 18 posts

and, of couse, Hague-Geneva "stuff"; Gitmo habeas cases, etc.

Now, moving to some individual points on which we have basic agreement (I think), but where the political facts of life in the UNSC dictate the "terms of engagement".

Max:

It's worth noting though that ONUC went to war against Tshombe's Katangan separatists in the 1960s under a mandate that didn't specify either chapter of the UN Charter. It just said 'go do it.'

Case Study on “Afghanistan”

Historically, Chapter VI was the reference for traditional peacekeeping operations and Chapter VII for enforcement-oriented operations.
...
Yet, as the memo noted, in reality the Council does not need to refer to a specific chapter of the Charter when adopting or extending resolutions for UN peacekeeping operations

My only objection to the UN not citing its source of authority is same as I have to "shorthand pleading" in criminal indictments and civil complaints. That is ambiguity and an absence of command guidance. Of course, the UNSC is ruled by political expediency and the need to be vague in order to pass resolutions.

We hope that deficiency is rectified "by the tasks specified in their mandate, by the accompanying rules of engagement and by other directions pertaining to the use of force and international humanitarian law," as ST suggests above. But, is it in your opinion?

A suggestion is, where you cite somewhat exotic "stuff", you hyperlink the source if online or the full title if it's not online - e.g., "... war against Tshombe's Katangan separatists in the 1960s under a mandate ...'go do it.'"; and "... 97% are serving under Chapter VII mandates ..." Nuff said.

Max:

Since UNAMSIL in 1999, almost all new PKOs have been authorized under Chapter VII to use force to uphold all or part of their mandates (which isn't to say they do so consistently).

Of the nearly 98,000 troops and police currently deployed to PKOs, 97% are serving under Chapter VII mandates

Case Study on “Afghanistan”

In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of explicitly invoking Chapter VII (Chapter VI has never been invoked) ...

Again, basic agreement (100% or 97% - de minimis non curat lex).

In conclusion to this Part 1, the UN Charter may need an amendment Chapter VI-1/2 (and a 1/4 and a 3/4); but we are unlikely to see a charter amendment to that effect. Hence, we have to go to "peace enforcement" with what we have.

- to be cont -

Regards

Mike