One stop interrogation & interviewing resource

[Jedburgh]

This may be off topic but it is pertinent to the above. One of the problems we used to have training interrogators was that the training used to concentrate on the face to face issues. The two areas left un-tapped and never correctly trained for where the before and after. In my opinion, these are usually more important, and denigrated at the table of cunning interrogator ego.

Circumstances of capture/detention and detailed back story were never really adequately captured in exercise briefs, and nor were "all sources" exploitation, in the aftermath. It all meant we were very likely to end up interrogating people we did not need to talk to at all. Time is and human resources are very finite.

The face-to-face interrogation is the most difficult bit for most, which is why so much training time is devoted to that aspect. Yet you are correct in that the before and after phases are just as important – but in my experience in the US Army is that they are not neglected in training (at the schoolhouse or at the units), just not discussed as much outside the field of interrogation. I’ve been through the Brit joint services interrogation training, and they did not exactly neglect those aspects either.

Also in my experience, once the newly-minted collector has moved on to an operational unit, in-house unit training often does very well in covering the screening, planning & prep and the interrogation aspects – it is the further development of report writing skills that tends to suffer post-schoolhouse. (of course, that’s just my personal experience in a limited number of units – as is usual, the overall reality at other units probably covers the spectrum from limited and poor quality training to outstanding comprehensive scenario exercises)

The aspect of intelligence support to interrogation and planning and prep for the event, is absolutely critical and is recognized as such by every professional in the field that I am aware of.

However, in the tremendous amount of media coverage and discussion of interrogation methods over the past several years, I’ve seen almost nothing that discusses planning and preparation for, or intelligence support to, interrogation. And absolutely nothing that deals with the tedious nuts and bolts of writing any of the variety of intelligence reports that may be produced from an interrogation. Those aspects are dull and boring for public consumption compared with heated discussion of what constitutes abuse of a source.

Chapter 6 of the current FM 2-22.3 deals with Screening, and Chapter 7 covers Planning and Preparation. Paragraph 6-3 speaks to your final point:

The resources (time and personnel) allocated to screening must be balanced against those required for interrogations, debriefings, and other collection methodologies. Although screening is not in itself an information collection technique, it is vital to the rapid collection of information. Through screening, the effectiveness of limited collection assets can be maximized by targeting those assets against the sources with the highest potential of providing key information. Screening requires experienced individuals with maturity and judgment who are totally knowledgeable of the collection requirements and able to make well-reasoned decisions based on limited information. Collection (interrogation, debriefing, and elicitation) can be integrated into screening activities; however, it slows the screening process and decreases the number of potential sources that can be screened.

When I said ….if the situation allows, during the first screening interview., I did not mean to imply that the screening process may be dumped. Although it is often abbreviated, and certain effective methods of screening may not resemble those taught at the schoolhouse (the Brits taught one very effective method that will probably never be seen at Huachuca), screening in some form is always conducted. This holds true whether the situation involves a single collector out working with the infantry or if it’s dealing with a detainee that's been evac’ed to the JDIC. What I was referring to in my statement was that in many situations the individual who will conduct the interrogation does not conduct the screening – or is not even physically present to observe the screening.

The ideal, practicable in many operational scenarios in the COE, is to for one collector to conduct the screening and then to shift directly into interrogation if the source warrants. The manual’s reference to the integration of collection and screening that it slows the screening process and decreases the number of potential sources that can be screened is really only applicable when you are dealing with large numbers of prisoners at one time. When dealing with individual detainees, or prisoners in smaller numbers, it is far more effective to integrate the process. Breaks can be taken to obtain/verify information necessary to support the interrogation, but it is almost always more effective if the source is dealt with by one collector throughout the initial screening and first interrogation. The collector’s development of source indicators, tells, leads – whatever label you prefer to slap on it – begins from the moment he first lays eyes on the source. The obstacles, as always, are the language capabilities and experience level of the collector.

And all of that means absolutely nothing if the information obtained can’t be put clearly and concisely in a report that has meaning for the commander.

[William F. Owen]

I did my stuff back in the days of Ashford and JSIW/ JSIO, and admittedly, I have not been in an I room since 93' so I am hoping all has improved for the better. It certainly should have based on all the operational experience.

[Jedburgh]

I did my stuff back in the days of Ashford and JSIW/ JSIO, and admittedly, I have not been in an I room since 93' so I am hoping all has improved for the better. It certainly should have based on all the operational experience.

I went through training with the Brits in early '90 - and at that time their training was far more practical and operationally-based than was the US equivalent. The US course still had the student interrogator fixed behind a desk with a massive binder notebook in front him for all the interrogations in those days - even during the field exercise.

[Someguy]

The course hasn't gotten much better. I went through the 10 level course as a reclass last year. I met other NCOs who couldn't do the basics of the job and had to be recycled -- we had Warrant Officer reclassers that were recycled. Two of my peers couldn't ID OBL from a photo.