"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[Bob's World]

Moderator's Note

This thread was in the Operation Iraqi Freedom arena and on a quick review is a far more general topic so moved here (ends).


People enjoy comparing Afghanistan to Vietnam. Some comparisons fit, many do not. I believe it is high time to explore some other comparisons in a manner that may help us to better understand a family of conflicts, past and present. That family is Resistance.

The two case studies that most of the Small Wars Council community are very versed in for this thread are WWII and the ongoing US War on Terrorism. The core (rooted in human nature) dynamic that I would like to explore is the natural tendency for a foreign, and therefore illegitimate, occupation to trigger a resistance response in the populations affected by the same.

A resistance insurgency is very different than a revolutionary insurgency. The first is a continuation of war - where one system of governance seeks to coerce its will over another, where the government and army have been defeated, and only the population remain in the fight. Resistance is war.

A revolutionary insurgency, however, is internal to a single system of governance. Like the division of a cell, revolutionary insurgency occurs when some segment of the population comes to feel compelled to coerce through illegal (and often very violent) ways political change on the domestic system of governance over them. Such conflict is best thought of as civil emergency, rather than war, as it is largely an act of illegal democracy where legal democracy either does not exist or is inadequate to the task. If such a "cell" ultimately divides and new governance and army forms around the dissident population, such a civil emergency then, and only then, becomes civil war.

Below is a response I posted this earlier today on a thread on the Small Wars Journal:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/how...s-of-tora-bora

In a court of law this entire thread is what might be called "relevant, but immaterial" (in that the information, while interesting and applicable to the case at hand, in no way helps resolve said case).

At a tactical level AQ is a pain in the ass. Tactically they are "a threat." They came to our country, they murdered our citizens, and while they did so in a war-like way, it was plain old, garden variety mass murder and we need to bring justice to those who perpetrated the act, and peace to those who suffered a tragic loss from that same act. Acting like a proverbial elephant with an irrational fear of mice, tromping all over any place where we think mice might hide with little regard to the impression that is creating in the minds of those innocently affected by our tromping is not making us safer. Quite the opposite, in fact.

At a strategic level AQ is a symptom. Just as the Treaty of Versailles made a future war with Germany inevitable, so too did the US decision to let the programs, policies and relationships nurtured during 45 years of Cold War manipulations in the Middle East to simply ride into the future make conflict with the people of that region inevitable as well. The explosion of information technology was an accelerant. Like the collision of a cold (war) front and a warm front over a sea of the people - it brewed a perfect storm.

In the first case, if not Hitler and the Nazi ideology it would have been someone else with some other rallying message. In the second case, if not AQ and their Islamist ideology it would have been someone else with some similar message (Islam-based ideology seems to be the only flavor that works in the Middle East for rallying people to illegal political action).

Resistance insurgency is a natural human response. While it is easy to appreciate why Hitler triggered this human response in every single country he invaded during WWII (and to some degree we even concede why we triggered resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan), we have a harder time appreciating that not every inappropriate, illegitimate "occupation" need be physical. I think we understand the rise of AQ and the resonance their message has had across the greater Middle East in the post-Cold War era best if we consider the possibility that one can trigger this human response through an "occupy by policy" as well as by the more traditional physical occupations we normally associate with resistance movements.

Why is this important? Because if we want to reduce the likelihood of terrorism against the US we must address the source of energy fueling the problem in the first place. Widespread CT operations and invasions of nations we see as supporting or facilitating the UW operations AQ has been conducting to leverage this resistance energy have served primarily to make that energy stronger. Symptoms must be mitigated, not defeated. To attempt to defeat symptoms ignores the problem and allows it to grow unchecked at best - at worst, and we have been bad, such efforts make the problem worse and accelerate its growth.

In many ways, much of what President Obama has been doing in regards to turning his back on Mubarak, tempering the use of drones, looking for diplomatic solutions to Syria, acting in ways that tend to piss off Cold War partners such as the Israelis and the Saudis in general - all have done far more to reduce the energy of this occupation by policy than all of our military efforts over the past 12 years combined. The boss has good instincts, but we have no strategy to provide the framework or narrative necessary to guide and communicate the logic of those actions.

If we want to get to better results, we need to redefine the problem and then devise new strategies. Working harder and faster to execute flawed perspectives focused on symptoms, or rehashing 12-year old battles, is not going to help us finally turn the corner on this problem.

RCJ

Did the victors of WWI provoke an inevitable WWII by their occupation by policy of Germany through the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles?

Did the victors of the Cold War provoke an inevitable War on Terrorism and associated Arab Spring by their decision to largely leave in place in the Middle East the policies, practices and relationships nurtured during and in support of activities designed to contain the Soviet Union?

Do men like Osama bin Laden and Adolf Hitler "cause" these types of conflicts, or are they simply opportunists who, like Mao so eloquently said about his role in China, "saw a parade and leapt in front"?

Do ideologies - be it Nazism, Communism, Islamism, or any other "ism" radicalize otherwise content populations to rise in illegal conflict, or are these simply effective tunes tailored to help a particular "parade" march in step?

I believe we need to refocus the debate. We have debated the branches of these types of conflicts to death. The roots, however, we tend to gloss over. After all, it is uncomfortable to confront the very real possibility that these are roots we planted ourselves.

[AmericanPride]

Did the victors of WWI provoke an inevitable WWII by their occupation by policy of Germany through the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles?

"Inevitable" is too deterministic. I think it's generally accepted that the termination conditions of WWI did not resolve all of the outstanding issues in Europe, and also created new conditions for conflict. The Great Depression had an equally (or more?) important impact on the political and economic conditions that facilitated the success of Nazism. Germany survived World War I, unlike Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. But this question is also one with an implied structural theoretical base: did the individuals in politics and business matter at all to the outcome? And lastly, the agenda of the Nazi Party was not only the reversal of the Versailles Treaty, but also the establishment of a new German Empire in Europe itself. What about the end of WW1 prompted an imperial/colonial focus in Europe instead of Africa or Asia? Did those same conditions make it easier for the Nazis to succeed than other right-wing and left wing factions (particularly the socialists)? The Nazis were adeptly organized and by 1933 they had forged a number of key political and business alliances that propelled them to power. The other question is: was Nazi policy deliberate from start to finish, or did it evolve as the party gained power and became entangled in another world war? I forget which one, but one of the Werhmacht field marshals after the war basically started that none of them anticipated the invasion of Poland to start a global war.

Did the victors of the Cold War provoke an inevitable War on Terrorism and associated Arab Spring by their decision to largely leave in place in the Middle East the policies, practices and relationships nurtured during and in support of activities designed to contain the Soviet Union?

Same thoughts as above, although Islamism was already on the ascent since the final failure of the Arab nationalists in 1973. I think the end of Arab nationalism as a credible political force had more to do with the emergence of Islamism than anything else. I think globalization (proliferation of weapons, technologies, communication, etc) contributed more significantly to Islamism's successes since then.

Do ideologies - be it Nazism, Communism, Islamism, or any other "ism" radicalize otherwise content populations to rise in illegal conflict, or are these simply effective tunes tailored to help a particular "parade" march in step?

I think this is an important and deep question. First, ideologies don't emerge in a vacuum and it's difficult to predict which ideas will catch fire or how they will evolve over time. It's been argued that the ideological origins of Nazism can be traced to the mid 19th century. Of course, communism can be traced back to the writings of Marx in the same time period -- all before the emergence of a unified Germany, the rise of the US, and the two World Wars. How could anyone predict that these ideologies would more or less shape the second half of the 20th century? But it's also important to note that Marx himself argues that ideological reproduction is function of a system's political economy; in other words, the material system exists first and from it emerges an ideology to sustain it. In my view, this is probably the most accurate; people willingly believe what they wish to explain the world around them. The more desperate they are, the more radical the ideas will be. When times were good in the Weimar Republic, the Nazi party struggled to find support among the electorate. That changed with the Great Depression.

[Bob's World]

Certainly no particular set of facts or outcomes involving people are "inevitable," after all, we have free will to make decisions and the specific facts and cultural factors will always be unique. Versailles and the lesser known companion treaties, however, created an effect at the human nature level making some form of conflict inevitable.

But these are perceptions that can only be assessed through the lens of those on the receiving end of such an "occupation by policy."

Many on the winning side thought these treaties reasonable and necessary to prevent the very war they ultimately provoked. Likewise most Americans and Middle Eastern leaders either swept up in, or scrambling to ward off, Arab Spring, found the idea of sustaining the status quo emerging from the Cold War reasonable as well.

Common to both examples is that no one asked or gave serious consideration to how the people affected by these decisions felt.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert-what is interesting is the failure of Arab nationalism in the 70s and 80s vs say the rise of Sunni and Shia fundamentalism development since then-- especially Iran since 1979.

We often tend to focus on the AQ salafist side of the Sunni house and we speak of the Wahhabi Saudi influence with say FFs but I would say the last 12 years we tended to ignore the real differences between Sunni and Shia Islam.

During the last 12 years Saudi fundamentalism has in fact become the defacto Sunni standard across all Sunni Muslim populations especially in the political arena. While at the same time Shia fundamentalism is really a copy of what the Sunni's were doing as Khomeini attempted to become the overall leader of the Islamic world by using Sunni fundamentalism messaging-which he failed in because he could not bridge the gap of being a Shia and an Iranian in the eyes of the Sunni.

So what we now have in the ME is IMO a true clash between Sunni fundamentalism and Shia fundamentalism which is occurring in Syria as Syria is the key in the view of the Sunni fundamentalists in stopping the Shia expansion started by Khomeini and which is still is being continued by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards who view themselves the defenders of the Shia faith worldwide.

What concerns me is that we the US seem to want to sidestep this Islamic development as it is messy, complicated, has cost us a large amount of cash and lives on both sides and it does not lend itself to easy solutions that fit in a 30 second TV message. And it is equally difficult to explain to the US public who has been paying for it for the last 12 years.

It is now hard to say we screwed up and now we have to change directions---with our current divided political camps what politician is going to venture out with that messaging?

Also look at our think tanks and all of their messaging---who wants to lose one's funding stream by saying --just maybe we went the wrong direction.

Overall the ME population is working it out at the cost of thousands of killed and injured and we the US simply stand by---in some aspects our actions even recent actions are reinforcing the message that it is also not only the Shia fundamentalism that is problem for the Sunni --it is also our actions that are reinforcing the image that the US is actually siding with the Shia---if one really does take the time to read the recent AQ General Guidance for Jihad (Sept 2013) we could in fact be declared the "near enemy" and right now AQ is having success against the "near enemy".

What also concerns me is the side lining of the secular Sunni which is really a large part of the international Sunni population especially among the young and elites---we see this playing out now in Turkey.

We also see it playing our in Germany and France which have rather large Muslim populations--in Berlin there are districts under control of one or two Arabic clans/families/tribes using Sharia law to settle disputes---meaning in those districts the German judicial system which is the linchpin of Germany democracy is being undermined by Islam---already leading to increased neo Nazi backlash-which by the way is growing-and as well a growing concern for German politicians (from both major parties) who are also voicing the same concerns.

In France it is causing a large growth in the right wing as well.

In order to understand the ME it is time to fully understand Islamic fundamentalism (Sunni and Shia), why it occurs, how it is occurring and our role in driving that development---it is no longer just about AQ nor has it really been about AQ.

Islam is not going away any time soon.

[Bob's World]

In short, it isn't all about us. Yet when our policy is deemed as excessively inappropriate we generate a resistance effect that focuses negative energy in our direction.

Just as the information age created by the printing press opened an era of political and religious (religion being a tool of government) evolution; so too is the modern info age affecting the ME.


When our policy is a fusion of status quo of governance and promotion of Western values in an era of massive upheaval and political/religious evolution, how can there not be conflict?

[AmericanPride]

Bob,

I think we also have to be careful in categorizing all opposition ideologies or factions as passive. Granted, in many cases, US actions and policies generate resistance, but Western democratic capitalism is not the only ideological force driving for change. With the complexity of ideology and it's evolution over many decades (in some cases, centuries, like Christianity), it's hard to predict which will catch fire and which won't. Nobody expected a communist state in Russia, not even Marx, who predicted revolution would come in the most advanced capitalist economies first. But that never happened, not even in Germany's defeat in WWI. So I think we should be careful in comparing the global momentum of ideologies with the specific opportunities that emerge in conflict itself. There's always going to be an out-group, whether by design or by choice, and there will be some ideological tool kit lying around for them to pick up and use. Some have been successful with terrible results. Others, like the Unabomber, barely make a bump in history.

Versailles and the lesser known companion treaties, however, created an effect at the human nature level making some form of conflict inevitable.

Again, I take issue with the word "inevitable" since you are implying there is a direct and causative relationship between the treaty and the rise and policies of the Nazi Party. But between 1918 and 1933, the Nazis were only one of dozens of radical factions on both right and left. Did any the conditions created by the treaty make it any more likely that the Nazis would be successful not some other political faction instead?

Versailles created conflict on issues directly bearing on its issues; i.e. the Rhineland. But I don't think a direct connection can be drawn between the treaty, the specific components of the Nazi program, and the start of World War II. It wasn't the Rhineland or German demilitarization that led to World War II - it was the invasion of Poland, which was formerly Russian territory. The Nazis imposed a hard colonial regime in Eastern Europe not unlike imperialism in Africa in some regards; was that policy caused by Versailles?

Common to both examples is that no one asked or gave serious consideration to how the people affected by these decisions felt.

Yes, but to what extent did alienation drive political radicalization? And how is radicalization predictable? In other words, did decision-makers at those times have a reason to believe that their actions would lead to the historical outcomes that occurred?

[davidbfpo]

Earlier in the thread mention has been made of the apparent absence of an internal jihadist activity when compared to the size of India's Muslim minority, so Stephen Tankel's latest offering 'Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat' may help understanding. I have not read the paper yet; the summary says:

India faces many well-known challenges, from corruption to environmental degradation. A lesser-noted challenge is domestic militancy. This new study, produced by noted South Asia security expert Stephen Tankel, focuses on the Indian Mujahideen (IM)--a loosely organized indigneous Islamist militant network. IM, Prof. Tankel argues, is "an internal security issue with an external dimension." Its leadership is currently based in Pakistan, but the organization represents a response to Indian domestic failings.

Link:http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publicat...-indian-threat

[AmericanPride]

Outlaw,

American policy is more aptly described as "balance of power" instead of "do not rock the boat". The US has no problems rocking the boat when it suits its interests - Lebanon, Iraq, etc. Cold War competition made this policy more clear since it was aimed at containing and reversing Soviet influence to maintain Gulf security. Dual containment of Iraq and Iran followed, but now with the removal of Hussein and the prospect of a nuclear Iran, the balance of power has shifted once again. Our "traditional" allies (the Saudis, Egyptians, Israelis, et al, but the Saudis the oldest and foremost among them) see these winds changing and I think after years of being our favorites, it's a disappointment (as an understatement) to them that we're not, as Dayuhan puts it, "an attack dog for them to unleash at their whim on those that they dislike". They don't care if we're the lightning rod for resentment in the region; it's not their problem (until it's their problem like the case with Al Qaida).

Though written before the latest Iraq War, my favorite book on the foreign policies of these states (Turkey among them) is The Foreign Policies of Middle East States edited by Hinnebusch and Ehteshami. It looks at the regional interests and international penetration of the region from the perspective of each local actor and it does so without the color of ideology.

The problem for the US isn't perception - as others have noted, that's not going to change any time soon. The real problem is making sure we're on the right side of history as these events unfold. The goal is to gain predictability. Syria conflict, Egyptian revolution, Iraq war, Iranian nuclear program -- all of this makes the region unpredictable and in some cases alters the fundamental drivers of these states (i.e. Iraq War). But otherwise, it's business as usual. An agreement with Iran solves one part and might influence some of the others, so I think a long term accommodation of some kind is inevitable. The alternative is war.

[Bob's World]

AP - "Syria conflict, Egyptian revolution, Iraq war, Iranian nuclear program -- all of this makes the region unpredictable and in some cases alters the fundamental drivers of these states (i.e. Iraq War)."

And yet, all of these events were either totally predictable or actaully caused (Iraq) by us.

Human activity is impossible to predict, but human nature is largely constant. The better we develop our fundamental understanding of the human nature-driven events, such as resistance insurgency and revolutionary insurgency, the better we will deal with the specifics of each event as it occurs, fully flavored by the human behavior of "all the surrounding facts and circumstances" (favorite quote of my brilliant contracts professor in Law School, Professor Holmes) unique to each event.

I see very positive signs in recent strategy decisions, yet feel they are being made by instinct rather than by any comprehensive design. That is a problem for our challengers and our partners and allies in equal measure. We need to explain ourselves.

But before we can effectively explain ourselves, we must first fully grasp a better understanding of the fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction that frustrate us so completely today.

[AmericanPride]

And yet, all of these events were either totally predictable or actaully caused (Iraq) by us.

I partially agree. They were predictable in the abstract but not in any way useful for policymaking. And the consequences of their outcomes are even less predictable. Will increased militancy and awareness of the Egyptian population compel the new government to pursue specific goals? Will these goals collide with US interests? If a Syrian peace agreement keeps Assad in power, what will happen to the hardline Islamists? Will they migrate to another country and destabilize it? If there's a permanent agreement with Iran, will that lead to any kind of permanency between Israeli and Saudi cooperation? What would that look like - could it provide an opening to a wider Arab-Israeli peace? That's what I mean by predictability - there are to many questions right now entangled in a deep nexus of complicated questions with no clear answers. That's bad for policy. So the best option for the US under these conditions is to keep its head down.

But before we can effectively explain ourselves, we must first fully grasp a better understanding of the fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction that frustrate us so completely today.

The problem I foresee is that there are substantial differences in perspective regarding the "fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction". Is "occupation by policy" even detrimental to US interests?

[Bob's World]

I partially agree. They were predictable in the abstract but not in any way useful for policymaking. And the consequences of their outcomes are even less predictable. Will increased militancy and awareness of the Egyptian population compel the new government to pursue specific goals? Will these goals collide with US interests? If a Syrian peace agreement keeps Assad in power, what will happen to the hardline Islamists? Will they migrate to another country and destabilize it? If there's a permanent agreement with Iran, will that lead to any kind of permanency between Israeli and Saudi cooperation? What would that look like - could it provide an opening to a wider Arab-Israeli peace? That's what I mean by predictability - there are to many questions right now entangled in a deep nexus of complicated questions with no clear answers. That's bad for policy. So the best option for the US under these conditions is to keep its head down.



The problem I foresee is that there are substantial differences in perspective regarding the "fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction". Is "occupation by policy" even detrimental to US interests?

The primary thing that is unpredictable is "when"; "to what degree" and "how."
Those are very important tactical criteria, but largely irrelevant to designing and implementing an effective foreign policy.

What was totally predictable was "what" and "why." That is all we really need for good policy. "What will be the likely effect of this policy and why will it have that effect"? "Oh, ok, so how could I avoid that bad effect by taking another approach..."

We need to stop thinking that our feces has no odor; and that we are the good guys in the white hats bringing the rule of law and superior values. That is our own twisted internal narrative that others quite reasonably do not buy into. Once we get over ourselves, we will be far more effective in our interactions with others.

[davidbfpo]

Within a broad ranging article Rory Stewart, a British MP, with an interesting resume, reflects upon his life to date and his lack of power as a MP:http://www.theguardian.com/politics/...wart-interview

Pertinent to this debate are these two passages on intervention, with my emphasis:

In the end, the basic problem is very, very simple. Why don't these interventions work? Because we are foreigners. If things are going wrong in a country, it's not usually that we don't have enough foreigners. It's usually that we have too many.

Our entire conceptual framework was mad. All these theories – counterinsurgency warfare, state building – were actually complete abstract madness. They were like very weird religious systems, because they always break down into three principles, 10 functions, seven this or that. So they're reminiscent of Buddhists who say: 'These are the four paths', or of Christians who say: 'These are the seven deadly sins.' They're sort of theologies, essentially, made by people like Buddhist monks in the eighth century – people who have a fundamental faith, which is probably, in the end, itself completely delusional.

I wonder if Rory ever debates COIN plus with those who are apparently deluded. I'd pay to see that.