"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[AmericanPride]

Outlaw,

I think US strategy in the ME has been relatively stable over the years, with the notable exception of the Iraq invasion (which I will address), and very clear in its intent: maintain close relationships (but not too close) with strategic partners Saudi Arabia, Gulf kingdoms, Egypt, and Israel while sustaining pressure (but not too much pressure) on adversarial governments in Syria, Iran, and formerly Iraq (and to a lesser extent, Libya). We've more or less pushed this strategy to the limit with our current partners, and combined with the misadventure in Iraq and opportunism in Libya, there's not much more that can be done short of another out right war, which we recently learned is not necessarily an American interest.

The US has a number of basic and traditional tools to influence the ME, chief among them military power and money. But as we know, both of these have their limits, and the complexity of disparate interests and the rapidity with which regional alliances shift makes exercising the first a dangerous proposition. And I think Yemen and its problems demonstrates that the use of the second is no guarantee of success.

Now I said the Iraq war was a misadventure, not just because of its execution, but also because it marked a significant break from historical US policy to let local allies or alliances figure out their problems (with US weapons and money of course). And then afterwards at some opportune point, the US steps in to facilitate an agreement. The security of Saudi Arabia is the longest standing linchpin of US interests in the region, and around it we have built a considerable military-oriented strategy to secure the Gulf. But actually exercising that power to destroy Hussein's Iraq only upset the balance of power and not in our favor; more or less forcing us into an understanding with Iran.

The Arab Spring doesn't demand a unifying US policy or a reimagining of US strategy. The US actively intervened in Libya, stayed more or less on the sidelines in Egypt and Syria, and basically ignored unrest in the Gulf. Unless there's a fundamental change in the structures of power in the ME, US strategy won't change and shouldn't -- our allies might change, but that's another question. Here's where I see emerging decision points:

- a nuclear Iran can't be ignored and probably not "occupied by policy". Some kind of accommodation will have to be made to maintain security in the Gulf (and to a lesser extent, the Caucasus). That might come at a heavy price for the US and probably not without some more violence.

- Iraq is out of the game for the foreseeable future. Escalation of Iraq's internal violence could pull in outside actors (read Iran and KSA) deeper into the country again.

- Syria is also out of the game; now it's just a matter of how long and under what conditions. A peace agreement will leave the international jihadists exposed and open to government repression. Where will they go next?

- Although it's not quite over in Egypt yet, as far as the US is concerned, the changes transpired with US interests intact. The question is with the elevated expectations and militancy of the population, what policies will this compel the Egyptian government to pursue?

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

It appears that we are equally "fixated." Just as I suggested to Dayuhan yesterday, we see the same facts, but assess the meanings from different backgrounds.

I struggle to see how the ideas built around the belief that "an island should not rule a continent" and that British rule was therefore illegitimate somehow came before Britain's rule of that continent. John Locke was perhaps the most influential theorist informing the thoughts of our founders (legitimacy coming from the people rather than power or God; the right of revolution when governments loses touch, etc), but he lived in England in the era following the heated events of the Civil War and the peace of Westphalia.

Thoughts on governance were evolving faster than governments. In the West this began when Mr. Guttenberg's printing press freed and empowered men to read, and think and communicate free from the control of such activities the Holy Roman Empire imposed through the Catholic Church. (Yes, governments use ideologies too). Guttenberg created a revolution of information which in turn fomented a revolution of thought and people's expectations of government and governance. This is not say that governance became evil or even ineffective, it simply grows stale and out of touch with the evolving expectations of the people in such eras. As friction grows, governments being made up of politicians, blame the challenger rather than themselves for the trouble.

Russia's policy of Glasnost had the same effect in the Soviet satellite states, as did modern communications tools in the Middle East. In each case governance comes first, a breakthrough of the state's ability to control information and thought comes second, perceptions of "poor governance" develop and spread, friction grows, (conditions of insurgency - often beginning to grow long before the first bullet is fired or bomb explodes), then informal leaders emerge and ideologies for change are adopted and applied.

This is a timeless, multi-act play. Just because governments tend to sleep through the first several acts does not mean the play begins when the first explosion wakes them up.

Thanks for clarifying your position, I never claimed to be quick on the uptake . Your comments here make sense, but your previous comment about ideology not being the boogey man is not entirely correct in my view, but then it again it depends upon what you mean by that statement. I think ideology can be a subversive tool in a UW campaign that undermines the credibility of the existing government, and therefore it needs to be what? Discredited, neutralized, challenged, whatever, but where I think we'll agree is that the government better have a better system/ideology/narrative, or the subversives using ideology will potentially gain a decisive edge.

Where I suspect we'll disagree is that a challenge to the State must be countered or the State is illegitimate. If the government can and is willing to reform and those reforms can effectively neutralize or co-opt the challengers that would be the ideal approach. As an occupying power rushing to establish a government that is seen as illegitimate by its people is almost guaranteed to be doomed to fail. We removed and then imposed governments upon the people(s) of Iraq and Afghanistan that conformed to our model of what a government should like, and even endorsed them in our minds with questionable elections. As it starts to come apart at seams we're standing by with bags of money and security forces to try to hold it together.

In short we created our own Catch 22, we're damned if we continue to support them, and we think we're damned (politically) if we pull support from them. I think most agree it is the policy wonks that need to get this right up front, and how much influence the military will have on these decisions now or in the future is debatable, but we're professionally obligated to voice an opinion on the matter.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by AmericanPride

I think US strategy in the ME has been relatively stable over the years, with the notable exception of the Iraq invasion (which I will address), and very clear in its intent: maintain close relationships (but not too close) with strategic partners Saudi Arabia, Gulf kingdoms, Egypt, and Israel while sustaining pressure (but not too much pressure) on adversarial governments in Syria, Iran, and formerly Iraq (and to a lesser extent, Libya). We've more or less pushed this strategy to the limit with our current partners, and combined with the misadventure in Iraq and opportunism in Libya, there's not much more that can be done short of another out right war, which we recently learned is not necessarily an American interest.

Partly in agreement but wanted to post a contrary view. At least some of our allies don't see our policy as consistent. Only addressed Saudi here, but obviously Iran, Israel, Egypt and others since a change.

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/1...transcript.pdf

The unprecedented anger and chastising in Washington by Prince Turki Al-Faisal just a couple of days ago at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations – and I was there, and I heard it, and it was carried on many GCC newspapers and in the Arab world. For the first time in years, the dispute and differing with Washington from a GCC perspective is out in the open in a very clear manner. Adjective describing the U.S. policy in the Gulf, in the region and the Middle East in general, like weak, wavering, differing, naïve, unreliable have become the norm.

[Dayuhan]

The unprecedented anger and chastising in Washington by Prince Turki Al-Faisal just a couple of days ago at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations – and I was there, and I heard it, and it was carried on many GCC newspapers and in the Arab world. For the first time in years, the dispute and differing with Washington from a GCC perspective is out in the open in a very clear manner. Adjective describing the U.S. policy in the Gulf, in the region and the Middle East in general, like weak, wavering, differing, naïve, unreliable have become the norm.

Yes, the Saudis et al are upset. When you get to the root of the displeasure, though, it seems to derive largely from the fact that the US is not doing what they want. I don't personally have a problem with that. It's long past high time that the Saudis (and the Israelis, and a few others) figured out that they don't get to dictate US foreign policy and the US is not an attack dog for them to unleash at their whim on those that they dislike.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan--here is the problem currently for the NCA---they make continuous red lines in the sand, which they feel will never happen then the red lines become pink and then white--when they reach white suddenly the NCA has no plan, but has been on record as having one.

I really do pay attention to small comments that come via some good media reporters---the NYTs comments infer that there is no policy ie there is one "do not rock the boat"---have you ever seen that one work before?

One might as well throw a dart at the wall-you get the same decision effect.

Right now we have through a series of policy decisions or non decisions created an image in the population that we have effectively sided with fundamentalists of the Shia variety which if one looks later the ME is mainly Sunni.

Had we pushed Israel extremely hard after the election of Hamas in Gaza to open the borders for growth and fishing off their own coast line---there was a phase when the Israeli security worked extremely well with the PLO security and not much happened but we let that program go down the drain as a confidence building mechanism---we are currently training PLO police in both Jordan and in the West Bank which some say is getting better.

But when a group regardless of who they are wins a relative fair, free, and democratic election and then we shut the borders, cut off the population from economic growth and they virtually live in a prison---what would be your reaction---push back with all possible efforts and so it happened further cycling the violence.

By the way we were the ones that pushed for a fair election thinking the PLO would win---somehow again not realizing the PLO was corrupt and would lose.

If you say that one country cannot go nuclear then be honest with the world and admit there is another country in the ME that is fully nuclear and that in the end they must disarm as well---that will never happen.

Syria---has been at it for now over three years when one counts the demos---we instituted a full embargo on Iran but we cannot institute a full naval blockade on Syria or stymie the air bridge that Iran is using to fly in weapons and fighters?-come on we flew a no fly zone for years over Iraq with all related costs. Cannot do that without clashing with the Iranians and Russians--open the intelligence and let the world see the verified over flights and the Russian weapon ships.

Release verified intelligence on comments made by Iranian RG Generals that they are sending "troops" to fight in Iran---the Syrian anti-Assad groups did pickup 48 of them to include several Generals---release it openly to the world.

Sometimes verified words/pictures in the open world does wonders and is non violent. But we cannot as we have decided that leaking of intelligence is a crime higher than say creating a lasting truce by all parties in the ME.

If one states a red line then hold to it as it sets perceptions in the region ie if I say something I will do it---counts in the eyes of some Arab countries. The Russians seem to have no problems in doing exactly what they say they will do in reference to Syria and Iran.

When giving a press conference---do not stutter into a solution as an afterthought ---especially by a professional politician who is a VN war vet who should have known better---now the Russians feel they are the verified protectors of a state they support and they are not coming off that idea at no time now or in the future--it is their foothole in the Med.

Reinforce the image that weapons moving across the border to Hezbollah have to be stopped with violence if necessary---three attacks have already been carried out why not more if necessary to reinforce the concept and it sends a message.

Refugees---stop playing games with the refugees---the EU is starting to take thousands-ie over 6K to Germany---JUST how many are coming to the US and slowly WHY because every Arab/Christian from the ME is in the eyes of US security a terrorist attacking the "homeland".

Weapons --flood the market with small arms up to 57/106mm RR including mortars and some type of AAA to level the playing field--the anti-Assad groups have taken out the Air Force but are being hurt by copters---risk is that they flow to FF and we still have an AFG/Soviet syndrome ---so it does not happen.

One wins the perception game---currently viewed as that we do not care and will not actively support the anti Assad groups---also a win in the eyes of some Arab countries.

Politically---we are afraid to engage the Islamists why out of fear of AQ---why-- watch the street in the ME where the Islamists after the Spring became overbearing- they were countered by the street and the population decided against them even against the MB---are they still causing problems yes but let the street decide even if it goes against us. Creates the perception we truly believe the street is responsible for their futures.

Why is it we have a redline for chemical weapons but Syrians are being killed now by "barrel bombs" fully documented---not a single comment have you noticed out of the US-why? Perception in the street is that we are split tongued.

I could go on and on--BUT here is the problem and Robert hit it ---with Corporations and religious groups strength inside the US none of the above will occur as it goes against them---you must realize our foreign policy is driven by who has the money and who yells the loudest in front of Congress and who can finance electoral campaigns.

But that is not the problem---perception wise we are now being seen by a number of Sunni Arab countries of being slanted towards Iran and Shia--that is a dangerous view to create. I have seen a large number of media comments since 2012 "that we have a frank and open relationship with the KSA" --there is an old saying that if one repeats the same thing over and over then there is a problem--if that is true then why the frank and open in the media attacks by the Saudis against what they perceive to be mistakes in our policies---frankly they are now a tad p.....ed. at us.

This is where I to a tad differ with Robert---we need both religious wings of Islam to be at least on "friendly" terms with us not one over the other.

I though still do not understand if the US really does understand the Green Crescent theory of Khomeini---he set it into motion and it is the single anchor in the Iranian foreign policy that one can count on as being accurate.

Agree with Robert that Iran is geo important-but we killed any chance in 1979of moving forward with them and regardless of how much we "think" Iran can become "moderate" as long as the RG and the Spiritual leaders are basically fundamentalists nothing will really become moderate---the Iranian population as a whole backs the 1979 move regardless of rather they want western contact or not---they would like on the whole a more secular move but they do not want to ditch the religion that I know of.

Sometimes one has to dance with the "devil" to set into motion changes that one sometimes cannot forecast---but we need to do it in a non violent way and allow the population to continue their Spring whatever direction it goes which really was started under the guise of pan Arab nationalism must be allowed to finally finish the transformation that has stuttered for years---with the messaging we will be at the end of the road still with you regardless of what direction you go in if you want us to be there--we will support the moves with non violent means were possible but we will not get involved-actually we seem to be doing that in Egypt but it was forced on us by their military--it was not our own decision. If one notices the military is clamping down on both sides to restore a sense of security which is what many Egyptians on the street really want right now in order to get economic growth going again.

Will our Corporations and our own religious groups allow that?

Seriously doubt it.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP--you in fact with your comments actually confirmed the NYTs article comments yesterday---that in fact our policy in the ME is "do not rock the boat".

See how in fact no action or ignoring the problems by no reacting is in fact a "do not rock the boat" foreign policy?

Does not take security advisors, contractors, think tanks, or academics to come up with that policy---any number of teenagers/adults do that on a daily basis.

Sometimes we simply are procrastinators waiting to see if the problem resolves itself before we really have to make a decision---do you not agree?

[OUTLAW 09]

AP--example---yesterday it was leaked out by of all people the DoS who openly stated that it might possible to station US troops on the Jordan Valley border in order to drive an Israeli/Palestinian solution.

Now what genius thought that one up?

What was the immediate leak coming out of DoD---you must be out of your mind on that solution set---cost, manpower, we getting shot at all the time for what, what will it bring to the table?

Procrastination--- the mother of all US foreign policy decisions if you ask me---or thrown it up on the wall and see if it sticks---both are doomed to fail.

[Bob's World]

Good discussions. I wish they were being held higher and more formally, but the longest journey...

Crowd sourcing this concept is being very helpful for me as I push this concept upwards at work, and prepare to sit down and write it up in a (hopefully) clear, concise, and persuasive package.

Keep up the great comments.

As to ideology in insurgency and UW - I published a piece here on Swj several years ago. Ideology to the insurgent is like a rife to a soldier. He must have one, but not any particular one. Just find one that works and Charlie Mike

[davidbfpo]

Earlier in the thread mention has been made of the apparent absence of an internal jihadist activity when compared to the size of India's Muslim minority, so Stephen Tankel's latest offering 'Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat' may help understanding. I have not read the paper yet; the summary says:

India faces many well-known challenges, from corruption to environmental degradation. A lesser-noted challenge is domestic militancy. This new study, produced by noted South Asia security expert Stephen Tankel, focuses on the Indian Mujahideen (IM)--a loosely organized indigneous Islamist militant network. IM, Prof. Tankel argues, is "an internal security issue with an external dimension." Its leadership is currently based in Pakistan, but the organization represents a response to Indian domestic failings.

Link:http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publicat...-indian-threat

[AmericanPride]

Outlaw,

American policy is more aptly described as "balance of power" instead of "do not rock the boat". The US has no problems rocking the boat when it suits its interests - Lebanon, Iraq, etc. Cold War competition made this policy more clear since it was aimed at containing and reversing Soviet influence to maintain Gulf security. Dual containment of Iraq and Iran followed, but now with the removal of Hussein and the prospect of a nuclear Iran, the balance of power has shifted once again. Our "traditional" allies (the Saudis, Egyptians, Israelis, et al, but the Saudis the oldest and foremost among them) see these winds changing and I think after years of being our favorites, it's a disappointment (as an understatement) to them that we're not, as Dayuhan puts it, "an attack dog for them to unleash at their whim on those that they dislike". They don't care if we're the lightning rod for resentment in the region; it's not their problem (until it's their problem like the case with Al Qaida).

Though written before the latest Iraq War, my favorite book on the foreign policies of these states (Turkey among them) is The Foreign Policies of Middle East States edited by Hinnebusch and Ehteshami. It looks at the regional interests and international penetration of the region from the perspective of each local actor and it does so without the color of ideology.

The problem for the US isn't perception - as others have noted, that's not going to change any time soon. The real problem is making sure we're on the right side of history as these events unfold. The goal is to gain predictability. Syria conflict, Egyptian revolution, Iraq war, Iranian nuclear program -- all of this makes the region unpredictable and in some cases alters the fundamental drivers of these states (i.e. Iraq War). But otherwise, it's business as usual. An agreement with Iran solves one part and might influence some of the others, so I think a long term accommodation of some kind is inevitable. The alternative is war.

[Bob's World]

AP - "Syria conflict, Egyptian revolution, Iraq war, Iranian nuclear program -- all of this makes the region unpredictable and in some cases alters the fundamental drivers of these states (i.e. Iraq War)."

And yet, all of these events were either totally predictable or actaully caused (Iraq) by us.

Human activity is impossible to predict, but human nature is largely constant. The better we develop our fundamental understanding of the human nature-driven events, such as resistance insurgency and revolutionary insurgency, the better we will deal with the specifics of each event as it occurs, fully flavored by the human behavior of "all the surrounding facts and circumstances" (favorite quote of my brilliant contracts professor in Law School, Professor Holmes) unique to each event.

I see very positive signs in recent strategy decisions, yet feel they are being made by instinct rather than by any comprehensive design. That is a problem for our challengers and our partners and allies in equal measure. We need to explain ourselves.

But before we can effectively explain ourselves, we must first fully grasp a better understanding of the fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction that frustrate us so completely today.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan--here is the problem currently for the NCA---they make continuous red lines in the sand, which they feel will never happen then the red lines become pink and then white--when they reach white suddenly the NCA has no plan, but has been on record as having one.

Fully agree that "red lines" are a terrible idea and accomplish nothing. The only thing dumber than drawing a red line in the first place is walking into a fight with no clear objective, no clear plan, and no viable partner just because somebody crossed the "red line" you should never have drawn in the first place.

I really do pay attention to small comments that come via some good media reporters---the NYTs comments infer that there is no policy ie there is one "do not rock the boat"---have you ever seen that one work before?

What do you mean by "work"? Staying out of fights where we have no vital national interest at stake, no clear and achievable objective, no viable plan and no functional local partner seems a quite reasonable plan to me.

Right now we have through a series of policy decisions or non decisions created an image in the population that we have effectively sided with fundamentalists of the Shia variety which if one looks later the ME is mainly Sunni.

How do you reach that conclusion? How does staying out of the fight constitute taking anyone's side?

Had we pushed Israel extremely hard after the election of Hamas in Gaza to open the borders for growth and fishing off their own coast line---there was a phase when the Israeli security worked extremely well with the PLO security and not much happened but we let that program go down the drain as a confidence building mechanism---we are currently training PLO police in both Jordan and in the West Bank which some say is getting better.

What makes you think the Israelis will do what we say? They aren't exactly famous for following instructions.

By the way we were the ones that pushed for a fair election thinking the PLO would win---somehow again not realizing the PLO was corrupt and would lose.

Yes, that was dumb. Taking sides in ME conflicts usually is, a good reason to do it less often.

If you say that one country cannot go nuclear then be honest with the world and admit there is another country in the ME that is fully nuclear and that in the end they must disarm as well---that will never happen.

Yes, it will never happen. Trying to make things happen that we know won't happen is a poor basis for policy.

Syria---has been at it for now over three years when one counts the demos---we instituted a full embargo on Iran but we cannot institute a full naval blockade on Syria or stymie the air bridge that Iran is using to fly in weapons and fighters?-come on we flew a no fly zone for years over Iraq with all related costs. Cannot do that without clashing with the Iranians and Russians--open the intelligence and let the world see the verified over flights and the Russian weapon ships.

We have not imposed an embargo on Iran. We have imposed sanctions on Iran, a quite different thing. Iran trades freely with many regional and global partners.

Are you proposing a no-fly zone and blockade of Syria? Wouldn't that mean full scale suppression of Syrian air defenses, and probable clashes with Iran, possibly Russia? In short, going to war? For what? For what objective, and with what plan? Why would we want to do that?

Release verified intelligence on comments made by Iranian RG Generals that they are sending "troops" to fight in Iran---the Syrian anti-Assad groups did pickup 48 of them to include several Generals---release it openly to the world.

Anyone who's paying attention has assumed for some time that Iran is sending troops. So what? How does that mean the US should be involved?

Sometimes verified words/pictures in the open world does wonders and is non violent. But we cannot as we have decided that leaking of intelligence is a crime higher than say creating a lasting truce by all parties in the ME.

Creating a lasting truce by all parties in the ME? Surely you jest. Not a snowball's chance in hell of that happening, and a fool's errand to try to make it happen.

If one states a red line then hold to it as it sets perceptions in the region ie if I say something I will do it---counts in the eyes of some Arab countries. The Russians seem to have no problems in doing exactly what they say they will do in reference to Syria and Iran.

The Russians have been a bit more careful about what they say they will do. We should follow their example. As above, dumb to draw red lines, but even dumber to allow yourself to be forced into pointless and counterproductive actions just to back up a red line you should never have drawn in the first place.

Reinforce the image that weapons moving across the border to Hezbollah have to be stopped with violence if necessary---three attacks have already been carried out why not more if necessary to reinforce the concept and it sends a message.

Why should we reinforce that message? How is it our business?

Weapons --flood the market with small arms up to 57/106mm RR including mortars and some type of AAA to level the playing field--the anti-Assad groups have taken out the Air Force but are being hurt by copters---risk is that they flow to FF and we still have an AFG/Soviet syndrome ---so it does not happen.

Flood the market with small arms? Why? What are we trying to accomplish by pouring small arms into an area where we have not one shred of a chance of controlling where those arms end up and at whom they end up pointed?

One wins the perception game---currently viewed as that we do not care and will not actively support the anti Assad groups---also a win in the eyes of some Arab countries.

Then we get perceived as changing our policy to do as the Saudis are telling us to do. How does taking orders from the Saudis improve anyone's perception of us?

Why is it we have a redline for chemical weapons but Syrians are being killed now by "barrel bombs" fully documented---not a single comment have you noticed out of the US-why? Perception in the street is that we are split tongued.

Because Syrians killing Syrians is no more our business than Congolese killing Congolese. We are not the world's cop. It's about time people figured that out.

I could go on and on--BUT here is the problem and Robert hit it ---with Corporations and religious groups strength inside the US none of the above will occur as it goes against them---you must realize our foreign policy is driven by who has the money and who yells the loudest in front of Congress and who can finance electoral campaigns.

I agree that it won't occur, by why do corporations and religious groups have anything to do with it? Why would corporations care? I don't see it happening because there is zero political or popular support for intervention in Syria, because we have no clear, achievable policy objective, we have no vital national interest at stake and no internal partner we can trust. Why would we want to take sides in that fight? What have we to gain?

But that is not the problem---perception wise we are now being seen by a number of Sunni Arab countries of being slanted towards Iran and Shia--that is a dangerous view to create. I have seen a large number of media comments since 2012 "that we have a frank and open relationship with the KSA" --there is an old saying that if one repeats the same thing over and over then there is a problem--if that is true then why the frank and open in the media attacks by the Saudis against what they perceive to be mistakes in our policies---frankly they are now a tad p.....ed. at us.

Yes, they are pissed at us. They are pissed because we are not following their instructions and subordinating our interests to theirs. So what? I see no reason at all to assume that the US is slanting toward Iran. The US is slanted toward non involvement, which is a quite rational policy.

This is where I to a tad differ with Robert---we need both religious wings of Islam to be at least on "friendly" terms with us not one over the other.

Actually we don't "need" that. We might want that, but we can't make it happen. We can and should avoid getting caught up in their fight.

actually we seem to be doing that in Egypt but it was forced on us by their military--it was not our own decision. If one notices the military is clamping down on both sides to restore a sense of security which is what many Egyptians on the street really want right now in order to get economic growth going again.

Will our Corporations and our own religious groups allow that?

Seriously doubt it.

Our corporations and religious groups have zero capacity to allow or disallow anything in Egypt.

I'm still at a total loss as to what you want the US to do in Syria. What's the goal? What plan do you propose for achieving that goal?

[AmericanPride]

And yet, all of these events were either totally predictable or actaully caused (Iraq) by us.

I partially agree. They were predictable in the abstract but not in any way useful for policymaking. And the consequences of their outcomes are even less predictable. Will increased militancy and awareness of the Egyptian population compel the new government to pursue specific goals? Will these goals collide with US interests? If a Syrian peace agreement keeps Assad in power, what will happen to the hardline Islamists? Will they migrate to another country and destabilize it? If there's a permanent agreement with Iran, will that lead to any kind of permanency between Israeli and Saudi cooperation? What would that look like - could it provide an opening to a wider Arab-Israeli peace? That's what I mean by predictability - there are to many questions right now entangled in a deep nexus of complicated questions with no clear answers. That's bad for policy. So the best option for the US under these conditions is to keep its head down.

But before we can effectively explain ourselves, we must first fully grasp a better understanding of the fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction that frustrate us so completely today.

The problem I foresee is that there are substantial differences in perspective regarding the "fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction". Is "occupation by policy" even detrimental to US interests?

[Bob's World]

I partially agree. They were predictable in the abstract but not in any way useful for policymaking. And the consequences of their outcomes are even less predictable. Will increased militancy and awareness of the Egyptian population compel the new government to pursue specific goals? Will these goals collide with US interests? If a Syrian peace agreement keeps Assad in power, what will happen to the hardline Islamists? Will they migrate to another country and destabilize it? If there's a permanent agreement with Iran, will that lead to any kind of permanency between Israeli and Saudi cooperation? What would that look like - could it provide an opening to a wider Arab-Israeli peace? That's what I mean by predictability - there are to many questions right now entangled in a deep nexus of complicated questions with no clear answers. That's bad for policy. So the best option for the US under these conditions is to keep its head down.



The problem I foresee is that there are substantial differences in perspective regarding the "fundamental dynamics behind the many points of friction". Is "occupation by policy" even detrimental to US interests?

The primary thing that is unpredictable is "when"; "to what degree" and "how."
Those are very important tactical criteria, but largely irrelevant to designing and implementing an effective foreign policy.

What was totally predictable was "what" and "why." That is all we really need for good policy. "What will be the likely effect of this policy and why will it have that effect"? "Oh, ok, so how could I avoid that bad effect by taking another approach..."

We need to stop thinking that our feces has no odor; and that we are the good guys in the white hats bringing the rule of law and superior values. That is our own twisted internal narrative that others quite reasonably do not buy into. Once we get over ourselves, we will be far more effective in our interactions with others.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---reference comments concerning American Corporations and religious groups---you must have missed the 60/70s when in just about every demo in the ME in those days we were the "imperialists". Heck even in Europe students demoed against our "imperialist" corporations. What about our oil companies in the ME or for that matter Angola or say Nigeria.

You do not think US corporations would like nothing more than peace and quiet in the ME in order to conduct business.

As for religious groups--check their involvement in Uganda in the Gay issues there or say in Congress in support of Israel or say the fundamentalist Christians who apparently love burning Qurans knowing the impact in the Muslim world, or lastly fundamentalist Christians who identify with Israel due to the Second Coming thesis screaming about our lack of support to Israel---come on Dayuhan wake up a smell the roses.

Now for the following response;

"Yes, they are pissed at us. They are pissed because we are not following their instructions and subordinating our interests to theirs. So what? I see no reason at all to assume that the US is slanting toward Iran. The US is slanted toward non involvement, which is a quite rational policy."

You honestly do not believe we have slanted towards the Shia?---check all available open source reporting from the left, right and center sides of this argument since say 2012.

Secondly, the Saudis are angry because they feel like we are not listening---man I heard that being thrown at me in Iraq by the Iraqi's and guess what they were right we do not know how to listen---why because we think we are always correct.

Listening is not science---it is a black art and we as a country are bad at it.

The Saudi's feel that the US does not understand the danger of Iranian hegemony for the region and they feel that as a Shia country the Green Crescent foreign policy they voice is real and active since Khomeini and a threat to Sunni ME countries.

Lastly they rightly believe we are no longer saying what we mean and or worse say things and then do not follow through.

By the way a valid argument out of Europe these days.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP---here are responses to the following two questions.

"If a Syrian peace agreement keeps Assad in power, what will happen to the hardline Islamists? Will they migrate to another country and destabilize it?"

First of all I am not so sure there will be an agreement with Assad ---as the Saudis have not signaled their attendance---Saudi views Syria as the existential religious fight with Shia and they view Syria as the lynchpin in stopping the Green Crescent expansion as it would split Syria from Lebanon, and isolate Iraq with a Sunni country on either side of it thus ending the Green Crescent.

"Will the fundamentalists (they are not hardline Islamists) migrate"---no as they themselves view the fight as one of stopping Shia expansionism and wanting to setup a fundamentalist Caliphate.

They are having their wings clipped the last couple of days by the other Islamic fighting groups/FSA for their terror against the civilian population.

What I do see is though the effect of the Saudi involvement in the fight---while initially working with Islamists on the ground ie AQ I really think they are behind the Islamic Front and are quietly supporting the FSA as well with weapons and money ---in fact there might be a synergy developing/or already developed between the Jordanian SF who have been training Syrian Sunni fighters and the KSA. Jordan is interesting as they have actually been the only ME country to actually have responded positively to the demands of the Arab Spring and the population has gone quiet.

The fighting against AQ in the north by the FSA and the Islamic Front has shown a professionalism that is new---one can see the handwriting of a paramilitary training coming from somewhere.

Once they cap the fundamentalists then they will turn towards Assad again.

Actually the AQ HQs warned the ISIL that this would in fact occur if they did not rein in their actions against the population.

In some aspects this is the core mistake made in Iraq by the AQI---they forked the insurgency there and lost and now they are forking the Syrian insurgency --they just never seem to take lessons learned to heart.


"If there's a permanent agreement with Iran, will that lead to any kind of permanency between Israeli and Saudi cooperation? "

Actually agree that right now both Israel and the KSA have a joint perspective towards Iran---one of containment for varying reasons.

If you really look at the KSA view towards Israel it has moderated over the years and the DoS is using a peace plan pushed by the Saudis through the Arab League that Israel has to a degree looked at and finds points they could discuss---trying to get the Palestinians to sign on has been an issue for the Saudi's.

Actually what is interesting right now is that both Israel and the KSA simply distrust the US on anything for exactly the same reasons--that has made the two strange bedfellows---will be interesting to see where that one goes long term.

The comments coming out on Israel after the DoS travelled there this weekend on Israeli national radio and local radio were brutal.

The DoS is being viewed as pitching an offer on the take it or leave it basis and if it fails you are own your on internationally---blackmail by a superpower is what they feel it is and it does not answer their long term security concerns.

An accommodation between the two---think about it---Israeli knowhow and Saudi money via investments could drive economic development in the ME in ways we can not think of.

It happened in the past with Israel and Libya.

[OUTLAW 09]

David---read the article- long but actually quiet good---in fact it matches to a degree some of the concepts Robert has been talking about in the last 150 or so responses.

Was wondering when the internal Sunni fundamentalist movement that spun LeT would come back to roost---but the social side of gangs and student support is interesting as it points to a number of strong internal social problems that India is facing-- merging into a fundamentalist approach that seems to be building meaning it has a message that appeals---again due to their own social ills ---not a response to an outside power player.

Robert would say it is all about governance.

A good article to read from a country we do not pay much attention to on the Islamic side.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---if you think we seem to have coherent policies in the US that foreign populations understand check this comment from Congress.

There is an old chess saying that we in the US seem to not understand in policy debates/decisions---"one well placed pawn is worth a king"

Taken from today's WH briefing;

"I've heard members of Congress suggest this, but if members were suggesting that there should be American troops fighting and dying in Fallujah today, they should say so," Carney said during his daily press briefing."

I did not see volunteers from Congress wanting to be the first back into Iraq---but hey talk is cheap.

But I guess if the Shia government needs manpower they could volunteer.

Note---noticed the Iranians have offered "military advice" and supplies against AQ---and who said Iraq is not a part of the Iranian Green Crescent?

Not so sure what an offer of "military advice" is outside of sending troops as "volunteers" as they did in Lebanon and Syria.

What do you think the Saudi response will be to that offer?

More weapons, cash, fighters into Syria or participation in the coming Syria talks-----

And what is our policy towards Syria currently---do not rock the boat and just talk at a meeting that will go nowhere except cement Russian influence in the ME, keep Assad in power and keep the Shia controlling the Green Crescent if the US does not support the anti Assad forces.

I do not for a moment think Assad will give up and walk away from his country and go where---would have to be Iran as he could be hauled in front of the Hague for crimes against humanity.

[Dayuhan]

The primary thing that is unpredictable is "when"; "to what degree" and "how."
Those are very important tactical criteria, but largely irrelevant to designing and implementing an effective foreign policy.

What was totally predictable was "what" and "why." That is all we really need for good policy. "What will be the likely effect of this policy and why will it have that effect"? "Oh, ok, so how could I avoid that bad effect by taking another approach..."

Not sure that's fully true.

When you ask "What will be the likely effect of this policy and why will it have that effect", you have to realize that you may never fully know the effect of your policy, because its effects are not seen in isolation: they are tied in with dozens of other factors and it's often impossible determine the extent to which any given factor affected the end result. I don't think anyone can determine the extent to which US policy in Egypt over the lat few years affected the Arab Spring and subsequent events.

When we deal with autocratic regimes or unstable non-autocratic regimes, we have to deal with the status quo, because it exists. We also have to deal with the possibility that the status quo could change. We can't make any specific preparation for that change, because we have no idea when or how it will occur. We don't want to get overly committed to these regimes, because we know they could change, but we also don't want to try to intrude and start the process of change, because we can't control it and starting it prematurely can have all manner of unintended outcomes. Essentially all that leaves us with is a policy of dealing with the regime to the extent we must, and dealing with change as it happens, on the basis of how and when it occurs. That may or may not be "good policy", but what are the better options?

In light of this comment:

What was totally predictable was "what" and "why." That is all we really need for good policy.

What would you consider to be "good policy" toward, say, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States?

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---reference comments concerning American Corporations and religious groups---you must have missed the 60/70s when in just about every demo in the ME in those days we were the "imperialists". Heck even in Europe students demoed against our "imperialist" corporations. What about our oil companies in the ME or for that matter Angola or say Nigeria.

I'm well aware of what happened 40-50 years ago. I'm also well aware that times have changed. Oil companies are not calling the political shots in the Middle East. They have some infulence on US policy, little or none on that of the local players.

You do not think US corporations would like nothing more than peace and quiet in the ME in order to conduct business.

Of course they would like it. Neither they nor the US government have even the slightest capacity to achieve that outcome, so it's pretty much a moot point.

As for religious groups--check their involvement in Uganda in the Gay issues there or say in Congress in support of Israel or say the fundamentalist Christians who apparently love burning Qurans knowing the impact in the Muslim world, or lastly fundamentalist Christians who identify with Israel due to the Second Coming thesis screaming about our lack of support to Israel---come on Dayuhan wake up a smell the roses.

Yes, they are annoying. No, they are not a major or even significant influence on most policies in the Middle Est. They are one among several factors driving the traditionally rather reflexive S subservience to Israel, but on issues like the Syrian situation or the broader Sunnai/Shia conflict, not a factor.

You honestly do not believe we have slanted towards the Shia?---check all available open source reporting from the left, right and center sides of this argument since say 2012.

No, we have not "slanted toward the Shi'a". We have slanted toward non-involvement in a conflict in which we have no vital interest involved nd very little chance of achieving a positive outcome. We have slanted away from supporting a faction of the Sunni side that would almost certainly use our support against us. Slanting toward neutrality is not slanting toward the Shi'a. Declining to serve as enforcers for the Saudis is not "slanting toward the Shi'a".

A claim that we are slanting toward the Shi'a side requires support from specific supporting evidence and reasoning, not a generic "check the open source reporting".

Secondly, the Saudis are angry because they feel like we are not listening---man I heard that being thrown at me in Iraq by the Iraqi's and guess what they were right we do not know how to listen---why because we think we are always correct.

No, the Saudis are angry because we are not obeying, a very different thing. We have listened, and they know it. We have declined to comply with their wishes, and they know that too. They don't like it, but these are indeed tough bananas: there is no earthly reason why the US should go to war in support of Saudi objectives.

The Saudis want the US to remove Assad and suppress Iran. We don't want to, for innumerable and excellent reasons. Should we do as we desire, or do as they desire us to do? Going to war against one's own interests on someone else's behalf because we are afraid they will think we weren't listening seems to me a departure forom the path of wisdom, to put it mildly.

The Saudi's feel that the US does not understand the danger of Iranian hegemony for the region and they feel that as a Shia country the Green Crescent foreign policy they voice is real and active since Khomeini and a threat to Sunni ME countries.

Yes, and they want us to protect them by proactively removing or weakening their potential antagonists. They want us to enter a war that we have no interest in entering to achieve their policy objectives. The Saudis can believe whatever they damn well please, the US us under no obligation to act on their beliefs.

Lastly they rightly believe we are no longer saying what we mean and or worse say things and then do not follow through.

That's always been our habit. Unfortunately our politicians love talking tough and sending big messages. All too often when push comes to shove it becomes clear that acting on those messages would cause more harm than good. The solution to that problem is not to act out the messages and do stupid things, the solution is for our politicians to learn to zip it up (which of course will never happen). If you can't swim, and boat that you will swim across a river, and someone calls your bluff... do you jump in and drown to avoid backing down?

I'm still missing a point here: what exactly do you think we should do in Syria, and why?