"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert in his comments on the use of SF in the future meaning the building of informal face to face relationship building is and will be the way forward in the coming years vs say the state to state types of meetings/training/exchanges.

By the way the face to face can actually change US policy if the SF UW team on the ground is good at what they do during the relationship building phase.

The following is an example of a early 70s SF UW team;

The entire team had been either just coming from or recently returned VN, Thailand vets from the CIDG or MACV-SOG programs. Many had been wounded a number of times and it was one of the highest decorated SF teams in Germany. The ten man team had the ability to cover five European languages fluently.

Educational backgrounds and military years of service extremely varied-most eventually retired out of SF and the others went back to college ---one was a MOH recipient.

Now comes the interesting part---most of the bloggers here would be advised to go back into history and read in detail the development of Greece from 1954 until the coup of 1967 and especially a Greek army unit called the Hellenic Raiding Force.

Now the shift to what Robert is inferring to--the team receives the mission to train selected Greek officers and senior NCOs of the HRF first in Germany and then in Greece---on the surface a typical FID but there were other players involved that set another set of mission requirements.

When the team received the second set of instructions it did not sit well with the team which actually after a long intensive internal debate refused the mission set as it did not match what they had fought for in a long number of years but which were the national level interests at that particular time in space. The team refused the mission via their chain to conduct the mission and since the mission was tailored to them the chain listened---there was no heated debates just a solid exchange of reasons the team felt the national level was not aware of the impact on the population and Greek military side especially in 1970 inside Greece. By the way this was not the first encounter by the team with the HRF.

And especially an island called Cyprus in 1970 where the HRF had been/was active and that was unknown to the national level tasker but it was known to the SF UW team from previous encounters with them.

The provider of the second set of requirements was then forced to redo their requirements to match the teams beliefs of what should occur based on the SF values of what they had been trained in on the UW side and off the team went---everyone was happy except those that provided the second mission set requirements.

Six month mission was successfully completed based on the UW teams requirements---now check history and see what Greek unit made the initial move to remove the COLs and returned to the population their country which was the same unit that triggered the shift to the COLs in 1967.

It is really all about perceptions and the values established by a SF team at the informal face to face phase of a relationship. There are sometimes minor victories at the informal level that trigger historical events down the road especially when it is based on personal one on one encounters that are previously established. It is amazing what occurs during these personal encounters that can effect history and the cost is literally nothing to the national level.

This is I think where SF wants to head but it requires a SF leadership that sets that tone in UW training and it takes SF teams that are willing to voice their SF values when a mission set comes down that goes counter to their training and values.

It also requires a national level decision maker to understand that every move they make whiplashes the intended population in ways sometimes no one thinks about---so all decisions at this level must have a COA phase that discusses this. Check the current European populations view of the US/NSA since the release of their activities here in Europe---the lowest view of the US is held currently at a level that is scary-- even Russia is being viewed as more trustworthy.

This is where we have gone so wrong with Islamic fundamentalism and AQ.

We have based on our national polices actually driven one and created the other.

BUT who is going to carry that message to a divided US public and political body at large that would declare the messenger to be a traitor.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---would you not agree that the interests of the Saudis now match those of AQ in Syria---namely confronting Shia fundamentalism in the name of Shia containment? Really reread the Sept 2013 AQ General Guidance to the Jihad and AQs references to the "near enemy".

Second question would be --if true then what drove that merging of interests?

Third question would be if in fact they have merged their short term interests-and both being of a fundamentalist Sunni direction (one Salaist- one Wahhabist) has AQ pulled a 180 turn and is now not viewing SA as the "near enemy" as they did under UBL?

Combat against a perceived common "near enemy" does make strange bedfellows that can have long term impacts that we in the US have not yet fully understood while we tap dance in our Syrian policies.

Lastly what will be the perception impact on the greater Arab population be if both AQ and the Saudi in fact stopped Assad in Syria and the US and Europe just stood by while thousands of Arabs were killed and wounded and millions forced to flee Syria?

That is the inherent question that you side step.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---would you not agree that the interests of the Saudis now match those of AQ in Syria---namely confronting Shia fundamentalism in the name of Shia containment? enemy".

Agreed

Second question would be --if true then what drove that merging of interests?

Mutual dislike for/fear of both Iran specifically and the Shi'a generically.

Third question would be if in fact they have merged their short term interests-and both being of a fundamentalist Sunni direction (one Salaist- one Wahhabist) has AQ pulled a 180 turn and is now not viewing SA as the "near enemy" as they did under UBL?

I think both SA andf AQ still view each other as enemies, but as enemies with whom they are willing to cooperate if it seems expedient. I don't think the Saudis are all that displeased to see AQ (and allied movement) resources and attention poured into Syria, rather than into the Arabian Peninsula.

Combat against a perceived common "near enemy" does make strange bedfellows that can have long term impacts that we in the US have not yet fully understood while we tap dance in our Syrian policies.

Absolutely.

Lastly what will be the perception impact on the greater Arab population be if both AQ and the Saudi in fact stopped Assad in Syria and the US and Europe just stood by while thousands of Arabs were killed and wounded and millions forced to flee Syria?

That is the inherent question that you side step.

Hasn't really come up on this thread.

First, in terms of "the perception impact on the greater Arab population", I think direct involvement in Syria would be a huge mistake. One of the few things that street agrees on is that they don't want the US or "the west" meddling in regional affairs. Even if "the west" did in fact improve things for Syrian Muslims (a huge "if"), I doubt that they'd give any more credit than they did for protecting Bosnian Muslims. The assumption will always be that intervention was in pursuit of some ulterior motive, not to protect the populace. No matter what positive spin we try to put on it, the image of US armor rolling down Arab streets raises a very predictable and very negative reaction among the greater Arab population. That reaction may not be logical or justifiable, but it's still predictable. Any US intervention in the region, even if we say it's totally altruistic and even if we really believe it's totally altruistic (including any attempt to mediate between the Saudi government and populace) will be interpreted locally as a self-serving effort to advance our own interests. They don't trust us. Can't imagine why.

Wading into a mess we can't resolve because we don't want someone else to get credit for resolving it would seem to me to be pursuit of policy contrary to self-interest.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---interesting comment from you;

"Muslims are also persecuted in many places... parts of Russia, western China, Burma, southern Thailand, southern Philippines. How would we change that short of something stronger than talk, if it can be changed at all? And again, why would we try?"

With what about 3B Muslims world wide---and having read AQs recent General Guidance to Jihad what if the US policies message the reinforcing of our interests in that population being fairly treated ---not through force but by all available other non violent methods.

Then how does AQ handle that ie the US is now strongly interested in those populations --not forcing our value systems on them but allowing those populations to decide for themselves where they want to go even if it goes against our initial political instincts.

IE just what was our response to the Arab Springs? Initially confusion, then standoff, then we tried to engage insisting on democratic development---instead of providing flanking support and allowing the effected population to decide on their own which direction they want to go and with the US signally OK maybe it is not in our interests but it is your interests so we will go with it.

Just what then is AQs messaging--are we then the "near enemy" or is the governance that is not responding to their population really now the "near enemy" as alluded to in the AQ Guidance as we have to a degree identified with the populations own desires and drives regardless of where it goes?

But we will never get to that point as we have locked ourselves into our former Cold War mindsets and view AQ and Sunni/Shia fundamentalism as also equal to Communism-therefore the old domino theory has arisen again.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan--this comment goes to the heart of our policy failures in the ME---it is all about how we are perceived nothing more nothing else---how does the common man in the population view us.

Right now not much higher than say the top side of a buried grain of sand.

"Wading into a mess we can't resolve because we don't want someone else to get credit for resolving it would seem to me to be pursuit of policy contrary to self-interest."

Yes we could have waded into Syria but in fact we cannot as we are trying to gain a settlement with Iran which we nationally right now view of higher importance that the thousands being killed in Syria or the Sunni/Shia death fight.

We let others take Syria as we as a country really do not want to conduct a war with Iran where there are no winners only losers.

Confronting the Shia in Syria would have killed any chances of an agreement with Iran for the next ten or so years and Iran would have gone faster nuclear and the Israelis would have gone to war so Syria civilian deaths while brutal are not in our national interests and this is the messaging that AQ throws at us in the ME---and our actions just reinforce that message.

But to the Arab population as a whole the killing does in fact matter and how we respond to Syria is determining what influence or no influence we will have going forward in the ME and it is definitely impacting the Saudi's who say the least are p_____ed at us is an understatement.

[Bob's World]

BG Wendt wrote at article that goes to one way SOF can more effectively develop understanding, influence and relationships than solely through traditional vehicles, such as training with partners, traditional Embassy positions, or emersion language training.

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archiv...nnProgram.html

This is not about spying on people or working to develop covert networks, this is simply about being in critical places (a fusion of geostrategy and vital interests), living among the equally critical populations who live in those places, and having trusted relationships with appropriate military partners as well. This means stop chasing the threat of the day and going where the J2 says "the threat" is; this means not working to simply help some government stay in power by helping them through capacity building and CT to keep their own population in check; this means applying a strategic perspective that takes a long view so that we are already there and aware long before a threat to interests ever develops.

As to the types of perceptions that create conditions of insurgency among a population, these are subjective and tend to develop over time; and can grow to very high levels (as Arab Spring demonstrates) and remain latent for years before some event or leader sparks the people to move. Or when the people simply overcome their fear of their government. This is nuance and cannot be measured with ruler. Many states, like the KSA, look extremely stable, but in fact are quite brittle. Like the Titanic, a state can appear "unsinkable," but hidden flaws and poor leadership can quickly lead to a catastrophic event.

There are many subtle signals coming out of the ME; and increasingly out of Europe, China and other places as well. Poor governance and conditions of insurgency are widespread. When these conditions are merely revolutionary (internal) in nature it is of little consequence to the US unless it threatens some critical location where our interests manifest. But when the conditions are of a resistance nature cause by the impact of US policy we need to be extremely aware, as this is what drives transnational terrorism against us. When it is a fusion of both, and we work to protect the government that is at odds with its population (as is typically the case for out intel-driven operations today), it is the worst case, and this is why strategically we are moving in the opposite direction our tactics are intended to take us.

[Dayuhan]

But when the conditions are of a resistance nature cause by the impact of US policy we need to be extremely aware, as this is what drives transnational terrorism against us. When it is a fusion of both, and we work to protect the government that is at odds with its population (as is typically the case for out intel-driven operations today), it is the worst case, and this is why strategically we are moving in the opposite direction our tactics are intended to take us.

We need to very careful about any assumption that any situation is caused by US policy. US policy is often one of many interactive causes, but it is almost never "the cause" of anything. Overrating the causative impact of US policy can lead us to overrate the curative impact of a US policy change, or lead us to assume a control that we do not actually have.

Perhaps the worst mistake we can make is thinking that problems exacerbated by our meddling in the past can be alleviated by meddling again: that we can effectively counter-meddle, or undo bad meddling with good meddling. That just gets us deeper into the mess.

Casting the causation of modern radical Islam and the terrorism some factions of it have embraced purely in terms of populace-government dynamics is dangerously simplistic. Assuming that it was caused by US policy and therefore can be uncaused by US policy is equally simplistic and equally dangerous, assuming a power that we do not actually have. Government-populace dynamics in the Muslim world (and elsewhere) are complex and often tense, but they are not something we can play any meaningful role in resolving. Even in cases where we have distorted those relationships in the past, we cannot meddle again to try to un-distort them; if we try we just distort them more.

I feel that at times you're trying to force ground circumstances into the model, rather than adjusting the model to fit ground circumstances.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

We'll just have to agree to disagree.

There is a far cry from "simple" to "simplistic.". A P38 C-ration can opener is simple, beating a can open with a rock is simplistic.

Ideology has been made the great Bogeyman, along with simplistic statements like "they hate us for our freedom." History of such conflicts and the facts of the current ones simply don't support this.

"They" hate that we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable, and no effective legal means exist to gain such changes. Or at least this is often perceived to be true. Reality is irrelevant, as is our own perceptions of ourselves. It is the perceptions of the people in question that rules.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---interesting comment from you;

"Muslims are also persecuted in many places... parts of Russia, western China, Burma, southern Thailand, southern Philippines. How would we change that short of something stronger than talk, if it can be changed at all? And again, why would we try?"

With what about 3B Muslims world wide---and having read AQs recent General Guidance to Jihad what if the US policies message the reinforcing of our interests in that population being fairly treated ---not through force but by all available other non violent methods.

Then how does AQ handle that ie the US is now strongly interested in those populations --not forcing our value systems on them but allowing those populations to decide for themselves where they want to go even if it goes against our initial political instincts.

I expect that the nations involved would tell us to piss off, mind our own business, and stay out of their internal affairs, and that AQ's message would be "they talk, we act".

IE just what was our response to the Arab Springs? Initially confusion, then standoff, then we tried to engage insisting on democratic development---instead of providing flanking support and allowing the effected population to decide on their own which direction they want to go and with the US signally OK maybe it is not in our interests but it is your interests so we will go with it.

Just what then is AQs messaging--are we then the "near enemy" or is the governance that is not responding to their population really now the "near enemy" as alluded to in the AQ Guidance as we have to a degree identified with the populations own desires and drives regardless of where it goes?

But we will never get to that point as we have locked ourselves into our former Cold War mindsets and view AQ and Sunni/Shia fundamentalism as also equal to Communism-therefore the old domino theory has arisen again.

I don't think the US tried all that hard to impose direction on the Arab Spring revolutions, nor do I think the overall outcome was unduly influenced by the US. Of course these nations will be unstable and in flux for many years to come, but that's the nature of transition out of extended dictatorship. Quite pointless to think that instability is an outcome of American action or inaction.

I do not believe that the US can undo AQs messaging by trying to supplant AQ as defenders of Muslims. That just leads to more meddling, and it will snap back on us. If we suffer the consequences of ill advised meddling in the past, the solution is not counter-meddling: we can't undo bad meddling with good meddling. We can undercut AQs message by meddling less, and by meddling more discreetly when we must meddle.

We need to understand that we will not win points with Muslim populaces by criticizing their governments. It's a hard quirk for many Americans to understand, but in much of the world even people who hate their government will rally behind it if it is criticized by a foreign power, especially if that foreign power is the US.

Dayuhan--this comment goes to the heart of our policy failures in the ME---it is all about how we are perceived nothing more nothing else---how does the common man in the population view us.

Right now not much higher than say the top side of a buried grain of sand.

"Wading into a mess we can't resolve because we don't want someone else to get credit for resolving it would seem to me to be pursuit of policy contrary to self-interest."

Yes we could have waded into Syria but in fact we cannot as we are trying to gain a settlement with Iran which we nationally right now view of higher importance that the thousands being killed in Syria or the Sunni/Shia death fight.

We let others take Syria as we as a country really do not want to conduct a war with Iran where there are no winners only losers.

That's one of many reasons we don't want to get involved in Syria.

Confronting the Shia in Syria would have killed any chances of an agreement with Iran for the next ten or so years and Iran would have gone faster nuclear and the Israelis would have gone to war so Syria civilian deaths while brutal are not in our national interests and this is the messaging that AQ throws at us in the ME---and our actions just reinforce that message.

If we do get overtly involved in Syria, that would reinforce AQs message even more. Regardless of our intention, it would be perceived as American intrusion in a Muslim nation in pursuit of presumably nefarious American objectives. We can message til we're blue in the face, the Arab Street will not believe that we are acting to protect Syrians. I don't think most Americans would believe it.

But to the Arab population as a whole the killing does in fact matter and how we respond to Syria is determining what influence or no influence we will have going forward in the ME and it is definitely impacting the Saudi's who say the least are p_____ed at us is an understatement.

Certainly it matters, but that doesn't mean they expect the US to do anything about it. It's one of those "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situations: if we stay out we're accused of standing by and watching Muslims die, if we go in we're accused of meddling for our own devious purposes. Given that there is zero domestic support for involvement, the chances of a favorable outcome look very small, there's a serious lack of credible partners to support, and very high quagmire potential, it's hard to craft a persuasive case for involvement.

[Bill Moore]

Robert in his comments on the use of SF in the future meaning the building of informal face to face relationship building is and will be the way forward in the coming years vs say the state to state types of meetings/training/exchanges.

By the way the face to face can actually change US policy if the SF UW team on the ground is good at what they do during the relationship building phase.

The following is an example of a early 70s SF UW team;

The entire team had been either just coming from or recently returned VN, Thailand vets from the CIDG or MACV-SOG programs. Many had been wounded a number of times and it was one of the highest decorated SF teams in Germany. The ten man team had the ability to cover five European languages fluently.

Educational backgrounds and military years of service extremely varied-most eventually retired out of SF and the others went back to college ---one was a MOH recipient.

Now comes the interesting part---most of the bloggers here would be advised to go back into history and read in detail the development of Greece from 1954 until the coup of 1967 and especially a Greek army unit called the Hellenic Raiding Force.

Now the shift to what Robert is inferring to--the team receives the mission to train selected Greek officers and senior NCOs of the HRF first in Germany and then in Greece---on the surface a typical FID but there were other players involved that set another set of mission requirements.

When the team received the second set of instructions it did not sit well with the team which actually after a long intensive internal debate refused the mission set as it did not match what they had fought for in a long number of years but which were the national level interests at that particular time in space. The team refused the mission via their chain to conduct the mission and since the mission was tailored to them the chain listened---there was no heated debates just a solid exchange of reasons the team felt the national level was not aware of the impact on the population and Greek military side especially in 1970 inside Greece. By the way this was not the first encounter by the team with the HRF.

And especially an island called Cyprus in 1970 where the HRF had been/was active and that was unknown to the national level tasker but it was known to the SF UW team from previous encounters with them.

The provider of the second set of requirements was then forced to redo their requirements to match the teams beliefs of what should occur based on the SF values of what they had been trained in on the UW side and off the team went---everyone was happy except those that provided the second mission set requirements.

Six month mission was successfully completed based on the UW teams requirements---now check history and see what Greek unit made the initial move to remove the COLs and returned to the population their country which was the same unit that triggered the shift to the COLs in 1967.

It is really all about perceptions and the values established by a SF team at the informal face to face phase of a relationship. There are sometimes minor victories at the informal level that trigger historical events down the road especially when it is based on personal one on one encounters that are previously established. It is amazing what occurs during these personal encounters that can effect history and the cost is literally nothing to the national level.

This is I think where SF wants to head but it requires a SF leadership that sets that tone in UW training and it takes SF teams that are willing to voice their SF values when a mission set comes down that goes counter to their training and values.

It also requires a national level decision maker to understand that every move they make whiplashes the intended population in ways sometimes no one thinks about---so all decisions at this level must have a COA phase that discusses this. Check the current European populations view of the US/NSA since the release of their activities here in Europe---the lowest view of the US is held currently at a level that is scary-- even Russia is being viewed as more trustworthy.

This is where we have gone so wrong with Islamic fundamentalism and AQ.

We have based on our national polices actually driven one and created the other.

BUT who is going to carry that message to a divided US public and political body at large that would declare the messenger to be a traitor.

I both agree and remain strongly critical of your proposals based on my personal experience and study of history. BG Wendt's proposal for what used to be called the Global Scout is workable only if those individuals are empowered by our bureaucracy. This approach could and has worked when these individuals were empowered and could bypass the bureaucracy and speak truth to power. That has happened, but more often than not it didn't and couldn't, so to base a strategic approach is an approach built on a house of cards.

Some examples include OSS members at the end of WWII who understood the situation on the ground based on their relationships with the people, yet their insights were completely discarded by the bureaucrats who blindly embraced dumb policies and marginalized anyone (included the experts on the ground) who disagreed with them.

Currently reading another book on Lansdale, and he stated the only reason he was successful in the Philippines was because he could bypass the bureaucrats in State and Defense and shape the situation. They hated him for it, and did everything they could to undermine his efforts, to include the JUSMAAG Chief blowing his cover (he was relieved, but the damage was still done).

In Vietnam, he was unable to do this, and he had deep concerns about our policies there, but he was silenced by McNamara, a number of senior officers, and State.

Bureaucracies over time increasingly centralize power over time, so this situation will only get worse. Having recently left the ranks of SF, I was sickened by the officer centric nature of the force when I did leave and it continues today. The bureaucracy has created the perception that only officers are qualified to work with country teams or develop important relationships with host nation personnel. We have effectively marginalized the most talented 90% of our force, who throughout its relatively short history have moved mountains in Africa, SE Asia, and Papa New Guinea at a minimum. Unlike our system where most tend to assess people based on their titles and rank instead of their individual strengths and weaknesses, people outside the bureaucracy will recognize talent and character. I don't give a crap about what you wear on your collar, or if you were appointed as an Ambassador.

How can we fight population-centric conflicts effectively, when we're arrogantly focused on determining who is the most appropriate person for a position based on rank and his/her ability to conform to the bureaucracy?

I hear what you and Bob are saying, and I don't want to quit focusing on "what can be" by getting excessively tied to "what is,", but at the same time we have to understand our system to know what is feasible. Lots of things need to change to make these proposals work.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

No argument. But the longest journey begins with the first step, right? Step one is stepping back from what really isn't working and exploring what might work better. This thread is just an effort to take a step or two.

Too many think the answer is just to just work harder and faster at what we've been doing; or to be more aggressive in attacking Islamist ideology; or to go more aggressively after governments who have interests that do not support our own (just as our do not support theirs...).

For all of design's flaws, step one is to reexamine the problem. I think we've defined the problem in terms that are excessive symptomatic and in ways that avoid any hard examination of our own causal role or how we might advance our interests more effectively in ways that are less expensive or provocative than the ways we apply today.

I worked for a Marine Brigadier Deputy G3 at PACOM who would routinely "motivate" the troops after we'd been slaving on some problem for days by reminding us "congratulations, we are at step 3 of a 100 step process."

You and I both know "too hard" is never a reason not to try, or we'd be in very different places right now than we currently are.

[Bill Moore]

Concur, just expressing my frustration with the system for the first time this year. We will still continue to slave away in hopes of achieving big changes, but will be happy with small victories when we achieve them. If you go back to work tomorrow you'll find something in your inbox I have been slaving away on the past days that actually, if approved, will be a framework for moving in this direction.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert/Bill---what I say in the next might inflame SF but here goes anyway as I think that is where SF has gone wrong in an attempt to overcome that Army's intense dislike of SF coming out of VN.

In the days of 50/60/early 70s officers assigned to SF A, B, C teams were always volunteers as the crossed arrows for them did not exist.

The result was that the officers came and went but the NCO structure remained in place---WOs were also an unknown item.

What the result was that we got some great, some good and some not so good officers assigned to us-but the team suffered through it knowing they were go at some point so they made the best of it--the shift to the crossed arrows came when the argument was raised that officers would not volunteer for SF as it 1) effected their promotions and future careers, 2) it actually did kill careers as big Army still did not like SF.

If one looks at how that model turned out then today this is what SF has---as the officer raises within the crossed arrows there are becoming virtually no more places for them to be naturally assigned to corresponding to their rank requirements for the next promotion and now SF has a jam at the MAJ and LTC levels causing say a MAJ who gets assigned to a position at the International Center in Germany and who makes LTC to then slide left to an embassy position in a country where he speaks the language and then slides left again to say a SOF higher staff position in order to reach 20 years.

So really you still only have young officers up through CAPT and then they are on the hunt for promotion positions in that 20 yr hunt.

So SF shifted---and installed officers and WOs into the teams taking away what had been a solid NCO core who remained for years a lot of the time in the same teams.

In my case it was the core NCOs that moved a second tasker to rethink--not the officers who were just assigned for 2 yrs and who moved on.

It was the NCOs that set into motion a movement within the HRF that came to fruition ---ie moving a really rightwing unit to a moderate force that led in the rebalancing of a mistake---it took massive efforts on the part of that team and teams coming in behind us ---it was NCOs that made the difference, not staffs or officers. But we pulled it off and in the process forced the national level to rethink their policies.

I think this is where Robert is going in his thoughts.

If SF really wants to rethink and reset after 12 yrs of war then they need to start with the crossed arrows problem set that is in fact gumming up the works not helping.

Maybe a policy of yes you can served X number of officer years within SF under the crossed arrows but at some point you have to get into the real world and perform in the real world and then maybe in X number of years come back to the force in more senior positions.

This would in effect do what a number of PME courses tries to do---integrate SF into the GPF and provide a better understanding within the GPF of SF.

Try selling that right now to the crossed arrows.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan--this is an interesting comment;

"The contention that "we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable" remains unsupported."


Take this sentence and then as an exercise read all the major US newspaper headlines right after the Arab Spring erupted in each Arab country---immediate talk of "democracy breaking out, free elections, rights for women, radical Islam being defeated, personal freedom and democratic values, etc---the list could go on and on.

So at the national level we transported our values into the Spring ---did we for a single moment stop as ask if that is what the population wanted that was in the streets?---no we did not and when the Spring took a turn we did not like---check out then the newspaper headlines.

This is where Robert is heading.

Take Iran right now---there was a really interesting article in a leading German newspaper a week or so ago in German indicating that yes fundamentalism is being reinforced every day in Iran but that is not where the young population is headed--ie they tolerate the fundamentalism because in their private lives out of sight of the Revolutionary Guards they drink, party to the latest music and purchase ten times the amount of cosmetics than during the Shah days-by the way cosmetics sales in Saudi are sky high and the young Iranians in the face of all of this are actually favorable towards the US

By the way the article was not picked up by any newspaper outside of Germany. Ever wonder why?

BUT here is the difference---they would never turn back the revolution, and they firmly believe Iran has a nuclear right, are practicing Shia and blame the US for the economical problems inside Iran.

They do though believe in secularism not fundamentalism---big difference.

So what has been our position towards Iran?

This is what Robert is alluding to---do our actions which we view from our side to be correct actually cause more problems especially if those actions are not being viewed the same way by the target population? Historically speaking and even today the answer is yes.

I keep repeating as it is true our national policies are in fact driving fundamentalism on both sides of Islam and we are delivering to AQ everyday messaging that is being used against us within the target population.

Especially in the worldwide Sunni populations---this includes the worldwide Shia populations as well.

[Bob's World]

First, I want to thank everyone who has weighed in on this thread to date, your comments have been well- considered and thoughtful, regardless of where your personal analysis led you to fall on the topic.

Often our greatest advances as humans appeared simplistic when first introduced. My thoughts are a multi-year reduction process from many diverse and complex concepts and events down to where I am now. That does not make me right, I could be as wrong headed as our current concepts, doctrine and approaches to these challenges. It is an effort to get to a fundamental understanding, and to express it in simple terms.

Often that can be perceived as "simplistic."

Simplistic is watching cable news and reading blogs all day; marinating that in one's own personal biases and then announcing some theory. That could produce the right answer, like monkeys typing, but that is not how I got here.

Nor did I get here doing lengthy research in some University office, spiced with a handful of field trips to various theaters.

Mine is a mix of research, study and continuous practice. That does not make my perspective right, but it does make it not "simplistic."

[Dayuhan]

Simplistic is watching cable news and reading blogs all day; marinating that in one's own personal biases and then announcing some theory. That could produce the right answer, like monkeys typing, but that is not how I got here.

Nor did I get here doing lengthy research in some University office, spiced with a handful of field trips to various theaters.

Mine is a mix of research, study and continuous practice. That does not make my perspective right, but it does make it not "simplistic."

There are many ways to be simplistic. Excessive attachment to a single model is one of them.

I think your model does have substantial relevance to many insurgencies. It provides, for example, an excellent lens for focusing understanding of the drivers of insurgency in the Philippines. It would apply as well to southern Thailand, and I suspect to the ongoing insurgencies in India, and many others.

I think it's less relevant to insurgencies driven primarily by ethnic, sectarian, an similar us/them grievances, particularly where the parties involved are not prepared to accept the possibility of inclusive settlement. When "good governance" means "governance by us" and "bad governance" means "governance by them", it's hard to find a recipe for good governance that will please both parties.

I do think you're inclined to go a bit astray in taking the model from a device for understanding to a device for action. I think you consistently overrate the influence the US can bring to bear on governance/populace relations in other countries, and consistently underrate the extent to which both governments and populaces will resent and resist any American attempt to intervene in their relations, no matter how well intentioned. For example again, while your model is an excellent device for the American who wishes to understand Philippine insurgencies, an American who decided to take it to the next step and try to help resolve those insurgencies by influencing government/populace relations would accomplish nothing and create a significant mess.

Extending this model to accommodate an actor like AQ, which is neither an insurgency nor populace-based, is quite a stretch. The assumption that AQ draws its primary impetus from a popular desire to change or reform governance in their own countries remains, IMO, unsupported, questionable, and not fully compatible with visible evidence.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---for the want of beating a dead horse five tines over---here goes just two examples of what I and Robert might agree on.

1. Let's take Iran which is the most pressing national policy point right now---now take yourself on a backwards journey to the beginnings at least for me of the Iranian problem---1953 with the CIA's overthrow of a "democratically elected president".

Understand fully why we at the national level condoned the coup ie Soviet containment---all Cold War thinking.

Now jump forward to the 1979 overthrow of the Shah which really was just a continuation of unfinished business from 1953.

What was our public and private responses to the overthrow then?

Now take time to really study the SAVAK-trained by, paid for,sometimes led by and controlled by the CIA and the role it played from in Iran 1953 to 1979.
More critically the role played by SAVAK against Iranian dissidents in say Germany during that period.

Jump to the Beirut US Embassy bombing which actually only targeted the CIA---strong rumors that it was a payback by the KGB for the CIA's turning over to the Iranians a list of all Iranian Communists-who were then either killed, imprisoned or fled the country by the Revolutionary Guards.

Now jump forward to 2013 and how do we respond to the Iranian nuclear drive? Now really take time to study the hypocritical views of the US in that you Iran cannot have a nuclear program but yes you Israel can not only have nuclear power you can in fact have nuclear weapons.

How is it possible that Israeli nuclear weapons are such a "well kept secret" that everyone in the ME knows exists, but we at the national level still deny?

2. Now the second example of our national policies and how they effect the target population-Hamas and Gaza.

Was it not Bush that pushed for "democratically open, free and observed public elections" in Gaza? Yes and they were open, public, free,--- from the multinational observers on the ground relatively fair for/by ME standards.

Why/How did the national policy makers really believe the PLO would win?---just where were they in their thoughts as everyone in Gaza knew how corrupted the PLO was and still is.

Hamas now wins in an "democratically open, public, free, and fair election" and then what was our national level policy response to that election through to today? We should have at the national level been overjoyed as is it not the same values we keep repeating over and over to the world as examples of "democracy"?

In the Gaza population the US polices as perceived by them definitely are not winning us friends in that region.

If you still cannot see the connections then I guess we can beat the dead horse six times with other examples.

This is where Robert is coming from.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---your comments on simplistic are interesting---the core problem I have with the national policy making since the days I began a long walk through the dark UW world colored by the Cold War and continued until today has been one of really wondering why they get it so wrong all of the time just not occasionally wrong.

Yes I can understand the drive in having the entire world accept our values as an underlying US quirk but much as you have I learned also during that long cold UW march that those we assumed wanted and aspired to "our values" did not necessarily have the same understanding of the meaning of the words that we have. Miscommunication is killing us geopolitically.

Then attempt to push back and start to question what was occurring---then one gets hit with "you don't get it, what are you a leftie worst a communist, hey if you do not like it leave the country, you are naive that is not what the world wants etc".

And if one holds a clearance then one learns to throttle the thoughts, accept the marching orders and move on---but the questions still chew at you especially if in Iraq you get an eye opening again that starts showing you what you thought years earlier was in fact correct. Have felt for years that holding a clearance inhibits deep and straight forward discussions out of fear that one takes the comments in the wrong direction---one of questioning authority.

My question to you recently--it cannot be that simple---meant if in fact it is actually simple then why does not a national level decision maker or advisor see it as well.

I have felt for a long number of years the world is far simpler than we want it to be and we as humans tend to want to make something far more complicated than needed as we think that is what it should be---being simple challenges one to relook his or her view of the events and question all the time not just once and move on.

Maybe having worked the team level in strange and challenging cultures colored my views but at the same time it reinforced certain views --I was as well fortune to during my education after SF to have had BU Professors who had great academic reputations as renown "actual" Socialist/Communists who forced one to challenge one's biases and to defend one's views.

This discussion has been interesting in that it pushes a thought that is hard for an individual to do "speak truth to power"---really hard for the current Force even harder for national decision makers and their advisors.

Maybe that is the reason that after fighting the fight for so long within the organization and seeing how the organization does not listen worse yet sidelines one---I decided to pull the plug and remain outside the US --gives me peace of mind as one can carry on such discussions as this one with friends/past service members and one surprisingly finds many having the same views.

My SF career started overseas and ending a career overseas seemed to be a fitting concept. When one walks the road of participating in history as long as I have one tends to get cynical--cynical does not work currently in the US. Learned a long time ago peace of mind counts over anything-also learned that one can never really change history.

You and I might understand what we are discussing but that understanding will never make it to the decision making levels.

Actually events are simple but that is a hard message to carry forward especially for decision makers.