"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[carl]

Ok, so if we don't support our very hypothetical "friends" in Syria, someone somewhere MAY accuse us of abandoning our "friends". If we do choose sides and intervene in Syrai, is there not an equal or greater probability that a whole bunch of people in the region will accuse us of arrogantly forcing our way into a regional conflict that's none of our business in a cynical effort to further our own invariably nefarious objectives? The reality of "perception management" is that somebody will put a negative spin on anything we do, and somebody will believe that spin no matter what we do. If we're damned if we do and damned if we don't why not act according to our own interests and objectives?

Does the above have anything to do with my point? Nope.

Ok, who? Specifically, please...

Do I think there are people in Syria we should support? Yep. Did I come to this conclusion reading open source things available to all over the last several years? Yep. Do I figure this airy request for specificity is being made in good faith? Nope. Do I think it is just being argumentative? Yep. Do I think if God himself could provide a list of people in Syria we should support and the reasons why, notarized by a squad of angels that Dayuhan would still come back with a torrent of 'How do we know?'s followed by a cataract of 'Why should we?'s? Yep. Given this do I have the slightest interest in acceding to the airy request for specificity? Hell no. Am I having a grand old time going on like this? Yep.

[Dayuhan]

I did not intend to imply that your argument constitutes "occupation by policy" but instead that the same question (why should the perception of other actors dictate our policy?) also applies to the concept of "occupation by policy", if that in fact is US policy and it is relevant to outcomes in the ME.

Certainly perception is relevant to policy, but perception management is a complicated and highly unpredictable business. Any given action can evoke a wide range of perceptions from varying actors, and any effort to declare that if "we" do this, "they" will perceive that is generally way oversimplified. As pointed out above, for example, the preferred agenda is not necessarily indicative of perceptions across the Middle East or even the Saudi populace: it's just what the Saudi royal family happens to want.

I actually think that the discussion of Syria strays a bit from the original topic, which involved the premise that US support for autocratic regimes enables those regimes to resist popular pressure for reform. That seems rather far from the discussion of Syria. The Saudi royal family may want the US to do the dirty work and get rid of Assad, but I doubt that the Saudi populace really cares that much. I suspect that for every person in the ME populace who wants the US to intervene and protect the Sunni, you'd find 5 who are generically opposed to any US intervention in ME affairs, but of course we don't know that. How much basis do any of us have, really, to be talking about what a foreign populace perceives?

As above, it's very easy to say "it's all about perception", but very difficult to accurately assess the range of perceptions that exists, and very difficult to predict how any given action or policy will be perceived.

[Dayuhan]

Do I think there are people in Syria we should support? Yep. Did I come to this conclusion reading open source things available to all over the last several years? Yep. Do I figure this airy request for specificity is being made in good faith? Nope. Do I think it is just being argumentative? Yep. Do I think if God himself could provide a list of people in Syria we should support and the reasons why, notarized by a squad of angels that Dayuhan would still come back with a torrent of 'How do we know?'s followed by a cataract of 'Why should we?'s? Yep. Given this do I have the slightest interest in acceding to the airy request for specificity? Hell no. Am I having a grand old time going on like this? Yep.

To whom would you have us send guns and/or money, and what reason have you to think that party will use them in a manner consistent with our objectives?

If you seriously propose to back a horse in the Syrian derby, you have to have some idea of what horse you want to back, particularly as the lack of viable horses is at this point one of the stronger arguments against taking sides. Are we to pick a side at random?

[OUTLAW 09]

Let's turn the question concerning the KSA on it's head with the following.

What if the KSA was the largest "Christian" ie Catholic/Protestant/and others ME country bordering on say two countries what were stating they are the "chosen" and they had build a containment wall around the "Christian" country. Then throw in the mix that we have had differences with the "Christian" country in the past---but economically they have invested deeply into the US economy and in the past they have even in the face of a "peaceful religion" allowed and supported large number of US troops on the ground agitating their "chosen" neighbors. Regardless of what we the US has "done" policy wise they have tended to support us---even if it on occasions goes against their own inherent interests.

WHAT then would our policy be towards that "Christian" country be and WHY?

What if the "Catholic" church along with it the Vatican/Pope was in fact say based in and was now Lebanon--- and in the 80s under a waving Green flag a large number of non Lebanese who were of another religion marches in sets up a separate "shadow" government and security force-then triggers a massive civil war creating thousands of refugees and large numbers of killed and wounded--WHAT would the US policy be and WHY?

Sometimes turning the debate around and shifting terms allows one to "see and "understand" the opposite side of the debate.

We need a level platform (intently understanding Islam which has been missing from all policies now and in the past) towards Islam but that means an honest appraisal of both sides of Islam---right now I am personally not so sure the Iranian hardliners have given up so easily.

Not so sure the Revolutionary Guards, the Qud Forces and several of the spiritual leaders have signed on in the last few months to be "peaceniks"---

Remember in the face of an massively hard embargo which is really an economic blockade these same groups have still managed to continue designing and building new weapon systems, expanded their control in Lebanon, expanded greatly the enrichment program, and have succeeded in turning the fighting around for Asaad.

Robert recently nailed it with our fear of WMD---in the eyes of the hardliners having the ability to either build and have built one nuclear device locks both the US and Israel into the mutual self destruction concept of the Cold War--that is why Israel is so adamant in their views towards Iran.

Remember there are a large number of 79ers still in power who I know have not changed their minds to become "peaceniks"--even the Islamic nationalists see the US as weak right now.

What I think they have figured out is how to maneuver a rather weak US national policy by using the Russian intentions in the region after the US lost in Iraq, having invested 1T in the area for nothing and we are in the process of pulling totally out of AFG.

To the hardliners we are losing at every turn to Shiaism and they see that as in turn weakening the KSA, maintaining Assad, and still controlling Lebanon so in their view why do they need to change?

From their view/analysis I would actually agree with them.

While I agree with Robert that is a need to reconcile with Iran from a geo political perspective---the core question is WHY---outside of their influence inside the former Northern Alliance they are still basically a Shia country interfering inside a largely Sunni country as they attempt to build a bridge to Shia inside both AFG and Pakistan. Economically they will develop strongly if they can get out from under the economic blockade, but they also know the oil industry is running out so where then?

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---do you really understand the core differences between Shiism and Sunnism? Have you spent hours talking/debating with fundamentalists of both colors? Do you "understand" Khomeini's Green Crescent policy ---follow on a map the Silk Road and you will "understand". Do you "understand" the KSA reaction to the Green Crescent theory?

Do you really understand the long standing (1400 year old) philosophical debate between the various factions of Shiaism as there are actually over eight different factions of Shiasm, Sunnism (secular/fundamentalist) and Sulfism?

Do you understand their different understandings of governance/their responsibilities to their own community, and the WHY behind those differences?

If you do "understand " the differences then do you see in our US ME polices a reflection of all of that?---especially in Syria/Lebanon where this question of Islamic differences is playing out along with the issue of regional hegemony?

If you do "understand" then you would be "seeing" what is going on inside Iraq, AFG, Lebanon, Pakistan, and finally Syria.

Then you would actually "understand" where the KSA is coming from.

What I see is a US policy for years which has for the ME been economically driven around one topic--cheap oil that flows forever-- tied to blocking Soviet expansionism in the ME---which is actually occurring now under Putin---might now be changing with the US becoming the top oil exporter---but that will only be for as long as the oil flows.

What is interesting is a theory (perception) by the oil countries of the ME that have quietly for years said that the US wanted cheap oil out of the ME in order to protect their own oil supplies--we have if you are honest when reviewing comments made about US oil over the years have been in fact protecting our strategic oil supplies.

Interesting is it not that suddenly after claiming for years we had none and we were dependent on the ME that we are suddenly the worlds top oil producer?---strange is it not that it confirms the 50 year old perception held by ME oil countries?

That change in the status of US oil I think is quietly driving the slant in US policy---lets be real about the slant towards Shiaism--it is occurring causing as whiplash a period of instability that cannot be directed by anyone outside of the regional players which this is all about anyway---that instability will be both dangerous and brutal.

Have you ever seen what Shia and Sunni fundamentalists can do to a human being up close and personal?---then you will "understand" what I mean by brutal.

It is all about regional hegemony being fought under the Green Flag of Islam nothing more nothing less---and we are not a player in that game as we simply do not "understand" Islam nor are we from the region in question.

[Dayuhan]

What if the KSA was the largest "Christian" ie Catholic/Protestant/and others ME country bordering on say two countries what were stating they are the "chosen" and they had build a containment wall around the "Christian" country. Then throw in the mix that we have had differences with the "Christian" country in the past---but economically they have invested deeply into the US economy and in the past they have even in the face of a "peaceful religion" allowed and supported large number of US troops on the ground agitating their "chosen" neighbors. Regardless of what we the US has "done" policy wise they have tended to support us---even if it on occasions goes against their own inherent interests.

WHAT then would our policy be towards that "Christian" country be and WHY?

Not much different, I expect. We'd trade, and we'd try to promote our own trading interests. We'd decline to interfere in domestic politics; what Robert would call the relationship between government and populace. We might defend them from direct foreign aggression, as we did when the Saudis were threatened by Saddam and as we would do if the Saudis were directly threatened by Iran, but we would not go around bombing whoever they disliked or intervening in foreign conflicts at their behest. I do not think anyone could reasonably claim that the US has been insufficiently attentive to Saudi needs because they are Muslim.

What if the "Catholic" church along with it the Vatican/Pope was in fact say based in and was now Lebanon--- and in the 80s under a waving Green flag a large number of non Lebanese who were of another religion marches in sets up a separate "shadow" government and security force-then triggers a massive civil war creating thousands of refugees and large numbers of killed and wounded--WHAT would the US policy be and WHY?

US policy in such a case would depend on the extent to which the events affected perceived American interests, not on the religion of the country concerned.

Not so sure the Revolutionary Guards, the Qud Forces and several of the spiritual leaders have signed on in the last few months to be "peaceniks"---

Of course they have not. Neither have the proxies of the Saudis. Not a whole lot of peaceniks in the Middle East.

Remember in the face of an massively hard embargo which is really an economic blockade these same groups have still managed to continue designing and building new weapon systems, expanded their control in Lebanon, expanded greatly the enrichment program, and have succeeded in turning the fighting around for Asaad.

I think you overrate the impact of sanctions, which are a long way from being a blockade or even a very effective embargo. Iran still sells oil and gas to China, Japan, Korea, India, and others. They trade with all of those and with the EU.

Yes, Iranian intervention has helped to keep Assad in power. Saudi intervention has helped maintain the threat to Assad. How is that an argument for American intervention?

Remember there are a large number of 79ers still in power who I know have not changed their minds to become "peaceniks"--even the Islamic nationalists see the US as weak right now.

No, they are not going to become "peaceniks". How is that an argument for US intervention in Syria?

What I think they have figured out is how to maneuver a rather weak US national policy by using the Russian intentions in the region after the US lost in Iraq, having invested 1T in the area for nothing and we are in the process of pulling totally out of AFG.

How did the US "lose" in Iraq? Pulling out of Afghanistan and avoiding engagement in Syria is not weak policy, it's sane policy.

To the hardliners we are losing at every turn to Shiaism and they see that as in turn weakening the KSA, maintaining Assad, and still controlling Lebanon so in their view why do they need to change?

From their view/analysis I would actually agree with them.

How can "we" - the US - be "losing" to Shiaism" when "we" aren't fighting against Shiaism? We are not taking sides in the Sunni-Shi'a issues. Why would we want to?

Economically they will develop strongly if they can get out from under the economic blockade, but they also know the oil industry is running out so where then?

The oil industry is not running out, far from it. Iran's oil and gas reserves are among the world's largest, and there are huge and promising areas that have yet to be explored using modern methods. Supply is enormous, and demand sure isn't going anywhere. Iran's oil business will not be "running out" for a long, long time.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---do you really understand the core differences between Shiism and Sunnism? Have you spent hours talking/debating with fundamentalists of both colors? Do you "understand" Khomeini's Green Crescent policy ---follow on a map the Silk Road and you will "understand". Do you "understand" the KSA reaction to the Green Crescent theory?

Do you really understand the long standing (1400 year old) philosophical debate between the various factions of Shiaism as there are actually over eight different factions of Shiasm, Sunnism (secular/fundamentalist) and Sulfism?

Do you understand their different understandings of governance/their responsibilities to their own community, and the WHY behind those differences?

If you do "understand " the differences then do you see in our US ME polices a reflection of all of that?---especially in Syria/Lebanon where this question of Islamic differences is playing out along with the issue of regional hegemony?

If you do "understand" then you would be "seeing" what is going on inside Iraq, AFG, Lebanon, Pakistan, and finally Syria.

Then you would actually "understand" where the KSA is coming from.

Yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes. I see and understand where the Saudis are coming from. It's really not hard to do. What I do NOT see is why you seem to feel that US policy should be built on where the Saudis are coming from, rather than where Americans are coming from. The Saudis have their own priorities and perceptions. If they feel that their interests justify intervention in Syria, they can decide to intervene in Syria, as they have. How in this world or the next does that require the US to get involved in Syria? Why should the US base its regional policy on the priorities and perceptions of the Saudi royal family?

What I see is a US policy for years which has for the ME been economically driven around one topic--cheap oil that flows forever-- tied to blocking Soviet expansionism in the ME---which is actually occurring now under Putin---might now be changing with the US becoming the top oil exporter---but that will only be for as long as the oil flows.

Been a fair number of years since cheap oil flowed out of the Middle East. The US is nowhere near becoming the top oil exporter. The US is becoming one of the top producers, but due to prodigious internal demand is a long, long, way from becoming a major exporter.

What is interesting is a theory (perception) by the oil countries of the ME that have quietly for years said that the US wanted cheap oil out of the ME in order to protect their own oil supplies--we have if you are honest when reviewing comments made about US oil over the years have been in fact protecting our strategic oil supplies.

The decision not to exploit domestic reserves was not a product of government policy. It's simply a matter of price. Investment in US production was not seen as a viable proposition until potential investors were convinced that high global prices were sustainable.

Interesting is it not that suddenly after claiming for years we had none and we were dependent on the ME that we are suddenly the worlds top oil producer?---strange is it not that it confirms the 50 year old perception held by ME oil countries?

We are not the world's top producer. #3, behind Russia and Saudi Arabia. Anyone paying attention has known all along that the US had extensive reserves, but required a high pricing environment to justify investment and persuade the populace to accept the environmental impact.

That change in the status of US oil I think is quietly driving the slant in US policy---lets be real about the slant towards Shiaism--it is occurring causing as whiplash a period of instability that cannot be directed by anyone outside of the regional players which this is all about anyway---that instability will be both dangerous and brutal.

You have yet to provide any compelling evidence - or any evidence at all - to support the claim of a US "slant toward Shiaism".

Have you ever seen what Shia and Sunni fundamentalists can do to a human being up close and personal?---then you will "understand" what I mean by brutal.

Exactly the same things as all the other forms of religious and political fundamentalism. Belief makes people brutal.

It is all about regional hegemony being fought under the Green Flag of Islam nothing more nothing less---and we are not a player in that game as we simply do not "understand" Islam nor are we from the region in question.

How is that an argument for US involvement in Syria?

And, once again, what exactly do you want to see the US do in Syria, and why?

[Bob's World]

Religion is powerful stuff. Historically religion is the tool employed by governments to control the people under their governance. This evolved over the past 500 years in the West, but is just beginning to take the same journey in the Middle East.

Consider - under the Holy Roman Empire legitimacy came from God and it was vested in the body of the Holy Roman Emperor. Charlamagne.

For 800 years a series of emperors and popes exercised control over the people of the empire, and controlled how people thought by demanding and enforcing a single system of religious thought.

Then Guttenberg invented his press, and as the government lost control on information they began to lose control over thought. Marten Luther was one who reasoably chafed at the interpretation of Christianity promoted and enforced by the Church, so he protested. Men with political concerns quickly saw the value of this Protestant ideology, and the wars of reformation began. Cast as Protestant vs. Catholic, that was really more Shirts vs. Skins as the have nots and oppressed took on the haves and oppressors.

The peace of Westphalia changed the rules. It established that Legitimacy came from the ability of a government/man to rise to power, and anyone who could take power could then pick the religion of his choice to exercise control over the people. This was in some ways a major change, as it broke up a broad system of control, but it really merely replaced it with many smaller systems of the exact same method of control.

The colonization of America took place in this era; and far from the direct control of Kings, thinking on governance evolved at a more rapid pace. Many of the original settlers came for religious freedom, but this was not freedom for all, but rather just freedom to make their own dogma the ruling dogma. The Puritans exercised the same single-minded control being exercised by Kings in Europe, and were at least as burtal in their methods. In many ways the Taliban of 2000 were little different than the Puritans of 1650.

But by the time of the American Revolution thought had evolved, guided by the theories of men like John Locke, to the radical new belief that legitimacy came from the people. But the only way to have legitimacy from the people was to disempower the abilty of the state to exercise idological control through a single state religion. And thus the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights is a genius bit of revolutionary prevention. A state that cannot establish an ideology is a state far less able to oppress.

But all of this is about governance and human nature. Religion is a tool. If you can appreciate the idea that "guns don't kill, people do," then you can appreciate the idea that "religion does not oppress, governments do."

Bottom line is that the history books spin this in the wrong direction; and the modern luancy in America that interprets the Establishment Clause as meaning that governments cannot sponsor crosses on hilltops, or nativity scenes, or that public schools cannot play religious context music at Christmas completely misunderstands the purpose of the law.

[AmericanPride]

Bob,

Religion goes both ways. When true believers seized the Grand Mosque in 1979, it forced the Saudi government into a more conservative position regarding religion out of fear of a religious uprising and empowered the hardliners in the government for the next two decades. I think the timing is interesting with the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year; all paradigm shifting events for the region. (And to go back further in history, there is some scholarship which argues that many of the Crusaders were true believers as well who gave up wealth and position in Europe for a high chance of death in the Holy Land). Certainly governments often seek to manipulate religion favorably, but just the same the power of religion can overwhelm government.

[Bob's World]

As I said, a similiar evolution of how people think about religion and how that affects the ability of governments to employ a single interpretation of religion as a population control measure is being challenged to what occured in Europe is happening in the ME.

It isn't about us, we need to respect there is a huge segment of humanity that is thinking about very fundamental things in new ways. Some will attempt to hijack religious concepts for political change, some will move toward more liberal interpretations and some will move to more conservative interpretations. This is an internal drama that we need to be very cautious about getting into the middle of, or to take sides in. Because then we become part of the problem for someone if we are part of the solution for someone else. Then they attack us.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan-- this sentence is interesting.

"I think you overrate the impact of sanctions, which are a long way from being a blockade or even a very effective embargo. Iran still sells oil and gas to China, Japan, Korea, India, and others. They trade with all of those and with the EU."

Not sure if you have friends who live in and or working in Iran---if you do---then ask them if they think the sanctions are not hurting them---ask the overseas Iranian students who have been restricted in exchanging legally their currency---actually look at the recent agreement and just what sailed through Congress concerning this---students can now exchange currency without being a criminal. By the way a large amount of the economic damage they are going through is of their own making and not from the oil embargo/economic restrictions.

The oil embargo was not a total embargo by the way---they are "allowed" to sell upwards of still 50% of their oil---which by the way finds it way to Europe and then in turn is sold to the US in the form of refined products---so we the US consumer are still supporting Iran---you do not hear much from the US on that point.

By maintaining a high level of oil production within the US we are now effectively importing less----our refineries do not know where to go with what we ourselves are producing---thus less dependence on ME is a nice plus---check the import numbers for the last three years---they are falling at a solid rate.

If you have noticed the shift in Syria among the fundamentalists is now starting to shake out with the KSA appearing to have correctly set into motion their support for "selected" Islamists of the non AQ variety which on the "surface" appeared they were doing (the Islamic group doing the current negotiations between the various Islamist groups and AQ is also well trained and rumored to be receiving weapons/money from the KSA).

These Islamists groups appear to be well trained, coordinated and motivated and this is the critical point-- in the eyes of the population acceptable to them.

There was a recent field account out of Syria that these groups are letting their combat be their image not how they institute Islam---and they seem to be doing well on that image building front. If you also notice the thoroughly confused FSA has magically reappeared in conjunction together with the Islamic Front just as the operations against the AQ started---and just in time for the talks in Geneva.

This is a step I have been saying to take---when I mention one has to dance with the devil--you just seem to slide over the comment.

Sometimes by supporting something that does not really go with your policies, but is supported by the population one in fact gains a channel for conversations---not influence just solid give and take conversations which over the long run can work for both sides.

Why is it that we can economically blockade Iran but not Syria?---strange is it not? Noticed the Russian "oil" was delivered nicely from Iran to Syria recently and yet we did not say a word.

A nice touch of hypocrisy on our part---oil on Iranian ships no, but Iranian oil on Russian ships yes---ever wonder why? We seem to see the Russians driving hard on a ME policy but where are we with ours?

Now what is interesting to ask is does the US have conversations going back channel with the Saudis on this support to their "Islamists"---from open reports ---apparently not.

I would have thought over Jordan, but Jordan has been complaining privately lately to the US that they have been cut out by the US on the Israeli/Palestinian talks even though they are tasked by treaty with the security of the Islamic sites in Jerusalem.

So again we do not have a slant?---am not sure just what open source media you are not reading. Will get you an account with Nexus if that helps.

Even the Iranians are seeing the slant so what is it you are not seeing?

[OUTLAW 09]

AP----your comments on religion are interesting.

There is an old saying "religion is the opium of the masses"---Robert recently said "religion is the rifle of the insurgent".

I say---historical developments in religion often match political developments in history and if one does not understand those developments or as Robert says the WHAT and the WHY then one is destined to go in circles.

Those that do not speak Arabic, have not been on the ground there, and have not read the Koran often get confused with all the chatter of ME politics---it in order to understand the ME one must understand Islam with all of its issues. For those in the US hard to do as we tend to let our own biases get in the way.

[Bob's World]

Actually, I said that ideology is like a rifle. In that I need one to fight, but if mine is somehow "defeated" by my enemy or stops working for whatever reason, any functional rifle will do.

Chairman Deng said it another way, (regarding the nature of ideology) "it does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice."

Governments tend to fixate on the ideology being applied, and also upon the person applying it, rather than upon the political reasons one is applying ideology at all.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP----this is what I mean with religion in the ME.

Right now AQI/ISIS in Iraq needs Malaki and Malaki needs AQI/ISIS---sounds strange but it is so---ie Malaki needs the sectarian violence from a Shia perspective just as AQI/ISIS needs Shia violence against the Sunni in order to justify why they are in Iraq.

Malaki is cementing his Shia position before the coming April elections in Irag---thus he is "beating up" on AQI/ISIS, raiding Sunni protest camps and arresting a number of well respected Sunni leaders in both Anbar and Diyala.

It was his failure to implement confidence building measures for the Sunni that were built into the Constitution and in settling the oil money issue which he was shutting out the Sunnis on that is driving the Sunni perception that he is totally against them.

What is interesting is that when AQI/ISIS killed an Iraqi Army Division Commander and two Brigade Commanders there was a moment where all Iraqi's (Shia and Sunni) rallied behind the Iraqi flag and called for military action together with the tribes against AQ.

For the first time since we left and for a split second there was religious unity behind a common flag-what one would term nationalism.

Then Malaki raided/arrested and fought with Sunnis and the Sunni explosion is for all to see. It is now not only the AQI/ISIS-- it is as well the tribes taking on the Iraqi Army.

There is though an interesting development that threatens religiously Tehran itself and it comes out of Iraq and will at some point effect Malaki.

Ayatollah Sistani was the calming Shia voice if one was in Iraq during the 2005 elections, he was also calling then for protecting the minority Sunni and had hoped to settle the Shia political party issue after the elections---he was politically sidelined by Malaki as Malaki then as well as now used AQI as the tool to beat up and sideline the Sunni.

Since the elections of 2005 there has not been a true discussion on what form of Shia governance should be developed for Iraq which was Sistani's goal. Initially he was only interested in securing Shia dominance in Iraq historically speaking then he was going to deal with the form of governance-a missed chance for the history of Islam.

It will be interesting to see how he comes out verbally in the next few weeks during his Friday prayers after Fulluja and Ramadi.

"Sistani's popularity extends into Iran where it has deepened in recent years, partly due to the pilgrimage (over 2M Shia came to Iraqi Shia pilgrimage sites). The Iranian-American scholar Mehdi Khalaji cites estimates that "nearly 80 percent of Shiite worshippers" in Iran "follow Ayatollah Ali Sistani" as their spiritual leader. This is echoed by Johns Hopkins' Vali Nasr who attributes Sistani's rising popularity to two factors: the influence of pilgrims returning from Iraq, and widespread cynicism toward Tehran's corrupt religious establishment."

"Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the Iranian mullahs have transformed themselves from humble scholars into an elite that controls the country's political and economic life. Sistani's popularity reflects a genuine hunger in Iran for an independent religious leadership untainted by connections and corruption."

Sistani is the one to watch in the Shia world--not the Iranian Ayatollahs who use fundamentalism to maintain power. I have never seen any attempt by the US to communicate with him.

That is why I say one must understand Islam to even begin understanding the ME.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---stand corrected on the quote---was too lazy to search back on the string and was going on recall.

The cat quote is better though.

Recall is getting weak it seems.

[OUTLAW 09]

There is a good link to an Foreign Policy article on explaining the high inflow of Sunni foreign fighters into Syria that speaks of perceptions that drive the inflow.

http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/09
/syrias_foreign_fighters#sthash.fkBK7ih3.dpbs

[OUTLAW 09]

While the following is not to topic---- yet it does in fact go a long way in explaining the Arab Spring and the turmoil in the ME---was sent to me from a friend who has been following the thread---refers to complex adaptive systems.

Complexity : “ The balance point -- often called the edge of chaos -- is where the components of a system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence either. . . The edge of chaos is where life has enough stability to sustain itself and enough creativity to deserve the name of life. The edge of chaos is where new idea and innovative genotypes are forever nibbling away at the edges of the status quo, and where even the most entrenched old guard will eventually be overthrown. The edge of chaos is where centuries of slavery and segregation suddenly give way to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s; where seventy years of Soviet communism suddenly give way to political turmoil and ferment; where eons of evolutionary stability suddenly give way to wholesale species transformation.

The edge is the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, the one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, adaptive and alive.”

Now where does policy fit in and how does policy effect it?

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan-- this sentence is interesting.

"I think you overrate the impact of sanctions, which are a long way from being a blockade or even a very effective embargo. Iran still sells oil and gas to China, Japan, Korea, India, and others. They trade with all of those and with the EU."

Not sure if you have friends who live in and or working in Iran---if you do---then ask them if they think the sanctions are not hurting them---ask the overseas Iranian students who have been restricted in exchanging legally their currency---actually look at the recent agreement and just what sailed through Congress concerning this---students can now exchange currency without being a criminal. By the way a large amount of the economic damage they are going through is of their own making and not from the oil embargo/economic restrictions.

Yes, the sanctions do damage, mainly to the ordinary folks, as is usually the way with sanctions. They are still far from being an embargo or a blockade.

The oil embargo was not a total embargo by the way---they are "allowed" to sell upwards of still 50% of their oil---which by the way finds it way to Europe and then in turn is sold to the US in the form of refined products---so we the US consumer are still supporting Iran---you do not hear much from the US on that point.

As I said, sanctions typically have limited impact on the government, and these are far from being as effective as you previously suggested they were.

By maintaining a high level of oil production within the US we are now effectively importing less----our refineries do not know where to go with what we ourselves are producing---thus less dependence on ME is a nice plus---check the import numbers for the last three years---they are falling at a solid rate.

Yes, we all know this. We all also know that even if the US ceases to import from the ME altogether, we still pay prevailing world price for out domestic production (and the imports from Canada, Venezuela, Nigeria et al), and as the largest exporter and the largest holder of surplus capacity, the Saudis still control the price. The US would just as dependent on Saudi production with zero mbpd of imports form Saudi Arabia as it is with 1.46 mbpd. If one producer sees a substantial capacity reduction, it's not just that producer's customers that are hit, it's all buyers, because those customers then compete to buy the rest of the oil, and the price goes up for everyone. Even if the US stops importing from Saudi Arabia, they still need Saudi Arabian production to stay strong to keep the price manageable.

If you have noticed the shift in Syria among the fundamentalists is now starting to shake out with the KSA appearing to have correctly set into motion their support for "selected" Islamists of the non AQ variety which on the "surface" appeared they were doing (the Islamic group doing the current negotiations between the various Islamist groups and AQ is also well trained and rumored to be receiving weapons/money from the KSA).

These Islamists groups appear to be well trained, coordinated and motivated and this is the critical point-- in the eyes of the population acceptable to them.

There was a recent field account out of Syria that these groups are letting their combat be their image not how they institute Islam---and they seem to be doing well on that image building front. If you also notice the thoroughly confused FSA has magically reappeared in conjunction together with the Islamic Front just as the operations against the AQ started---and just in time for the talks in Geneva.

This is a step I have been saying to take---when I mention one has to dance with the devil--you just seem to slide over the comment.

Since the Saudis already seem to be taking it, why does the US need to be involved?

Every time I ask what actions you'd like to take in Syria and why, you just seem to slide over the comment. Might want to do something about that.

Sometimes by supporting something that does not really go with your policies, but is supported by the population one in fact gains a channel for conversations---not influence just solid give and take conversations which over the long run can work for both sides.

What is the "something" in this case, and what "population" supports it? A little specificity would help.

Why is it that we can economically blockade Iran but not Syria?---strange is it not? Noticed the Russian "oil" was delivered nicely from Iran to Syria recently and yet we did not say a word.

We've already established that we can't "economically blockade" Iran... you mentioned yourself that Iranian oil ends up in the US as refined products and the US can't do anything about it. Chinese weapons end up in Iran.

Why should the US blockade Syria in the first place?

A nice touch of hypocrisy on our part---oil on Iranian ships no, but Iranian oil on Russian ships yes---ever wonder why? We seem to see the Russians driving hard on a ME policy but where are we with ours?

Where we are with ours is finally learning to mind our own business and stay out of other people's fights. It's about time.

Now what is interesting to ask is does the US have conversations going back channel with the Saudis on this support to their "Islamists"---from open reports ---apparently not.

If they are back channel, we won't know about them... if we know about them, by definition they aren't "back channel". I would guess there's all kinds of conversation going on behind the scenes.

So again we do not have a slant?---am not sure just what open source media you are not reading. Will get you an account with Nexus if that helps.

Even the Iranians are seeing the slant so what is it you are not seeing?

We are seeing exactly the same information, but apparently interpreting it differently. You made the claim of a "slant toward the Shi'a" (incidentally, a claim rather incompatible with your subsequent claim of an "economic blockade" on Iran), it's up to you to either back the claim with evidence and reasoning, or retract it. Repeating it is pretty pointless.

[Dayuhan]

While the following is not to topic---- yet it does in fact go a long way in explaining the Arab Spring and the turmoil in the ME---was sent to me from a friend who has been following the thread---refers to complex adaptive systems.

Complexity : “ The balance point -- often called the edge of chaos -- is where the components of a system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence either. . . The edge of chaos is where life has enough stability to sustain itself and enough creativity to deserve the name of life. The edge of chaos is where new idea and innovative genotypes are forever nibbling away at the edges of the status quo, and where even the most entrenched old guard will eventually be overthrown. The edge of chaos is where centuries of slavery and segregation suddenly give way to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s; where seventy years of Soviet communism suddenly give way to political turmoil and ferment; where eons of evolutionary stability suddenly give way to wholesale species transformation.

The edge is the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, the one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, adaptive and alive.”

Now where does policy fit in and how does policy effect it?

Seems too vague to fit in anywhere. Might ask him to focus a bit...

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuahn---now I understand why you tend to tear apart individual sentences and yet you fail to understand from a social science perspective what we refer to as complex adaptive systems or what Kilcullen meant when he used the term ecosystem which is easier to use and understand if one is not a trained social scientist.

In order to effectively discuss policy effects on a population as this thread is trying to do then one must stand back and look at the whole and actually Robert is right when he uses the questions WHAT and WHY.

Back to complex adaptive systems---the paragraph is clear and concise:
Navigating on the edge of chaos - describes how humans adapt to their environmental conditions within some 'rules' that can be defined and understood by social scientists.

You keep asking about what I would do--it is being done already on the ground through Islamist/Syria nationalist groups supported by the Saudis---the only problem is now the efforts being thrown at controlling AQ is distracting from Assad which is the focus of the fight in effect lengthening the overall population tragedy. AQ/ISIS has again decided to be stupid--meaning they "forked" the insurgency creating a counter wind against them based on their brutality against the population exactly a replay of Iraq 2005.

If you took the time to glance through the link on the foreign fighters coming into Syria---there is a topic for discussion by itself in SWJ---just what is motivating the FFs in numbers far higher than seen during the Soviet/AFG period.

What I have also been alluding to is the drive by Iranians being THE regional hegemon---the core reason is that Khomeini during his days actually moved Shiaism closer to the style of historical Sunni governance drive all in the name of creating a Shia Green Crescent regional hegemony from Pakistan to Lebanon--this drive is then translated into action by the RGs and Qud Forces.

The Green Crescent in turn alarmed the KSA who went into full counter mode again from the Sunni perspective and the entire action/counteraction has been going on since 1979.

In some ways the solution is rather simple but actually the hardest piece---how does one convince the leadership of a country that has been on an expansion trip to throttle back and remain inside one's territory.

In some ways the current general Iranian population is OK with that, but when you have for 35 years been on an expansionist trip and your security/military/intelligence apparatus have been supporting this trip then it is hard to throttle back. Once the genie is out of bottle recapping it is extremely hard especially if the current leadership in Iran is driving the expansionism from their religious perspective.

So the fighting goes on in Syria and Lebanon because there is no one is willing to stop this expansionist trip and we cannot because we were badly burned by Iraq and now AFG and I would also say because we failed to understand Islam and understand the current drivers behind the Arab Springs ie ME populations.

The KSA uses religion and money in order to gain influence---using their religious seminaries/charities--exactly as does Iran in Qom.

Iran takes it a step further through using actual military/paramilitary personnel hidden as "volunteers" which is exactly what the KSA sees occurring and has been "pointing it out" repeatedly to the US---we have seen it but refused to address it. You will notice that by the way there are no "KSA volunteers" from inside the KSA physically on the ground--the FFs are in fact the KSA foot soldiers.

That is why I mentioned it would be extremely interesting to this time to analyze the WHY they are answering the Sunni calls for help as that will give us a view for the future on what has to be addressed on this front with the KSA.

There are a number of Syrian solutions now floating around at there--which if one looks at them requires in the final end Iran returning to it's territorial borders.

That will not happen with the current Iranian theocracy power apparatus in place.

So now you see two points of focus---armed resistance on the ground coupled with a slow but steady push to return Iran to it's natural territorial borders pulling it's "volunteers" (military/security/intelligence) back as well. What is the US response in the coming months if Iraq cannot get ISIS under control if Iranian "volunteers" enter Iraq? That will be an interesting moment.

After the dust settles the next step would be to understand the drive behind the FFs in answering the KSA calls for help-via discussions on the topic with the KSA. By the way this was not done after 9/11 and is the camel standing in the corner between the US and KSA.

What you might not know is that when we in the US said that the madrassas supported by the KSA should throttle back their jihadi rhetoric which is buried in Sunni Wahhabism---the KSA did in fact quietly change the focus of the courses/classes and the rhetoric is now nowhere to be seen in KSA supported madrassas. But just as there are different Shia streams there are different Salafist streams other than Wahhabism that are pushing the "jihadi" rhetoric.