"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---as I said you tend to dissect sentences---try looking at this paragraph from Lebanon today and tell me what you think the Iranians mean by their use of the word "honor".

"Honor" to me means you must accept us as a full hegemon for the region not a side player. If in fact the majority of the Syrian population is Sunni WHY does Iran "feel their honor is at stake" and WHY do they feel they are required to be even involved in Syrian affairs if in fact the majority of the country is Sunni not a deviant of Shiaism which is in the minority---kind of a reverse of Iraq do you not think?

What is you interpretation?

A second question might be WHY did Baa'thism originally develop in Syria and was exported into Iraq when Syria was a Shia controlled country---when today Malaki equates Iraqi Sunnis with Baa'thism?

U.N. leader Ban Ki-moon did not include Iran in his invitations to 30 countries to the gathering. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has suggested Iran could play a role in the Syria conference from the “sidelines” but Tehran has scoffed at the suggestion, saying it would only accept offers that respect the country’s “honor.”

Read more: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Mid...#ixzz2ptPjQfgi
(The Daily Star :: Lebanon News :: http://www.dailystar.com.lb)

[Dayuhan]

Dayuahn---now I understand why you tend to tear apart individual sentences and yet you fail to understand from a social science perspective what we refer to as complex adaptive systems or what Kilcullen meant when he used the term ecosystem which is easier to use and understand if one is not a trained social scientist.

Oh please, these concepts are in no way rarefied and they certainly aren't advanced social science. Anybody participating here will grasp them fully, even when they are wrapped in unnecessary oleaginous verbiage. We could use less of the "I must be right because I know some (unspecified) thing that you don't" routine. The superiority of a position needs to be demonstrated, not proclaimed.

In order to effectively discuss policy effects on a population as this thread is trying to do then one must stand back and look at the whole and actually Robert is right when he uses the questions WHAT and WHY.

Standing back and looking at the whole provides initial context, but if you never bring it down to specifics, that context never gets you anywhere useful.

Back to complex adaptive systems---the paragraph is clear and concise:
Navigating on the edge of chaos - describes how humans adapt to their environmental conditions within some 'rules' that can be defined and understood by social scientists.

It's anything but clear and specific. It reads like the first paragraph of an unfinished essay, and as it stands it's consummately useless. It points in a very general direction, but doesn't go there, or anywhere else.

You keep asking about what I would do--it is being done already on the ground through Islamist/Syria nationalist groups supported by the Saudis---the only problem is now the efforts being thrown at controlling AQ is distracting from Assad which is the focus of the fight in effect lengthening the overall population tragedy. AQ/ISIS has again decided to be stupid--meaning they "forked" the insurgency creating a counter wind against them based on their brutality against the population exactly a replay of Iraq 2005.

Actually I asked what you would have the US do, and why... and if it's already being done by the Saudis, why would the US need to do it? Both AQ/ISIS have committed their share of stupidities... but again, how is that an argument for US involvement?

If you took the time to glance through the link on the foreign fighters coming into Syria---there is a topic for discussion by itself in SWJ---just what is motivating the FFs in numbers far higher than seen during the Soviet/AFG period.

Proximity is probably one factor - getting to and into Syria is a whole lot easier than getting into Afghanistan - but I don't think anyone here is in a position to answer that question with any degree of certainty.

What I have also been alluding to is the drive by Iranians being THE regional hegemon---the core reason is that Khomeini during his days actually moved Shiaism closer to the style of historical Sunni governance drive all in the name of creating a Shia Green Crescent regional hegemony from Pakistan to Lebanon--this drive is then translated into action by the RGs and Qud Forces.

Yes, we're all aware of that ambition.

In some ways the solution is rather simple but actually the hardest piece---how does one convince the leadership of a country that has been on an expansion trip to throttle back and remain inside one's territory.

Simple question, but hardly a simple answer.

In some ways the current general Iranian population is OK with that, but when you have for 35 years been on an expansionist trip and your security/military/intelligence apparatus have been supporting this trip then it is hard to throttle back. Once the genie is out of bottle recapping it is extremely hard especially if the current leadership in Iran is driving the expansionism from their religious perspective.

I don't think anyone is in a position to say what "the general Iranian population" (hardly a unitary entity) is or is not ok with. The general Iranian population hasn't got much to say about it in any event. The opinion of the population isn't the issue here, the actions of the government are. It would be interesting to know more about the spectrum or Iranian popular opinion regarding intervention in Syria, but I don't think that data is available to us.

So the fighting goes on in Syria and Lebanon because there is no one is willing to stop this expansionist trip and we cannot because we were badly burned by Iraq and now AFG and I would also say because we failed to understand Islam and understand the current drivers behind the Arab Springs ie ME populations.

Nobody willing, or nobody able. I have yet to see anyone make an argument for US intervention in Syria that effectively defines what vital US interest is at stake, what clear, practical, achievable goals are to be pursued, a viable plan for achieving those goals, and a realistic plan for managing the post-intervention endgame, the minimal requirements when contemplating intervention in someone else's war.

The KSA uses religion and money in order to gain influence---using their religious seminaries/charities--exactly as does Iran in Qom.

Agreed

Iran takes it a step further through using actual military/paramilitary personnel hidden as "volunteers" which is exactly what the KSA sees occurring and has been "pointing it out" repeatedly to the US---we have seen it but refused to address it. You will notice that by the way there are no "KSA volunteers" from inside the KSA physically on the ground--the FFs are in fact the KSA foot soldiers.

They have different ways of deploying foot soldiers, but the end result is the same. I still see no effective argument here for US intervention.

That is why I mentioned it would be extremely interesting to this time to analyze the WHY they are answering the Sunni calls for help as that will give us a view for the future on what has to be addressed on this front with the KSA.

The simplest explanation would simply be that they see an opportunity to bog the Iranians down on a prolonged 3rd party counterinsurgency effort that will drain their resources and eventually become an unpopular liability. Obviously there will be more factors involved, but it's not always necessary to over-analyze.

There are a number of Syrian solutions now floating around at there--which if one looks at them requires in the final end Iran returning to it's territorial borders.

That's a goal, not a solution. Viable means to accomplish that goal have yet to be proposed, nor has any good reason why the US should be involved.

That will not happen with the current Iranian theocracy power apparatus in place.

So now you see two points of focus---armed resistance on the ground coupled with a slow but steady push to return Iran to it's natural territorial borders pulling it's "volunteers" (military/security/intelligence) back as well. What is the US response in the coming months if Iraq cannot get ISIS under control if Iranian "volunteers" enter Iraq? That will be an interesting moment.

Is a US response required? Presumably in that case the Saudis and their Gulf allies will up the ante on their side as well. How is that an argument for US intervention?

What you might not know is that when we in the US said that the madrassas supported by the KSA should throttle back their jihadi rhetoric which is buried in Sunni Wahhabism---the KSA did in fact quietly change the focus of the courses/classes and the rhetoric is now nowhere to be seen in KSA supported madrassas. But just as there are different Shia streams there are different Salafist streams other than Wahhabism that are pushing the "jihadi" rhetoric.

I'm aware of that.

What action do you believe the US should take in Syria, and why?

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---as I said you tend to dissect sentences---try looking at this paragraph from Lebanon today and tell me what you think the Iranians mean by their use of the word "honor".

"Honor" to me means you must accept us as a full hegemon for the region not a side player. If in fact the majority of the Syrian population is Sunni WHY does Iran "feel their honor is at stake" and WHY do they feel they are required to be even involved in Syrian affairs if in fact the majority of the country is Sunni not a deviant of Shiaism which is in the minority---kind of a reverse of Iraq do you not think?

What is you interpretation?

Obviously the Iranians don't think that playing a role "from the sidelines" is consistent with their perception of their regional stature. That doesn't necessarily mean they want to be accepted as a "hegemon", but it suggests that they expect to be treated as an inner circle player. That does not necessarily have anything to do with the Sunni/Shi'a balance in Syria; it can bu purely based on the Iranian desire to be acknowledged as a central regional player.

A second question might be WHY did Baa'thism originally develop in Syria and was exported into Iraq when Syria was a Shia controlled country---when today Malaki equates Iraqi Sunnis with Baa'thism?

Of course Maliki will equate Ba'ath with Sunni, as the Ba'ath party in Iraq was dominated by the Sunni minority. The Ba'ath movement was at least nominally secular and not necessarily derived from either branch of Islam, it served more as a loose justification for autocratic rule in the nominal cause of pan-Arab unity than as a tool in the religious dispute.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---you question my comments concerning the tilt towards Iran---here is from an article from a conservative writer which states basically what I have been saying for awhile ---AND this is from a conservative writer not a liberal not a middle of the roader.

8 January Powerline blog

The signs of this “drawing together” of the mullahs and Obama are unmistakable:

On Monday, Iran offered to join the United States in sending military aid to the Shiite government in Baghdad, which is embroiled in street-to-street fighting with radical Sunni militants in Anbar Province, a Sunni stronghold. On Sunday, Secretary of State John Kerry said he could envision an Iranian role in the coming peace conference on Syria, even though the meeting is supposed to plan for a Syria after the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, an important Iranian ally.

What explains Obama’s tilt in favor of a nation that, during the past 35 years has been at least as implacable an enemy of America as the forces we hope to enlist that nation to combat?

Boot attributes it to a desire for stability. That’s certainly part of the explanation. In addition, it’s easier to reach an accommodation with an established nation state than with a group of rag-tag militias.

To be sure, as Boot emphasizes, Iran is not a force for regional stability; rather it remains a revolutionary, not a status quo power, whose goal is regional hegemony. Thus, accommodation with Iran ultimately means accepting it as a regional hegemon — a status that obtaining nuclear weapons would go a long way to promote.

For most of us, Iran as a regional hegemon is not acceptable. As Boot asks, “Do we truly want the Quds Force dominant in Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Kabul, Bahrain, Doha, Abu Dhabi, and other capitals? Do we want to permanently alienate allies in Saudi Arabia and Israel?” Unfortunately, it’s far from clear that Obama would have serious problems with any of these outcomes.

[carl]

As I said, a similiar evolution of how people think about religion and how that affects the ability of governments to employ a single interpretation of religion as a population control measure is being challenged to what occured in Europe is happening in the ME.

It isn't about us, we need to respect there is a huge segment of humanity that is thinking about very fundamental things in new ways. Some will attempt to hijack religious concepts for political change, some will move toward more liberal interpretations and some will move to more conservative interpretations. This is an internal drama that we need to be very cautious about getting into the middle of, or to take sides in. Because then we become part of the problem for someone if we are part of the solution for someone else. Then they attack us.

Bob, I assume you are talking about the struggles occurring in the Muslim world between the various factions. I agree with all you say above, but (you probably figured the the 'but' was coming) with some provisos.

First, we must be forthright about not being bullied for following our customs in our countries. If somebody wants to publish cartoons in western countries that some soreheaded mullah who wants to make a name for himself finds objectionable, then that is what they will do and we should make no apologies for it. To the contrary, we have freedom of speech and expression here and if that soreheaded mullah doesn't like it, tough. Our govs need to be clear about that. Some things are not negotiable.

Second, we need to be clear about what we would like to see. We don't want takfiri killers to come to the fore. That would be bad. And that could happen, maybe not likely, but remotely possible. That is one of the reasons I think it important to note the persecution of Christians in some of these countries, because it is indicative of their real positions and perhaps of their actions if they got firm control of some countries. A nation or nations that was actively hostile to other countries because of the predominant faith is a bad thing, a throwback to the middle ages.

That doesn't mean we should not be very cautious, as you indicate above, but we must be clear about what we think is best. It is an internal drama that we mostly can't do much about, but that doesn't mean we should not do anything at all and stand mute.

One thing perhaps we could do additionally is pressure Saudi Arabia and some of the other gulf states to stop private individuals donating big money to the takfiri killers. If we did that it might help level the playing field in the struggle in the Muslim world. We will be much more able to do that now because of all the oil and gas being found all over the world. The Saudis just aren't as important as they were in that respect. Maybe in the totality of things that isn't possible or would be ill considered but it should be considered for the results would be good.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---some more evidence if you think Iran is not driving as a revolutionary hegemon. You will see at the end of paragraph the mentioning of the Badr Brigade---you do not want to know how many Iraqis I talked to who said in 2005 you all will regret having not dealt with the Badr Brigade as you are dealing with AQI.

Taken from the Washington Post 9.1.2013

Iran’s fingerprints in Fallujah
By David Ignatius, Thursday, January 9, 2:02 AM

First, the Obama administration, in its rush to leave the country, allowed the sectarian Shiite government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to undo many of the gains made against al-Qaeda. Second, Iran has waged a brilliant covert-action campaign that turned Maliki and Iraq into virtual clients of Tehran — and in the process alienated Sunnis and pushed them toward extremism.

The covert campaign in Iraq was directed by Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and it included a range of different Shiite figures around Maliki. This ability to ride many horses at once is a mark of Suleimani’s operating style. The Iranians also benefit from intelligence relationships that in some cases date back 40 years.

Iran has drawn its cards from a full deck of Iraqi militias. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who allegedly helped plan the 1983 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, now directs the IRGC-backed insurgent group known as Kataib Hezbollah. Qais al-Khazali, charged with kidnapping and killing U.S. Marines in Karbala in 2007, runs an IRGC-allied insurgent group known as Asaib al-Haq, or the League of the Righteous. A third Iraqi Shiite militia is known as the Promised Day Brigades. At Iran’s covert direction, fighters from all three militias have been sent to Syria to battle Sunni rebels there.

Iran allegedly has been able to use Iraq as a staging ground for operations to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad thanks partly to Hadi al-Ameri, the Iraqi minister of transportation. He headed the Badr Brigade, a pro-Iranian militia.

New Iraqi elections will be held in April. It’s a mark of Iran’s tactical skill that Tehran is said to be abandoning Maliki and searching for a new client. The United States is picking up the slack, once more supplying Maliki with advice and weapons. The Iranians, it must be said, play the Iraqi game with a finesse and staying power the United States has never matched.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---can keep the evidence rolling---this from July 2013 by no other than the BBC shows the development of a Shia dictator---BY the way he "weathered" Saddams days IN Syria before he returned to Iraq.

Would you want to bet just WHY he is supporting Assad a Shia right now?

THIS is the missing link---explains just why he has not slowed down the resupply flights out of Iran when asked to by the US and WHY he has not "condemned" Iraqi Shia fighters or Lebanese Hezbollah fighters as "terrorists" WHEN he condemnes Sunni FFs as "terrorists".

Notice how he used then and still uses the argument that "it is the brutal Sunnis who want Saddam back" and or it's ISIS and or both.

That is why I previously mentioned ISIS needs Malaki and Malaki needs ISIS.

Check the response of the US to their support to Malaki---naive to a degree or a total none understanding of Shia politics?

1 July 2013 5:36 pm
The Iraq War Part 3 BBC2

Despite the intimidation al Iraqiya won two seats more than Malikis supporters in the March 2010 election. Maliki demanded a recount, but it did not change the result. It was agreed that Maliki would remain Prime Minister, with Al Iraqiya receiving three senior cabinet posts, including Saleh Mutlaq as Deputy Prime Minister

However, Maliki did not implement the power sharing agreement, leading to street protests. 23 protestors were killed and more than 600 Sunnis were arrested, as was the head of the electoral commission. Maliki blamed continuing terrorism on Sunni leaders who, he alleged, wanted to bring back Saddams regime.

President Barack Obamas new US administration backed Maliki, claiming that he headed a democratic Iraq, with its most inclusive government yet. Saleh Mutlaq, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, told Obama that he was dreaming. He also said that Iraq had a one man, one party show and that Maliki was a dictator. Two days after making these comments his house and those of two other Iraqiya ministers were surrounded by troops commanded by Malikis son.

The result seems to be the replacement of a Sunni dictator, Saddam Hussein, with a Shia one, Nouri Maliki.

[Bob's World]

Stepping back a bit, the attached link take one to a paper on a topic that is at least as important today as it was when it was written.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/interna...arsheimer.html

Written in 1994/5 Professor John Mearsheimer ( a realist, as am I) takes on a detailed look at how to move forward from the Cold War into whatever was going to happen next, and the debate between realism and liberal institutionalism.

Clinton promoted the latter; Bush left the latter in place while acting like a realist; and Obama falls in on the results of both of those two efforts acting in a manner that may well be appropriate, but is probalby not well defined or explained to those working to execute the program, or deal with the effects.

The result is a bit messy...

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---then as a realist you might recognize the similarities between the quoted article and this comment.

Especially if you look at his definition of Realism.

There is a movement among some analysts to look at this comment below again in trying to understand internal dynamics of a population as they shift in the face of their day to day reality and how that dynamic plays out then between the state that represents the population with other state represented populations. Basically it shuts out institutions and focuses on the population creativity in the face of reality.

What it takes though are analysts that can see and understand the spontaneous, the adaptive and the alive elements---not analysts stuck in institutions forced to avoid addressing these items as it does not match the status quo.

Right now a perfect example of this edge of chaos is Egypt where the status quo is no longer, but what comes out is an unknown quantity because of the large number of components in play.

Personally think this is where Kilcullen was initially going in his ecosystem concept as a way to explain the chaos being seen but then he went no further.

“ The balance point -- often called the edge of chaos -- is where the components of a system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence either. . . The edge of chaos is where life has enough stability to sustain itself and enough creativity to deserve the name of life. The edge of chaos is where new idea and innovative genotypes are forever nibbling away at the edges of the status quo, and where even the most entrenched old guard will eventually be overthrown. The edge of chaos is where centuries of slavery and segregation suddenly give way to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s; where seventy years of Soviet communism suddenly give way to political turmoil and ferment; where eons of evolutionary stability suddenly give way to wholesale species transformation.

The edge is the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, the one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, adaptive and alive.”

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---can keep the evidence rolling---this from July 2013 by no other than the BBC shows the development of a Shia dictator

Yes, we're all aware of this. Evidence of what?

Would you want to bet just WHY he is supporting Assad a Shia right now?

THIS is the missing link---explains just why he has not slowed down the resupply flights out of Iran when asked to by the US and WHY he has not "condemned" Iraqi Shia fighters or Lebanese Hezbollah fighters as "terrorists" WHEN he condemnes Sunni FFs as "terrorists".

Notice how he used then and still uses the argument that "it is the brutal Sunnis who want Saddam back" and or it's ISIS and or both.

None of this is a surprise to anyone who's been half paying attention.

That is why I previously mentioned ISIS needs Malaki and Malaki needs ISIS.

Of course. The dictator always needs the insurgent, and vice versa. It is a symbiotic relationship... and the occasional implications of omniscience will be more convincing if you spell Maliki's name correctly.

Check the response of the US to their support to Malaki---naive to a degree or a total none understanding of Shia politics?

The naivete is the same naivete that the US displays in Afghanistan. It is the fundamental naivete of the "regime change + nation building" construct: the idea that you can remove a regime, install a new one, maintain any vague facade of "democracy", and still have any significant degree of control over the direction in which the new regime develops, it's ability to govern, and the extent to which its choices and actions will be compatible with our policies. That persistent illusion needs to be considered in any contemplated action in Syria. Reality: even if we contribute to Assad's removal, we will have no control over what happens next, which is likely to be ugly. Of course what happens next is going to be ugly no matter what anyone does, but if we're the ones who make it happen, it's our responsibility. Taking responsibility for that which you cannot control is never an attractive position.

We don't support Maliki because of a "slant toward Shiaism". We support him for the same reason we support Karzai. They are the outcome of our actions, and we have in the past, mistakenly or not, declared them legitimate. We don't want to admit that we were wrong, or that what we started has gone into a place that is no longer consistent with our interests (though it's hard to say why a government of Iraq or Afghanistan should be directed by our interests). The same thing is likely to happen in Syria if we take sides and try to impose an outcome that we think suitable.

I'm still waiting: what do you think the US should be doing about the Syrian situation, and why?

[Dayuhan]

Personally think this is where Kilcullen was initially going in his ecosystem concept as a way to explain the chaos being seen but then he went no further.

The "ecosystem concept" does not in itself explain anything. That's not what it's meant to do. It provides a conceptual framework into which the unique details of a given "ecosystem" can be organized and perhaps better understood. Without the details there can be no explanation forthcoming, and the explanation coming out is no better than the accuracy and relevance of the details that go in. As a general rule, the broader and more general the inputs, the less valuable the output. The greater the extent to which the details are based on assumption or generalization, the less valuable the output.

Overall it's a potentially useful tool, but I wouldn't want to depend on it exclusively. Like most conceptual frameworks, it can be manipulated by controlling the information put into the framework, and it can be rendered useless if the information inputs are sloppy or based on assumptions or generalizations.

My observation of the discourse ecosystem in which we operate is that about 99.7% of the invocations of terms like "conflict ecosystems", "complex adaptive systems". "complexity theory", "quantum mechanics", "postmodernism", etc, ad nauseam, have minimal relevance to the construct referred to and are intended not to explain, but to identify those who invoke them with what are presumed to be cutting edge intellectual concepts. In short, they aren't meant to clarify, they are meant to make those who use them sound erudite, to position the user in a hypothetical inner circle, and avoid the risk of explaining something clearly. To use an expression Robert has been known to use, they are meant to complify, not simplicate. Buzzwords and jargon do not promote clarity, they obstruct it.

There is a movement among some analysts to look at this comment below again in trying to understand internal dynamics of a population as they shift in the face of their day to day reality and how that dynamic plays out then between the state that represents the population with other state represented populations. Basically it shuts out institutions and focuses on the population creativity in the face of reality.

For those of us who actually live in tn these populations, this seems like a rather... intellectually autoerotic approach to comprehension of our day to day reality. As always, the relevance of the output will depend not on the frameworks and systems developed by the analysts, or by the erudition of their buzzwords, but on the quality of the ground-level information they feed into the models. I don't expect much, but then I'm naturally cynical about what happens when analysts try to understand the edge.

Right now a perfect example of this edge of chaos is Egypt where the status quo is no longer, but what comes out is an unknown quantity because of the large number of components in play.

Outcomes are always unknown: we do not have crystal balls. Hence the need to avoid the hubris of thinking that involvement in a situation will allow us to control or dictate an outcome.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---have you yourself ever taken the time to take a specific problem and tear it into ever smaller "pieces" until you "see" and "understand" the real driver which might in fact be totally different from where you started with your own biases/assumptions when you initially looked at the problem set?

Everything these days the last time I checked are human driven and in order to "understand" and "see" the WHAT and the WHY one must fully "understand" the environment of the human, the reasons for his actions, the relationships of humans inside his environment, the interrelationship with other humans in their specific environments, the environment itself and the inherent drivers inside that environment and on and on ---this is what ecosystem is all about---every insect/animal on this planet has one and so humans are what not to have one?

Are you saying we are in fact so different from other life forms that we kind of have our "own" life space thing going for us, BUT it is in fact not an ecosystem?

So how do you describe yourself and the environment you live in--WHAT terms do you use--and WHY do you use them?

What we are just a bunch of humans drifting through the time/space continum who pretend to understand they know what is going on around themselves, but in no way are capable of changing anything as we humans have what no influence on things around us because we belong to no "system" thus are not required to interact with anything else---come on.

One is often surprised at the actual driver, relationship, or event of a problem set when it is all said and done---but it takes someone who understands how to use the method---throwing words, comments such as the comment below does not really work when attempting to "understand" and "see" a problem.

Throwing words, comments, around can be done by anyone ---doing the actual work is far harder and more intensive than you seem to think it is.

It is not about trying to "prove" your own particular (personal/political/religious) beliefs or biases---it is all about trying to "understand and see" the drivers of a particular group, person, population, environment---or Robert calls his WHAT and WHY.

The reason I am "assuming" you have not ever done a really thorough analysis on any problem set is actually reflected in the first sentence in your comment below--

"My observation of the discourse

" infers you have never conducted a thorough analysis on anything using as you yourself quoted

"conflict ecosystems", "complex adaptive systems". "complexity theory", "quantum mechanics", "postmodernism", etc, ad nauseam

Give me one example of your own actual analytical research on any particular problem set where you have used nothing taken from any of the methods you have just quoted above.

What do you use then as an analytical tool/tools -personal observations, personal biases, political views, religious views, media reports, gut instinct (which many times is actually correct), other people's quotes--?

My observation of the discourse ecosystem in which we operate is that about 99.7% of the invocations of terms like "conflict ecosystems", "complex adaptive systems". "complexity theory", "quantum mechanics", "postmodernism", etc, ad nauseam, have minimal relevance to the construct referred to and are intended not to explain, but to identify those who invoke them with what are presumed to be cutting edge intellectual concepts. In short, they aren't meant to clarify, they are meant to make those who use them sound erudite, to position the user in a hypothetical inner circle, and avoid the risk of explaining something clearly. To use an expression Robert has been known to use, they are meant to complify, not simplicate. Buzzwords and jargon do not promote clarity, they obstruct it.

Buzzwords and jargon do not promote clarity, they obstruct it.

You are so totally right but what do you yourself specifically use in analyzing the world around you----buzz words and jargon---interesting is it not?

So when you ask repeatedly for evidence--WHAT research methodology are you actually using if given evidence when you have excluded any of the research techniques listed in your quote?

Personal biases are easy to state, but really hard to defend.

Or as the old saying goes "talk is cheap so everyone has an opinion"---that is one analysis method I guess.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---not sure if you have used any of the new Social Network Analysis (SNA) "tools" before tied to some very,very good data search engines (which you had not previously listed recently), but what they have been revealing about insurgent groups and their "eocsystems" from personalities, funding, reasons for fighting, support mechanisms, cross ecosystem linkages which can then be proven is starting get one as they say "into the game" of "seeing" and then "understanding" a target population.

Sometimes regardless of what one thinks about them "tools" can help in "understanding" complexity one normally does not see or simply overlooks.

Advanced SNA has just stated to be used by the US, but any country where internal problems occur can use the "tools". Initially used in the US on analyzing insurgent groups it can be easily used to analyze criminal gangs and their activities.

This was taken from a new Mexican Crime article on SWJ which show you how others use SNA tools in their search for "understanding".

Today, technological tools available for social scientists allow zooming in and out on criminal networks, improving the understanding of global characteristics and details of these phenomena. Tools such as Social Network Analysis, predictive analysis, and various data mining procedures constantly improve and reveal an increasing level of complexity of criminal networks around the world.

Currently in Mexico converge some of the most complex criminal networks that operate in the Western Hemisphere, Western Africa, and parts of Europe.

These analyses have also revealed a high level of resilience, meaning that several subnetworks operating in different regions and countries, usually with different command structures, articulate entire criminal networks…………….

In practical terms, those networks do not consist of compact and hierarchical organizations.

[Bob's World]

My thought for the day:

We need to recover from the belief that playing well, but losing, is good enough. It isn't. When success is measured in tactical, objective terms over six month increments the "evidence" is that we are clearly winning. However, when one steps back and takes a longer view with subjective criteria it becomes equally clear that we are speeding our own demise.

Like the BCS Championship game, it is far better to play ugly and win in the end, than it is to execute a brilliant, dominating gameplan for over three quarters to lose in the end. One would think we would have learned this lesson in Vietnam, but the only lesson senior leaders tout about Vietnam recently is that "we defeated the insurgency, but only later, after we left, did the state of South Vietnam fall to the state of North Vietnam." Pure delusion.

[carl]

Dayuhan---not sure if you have used any of the new Social Network Analysis (SNA) "tools" before tied to some very,very good data search engines (which you had not previously listed recently), but what they have been revealing about insurgent groups and their "eocsystems" from personalities, funding, reasons for fighting, support mechanisms, cross ecosystem linkages which can then be proven is starting get one as they say "into the game" of "seeing" and then "understanding" a target population.

Sometimes regardless of what one thinks about them "tools" can help in "understanding" complexity one normally does not see or simply overlooks.

Advanced SNA has just stated to be used by the US, but any country where internal problems occur can use the "tools". Initially used in the US on analyzing insurgent groups it can be easily used to analyze criminal gangs and their activities.

This was taken from a new Mexican Crime article on SWJ which show you how others use SNA tools in their search for "understanding".

That sounds like the cross referenced file card system described by Orrin DeForest in his book Slow Burn, which he said, if I remember correctly, was taught to him by the Kempeitai. Is it about the same?

[carl]

Pundita had a very interesting post in her blog post of Dec 30 ( http://pundita.blogspot.com/ ). She said:

After seeing the two episodes of God in America I realized there was a simple explanation for this: modern America's obsessively secular public life suppressed disputes among Americans that are based in theology. While a political Liberal could cite his faith for support of say, civil rights legislation and a political Conservative could cite the same for his opposition to abortion, it was off limits in the public forum to dispute or even question the theological assumptions informing the political stances.

There is much more in the post itself.

This has application to this discussion I think. Could the same be said about our understanding of the motivations of our takfiri killer foes? Charles Cameron asked this question also in the comment section.

I think we are handicapped in fighting these guys if we aren't up front with ourselves about why they are so determined to kill people.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---not sure if you have used any of the new Social Network Analysis (SNA) "tools" before tied to some very,very good data search engines

I have not. The disadvantage of working outside of any institutional affiliation is that you don't get to play with the newest toys. The corresponding advantage is that you are unhampered by bureaucracy of any kind. I prefer the fringe, largely for personal reasons: I dislike bureaucracy more than I like new toys.

what they have been revealing about insurgent groups and their "eocsystems" from personalities, funding, reasons for fighting, support mechanisms, cross ecosystem linkages which can then be proven is starting get one as they say "into the game" of "seeing" and then "understanding" a target population.

Sometimes regardless of what one thinks about them "tools" can help in "understanding" complexity one normally does not see or simply overlooks.

Advanced SNA has just stated to be used by the US, but any country where internal problems occur can use the "tools". Initially used in the US on analyzing insurgent groups it can be easily used to analyze criminal gangs and their activities.

This was taken from a new Mexican Crime article on SWJ which show you how others use SNA tools in their search for "understanding".

Has it ever occurred to you that while the US invariably has access to the most sophisticated intellectual models and theories and the most technologically advanced data mining and processing capacity of any given time, American decision-makers still seem to remain singularly unable to understand the world around them? I'd submit that this is at least in part due to a tendency to be over-reliant on those intellectual models and technological marvels. Those provide useful tools, but they cannot compensate for lack of direct feet-on-ground exposure in the places we wish to understand. The US is singularly weak in this regard: we move our people around so much that they rarely if ever gain meaningful local expertise, we impose dense thickets of security measures that prevent official representatives from long term integration with populaces, and we are chronically reluctant to listen to the people who are actually in a position to understand... largely, I suspect, because they tell us what we don't want to hear.

The models and tools you describe are useful contributors, but they will not bring understanding by themselves. Mining and analysis of social media will provide useful data and important information... but anyone who thinks they can "understand" a conflict environment by reading social media postings, no matter how they are organized or processed, is simply delusional.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---have you yourself ever taken the time to take a specific problem and tear it into ever smaller "pieces" until you "see" and "understand" the real driver which might in fact be totally different from where you started with your own biases/assumptions when you initially looked at the problem set?

Yes. I do it all the time. It's my profession.

J.S. Furnivall once compared the British Colonial Office to a cuttlefish, noting their common tendency, when threatened, to conceal themselves in clouds of ink. Substitute pixels for ink and the balance of your post fits that model rather well.

Suppose we get back on topic, focus, and address a couple of questions:

You have mentioned several times that you perceive a "slant toward Shiaism" on the part of the US. What specific evidence leads you to that conclusion?

You have on a number of occasions expressed dissatisfaction with the US decision not to get directly involved in Syria. What do you think the US should have done, and when, and why?

[Bob's World]

I personally think if we truly want to be a "world leader" we need to avoid slants toward any particular party to the degree possible, and seek to be as balanced in our approach to the world as possible.

When we slant it should be toward some clearly stated set of principles that we stand for. I think FDR's vision for a post WWII world is a good start point for such a discussion

1. The four freedoms: From fear and want, freedom of speech and religion;
2. The right of self-determination of governance
3. The end of colonialism (or other excessive unwanted external influence over ones governance and day to day lives);
4. The four policemen (in 1945 that was the US, China, Russia and the UK forming a network dedicated to deterring conflicts between others - of course we then broke into two camps and the rest, as they say, is history)

Making others like us is not working. Neither is blindly backing the play of a handful of "enduring" allies. Working to allow others everywhere to be more like themselves but without being able to abuse their neighbors is better, IMO.

[carl]

Bob Jones I am ashamed of you. You can do a lot better than that. Some of those things are so broad or so anodyne they can mean anything and everything to any and everybody.

You did include freedom of religion. That is good. But that is one of the exact things the takfiri killers are adamantly opposed to. We should recognize that aspect of their behavior and openly oppose it. I am not sure we do that effectively.