"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[Bill Moore]

Concur, just expressing my frustration with the system for the first time this year. We will still continue to slave away in hopes of achieving big changes, but will be happy with small victories when we achieve them. If you go back to work tomorrow you'll find something in your inbox I have been slaving away on the past days that actually, if approved, will be a framework for moving in this direction.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---interesting comment from you;

"Muslims are also persecuted in many places... parts of Russia, western China, Burma, southern Thailand, southern Philippines. How would we change that short of something stronger than talk, if it can be changed at all? And again, why would we try?"

With what about 3B Muslims world wide---and having read AQs recent General Guidance to Jihad what if the US policies message the reinforcing of our interests in that population being fairly treated ---not through force but by all available other non violent methods.

Then how does AQ handle that ie the US is now strongly interested in those populations --not forcing our value systems on them but allowing those populations to decide for themselves where they want to go even if it goes against our initial political instincts.

I expect that the nations involved would tell us to piss off, mind our own business, and stay out of their internal affairs, and that AQ's message would be "they talk, we act".

IE just what was our response to the Arab Springs? Initially confusion, then standoff, then we tried to engage insisting on democratic development---instead of providing flanking support and allowing the effected population to decide on their own which direction they want to go and with the US signally OK maybe it is not in our interests but it is your interests so we will go with it.

Just what then is AQs messaging--are we then the "near enemy" or is the governance that is not responding to their population really now the "near enemy" as alluded to in the AQ Guidance as we have to a degree identified with the populations own desires and drives regardless of where it goes?

But we will never get to that point as we have locked ourselves into our former Cold War mindsets and view AQ and Sunni/Shia fundamentalism as also equal to Communism-therefore the old domino theory has arisen again.

I don't think the US tried all that hard to impose direction on the Arab Spring revolutions, nor do I think the overall outcome was unduly influenced by the US. Of course these nations will be unstable and in flux for many years to come, but that's the nature of transition out of extended dictatorship. Quite pointless to think that instability is an outcome of American action or inaction.

I do not believe that the US can undo AQs messaging by trying to supplant AQ as defenders of Muslims. That just leads to more meddling, and it will snap back on us. If we suffer the consequences of ill advised meddling in the past, the solution is not counter-meddling: we can't undo bad meddling with good meddling. We can undercut AQs message by meddling less, and by meddling more discreetly when we must meddle.

We need to understand that we will not win points with Muslim populaces by criticizing their governments. It's a hard quirk for many Americans to understand, but in much of the world even people who hate their government will rally behind it if it is criticized by a foreign power, especially if that foreign power is the US.

Dayuhan--this comment goes to the heart of our policy failures in the ME---it is all about how we are perceived nothing more nothing else---how does the common man in the population view us.

Right now not much higher than say the top side of a buried grain of sand.

"Wading into a mess we can't resolve because we don't want someone else to get credit for resolving it would seem to me to be pursuit of policy contrary to self-interest."

Yes we could have waded into Syria but in fact we cannot as we are trying to gain a settlement with Iran which we nationally right now view of higher importance that the thousands being killed in Syria or the Sunni/Shia death fight.

We let others take Syria as we as a country really do not want to conduct a war with Iran where there are no winners only losers.

That's one of many reasons we don't want to get involved in Syria.

Confronting the Shia in Syria would have killed any chances of an agreement with Iran for the next ten or so years and Iran would have gone faster nuclear and the Israelis would have gone to war so Syria civilian deaths while brutal are not in our national interests and this is the messaging that AQ throws at us in the ME---and our actions just reinforce that message.

If we do get overtly involved in Syria, that would reinforce AQs message even more. Regardless of our intention, it would be perceived as American intrusion in a Muslim nation in pursuit of presumably nefarious American objectives. We can message til we're blue in the face, the Arab Street will not believe that we are acting to protect Syrians. I don't think most Americans would believe it.

But to the Arab population as a whole the killing does in fact matter and how we respond to Syria is determining what influence or no influence we will have going forward in the ME and it is definitely impacting the Saudi's who say the least are p_____ed at us is an understatement.

Certainly it matters, but that doesn't mean they expect the US to do anything about it. It's one of those "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situations: if we stay out we're accused of standing by and watching Muslims die, if we go in we're accused of meddling for our own devious purposes. Given that there is zero domestic support for involvement, the chances of a favorable outcome look very small, there's a serious lack of credible partners to support, and very high quagmire potential, it's hard to craft a persuasive case for involvement.

[Dayuhan]

Is it something we need to change? No, not from a national survival standpoint. From a human standpoint though, yes it needs to change.

"It needs to change" and "we need to change it" are two very different things. Which, if either, do you propose?

The Muslims who are persecuted in the places you mention are targets mainly because they are Muslim Separatists, they are rebelling against the government. Righteous cause or not, they are viewed as rebels. That is qualitatively different from the persecution of Christians in some Muslim countries and especially the killings committed by the takfiri killers. That persecution and those murders are committed solely because the victims are Christians. They aren't rebelling against anybody. They are being killed because of the faith they profess. They aren't the only ones being killed for their faith. In Pakistan the Ahmadis, Shias and others get the chop.

They are separatists, and rebelling, because they are persecuted, not the other way around. Why do you think they are rebelling in the first place?

My own opinion as to what to do is twofold. The first is talk. The US gov should take notice of these things and say so.

I don't think talk is very wise if we aren't prepared to back the talk with action. If we aren't (and we're generally not) we just come off looking impotent.

The other thing is extension of visas to Christians from countries like that. It seems to me that they would win, not getting killed next week; and we would win, we would gain people who would like the place that saved them.

Would we extend that privilege to persecuted non-Christians as well? Why would we single out Christians persecuted by Muslims for special favor?

[Dayuhan]

But when the conditions are of a resistance nature cause by the impact of US policy we need to be extremely aware, as this is what drives transnational terrorism against us. When it is a fusion of both, and we work to protect the government that is at odds with its population (as is typically the case for out intel-driven operations today), it is the worst case, and this is why strategically we are moving in the opposite direction our tactics are intended to take us.

We need to very careful about any assumption that any situation is caused by US policy. US policy is often one of many interactive causes, but it is almost never "the cause" of anything. Overrating the causative impact of US policy can lead us to overrate the curative impact of a US policy change, or lead us to assume a control that we do not actually have.

Perhaps the worst mistake we can make is thinking that problems exacerbated by our meddling in the past can be alleviated by meddling again: that we can effectively counter-meddle, or undo bad meddling with good meddling. That just gets us deeper into the mess.

Casting the causation of modern radical Islam and the terrorism some factions of it have embraced purely in terms of populace-government dynamics is dangerously simplistic. Assuming that it was caused by US policy and therefore can be uncaused by US policy is equally simplistic and equally dangerous, assuming a power that we do not actually have. Government-populace dynamics in the Muslim world (and elsewhere) are complex and often tense, but they are not something we can play any meaningful role in resolving. Even in cases where we have distorted those relationships in the past, we cannot meddle again to try to un-distort them; if we try we just distort them more.

I feel that at times you're trying to force ground circumstances into the model, rather than adjusting the model to fit ground circumstances.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

We'll just have to agree to disagree.

There is a far cry from "simple" to "simplistic.". A P38 C-ration can opener is simple, beating a can open with a rock is simplistic.

Ideology has been made the great Bogeyman, along with simplistic statements like "they hate us for our freedom." History of such conflicts and the facts of the current ones simply don't support this.

"They" hate that we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable, and no effective legal means exist to gain such changes. Or at least this is often perceived to be true. Reality is irrelevant, as is our own perceptions of ourselves. It is the perceptions of the people in question that rules.

[AmericanPride]

Ideology has been made the great Bogeyman, along with simplistic statements like "they hate us for our freedom." History of such conflicts and the facts of the current ones simply don't support this.

Bob, I am interested in where you see policy and ideology intersecting and the relevancy of that relationship to your discourse. I ask this because the comment quoted below is itself riddled with ideological presumptions.

"They" hate that we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable, and no effective legal means exist to gain such changes. Or at least this is often perceived to be true. Reality is irrelevant, as is our own perceptions of ourselves. It is the perceptions of the people in question that rules.

In your original post, you asked: do ideologies - be it Nazism, Communism, Islamism, or any other "ism" radicalize otherwise content populations to rise in illegal conflict, or are these simply effective tunes tailored to help a particular "parade" march in step?

The question, and some other comments in the same OP, contain numerous references to legality and I am curious to what extent your emphasis on legality shapes your policy prescriptions.

[AmericanPride]

this comment goes to the heart of our policy failures in the ME---it is all about how we are perceived nothing more nothing else---how does the common man in the population view us.

I submit to you that the "common man" is an irrelevant political construct, and that the perception of others of us is less important than our perception of ourselves, as far as pursuing a specific policy is concerned. The Middle East is an interesting case study because the material interests of the engaged parties are so clearly visible and so it's easy to dispense with theoretical distractions. I agree that there are a number of "policy failures" in the Middle East, though I would contend that none of them are disastrous, and I am sure we will disagree on which policies should be counted among the failures. I do not think our failures can be described in any significant part to "how we are perceived" - as Dayuhan pointed out, the US is widely perceived as acting in a way contrary to the interests of the "common man in the population" regardless of which policy it pursues. The real question is which uncommon elites are unnecessarily incited to oppose US policies and is it necessary for the US to do anything about it?

Several countries in the ME are in contentious transition, and all the actors have already chosen sides - including the US. But the US is more constrained by the political and economic conditions at home than by any perception of the "common man" in the ME. If the US was ever interested in the views of the "common man", it would never have backed dictatorships in the first place.

[Dayuhan]

There is a far cry from "simple" to "simplistic.". A P38 C-ration can opener is simple, beating a can open with a rock is simplistic.

I'm aware of the difference. I used "simplistic" for a reason.

Ideology has been made the great Bogeyman, along with simplistic statements like "they hate us for our freedom." History of such conflicts and the facts of the current ones simply don't support this.

Agreed.

"They" hate that we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable, and no effective legal means exist to gain such changes.

Unfortunately, that's very nearly as simplistic as "they hate us for our freedom". There are any number of people out there who hate us, or see us as an obstacle to their ambitions or as a potentially exploitable asset or any number of things. There's a huge range of reasons behind all of those. The one you cite is probably among them, but it's by no means the only or the most important one. Singling out that one element as a basis for policy is, yes, simplistic.

The contention that "we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable" remains unsupported. Where is this the case? Certainly not in Saudi Arabia. We have zero control or influence over Saudi domestic policy, and not much more over their foreign policy. The example given before, of what happened when the US tried to promote accommodation and negotiation in Bahrain's Arab Spring incident, remains appropriate. I'm sure you noted that the Saudis recently offered $3 billion in military hardware to the Lebanese army, obviously seeking to improve its position vs Hezbollah, with the provision that the hardware must come from France. That's $3 billion less for the US defense industry. That seems a pretty clear statement to me, and I seriously doubt that any American attempt to influence the relationship between the Saudi government and its populaces is going to be well received by either side of that equation.

Or at least this is often perceived to be true. Reality is irrelevant, as is our own perceptions of ourselves. It is the perceptions of the people in question that rules.

I think you're making quite sweeping assumptions about what other people perceive, and I don't see any effort to support those assumptions with evidence.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert/Bill---what I say in the next might inflame SF but here goes anyway as I think that is where SF has gone wrong in an attempt to overcome that Army's intense dislike of SF coming out of VN.

In the days of 50/60/early 70s officers assigned to SF A, B, C teams were always volunteers as the crossed arrows for them did not exist.

The result was that the officers came and went but the NCO structure remained in place---WOs were also an unknown item.

What the result was that we got some great, some good and some not so good officers assigned to us-but the team suffered through it knowing they were go at some point so they made the best of it--the shift to the crossed arrows came when the argument was raised that officers would not volunteer for SF as it 1) effected their promotions and future careers, 2) it actually did kill careers as big Army still did not like SF.

If one looks at how that model turned out then today this is what SF has---as the officer raises within the crossed arrows there are becoming virtually no more places for them to be naturally assigned to corresponding to their rank requirements for the next promotion and now SF has a jam at the MAJ and LTC levels causing say a MAJ who gets assigned to a position at the International Center in Germany and who makes LTC to then slide left to an embassy position in a country where he speaks the language and then slides left again to say a SOF higher staff position in order to reach 20 years.

So really you still only have young officers up through CAPT and then they are on the hunt for promotion positions in that 20 yr hunt.

So SF shifted---and installed officers and WOs into the teams taking away what had been a solid NCO core who remained for years a lot of the time in the same teams.

In my case it was the core NCOs that moved a second tasker to rethink--not the officers who were just assigned for 2 yrs and who moved on.

It was the NCOs that set into motion a movement within the HRF that came to fruition ---ie moving a really rightwing unit to a moderate force that led in the rebalancing of a mistake---it took massive efforts on the part of that team and teams coming in behind us ---it was NCOs that made the difference, not staffs or officers. But we pulled it off and in the process forced the national level to rethink their policies.

I think this is where Robert is going in his thoughts.

If SF really wants to rethink and reset after 12 yrs of war then they need to start with the crossed arrows problem set that is in fact gumming up the works not helping.

Maybe a policy of yes you can served X number of officer years within SF under the crossed arrows but at some point you have to get into the real world and perform in the real world and then maybe in X number of years come back to the force in more senior positions.

This would in effect do what a number of PME courses tries to do---integrate SF into the GPF and provide a better understanding within the GPF of SF.

Try selling that right now to the crossed arrows.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan--this is an interesting comment;

"The contention that "we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable" remains unsupported."


Take this sentence and then as an exercise read all the major US newspaper headlines right after the Arab Spring erupted in each Arab country---immediate talk of "democracy breaking out, free elections, rights for women, radical Islam being defeated, personal freedom and democratic values, etc---the list could go on and on.

So at the national level we transported our values into the Spring ---did we for a single moment stop as ask if that is what the population wanted that was in the streets?---no we did not and when the Spring took a turn we did not like---check out then the newspaper headlines.

This is where Robert is heading.

Take Iran right now---there was a really interesting article in a leading German newspaper a week or so ago in German indicating that yes fundamentalism is being reinforced every day in Iran but that is not where the young population is headed--ie they tolerate the fundamentalism because in their private lives out of sight of the Revolutionary Guards they drink, party to the latest music and purchase ten times the amount of cosmetics than during the Shah days-by the way cosmetics sales in Saudi are sky high and the young Iranians in the face of all of this are actually favorable towards the US

By the way the article was not picked up by any newspaper outside of Germany. Ever wonder why?

BUT here is the difference---they would never turn back the revolution, and they firmly believe Iran has a nuclear right, are practicing Shia and blame the US for the economical problems inside Iran.

They do though believe in secularism not fundamentalism---big difference.

So what has been our position towards Iran?

This is what Robert is alluding to---do our actions which we view from our side to be correct actually cause more problems especially if those actions are not being viewed the same way by the target population? Historically speaking and even today the answer is yes.

I keep repeating as it is true our national policies are in fact driving fundamentalism on both sides of Islam and we are delivering to AQ everyday messaging that is being used against us within the target population.

Especially in the worldwide Sunni populations---this includes the worldwide Shia populations as well.

[Bob's World]

First, I want to thank everyone who has weighed in on this thread to date, your comments have been well- considered and thoughtful, regardless of where your personal analysis led you to fall on the topic.

Often our greatest advances as humans appeared simplistic when first introduced. My thoughts are a multi-year reduction process from many diverse and complex concepts and events down to where I am now. That does not make me right, I could be as wrong headed as our current concepts, doctrine and approaches to these challenges. It is an effort to get to a fundamental understanding, and to express it in simple terms.

Often that can be perceived as "simplistic."

Simplistic is watching cable news and reading blogs all day; marinating that in one's own personal biases and then announcing some theory. That could produce the right answer, like monkeys typing, but that is not how I got here.

Nor did I get here doing lengthy research in some University office, spiced with a handful of field trips to various theaters.

Mine is a mix of research, study and continuous practice. That does not make my perspective right, but it does make it not "simplistic."

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---for the want of beating a dead horse five tines over---here goes just two examples of what I and Robert might agree on.

1. Let's take Iran which is the most pressing national policy point right now---now take yourself on a backwards journey to the beginnings at least for me of the Iranian problem---1953 with the CIA's overthrow of a "democratically elected president".

Understand fully why we at the national level condoned the coup ie Soviet containment---all Cold War thinking.

Now jump forward to the 1979 overthrow of the Shah which really was just a continuation of unfinished business from 1953.

What was our public and private responses to the overthrow then?

Now take time to really study the SAVAK-trained by, paid for,sometimes led by and controlled by the CIA and the role it played from in Iran 1953 to 1979.
More critically the role played by SAVAK against Iranian dissidents in say Germany during that period.

Jump to the Beirut US Embassy bombing which actually only targeted the CIA---strong rumors that it was a payback by the KGB for the CIA's turning over to the Iranians a list of all Iranian Communists-who were then either killed, imprisoned or fled the country by the Revolutionary Guards.

Now jump forward to 2013 and how do we respond to the Iranian nuclear drive? Now really take time to study the hypocritical views of the US in that you Iran cannot have a nuclear program but yes you Israel can not only have nuclear power you can in fact have nuclear weapons.

How is it possible that Israeli nuclear weapons are such a "well kept secret" that everyone in the ME knows exists, but we at the national level still deny?

2. Now the second example of our national policies and how they effect the target population-Hamas and Gaza.

Was it not Bush that pushed for "democratically open, free and observed public elections" in Gaza? Yes and they were open, public, free,--- from the multinational observers on the ground relatively fair for/by ME standards.

Why/How did the national policy makers really believe the PLO would win?---just where were they in their thoughts as everyone in Gaza knew how corrupted the PLO was and still is.

Hamas now wins in an "democratically open, public, free, and fair election" and then what was our national level policy response to that election through to today? We should have at the national level been overjoyed as is it not the same values we keep repeating over and over to the world as examples of "democracy"?

In the Gaza population the US polices as perceived by them definitely are not winning us friends in that region.

If you still cannot see the connections then I guess we can beat the dead horse six times with other examples.

This is where Robert is coming from.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---your comments on simplistic are interesting---the core problem I have with the national policy making since the days I began a long walk through the dark UW world colored by the Cold War and continued until today has been one of really wondering why they get it so wrong all of the time just not occasionally wrong.

Yes I can understand the drive in having the entire world accept our values as an underlying US quirk but much as you have I learned also during that long cold UW march that those we assumed wanted and aspired to "our values" did not necessarily have the same understanding of the meaning of the words that we have. Miscommunication is killing us geopolitically.

Then attempt to push back and start to question what was occurring---then one gets hit with "you don't get it, what are you a leftie worst a communist, hey if you do not like it leave the country, you are naive that is not what the world wants etc".

And if one holds a clearance then one learns to throttle the thoughts, accept the marching orders and move on---but the questions still chew at you especially if in Iraq you get an eye opening again that starts showing you what you thought years earlier was in fact correct. Have felt for years that holding a clearance inhibits deep and straight forward discussions out of fear that one takes the comments in the wrong direction---one of questioning authority.

My question to you recently--it cannot be that simple---meant if in fact it is actually simple then why does not a national level decision maker or advisor see it as well.

I have felt for a long number of years the world is far simpler than we want it to be and we as humans tend to want to make something far more complicated than needed as we think that is what it should be---being simple challenges one to relook his or her view of the events and question all the time not just once and move on.

Maybe having worked the team level in strange and challenging cultures colored my views but at the same time it reinforced certain views --I was as well fortune to during my education after SF to have had BU Professors who had great academic reputations as renown "actual" Socialist/Communists who forced one to challenge one's biases and to defend one's views.

This discussion has been interesting in that it pushes a thought that is hard for an individual to do "speak truth to power"---really hard for the current Force even harder for national decision makers and their advisors.

Maybe that is the reason that after fighting the fight for so long within the organization and seeing how the organization does not listen worse yet sidelines one---I decided to pull the plug and remain outside the US --gives me peace of mind as one can carry on such discussions as this one with friends/past service members and one surprisingly finds many having the same views.

My SF career started overseas and ending a career overseas seemed to be a fitting concept. When one walks the road of participating in history as long as I have one tends to get cynical--cynical does not work currently in the US. Learned a long time ago peace of mind counts over anything-also learned that one can never really change history.

You and I might understand what we are discussing but that understanding will never make it to the decision making levels.

Actually events are simple but that is a hard message to carry forward especially for decision makers.

[AmericanPride]

This is what Robert is alluding to---do our actions which we view from our side to be correct actually cause more problems especially if those actions are not being viewed the same way by the target population? Historically speaking and even today the answer is yes.

Robert's argument is well understood - the counter-question is two-fold: (1) to what extent is that phenomenon relevant compared to other causes and (2) what is the relevancy of a "target population's" perception of policy to that policy? Resistance to a thing is not a determinant of that thing's invalidity.

[Bob's World]

AP - Exactly right. Often it is not the things (Ends) we seek to do, but rather the Ways and Means we employ to achieve them.

That, and the hard fact that success for the US post-Cold War was largely to sustain the status quo. This is also success for dictators, friend or foe, such as the Kim and Saudi and Assad families, Qaddafi, Mubarak, etc. In an era freed from the structure of the Cold War stand off and empowered by information technology everyone and every other government in the world defined success in terms of change.

It is this collision of those dedicated to sustaining the status quo with those dedicated to change. Stability from a rigid structure vs. stability as in riding a bike. We have been too dedicated to rigidity and have proven quite soundly that one can indeed forget how to ride a bike.

[Bob's World]

Not sure if this helps, but this is a visual depiction

Here is the text from the Notes Page:

To counter the strategy of AQ, we must first recognize the fundamental political opportunism of what they have been doing. We have overly focused on the illegality and violence of their tactics, upon the ideology they have applied to rally others to their cause, and upon the fact that they saw fit to attack the US and our interests. Those are all superficial factors that are true, and somewhat relevant, but largely immaterial to understanding this problem at a fundamental and strategic level.

There are two broad types of insurgency in play, revolution and resistance. These are very different. The first is internal and merely illegal politics; the second is external and a continuation of war. Both have unique cures as well. Bin Laden and AQ did not "create" this. Like Mao, UBL "saw a parade, and leapt in front."

US foreign policy for the Middle East was largely designed to contain the Soviets and to create a system of reliable allies across the region to secure our interests through. We compromised our values to put this system in place and to sustain it as part of our Cold War Containment strategy.

Once the Cold War ended, unlike other regions, the governments of this region were satisfied with the status quo, as were US business and government. So we let our foreign policy ride, and it grew increasingly out of date and inappropriate. This began almost immediately to create conditions of resistance insurgency to remove this virtual "occupation by policy." Recent decisions by President Obama in Egypt, Syria, and most recently Iran are working to reduce these conditions. Our excessive CT practices, however, and dedication to preserving regimes in KSA, Mali, Yemen; our invasions and manipulations of governance in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce perceptions of illegitimate control. We must find a new balance to reduce these conditions holistically across the region and it will work to drain the energy from the conditions of resistance insurgency AQ relies upon to recruit for acts of transnational terrorism against the US and our interests.

The governments of the region have never had to deal with populations as empowered and informed as currently exist in the region. Much like the conditions that led to the wars of Reformation in Western Europe 500 years ago, the Middle East is in a period of tremendous internal instability.

Governments that cling to the status quo will ultimately succumb to insurgent forces. Those that make substantive changes and that seek to be as inclusive as possible may evolve peacefully. Revolution does not bring good governance, it simply acts to force change or removal upon governance perceived as bad. The key for the US is to nurture a perception a mediator. To work to convert revolutionary energy into evolutionary change of governance. To take sides is to inadvertently take on too much control/ownership of outcomes and to create de facto illegitimate outcomes.

We must relinquish control and seek positions of influence with formal and informal groups alike.

Basic rules of this new game:
Anything we seek to control is de facto illegitimate and will be rejected to some degree by some, if not all, of the populations it affects.

We can conduct CT against UW operatives and foreign fighters; but not against nationalist insurgents. (primary purpose for action and nature of relationship to the population are the two critical factors for binning actors for action).

Ideology is a Critical Requirement, not a COG. But if based in religion it is not also a critical vulnerability. Do not counter ideology, rather we must out compete ideology. Co-opt rational aspects of AQ's political platform and out-compete them for influence with insurgent populations.

Winning is measured in terms of influence, not control of outcomes. We must assume risk and become more agnostic and pragmatic in our willingness to work our interests with who is there as they are, not who we want as we want them to be.

The COG for the US-AQ conflict is probably the nature of the US-KSA relationship. This deal with Iran and rejection of Mubarak have probably done more to reduce the energy of this COG than anything the military has done. There is no military solution to this problem, the military can only create time and space and be an agent of influence - positive or negative will be determined by how we act and how we are perceived; not by what we intend or if we are legal or not.

The COG for the US-Iran conflict is the damage and response of US violation of Iranian sovereignty in running the Coup to put the Shah into power and to then sustain him there; as well as the US compression of Iranian sovereignty following the hostage crisis. Iran is perhaps the most geostrategically important nation in the region, current efforts to begin healing that relationship will drain the energy from this conflict and open the door to the opportunities found in our shared interests.

LH was born as a resistance to Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Initially the physical occupation, but LH is sustained by the perceived occupation by policy that continues day to day.

Appropriate trumps legal.

A counter UW strategy shifts the main effort from JSOC to USASOC for SOF

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---does this comment not break eggs?

"A counter UW strategy shifts the main effort from JSOC to USASOC for SOF"


By the way the description and the slide as actually quite good and to the point--more over it makes sense.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP

"Resistance to a thing is not a determinant of that thing's invalidity"---- interesting comment.

The target population does not tend to validate the "thing" in the heat of the moment. It is the message that is important--meaning does it validate what I the population feel, eat, live---does it validate my life, my family, my envisioned future---that is the angle the population takes---they do not mentally dissect the thing for validity that is a western approach.

They are really only interested in the "thing" as an entity--in the ME that is a truthism.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---this is why I often say the national decision makers do not understand resistance insurgency or do they understand the populations they target in the ME.

This is from an article today that indicates that they really do play to the messaging of AQ.

"For the region as a whole, the President cited four key American interests in the Middle East—confronting aggression from the region aimed at the U.S., maintaining an unhindered flow of oil, confronting jihadists and terrorist networks, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. The promotion of democracy and human rights came in as a fifth fiddle."

Massive DoS cuts to the various democracy programs were also announced.

So really the non support for the Syria Sunni groups against Assad a Shia and the negotiations with Iran do in fact reinforce why the AQ has such a pull still in the ME.

And it reinforces the current thinking of the Saudi's ---a real mistake on the part of the US national decision level makers.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---your thoughts not only apply to say the ME it also would apply to say Mexico.

This was an interesting comment today in borderlandbeat.

When the leaders of Mexico and China met last summer, there was much talk of the need to deepen trade between their nations. Down on Mexico's Pacific coast, a drug gang was already making it a reality.

The Knights Templar cartel, (Caballeros Templarios) steadily diversifying into other businesses, became so successful at exporting iron ore to China that the Mexican Navy in November had to move in and take over the port in Lazaro Cardenas, a city that has become one of the gang's main cash generators.

This steelmaking center, drug smuggling hot spot and home of a rapidly growing container port in the western state of Michoacán occupies a strategic position on the Pacific coast, making it a natural gateway for burgeoning trade with China.