"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[Bob's World]

China and Mexico have some common ground in regards to drugs, the foreign policy of a world power, and an incredibly disruptive effect on their respective societies.

The history of how Great Britain forced China to take Afghan opium in trade, creating a nation of addicts and draining China of their hard currency, facilitating what China remembers well as the "100 years of humiliation" is not a proud one for the West.

US policy to make certain drugs illegal, resulting in the vast, illicit market that exists today and that is so disruptive to Mexican society and governance seem benign by comparison, but is nearly equally damaging all the same.

In both cases there was indeed an occupation by policy that created and is creating negative resistance energy against the perceived agents of their respective hardships.

It all comes down to a question of "how do the people feel, and who do they blame." Here is where ideology comes into play, as ideology is the tool to intensify these feelings and to direct blame in some particular direction.

America deluded itself that China hated the Europeans, but that they liked us. We saw them as a critical partner in the early days of the Cold War for containment of Sovietism. It was a rude shock that sparked the entire "Domino Theory" in South East Asia when Mao prevailed and China made very clear that they saw the US in the exact same light they saw the European powers who had occupied and oppressed them over the previous century.

This forced us to abandon key US concepts, such as the right of self-determination, when we had to expand containment from Sovietism to the much broader "communism" that was resonating with peasants weary of sharecropping small plots across SEA. It also led to the US promoting more heavily democracy as a political counter to communism. The proverbial slippery slope that began us on the path to our current NSS and its highly ideological tone.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert--- this sentence if compared to the released US main four points of policy for the ME does not bode well for the US through well for AQ for the various targeted populations of the ME.

"It all comes down to a question of "how do the people feel, and who do they blame." Here is where ideology comes into play, as ideology is the tool to intensify these feelings and to direct blame in some particular direction."

So when does the national level get off the slippery slope--or do they even see the slippery slope?

Or can they even get off of the slippery slope when the national political debate is divided and one side is ready to accuse the other for being weak in foreign policy or even worse.

Another point that spins out of your concept is one that is not mentioned if mentioned at all---with the speed of social media and other communication sources--- conversations that occur in the public political domain which is for say US internal consumption will be interpreted by the target population sometimes in ways that we did/do not anticipate and which will often reinforce their feelings and who they blame.

A second spin out of the concept is how does a target population take actions committed by individuals in another population that is viewed as provoking to their culture---this just reinforces the perceptions of the targeted population.

So in fact your concept does apply well to the actions of one population provoking another and reinforcing the messaging of AQ---we have seen this occur now repeatedly.

So are the actions of an individual who knows that he is specifically provoking a targeted populated in support of national level decision makers or an attempt to force decision makers in a particular direction if that person does not believe the national level is not "hard" enough?

[AmericanPride]

The target population does not tend to validate the "thing" in the heat of the moment. It is the message that is important--meaning does it validate what I the population feel, eat, live---does it validate my life, my family, my envisioned future---that is the angle the population takes---they do not mentally dissect the thing for validity that is a western approach.

Resistance to a thing indicates that the resistor perceives the thing resisted to be invalid on some level -- illegal, immoral, impractical, etc. However, if policy's effectiveness is measured by the extent in which it fulfills the goals of the policymaker, unless the goals explicitly include validation from the "target population", then the population's perception of the policy is irrelevant. This brings into question whether the problem identified by Robert is really a problem at all, at least in abstraction. In this calculation, resistance to policy is already a part of the cost-benefit equation; the fundamental problem is when an anomalous unintended consequence emerges that provokes resistance in sufficient strength to contradict the policy's pursued goals (that is, develops the capabilities to defeat the resources applied to the policy). In Robert's most recent example, the US policy in the ME to contain the expansion of Soviet influence was successful, despite the fact that it may have incited opposition from Islamist quarters. Like communism and nationalism before it, Islamism has not reversed or defeated US ME policy. Specifically, AQ has not been particularly successful - the House of Saud is still in power, the only Islamist state is shia-dominated Iran, and there has not been a general rising against US interests. The Arab Spring has largely been in indirect favor of US interests. Understandably, the evolution of US policy from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism has a number of continuities since the bureaucracies (and a good number of the policymakers) have not changed.

The issues you and Robert identify clearly are the results of problems in multi-level games where the administration's foreign policies are constrained (determined?) by the outcomes of internal bureaucratic/factional conflicts. But this also does not necessarily de-legitimatize the policy, even if it brings the policy into conflict with the interests of the "target population". It only means that the policy must satisfy a wider range of invested domestic actors and that will almost always come at the cost of outsiders (and why concepts like the "responsibility to protect" are politically absurd).

So, bringing this back full circle to Robert's original questions; yes, policymakers can provoke resistance, but that's not necessarily bad or undesirable for the policy. There's always some level of ideological radicalization which I suspect is strongly related to the general conditions of the population and its historical context. But that's less important than the capabilities of the radicals to resist the policy.

[carl]

America deluded itself that China hated the Europeans, but that they liked us. We saw them as a critical partner in the early days of the Cold War for containment of Sovietism. It was a rude shock that sparked the entire "Domino Theory" in South East Asia when Mao prevailed and China made very clear that they saw the US in the exact same light they saw the European powers who had occupied and oppressed them over the previous century.

This forced us to abandon key US concepts, such as the right of self-determination, when we had to expand containment from Sovietism to the much broader "communism" that was resonating with peasants weary of sharecropping small plots across SEA. It also led to the US promoting more heavily democracy as a political counter to communism. The proverbial slippery slope that began us on the path to our current NSS and its highly ideological tone.

I must object to what you are implying here. A lot of your analysis depends upon the proper reading of history. Your reading is flawed, deeply flawed.

Whether the Chinese or China liked or disliked the US in 1949 is completely beside the point. Mao and the CCP disliked the US and the Chinese were going to like and do what Mao and the CCP told them to like or do or they would be killed-blood on the ground, head bashed in never to breathe again killed. That this is true is obvious in the history. Lots of Chinese fought very hard to keep the CCP out. They lost. After that loss, tens-read that again-tens of millions of Chinese died at the hands of Mao and the CCP in order that their vision of China be imposed, whether the Chinese liked it or not. What happened is what a group of organized killers wanted to happen who were Chinese wanted to happen to those other millions, including the dead, not what 'China' wanted.

The false reading of history extends to the second paragraph also. It is makes your theories neater if you disregard the facts. The facts are that lots and lots of people didn't much like the Communists and fought very hard for a long time to keep them out. That they lost doesn't mean you can ignore the historical record in order to make sure your theory doesn't have any loose ends.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan--this is an interesting comment;

"The contention that "we are often the obstacle to forcing governments to evolve where evolution is both necessary and reasonable" remains unsupported."

Take this sentence and then as an exercise read all the major US newspaper headlines right after the Arab Spring erupted in each Arab country---immediate talk of "democracy breaking out, free elections, rights for women, radical Islam being defeated, personal freedom and democratic values, etc---the list could go on and on.

So at the national level we transported our values into the Spring ---did we for a single moment stop as ask if that is what the population wanted that was in the streets?---no we did not and when the Spring took a turn we did not like---check out then the newspaper headlines.

This is where Robert is heading.

American headline writers do have the tendency to rhapsodize over revolution against a dictator. They certainly have the tendency to assume that all people share our values, and that revolutions will necessarily go as we wish they would. They are also easily disappointed when they don't get what they expect.

However, newspaper headlines are neither a tool of policy nor indicative of policy, and they wield no coercive force. Our headlines do not "transport our values elesewhere", nor do they impose our values on anyone. It's a huge stretch to claim that anyone, anywhere, felt imposed upon because they read an American newspaper. If the US government hade made support or assistance conditional on acceptance of American values, or threatened to punish those who failed to adopt American values, that would be a different story. Did they?

In Egypt and Tunisia at least, democracy and free elections were very much on the agenda from the start, and not an American imposition.

I'm also not sure how relevant this is to what Robert was talking about, which was the US providing support to governments under pressure from their populaces, and thus allowing those governments to resist pressure to change. While the US may be reasonably accused of having done that for Mubarak in the past, the past is not terribly malleable, and the US at least resisted that temptation this time around.

In the aborted Bahrain Arab Spring, the US actually followed a course quite similar to what Robert has advocated in the past, throwing its weight behind accommodation, negotiation, and reform. The government of Bahrain, with Saudi support, ignored the US completely. How well that will work for them in the long run remains to be seen, but it underscores the very limited capacity of the US to intervene in government/populace relations in the Middle East.

Take Iran right now---there was a really interesting article in a leading German newspaper a week or so ago in German indicating that yes fundamentalism is being reinforced every day in Iran but that is not where the young population is headed--ie they tolerate the fundamentalism because in their private lives out of sight of the Revolutionary Guards they drink, party to the latest music and purchase ten times the amount of cosmetics than during the Shah days-by the way cosmetics sales in Saudi are sky high and the young Iranians in the face of all of this are actually favorable towards the US

By the way the article was not picked up by any newspaper outside of Germany. Ever wonder why?

BUT here is the difference---they would never turn back the revolution, and they firmly believe Iran has a nuclear right, are practicing Shia and blame the US for the economical problems inside Iran.

They do though believe in secularism not fundamentalism---big difference.

So what has been our position towards Iran?

Our position towards Iran necessarily responds to the Iranian government, not the partying, cosmetics-buying youth. The Iranian government and key elements thereof (like the Revolutionary Guards) have distinct regional ambitions that are not particularly compatible with US interests, and the US can't overlook that. The partying youth may think well of us, but the Ayatollahs at the top of the pile do not... and which of those two make decisions on where a bomb, or any other element of Iranian armed force, would go?

I have my own criticisms of US policy re Iran over the years, but at the same time it has to be recognized as a complex pile with no really good answers. I think the US has been wise to resist the constant urging toward hard-line policy and military action that we hear from the Saudis, Israelis, and some American factions who either agree with or represent them. At the same time, a policy that treated Iran as if the young pro-American generation ran the country would be a bit naive.

This is what Robert is alluding to---do our actions which we view from our side to be correct actually cause more problems especially if those actions are not being viewed the same way by the target population? Historically speaking and even today the answer is yes.

This is of course so. I should perhaps clarify: I completely agree with Robert that the US should not defend dictators from their populaces, or provide them with the means to resist popular pressure for change. We disagree on the extent to which the US is actually doing tins, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. We also disagree on the extent to which the US can proactively intervene to reverse or correct any previous meddling. My view is that any attempt by the US to interpose itself as mediator between Government and populace in any part of the Middle East will trigger exactly what you refer to above: "actions which we view from our side to be correct actually cause more problems". We cannot mediate unless both parties accept us as mediator, and the probability of that happening approaches zero.

I keep repeating as it is true our national policies are in fact driving fundamentalism on both sides of Islam and we are delivering to AQ everyday messaging that is being used against us within the target population.

Especially in the worldwide Sunni populations---this includes the worldwide Shia populations as well.

I've said that myself many times, particularly with respect to armed US intrusions in Muslim lands, which absolutely reinforce AQs message.

Dayuhan---for the want of beating a dead horse five tines over---here goes just two examples of what I and Robert might agree on....

...In the Gaza population the US polices as perceived by them definitely are not winning us friends in that region.

If you still cannot see the connections then I guess we can beat the dead horse six times with other examples.

This is where Robert is coming from.

I'm fully aware of the history in Iran, in Gaza, and quite a few other places. The US has contributed to some unholy messes in the area. We all know that.

However, for purposes of this discussion, the focus has been on the US habit of supporting dictators in their efforts to control their own populaces. There is of course no doubt that the US did this in many places during the Cold War. Since then the US has (broadly, and in varying degrees) tried to pull back from that policy. This has contributed to (not caused, but contributed to) a general transition out of dictatorship in much of the world. In other places, notably the Arabian Gulf, autocracies have shown that they don't need our support and are quite capable of controlling their populaces without it. The question is what, if anything, the US should try to do about that.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP---this is an interesting point--and it goes to actually what has been mentioned here---target populations do not think in abstracts and some do not use the western concept of rationally in taking a policy apart to see what is good or what is bad.

Many reactions on the ground within the population are emotionally built on their years of observing what had been happening to them.

If one currently accepts the argument that there is indeed a deep fight ongoing between Shia fundamentalism ie Iran and Sunni fundamentalism ie Saudi and that fight is around the religious belief that Shiaism is a deviant Islam to be countered by the Sunni side and the Sunni's ie Saudi believes that Shiaism must be contained and is attempting to build a wall around Iran from Afghanistan to Lebanon---then you are close to understanding what various populations in the ME are thinking.

Now along comes various US policy developments ie the US is negotiating with Iran a Shia country, ie the US allowed for the first time a democratically elected Shia government to be created bordering Saudi Arabia, ie the US tap dances a policy on Syria where over 100K Sunni's are killed or wounded, US policy in the eyes of Syrian Sunni's---chemical weapons are bad "barrel bombs are OK, the US is delivering weapons to a Shia country to be used against Sunni's and the examples go on.

Now if you are say the Syrian Sunni population or say the global Sunni population what is your view of US policies as they seem to be focused in the eyes of the Sunni population against them?

If you are Saudi who feels responsible to defend the global Sunni population--how do you interpret US policies other than focused against Saudi and Sunni's.

One could argue as you do that the US policies are being incorrectly interpreted or the Sunni population does not quite get the "abstract" of the policies---but they do not get it and in fact respond well to the arguments being pushed out by AQ as the messaging matches their personal experience.

So it is as Robert indicates---how they actually "feel" is something we Americans often have problems with when we create policies because "feelings" are hard to quantify. We are never good with "touchy feely things" some populations on the otherhand are quite adept at it.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---

Do not think this is really what Robert has been alluding to.

"However, for purposes of this discussion, the focus has been on the US habit of supporting dictators in their efforts to control their own populaces."

[AmericanPride]

One could argue as you do that the US policies are being incorrectly interpreted or the Sunni population does not quite get the "abstract" of the policies---but they do not get it and in fact respond well to the arguments being pushed out by AQ as the messaging matches their personal experience.

I'm not arguing that US policies are being "incorrectly interpreted". I'm arguing that the interpretation of US policies by the "common man" in the "target population" is not relevant in measuring the effectiveness of US policies (with the obvious caveat being if the policies are in fact aimed at affecting the perception of the target population). Strictly speaking, US policies fundamentally serve US interests. Perception or opposition or feeling toward US policy is not relevant unless it has a direct bearing on the outcome of the policy. This is basically a question of power, not perception. Does the perception of the common Saudi of US negotiations with Iran at all impact US energy security? I doubt it. In light of the reduced US military presence in the region and domestic economic constraints (and to a lesser extent, the Af-Pak issue), normalization of relations with Iran makes sense from a US standpoint. What makes the perception of the common Saudi, Syrian, Iraqi, or Israeli for that matter, relevant to that policy?

[carl]

"It needs to change" and "we need to change it" are two very different things. Which, if either, do you propose?

Well I'll tell ya. You should answer the questions you pose to yourself to yourself since I didn't ask them. Things would be much simpler that way. Or...Wouldn't things be much simpler if you asked the questions you pose to yourself, yourself?

They are separatists, and rebelling, because they are persecuted, not the other way around. Why do you think they are rebelling in the first place?

Well again I'll tell ya. It could be that there is a long history of separatism in those places going back decades that is as much cultural as it is religious and as much a result of various conquests and treaties as much as it is cultural and religious. The modern manifestations of these conflicts are also sometimes overlain by a takfiri ideology that makes them perhaps more nasty than before. Or...Don't you think that is what the separatists and AQ would have you think and perhaps that isn't totally accurate?

I don't think talk is very wise if we aren't prepared to back the talk with action. If we aren't (and we're generally not) we just come off looking impotent.

No, you are confused. If you don't back promises of action or threats of action, then you come off looking impotent. Talk encompasses more than that. It includes condemnations of murdering people for their religious beliefs and telling govs they should be more active in protecting people from takfiri killers who would kill them for those beliefs. If you are reluctant to do that you are either morally blind or the worst kind of moral coward.

Would we extend that privilege to persecuted non-Christians as well? Why would we single out Christians persecuted by Muslims for special favor?

Well I'll tell ya. That kind of argument is one of those sophist sleights of hand, the old 'If ya can't do everything, you shouldn't do anything.' bit. It is good to do just a little good, even if you can't do total good. And then of course, even though it is politically incorrect to say so, we are a predominantly Christian nation. Because of that, for better or for worse there is a greater sense of identification with the persecuted Christians. From that it is likely there will many more sponsors for those people among the tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands Christian congregations in the US, a logistical consideration of some importance.

Or...Don't you think that the perfect is the enemy of the good? Don't you think the identification of US Christians with say Pakistani Christians might allow for greater private resources to be devoted to them upon their arrival in the US? Don't you think giving a good thing to people who might be murdered if we don't is a good thing?

But the biggest thing to me personally, dumb, unsophisticated flyover person that I am, is that is just don't seem right that those people are targets of takfiri killers. We should at least publicly condemn the killings and offer them a safe place to go.

You don't agree obviously and can be counted on for a very many good reasons why. But for simple minded me, 'it don't seem right' beats them all.

[AmericanPride]

carl,

I sympathize with your point of view. However, I am curious how you would untangle the multiple layers of ethical obligations that political leaders have and where you draw your ethical boundaries. In your example, does the American president have a greater ethical responsibility to persecuted Christians or to the American voters (who could be put in harm's way in defending the persecuted)? Does the American president have a general responsibility to protect all persecuted populations, or just those with whom "there is a greater sense of identification"? Does it make a difference if the president or persecuted population is Catholic, Coptic, Protestant, or some other Christian brand? What about questions of political sovereignty? What if it's not a major issue for voters?

[Dayuhan]

Simplistic is watching cable news and reading blogs all day; marinating that in one's own personal biases and then announcing some theory. That could produce the right answer, like monkeys typing, but that is not how I got here.

Nor did I get here doing lengthy research in some University office, spiced with a handful of field trips to various theaters.

Mine is a mix of research, study and continuous practice. That does not make my perspective right, but it does make it not "simplistic."

There are many ways to be simplistic. Excessive attachment to a single model is one of them.

I think your model does have substantial relevance to many insurgencies. It provides, for example, an excellent lens for focusing understanding of the drivers of insurgency in the Philippines. It would apply as well to southern Thailand, and I suspect to the ongoing insurgencies in India, and many others.

I think it's less relevant to insurgencies driven primarily by ethnic, sectarian, an similar us/them grievances, particularly where the parties involved are not prepared to accept the possibility of inclusive settlement. When "good governance" means "governance by us" and "bad governance" means "governance by them", it's hard to find a recipe for good governance that will please both parties.

I do think you're inclined to go a bit astray in taking the model from a device for understanding to a device for action. I think you consistently overrate the influence the US can bring to bear on governance/populace relations in other countries, and consistently underrate the extent to which both governments and populaces will resent and resist any American attempt to intervene in their relations, no matter how well intentioned. For example again, while your model is an excellent device for the American who wishes to understand Philippine insurgencies, an American who decided to take it to the next step and try to help resolve those insurgencies by influencing government/populace relations would accomplish nothing and create a significant mess.

Extending this model to accommodate an actor like AQ, which is neither an insurgency nor populace-based, is quite a stretch. The assumption that AQ draws its primary impetus from a popular desire to change or reform governance in their own countries remains, IMO, unsupported, questionable, and not fully compatible with visible evidence.

[Dayuhan]

And then of course, even though it is politically incorrect to say so, we are a predominantly Christian nation. Because of that, for better or for worse there is a greater sense of identification with the persecuted Christians. From that it is likely there will many more sponsors for those people among the tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands Christian congregations in the US, a logistical consideration of some importance.

Or...Don't you think that the perfect is the enemy of the good? Don't you think the identification of US Christians with say Pakistani Christians might allow for greater private resources to be devoted to them upon their arrival in the US? Don't you think giving a good thing to people who might be murdered if we don't is a good thing?

I think we are a secular nation that by tradition treats all religions equally (or at least strives to) and grants no special privilege to members of any religious group. Announcing to the world that persecuted Christians are more deserving of our support, assistance, and refuge than any other persecuted person would be grotesquely incompatible with that tradition and would be an act of gratuitous hypocrisy. If it comes down to "it don't seem right", how does it seem right to extend special privilege to members of one religion? The last mantle we want to assume is that of Defender of the Faith.

[carl]

I think we are a secular nation that by tradition treats all religions equally (or at least strives to) and grants no special privilege to members of any religious group. Announcing to the world that persecuted Christians are more deserving of our support, assistance, and refuge than any other persecuted person would be grotesquely incompatible with that tradition and would be an act of gratuitous hypocrisy. If it comes down to "it don't seem right", how does it seem right to extend special privilege to members of one religion? The last mantle we want to assume is that of Defender of the Faith.

How about that? A 104 word (approximately, I only counted once) version of 'If you can't do everything, you shouldn't do anything.' Or...Why or what purpose would it serve to do anything if you couldn't do everything else?

[carl]

carl,

I sympathize with your point of view. However, I am curious how you would untangle the multiple layers of ethical obligations that political leaders have and where you draw your ethical boundaries. In your example, does the American president have a greater ethical responsibility to persecuted Christians or to the American voters (who could be put in harm's way in defending the persecuted)? Does the American president have a general responsibility to protect all persecuted populations, or just those with whom "there is a greater sense of identification"? Does it make a difference if the president or persecuted population is Catholic, Coptic, Protestant, or some other Christian brand? What about questions of political sovereignty? What if it's not a major issue for voters?

Why does...oops. I almost turned into somebody else for second. There is no need to untangle anything. You say 'We think takfiris blowing up Pakistani Christians for their faith is a terrible thing, a murderous unjustified and bestial thing. We also think the Pak Army/ISI (since they are the actual gov of the country) should be more energetic about protecting these poor people.' Then you say (in my preferred version of the future) 'We have decided because of these takfiri murderers to extend preferential visa treatment to their victims and potential victims.' And you could use about the same form for any other country it might apply to.

That is a plain and simple act of mercy to people who are in danger. It is a good. There is no conflict between this simple good and any of the other things you mentioned. There is no protecting anybody beyond calling out and shaming evil doers and offering refuge to some of those in danger.

That is how I see it. You want to play 'What if?'? Do it. If you wait until all the what ifs are resolved before you try to help, you will wait a long time because you will never run out of what ifs.

[Bob's World]

Extending this model to accommodate an actor like AQ, which is neither an insurgency nor populace-based, is quite a stretch. The assumption that AQ draws its primary impetus from a popular desire to change or reform governance in their own countries remains, IMO, unsupported, questionable, and not fully compatible with visible evidence.

First, I have never in my life claimed that AQ is an insurgency. Nor do I think it is helpful to call them a "terrorist organization" (what does that even mean other than that they apply terrorist tactics? It in now way suggests a solution for dealing with why they exist). AQ wages UW. UW requires conditions of insurgency to work. AQ is probably best thought of as a non-state political action group dedicated to the removal of overt Western influence in the Middle East along with those Regimes in the region who have become corrupted by some mix of wealth, power or Western influence, with the Saudis being #1 on that list. They also wish to create a coalition of Muslim states to once again have sufficient power to not have to worry about such external exploitation.

Where do you think AQ's power comes from? They have no population of their own, they must borrow populations from others. The only populations interested in what they are selling are those who are Sunni Muslim and that perceive their own governance to need to change, or that perceive external Western influence to be a corrupting factor that once removed will allow their governance to return to what they see as appropriate.

There is a wealth of visible evidence in the words and deeds of AQ; the events in the ME, the Arab Spring, and countless news articles, etc. coming out of the ME to support my position. In fact, there is little more than speculation and theory from Western "experts" to support the theories of what AQ is that much of our response over the past 12 years have been based upon.

You live in SEA, have you ever wondered why AQ's message falls flat there? The nations there are proudly sovereign, having thrown off inappropriate and illegitimate Western influence during the course of the Cold War. They have no occupation by policy drivers of resistance effects toward the West. Do they have internal revolutionary pressures still, and do some of those revolutionaries accept help from AQ? Yes.

What is the difference between the ME and SEA? Primarily the fact that the ME was held static politically as a major battle ground of our Cold War containment, and because frankly communism/land reform does not resonate among non-agrarian and non-industrialized populations. But in SEA communism/land reform resonated widely among tenant farmers weary of scratching out a scant living for some Western Colonial master or some local mixed breed elite caste master as Spain left behind everyplace they colonized. So SEA Muslims largely addressed these issues and have moved on. Now it is time for those in the ME to do the same. But we are too fixated on the symptoms and how it affects us to see the problem clearly.

AQ only has real influence where certain conditions exist. Address those conditions and they will rapidly fade into irrelevance. But those conditions are political, not ideological or purely economic.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---you hit the nail literally on the head and many in the US public/academic world/national decision makers do not understand the concept.

If one takes your comments below one can layer it nicely over Mexico---the 1910 revolution began over land reform-the revolution was never completed due to US military occupation until the begin of the 1st WW and I would argue the cartels are an extension of this failed revolution coupled with a government that cannot provide the population basic security for a chance for economic growth leading the population to believe their children will not have it any better than they do now.

Actually take out the word AQ and it would deliver a good explanation of what we saw in the 60/70s in Rhodesia (mixed with white supremacy), Angola, Mozambique, and inside South Africa which was called during this Soviet containment period as "wars of national liberation" and was the Cold War focal point for open conflict between the Superpowers.

One of the best written condensed explanations of AQ's pull in specific regions and why.

"You live in SEA, have you ever wondered why AQ's message falls flat there? The nations there are proudly sovereign, having thrown off inappropriate and illegitimate Western influence during the course of the Cold War. They have no occupation by policy drivers of resistance effects toward the West. Do they have internal revolutionary pressures still, and do some of those revolutionaries accept help from AQ? Yes.

What is the difference between the ME and SEA? Primarily the fact that the ME was held static politically as a major battle ground of our Cold War containment, and because frankly communism/land reform does not resonate among non-agrarian and non-industrialized populations. But in SEA communism/land reform resonated widely among tenant farmers weary of scratching out a scant living for some Western Colonial master or some local mixed breed elite caste master as Spain left behind everyplace they colonized. So SEA Muslims largely addressed these issues and have moved on. Now it is time for those in the ME to do the same. But we are too fixated on the symptoms and how it affects us to see the problem clearly.

AQ only has real influence where certain conditions exist. Address those conditions and they will rapidly fade into irrelevance. But those conditions are political, not ideological or purely economic."

Also I would add that in the SEA Muslim countries the issues between Shia and Sunni were settled sometimes brutally but nevertheless settled.

As a side comment Iran has not exported their brand of Shia fundamentalism into those countries as they did not contribute to the Shia Green Crescent theory (and they did not follow the Silk Road trading routes) that was built to defend Iran from Sunni's in the ME.

Again a nice comment to see these days about AQ's pull inside specific populations---it ties nicely into the recent AQ General Guidance to Jihad concerning the "near enemy".

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---

Do you think that we do not inside our own population have elements of religions and political groups that one outside viewing us might in fact declare are "fundamentalists"--using the same definition we here in this blog use? Check say the influence of US religious groups on the ongoing Gay laws inside Uganda-one might actually view their direct mixing into Ugandan politics as being "Defender of the Faith" actions. We seem to at times to act in ways that one could argue replicate "Defender of the Faith" actions when viewed by an outside population

"I think we are a secular nation that by tradition treats all religions equally (or at least strives to) and grants no special privilege to members of any religious group. Announcing to the world that persecuted Christians are more deserving of our support, assistance, and refuge than any other persecuted person would be grotesquely incompatible with that tradition and would be an act of gratuitous hypocrisy. If it comes down to "it don't seem right", how does it seem right to extend special privilege to members of one religion? The last mantle we want to assume is that of Defender of the Faith."?

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---I would even take Roberts last comments a step further and voice the opinion that if the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was resolved and laid to rest AQ would struggle as would a number of fundamentalist groups.

Running since 1968 as a red thread throughout all "Arab terror" groups (yes and even European terror groups ie RAF) to include AQ has been the argument that they support the Palestinian movement in their "fight" for self determination. Until just recently what side have we been vehemently supporting in the face of the Arab street which if one looks at what our own needs actually was against our best interests in the region.

As Robert indicates it is all political these days but it dates back to unfinished business from the British colonial/League of Nation days. Which we turned into a democracy vs communism argument from the 50s through to actually now if one listens to comments being thrown at Russia these days which is following it's own version of Communist expansionism as they reestablish in their eyes their own global geopolitical status after their internal breakup.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---if we also take as a given the recent reporting of Syrian strategic weapon systems making it from Syria to Hezbollah has not in fact Iran pushed the Green Crescent theory to the utmost maximum that it can in it's viewed confrontation with Israel?

Then it makes sense why the Saudi's have linked into AQ and other Islamists in the Syrian civil war in their belief that they must contain Shia fundamentalism.

So in fact has the tap dance policy decision by the US on Syria actually created something we have dreaded for awhile-namely open conflict between Iran/KSA/Israel being fought in Syria and Lebanon?

Having actually bombed Syria due to chemical weapons might have changed a perception being held currently by most of the ME population--that we the US do not care about the widespread killing of Sunni's by Shia. Actions taken sometimes while not definitive for the US can cause a perception shift and it is really all about perception these days. This perception that we seem to be supporting Shia across the ME is also driving the KSA to shift to a more aggressive foreign policy as they in fact now really do not trust us any longer.

So as Robert argues policy can in fact create population resistance in ways we never think about as our policies are in fact being currently interpreted by the various ME populations to be basically wrong.

Even if the Sunni and Shia resolved their issues---the longer term clash is inside both brands of Islam ie Fundamentalism vs Secularism and that one is coming for both brands of Islam-and that will be more far reaching than many think-then the ME can finally calm down and develop they way they want to without outside interference.

[Dayuhan]

Do you think that we do not inside our own population have elements of religions and political groups that one outside viewing us might in fact declare are "fundamentalists"--using the same definition we here in this blog use? Check say the influence of US religious groups on the ongoing Gay laws inside Uganda-one might actually view their direct mixing into Ugandan politics as being "Defender of the Faith" actions. We seem to at times to act in ways that one could argue replicate "Defender of the Faith" actions when viewed by an outside population

Yes, these groups exist, and yes, their actions may be misconstrued as national policy. That's not helpful, but the US Government has little if any ability to constrain these groups. That doesn't seem an argument for official adoption of the priorities and policies of these groups.

Dayuhan---if we also take as a given the recent reporting of Syrian strategic weapon systems making it from Syria to Hezbollah has not in fact Iran pushed the Green Crescent theory to the utmost maximum that it can in it's viewed confrontation with Israel?

Then it makes sense why the Saudi's have linked into AQ and other Islamists in the Syrian civil war in their belief that they must contain Shia fundamentalism.

So in fact has the tap dance policy decision by the US on Syria actually created something we have dreaded for awhile-namely open conflict between Iran/KSA/Israel being fought in Syria and Lebanon?

It is likely that the KSA ans Iran will end up fighting a proxy war in Syria and Lebanon, much less likely (though not impossible) that they will fight directly. I don't see how that could be claimed as a consequence or creation of US policy toward Syria.

Having actually bombed Syria due to chemical weapons might have changed a perception being held currently by most of the ME population--that we the US do not care about the widespread killing of Sunni's by Shia. Actions taken sometimes while not definitive for the US can cause a perception shift and it is really all about perception these days. This perception that we seem to be supporting Shia across the ME is also driving the KSA to shift to a more aggressive foreign policy as they in fact now really do not trust us any longer.

I find it very difficult to believe that American bombs falling on Syria would improve perceptions of the US in the Sunni world. A more likely perception would be that the US is once again using its military might to force its way into and Arab fight in pursuit of its own devious and nefarious objectives.

It is certainly true that the US refusal to act as enforcer for the Saudi regime is driving a more aggressive Saudi foreign policy, but I can't see how that would justify subordinating US interests to those of the Saudis. The Saudis need to understand that we are not going to beat up on Iran or Assad just because the Saudis want us to. The Israelis need to understand the same thing. If that leads to more aggressive foreign policy from either, so be it.

So as Robert argues policy can in fact create population resistance in ways we never think about as our policies are in fact being currently interpreted by the various ME populations to be basically wrong.

Robert's argument is rather more specific. He's saying that US support for autocratic regimes is allowing those regimes to ignore the desire of their populaces for reform, and that those populaces therefore support AQ. I do not see any particular relationship between that argument and th Syrian situation.

Even if the Sunni and Shia resolved their issues---the longer term clash is inside both brands of Islam ie Fundamentalism vs Secularism and that one is coming for both brands of Islam-and that will be more far reaching than many think-then the ME can finally calm down and develop they way they want to without outside interference.

Probably true, but that doesn't mean the US can play much of a productive role in that resolution. The US is not in a very good position to act as a mediator or influence anyone in that conflict. It's not as if either side trusts us.

Dayuhan---I would even take Roberts last comments a step further and voice the opinion that if the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was resolved and laid to rest AQ would struggle as would a number of fundamentalist groups.

Certainly true, but not very helpful, as the US has no capacity to resolve the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

I would also point out that Robert's argument is that support for AQ is primarily driven by relations between Muslim populaces and their own governments, not by external influences like the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.