I agree with your review, perhaps his rather recent lecture about 'Revisiting the perpetrators' might interest you. Never knew about the incredible story* of the jewish eye-witness inside a killing unit, serving as a translator. Starts at 51:00.Originally Posted by Red Rat
*Reflecting on it, of those who had not incredible luck, almost all didn't have a chance to tell us their tale.
Last edited by Firn; 06-04-2014 at 05:56 PM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Supreme Command, Cohen: Highly recommended. Best thing I've read in a while, and the case studies were well chosen. Undermines a lot of the facile "leave us alone to do our job" talk.
Grey Eminence: Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship, Cox: Don't bother. A thin monograph, and Conner's papers were burned so it relies almost solely on the views of the mentees.
The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the United States Marines, West and Smith: Good read, in the "journalism as the first draft of history" style. I've heard a few guys that were there take issue with some of his details though.
Are We Rome?, Murphy: Pretty good, quick read that digs a little deeper into that easy comparison between the US and imperial Rome.
Posted by Granite State
GS, I have seen mixed reviews on Cohen's book. Most agree his points are well argued, but some critics believe he has shifted the argument too far to the political end and attempts to silence the voice of the military. Interested in your thoughts on that view?Supreme Command, Cohen: Highly recommended. Best thing I've read in a while, and the case studies were well chosen. Undermines a lot of the facile "leave us alone to do our job" talk.
Haven't read it yet, but would be interested in his views if expressed on LBJ's inept control of the war (not an apology for Westmoreland), or JFK's handling of the Bay of Pigs (paramilitary operation). I would add our recent adventure in OIF where military advice was ignored on troop levels required to stabilize Iraq. I'm a believer of the military instrument being subordinate to policy and civilian leadership, but there is a balance that must achieved. I can't imagine a policy maker telling a brain surgeon how he will remove a tumor. I can imagine him telling him what the objective is, what risk he is willing to incur, what the left and right limits are, and basically have a discussion between policy makers and military professionals. The discussion can't end, because we'll be fighting a thinking and adaptive adversary, so the relationship must be persistent and both must remain flexible in policy ends and the military approach.
It definitely changed my perspective. He argues that Huntington's "normal" theory of civil-military relations (basically what you're describing) is not the best way to do business. LBJ gets mentioned, but the case studies are Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion. Cohen's issue with LBJ is not really that he meddled, but that he meddled badly. And the old line about military professionals being like surgeons who rarely if ever perform surgery has some truth to it.
Cohen's brief Rumsfeld chapter does not hold up well. But I think some of our recent problems stem from excessive deference to the military, not the other way around. Will get to my copy of "British Generals in Blair's Wars" one of these days to get another angle. All in all, "Supreme Command" is worth your time, even if only to provide a contrary perspective and an introduction to some of the national leaders mentioned above. Made me want to dig into some of the Churchill revisionism (Corrigan) and learn a lot more about US Civil War generalship.
I'll definitely give it a look. Whether we use the normal theory or politicians decide to intervene, I think you captured the issue.
That pertains to both military and civilian leadership, competence matters. I also think depending on the nature of the conflict or perhaps what phase we're in, one can shift between a normal theory heavy approach or a politician meddling approach.Cohen's issue with LBJ is not really that he meddled, but that he meddled badly.
It has a lot of truth to it, and the implications go further than meets the eye. We rely heavily on history (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Mao, etc.), which of course has merit, but the world moves on politically, culturally, and perhaps most importantly technologically, all of which provide a new context that a savvy political leader is probably more aware of than an officer who views the world through a doctrine that could be outdated. Just a thought.And the old line about military professionals being like surgeons who rarely if ever perform surgery has some truth to it.
Ist auf der Erde ewig dir nichts recht?
A book about the Ahnenerbe.
The Master Plan: Himmler's Scholars and the Holocaust by Heather Pringle.
Ahnenerbe - wikipedia
...
DER HERR:
Hast du mir weiter nichts zu sagen?
Kommst du nur immer anzuklagen?
Ist auf der Erde ewig dir nichts recht?
MEPHISTOPHELES:
Nein Herr! ich find es dort, wie immer, herzlich schlecht.
Die Menschen dauern mich in ihren Jammertagen,
Ich mag sogar die armen selbst nicht plagen.
Faust, The Prologue
the past is a foreign country
Four books that seemed to be common fixtures on expat shelves in mid-seventies Singapore.
War of the Running Dogs by Noel Barber
Syonan, My Story by Mamoru Shinozaki
The Scourge of the Swastika by Lord Russell of Liverpool
The Knights of Bushido by Lord Russell of Liverpool
...at the annual Speech Day of Liverpool College on 23 November (1961), Lord Russell of Liverpool lectured the boys on the three things he most disliked in young men: Teddy boys, pop singers and beatniks, but especially pop singers 'because they can cash in to the tune of about 200 pounds a week for strumming a guitar and looking as though they had Saint Vitus' dance.' The Beatles - All These Years
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks