General Petraeus: collection

[wm]

Reasonable minds can differ of course, but this is how I see it.

Not sure that my mind counts as reasonable, but I do differ, to some degree, with the following

US interests are best served by stability.

I think a more accurate assertion would be that nation states' interests in general, and those of the US in particular, are best served by predictability. Stability may well be one category of predictability, but I'm not so sure it is the only one. Some forms of instability are also predictable (like radioactive decay). A quiesant populace may appear to be stable, but that could be quite a distortion, as I think recent events in Egypt have pointed out. One would prefer to know,I think, whether a current level of stability (or instability) is likely to persist, and if so, for how long.

The US political process is predictable but it is rather far from stable, what with the potential turnover of significant portions of the governing elite at all levels every 2-6 years.

One optimizes one's interests by minimizing one's risks. The best way to minimize risk is to have a high level of certainty (that is, predictability) regarding future outcomes and consequences deriving from current actions.

[carl]

Sounds like we are in the middle of a big messy family squabble, aren't we?

No, it sounds more like we are in a violent civil war with lots of innocent people being killed, sometimes because they don't to do what some pathological teenager wants them to do fast enough or because a village mullah has decided he knows God's will better.

The Taliban do not have "clean hands" and no one here argues that they do. Nor does anyone argue that a border was drawn by white men that breaks the Pashtun populace into those who are "Afghan" and those who are "Pakistani" (much as if someone came and painted a line through the middle of your home and divided your family.) Neither of those lines mean much to the divided party.

The border is a reality that is recognized by both sides, grudgingly maybe on the Afghan side but it isn't seriously contested. I would guess the Pakistanis are rather more concerned about maintaining it as it is more than anybody.

The point of your Pashtun comment is to suggest that the Pakistanis aren't foreigners coming over to Afghanistan to kill locals on behalf of Taliban & company. From what I read, the Afghans know full well who is a Pakistani coming over to mess around in somebody else's neighborhood, not to mention various volunteers from over the ocean who show up from time to time.

You might want to change your "white men" reference to "europeans". My auntie was a missionary for decades in Pakistan. She was as fair skinned as the daughter of an Irishman could be. The Pakistanis always used to ask her if she was a Pathan.

Does Pakistan support the Taliban cause? Of course they do, it is in their interest to do so. Does the U.S. support the (formerly pro-Russian) Northern Alliance cause? Of course we do, it is in our interest to do so; or at least was in those heady days post 9/11.

But if this is about the interests of the people of Afghanistan perhaps we should take a more neutral role and promote solutions that serve the entire populace, not just the half we jumped in bed with (against the half we were in bed with when the Soviets were the occupiers).

You suggest "this" is about the interests of the Afghans. And you mention the Taliban & company's cause. That cause is from what I read an Islamist Afghanistan ruled by Kandaharis, not much evidence that it will be much different from what it was pre-2001. Most of the Afghans disliked that intensely and don't want it to come back.

You also say the Pak Army/ISI supports the cause of Taliban & company. Now, the Pak Army/ISI supports a cause which most Afghans view as inimical to their interests, and since you say we should promote solutions that serve the entire populace, shouldn't we therefore oppose the Pak Army/ISI's support for Taliban & company? This might possibly dovetail with our interests, since the Taliban was in charge of most of Afghanistan they hosted a group that killed 3,000 of our people and have never renounced that group.

In your parenthetical I think you are slanting things a bit. We, by deferring to the ISI, backed with most of the money the most religious muj groups. Gulbuddin and the boys comes to mind. And I believe Ismail Khan over there in Herat killed a lot of Russ. The Taliban doesn't like him at all. Also I might add that Massoud was the key leader in the Northern Alliance. He was not pro-Russian either judging by the number of their bodies he left on various battlefields. Not simple these things.

[Bob's World]

The "predictability" we carefully crafted over the past few generations in the Middle East arguably is the principal motivation for young men from a wide range of Muslim countries to act out violently against the US, but that on 9/11 or to travel to Iraq to fight us there, etc. A forced predictability sounds nice, but it comes with consequences.

As to stability, actually, as I think about it, I will clarify my position. It is not stability in Afghanistan that is important to the US, it is stability between Pakistan and India that is important to the US. That is arguably the biggest problem with our approach to Afghanistan, is that it has created a tremendous disruption of the uneasy stability that existed prior to our mucking around chasing terrorists.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best, but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side; a US forced solution will require the US to keep it stable. Frankly, we have bigger fish to fry.

AQ is everywhere and nowhere, they can plan, organize and launch attacks from virtually anywhere. Events such as are occurring in Tunisia and Egypt, and rumbling in several other countries promises to rob AQ of much of the rationale that they have been able to leverage to motivate attacks on the US. Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

Bottom line is that there are people out there working to whip up a lot of very irrational fears; and as Churchill reminded a London populace being submitted to German terror attacks, "we have nothing to fear, but fear itself."

Our fears have launched us on some fools errands. Time to stop taking counsel of our fears and to start focusing on what is really important. Pak-India stability is important. An improved US-Iranian relationship is important. Getting our military re-postured so as to be a more effective deterrent of state activity that is counter to our interests is important. Defeating the Taliban or denying any particular piece of dirt to AQ? Not so much.

Others think similarly. George Friedman's "the Next Decade" takes a very similar stance for slightly different reasons. He does a good job of laying out the history of the geopolitics as well.

[Dayuhan]

The "predictability" we carefully crafted over the past few generations in the Middle East arguably is the principal motivation for young men from a wide range of Muslim countries to act out violently against the US, but that on 9/11 or to travel to Iraq to fight us there, etc.

The extent to which despotism is predictable is debatable: many despots (Saddam Hussein for one) have been less than predictable, and the time and manner of their inevitable fall is often less than predictable.

The extend to which "we crafted" the pattern of despotism in the Middle East is also highly debatable. Most of these governments were not installed by us and their form is dictated less by us than by local habit and tradition. We've been quite willing to deal with it (not that we could do anything about it in most cases) but "crafted by us" is a huge overstatement. I realize that some may perceive it that way, but managing a perception is very different from managing a reality. If we believe that the stats quo was "crafted by us" when in fact it was not, we are tempted to try to re-craft it to suit our current beliefs. That's a recipe for trouble.

The extent to which foreign fighters are trying to "act out" against US control in the homeland is highly debatable and not fully consistent with evidence. Foreign fighters are regularly recruited from countries such as Libya and Syria, where no US control or even influence exist. Foreign fighters are not limited to fights against the US: they have been very successfully recruited for fights against other powers that have no influence in home countries (the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). Evidence and Occam's razor suggest that the driver for foreign fighter recruitment is the simple "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative, and that this is not US-specific or a reaction to US action in source countries.

This study of foreign foghter recruitment and motivations:

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/...2/ISEC_a_00023

does not cite desire to diminish US influence in the homeland as a significant motivator.

It's dangerous and inappropriate to assume that the US is simply an innocent victim of terrorism and that evebts have nothing to do with our past. It is equally dangerous and inappropriate to assume that it's all about us, and that everything that happens is a reaction to something we did or are doing. Even where our history is a causative factor, we can't always correct it with assertive action: the antidote to dumb intervention isn't smart intervention, it's less intervention.

It's all to easy to assume that now we understand all the mistakes we made before, and now we can correct them because now we know what everybody wants and needs. Worth remembering that our conviction was every bit as strong back when we were making all those messes. hen you think you know what's best for others it's a good time to be think again and be very careful. When you know you know what's best for others it's a good time to lock yourself up until sanity returns.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best

Best for us, no doubt. Burt can we dictate - and impose - what we think is "best" for Afghanistan? What if the various Afghan factions don't trust each other, don't think joint governance sufficiently protects them, and don't trust the US to determine what's "best"?

but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side

The last "homegrown solution" didn't work out all that well, certainly not for us. Why should we think the next will do better? Just because we aren't there doesn't mean a solution is "homegrown", either: the Pakistani Army and ISI will still be backing their chosen side.

Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

Didn't we try that before, with all that cruise missile drive-by shooting stuff? Did it accomplish the purpose? Will it if we do it again?

Our fears have launched us on some fools errands. Time to stop taking counsel of our fears and to start focusing on what is really important. Pak-India stability is important. An improved US-Iranian relationship is important. Getting our military re-postured so as to be a more effective deterrent of state activity that is counter to our interests is important. Defeating the Taliban or denying any particular piece of dirt to AQ? Not so much.

I agree. It wasn't just our fears, though, it was also our domestic need to translate punitive action into something benevolent, hence the efforts to "install" democracies in places where we have no business meddling in governance at all.

Unfortunately we have largely committed ourselves to a course we never should have taken. If you fire off an effective punitive raid and leave while you're on top and everyone fears you, you've accomplished a purpose and delivered a message: people will remember and be deterred. If you stay around until your vulnerabilities are clear and the other side is ascendant, leaving becomes defeat, and that delivers a message too. Unfortunately we selected goals that we haven't the capacity to achieve, and that makes failure, with all the perception-related baggage that goes with it, a very likely possibility. As far as I'm concerned we should never have tried to govern Afghanistan or to dictate how it will be governed, because these are things we haven't the capacity to do.

It would be lovely if we could bring all the competing factions into a functioning inclusive government with balanced powers and constitutional protections respected by all... but it's a pipe dream. Afghanistan is not the 51st state and we cannot impose an American solution to an Afghan problem.

[carl]

As to stability, actually, as I think about it, I will clarify my position. It is not stability in Afghanistan that is important to the US, it is stability between Pakistan and India that is important to the US. That is arguably the biggest problem with our approach to Afghanistan, is that it has created a tremendous disruption of the uneasy stability that existed prior to our mucking around chasing terrorists.

Why, apart from a humanitarian standpoint, is stability between the two countries so important to us? There is not likely to be a war to the death between the two since they both have nukes. Neither country is likely to let us influence the status of their nukes so we have no power to affect that equation either way.

What do you mean by stability anyway? I don't understand. Their existence is already insured by the nukes.

The continued tensions between the two is caused by three things (among others), Kashmir, the Pak Army/ISI support for violent young men who periodically go to India and slaughter Indian civilians and the disagreement between the two countries over who will have the greater say in Afghanistan. We can influence two of those things, maybe. Kashmir they will have to work out between themselves but we have some influence on the other two. What I can never understand is why your position normally seems to favor the Pak Army/ISI. It seems to be fair to tell them stop supporting LeT killers and you guys can share Afghanistan in that neither will control the place.

I will anticipate you answer. You normally respond by saying we must be sensitive to the Pak Army/ISI desire for strategic depth because anything that threatens that depth will set the Pak Army/ISI off on a march down the road to nuclear Armageddon, or it is implied. Why? I don't think they are insects programmed to react to stimuli in only one way. They may find it advantageous to make us think that, it pays; but they dealt with an Afghanistan they didn't control in the past and they will in the future.

The whole thing about strategic depth is a sham anyway. For strategic depth to be useful, there must be some sort of resource base to fall back upon. There is nothing in Afghanistan the Pak army can use to rebuild itself. Yet they insist that it is of value. It seems mindless adherence to something that isn't. That is only of value if it is part of a grift. They sort of remind me of the sheriff in Blazing Saddles threatening to shoot himself if the lynch mob didn't back off.

Your last sentence mentions how we disrupted an "uneasy stability" by going after some people who killed 3,000 Americans. That period of stability included lots of fighting in Kashmir by people dispatched, trained and sponsored by the Pak Army/ISI. It also included the Kargil conflict. That doesn't seem so stable to me.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best, but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side; a US forced solution will require the US to keep it stable. Frankly, we have bigger fish to fry.

What you are saying here is the Taliban & company's interests trumps those of the other Afghans and ultimately, it may be easier to just let them have the place and that wouldn't be so bad. Please correct me if I am wrong.

I would point out that any stability the Taliban could maintain would be that of a repressive police state. Isn't that something akin to a "forced predictability"?

AQ is everywhere and nowhere, they can plan, organize and launch attacks from virtually anywhere.

I've heard that very often and it always sounds good in theory, connectivity, virtual training, the miracle of the internet and all that. What I observe is they seem to hang out in Pakistan, near the mountains and most of the attacks on us seem to go through there. From this I conclude there is an advantage to being there that surmounts the discomforts. If they could do what they want to do from a seaside resort in Belgium, why don't they? The roads are better and the cheese is good.

Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

If it is so simple, how come we haven't been able to find AQ 1 & 2 and MO in a decade, 10 years, of trying? Strategic raids sounds really cool but I can't think of one that paid off since maybe Pizarro.

Bottom line is that there are people out there working to whip up a lot of very irrational fears; and as Churchill reminded a London populace being submitted to German terror attacks, "we have nothing to fear, but fear itself."

FDR said that in 1932 or 1933 and I believe he was referring to the domestic economy. If Churchill had said that in 1940 or 41 people would have thought him odd since bombs were falling on their heads at the time.

[Bob's World]

Ok, I concede the FDR / Churchill mix up. Otherwise I simply refer Carl and Dayuhan to each other for a group hug. I recommend you both read Friedman's "next decade," not that it agrees with me on all points or disagrees with you all, but I think you'll find it an interesting read. I don't think he takes into account role of today's info technology to the degree he should when he makes his argument on the US being a reluctant empire and needing to act like one along the lines of Rome and Great Britain, but otherwise there is a lot of good information and clear thinking. I don't think certain TTPs that were viable then would work today.

I will ad for Carl, the US and the Soviets came within a C-hair of launching on each other a few times as I understand it. Deterrence is always a delicate balance of provocation and restraint, and we are disrupting that balance in Pak-India. That could cause a tragic miscalculation. I didn't say it was most likely, on that it was the only real danger that we need to focus on in that region currently, and it is the one we seem to focus on least.

[carl]

Deterrence is always a delicate balance of provocation and restraint, and we are disrupting that balance in Pak-India.

Saying it don't make it so. How are we disrupting the balance?

I thought deterrence was basically a matter of the other guy knowing he won't get away with, thereby causing restraint. Where does provocation fit in?

[Dayuhan]

Otherwise I simply refer Carl and Dayuhan to each other for a group hug. I recommend you both read Friedman's "next decade," not that it agrees with me on all points or disagrees with you all, but I think you'll find it an interesting read. I don't think he takes into account role of today's info technology to the degree he should when he makes his argument on the US being a reluctant empire and needing to act like one along the lines of Rome and Great Britain

Carl seems a nice guy but I'm not sure I want to hug him. Not really my style.

I do not at all agree with anyone who says the US is an empire, reluctant or otherwise. Unless we're radically redefining the word, it's not a supportable contention. The thought of "acting like an empire" invokes a particular shudder. No point in acting like something we're not, especially when it's something we don't want to be, something that we haven't the capacity to be, and something it's not in our interests to be.

To get back to the point, which I think is being to some degree evaded... this seems to be your prescription for Afghanistan:

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best

A lovely idea, really, and I think we'd all love to see it happen. I just don't see any realistic way that we can make it happen, and I think that pursuing a goal that we haven't the capacity to achieve - something we've done all too often lately - is a very dangerous thing to do.

How is this not an American solution to an Afghan problem? How can we get to this point, short of dictating an outcome and trying to impose it? Do we even have the capacity to dictate or impose outcomes in Afghanistan? Do the various Afghan factions trust each other (or us) enough to make this possible? It sounds wonderful to us, but is this compatible with existing Afghan political culture and the various parties' perceptions of their own interests and goals?

Inquiring minds want to know...

[Ken White]

...... ......

[Dayuhan]

..... looking for the "chastened" emoticon .....

[Ken White]

that can be used ; \ on occasion.

OTOH, if yet again in pursuit of the ever elusive definitive answer, perhaps "chastened" (chastenity? Nah, probably not...) is not indicated...

[SWJ Blog]

David Petraeus deserves to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs...

Entry Excerpt:

... says the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) in an editorial titled "The President's Generals". "...Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen's term ends September 30... Names under consideration include the current vice chairman, General James Cartwright, supreme commander in Europe Admiral James Stavridis, and General David Petraeus... By broad consensus, the most accomplished general officer of his generation is General Petraeus..."



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[AdamG]

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Gen. David Petraeus, in his first appearance in Washington since taking over as the top war commander in Afghanistan, is laying out a mostly upbeat assessment of military progress that should allow the United States to begin withdrawing forces this summer, despite predictions that the wounded Taliban insurgency will mount an especially bloody fight this spring.
No one is calling it the Taliban's last stand, but U.S. officials say this is the year that the insurgency will be tamed on the battlefield and at the bargaining table.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories...TAM&SECTION=US

[tequila]

Tom Ricks reports rumors that USMC LTG John Allen will succeed Petraeus in Afghanistan.

[SWJ Blog]

Coalition Has Momentum in Afghanistan, Petraeus Says

Entry Excerpt:

Coalition Has Momentum in Afghanistan, Petraeus Says by Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service.

WASHINGTON, March 15, 2011 – The Taliban’s momentum has been reversed in most areas of Afghanistan, but the progress achieved there is fragile and reversible, the commander of NATO and U.S. forces said here today.

Army Gen. David H. Petraeus told the Senate Armed Services Committee that much dangerous work remains ahead for coalition and Afghan government forces in the country.

“Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and early 2011 have enabled the joint Afghan-NATO transition board to recommend initiation this spring of transition to Afghan lead in several provinces,” he said. The progress also will factor into his recommendations in drawing down the number of U.S. forces in the country, now at around 100,000, the general added.

The progress, Petraeus said, has put the NATO-led effort on the path to turn over security responsibility for the country to Afghan forces by 2014.

The effort in Afghanistan is more than simply a military campaign, Petraeus told the senators. Support and resources the United States and the 47 other troop-contributing countries have provided has allowed the civil-military campaign to work, he said.

And, Petraeus noted, the Afghans themselves are shouldering an increasingly larger share of the defense burden.

“More than 87,000 additional NATO ISAF troopers and 1,000 additional civilians have been added to the effort in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009,” the general said. “In Afghanistan, security forces have grown by over 122,000 in that time as well.”

Getting the inputs right has enabled all forces to conduct the comprehensive campaign, he said.

“Our core objective is, of course, ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for al-Qaida,” Petraeus told the panel. “Achieving that objective requires that we help Afghanistan develop sufficient capabilities to secure and govern itself, and that effort requires the execution of the comprehensive civil-military effort on which we are now embarked.”

The effort has enabled a stepped-up tempo of precise, intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders, the general said.

“In a typical 90-day period, in fact, precision operations by U.S. special mission units and their Afghan partners alone kill or capture some 360 targeted insurgent leaders,” Petraeus said. “Moreover, intelligence-driven operations are now coordinated with senior officers of the relevant Afghan ministries, and virtually all include highly trained Afghan soldiers or police, with some Afghan elements now in the lead on these operations.”

Combined ISAF-Afghan operations have cleared the Taliban from important safe havens, and the forces are holding these areas, allowing governance and development to take root, Petraeus noted.

“ISAF and Afghan troopers have, for example, cleared such critical areas as the districts west of Kandahar city that were the birthplace of the Taliban movement, as well as important districts of Helmand province,” he said.

These operations have resulted in the gradual development of local governance and economic revival in the growing security bubbles, the general said, pointing out that in Marja in Helmand province – once a Taliban stronghold – 75 percent of registered voters cast ballots in recent city elections.

“As a result of improvements in the security situation there,” Petraeus said, “the markets -- which once sold weapons, explosives and illegal narcotics -- now feature over 1,500 shops selling food, clothes and household goods.”

Safe havens in Pakistan also are receiving attention, as ISAF has troops in place to interdict these corridors, the general told the senators, and ISAF and Afghan troops are cooperating with Pakistani forces across the border to trap Taliban forces between this hammer and anvil.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai will announce which provinces will transition to full Afghan control next week, Petraeus said. “In keeping with the principles adopted by [NATO’s] North Atlantic Council to guide transition,” he said, “the shifting of responsibility from ISAF to Afghan forces will be conducted at a pace determined by conditions on the ground with assessments provided from the bottom up so that those at operational-command level in Afghanistan can plan the resulting battlefield geometry adjustments with our Afghan partners.”

The transition, he continued, will allow NATO to take some troops out of the country, and will enable a bulk-up of troops in other areas.

“Similar processes are also taking place as we commence transition of certain training and institutional functions from ISAF trainers to their Afghan counterparts,” Petraeus said.

It’s important to ensure the transition process is irreversible, the general said.

“As the ambassadors of several ISAF countries emphasized at one recent NATO meeting,” he said, “we’ll get one shot at transition, and we need to get it right.”

Since the surge of forces into Afghanistan reached its peak eight months ago, the progress is undeniable, Petraeus told the panel. The Taliban have lost safe havens, many insurgent leaders have been killed or captured, and hundreds of reconcilable mid-level leaders and fighters have been reintegrated into Afghan society, he said.

Meanwhile, Petraeus added, Afghan forces have grown in numbers and capabilities, and security improvements have meant real progress in governance and the economy.

“None of this has been easy,” the general said. “The progress achieved has entailed hard fighting and considerable sacrifice. There have been tough losses along the way, and there have been setbacks as well as successes. Indeed, the experience has been akin to that of a roller coaster ride. The trajectory has generally been upward since last summer, but there certainly have been significant bumps and difficult reverses at various points.”

The Taliban will try to regain momentum this spring, Petraeus said.

“We believe that we will be able to build on the momentum achieved in 2010, though that clearly will entail additional tough fighting,” he added.



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[AdamG]

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan insists the military can boost Afghan security forces to fight the Taliban, begin a troop drawdown this summer and fulfill President Barack Obama's goal of a long-term partnership with the Kabul government.

Facing a skeptical Congress and a war-weary public, Army Gen. David Petraeus is trying to build support for the continued and costly U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, telling lawmakers the conflict is turning around despite concerns about the viability of President Hamid Karzai's government and the dedication of neighboring Pakistan to root out terrorism.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories...TAM&SECTION=US

[SWJ Blog]

Petraeus, Polls Disagree On Afghan War Progress

Entry Excerpt:

Petraeus, Polls Disagree On Afghan War Progress by David Wood, Huffington Post. BLUF: "Petraeus argued that a substantial number of American troops will be needed well after this July, while the Afghan government, at the national and local levels, is prodded and encouraged and trained. While the Post-ABC poll found that nearly 80 percent of respondents wanted a "substantial'' withdrawal of troops this summer, Petraeus said many of those who are withdrawn from secure areas may be reassigned within Afghanistan rather than brought back home."



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[AdamG]

WASHINGTON (AP) — Challenged by a congressman to "be honest" about how long American troops might have to fight in Afghanistan, Army Gen. David Petraeus revealed that he has a personal stake in ensuring that the U.S. war objectives are met — his son, Stephen, whose recent combat tour was kept "very quiet."

In an emotional exchange with Rep.Walter B. Jones, R-N.C., Petraeus said "if I ever felt that we couldn't achieve our objectives," he would be "very forthright" not only with his superiors in the military chain of command but also with President Barack Obama and members of the Congress.

http://www.wtkr.com/news/military/wt...0,702929.story

[Bob's World]

I'll never fully understand why congress always plays the detached role of either cheerleader or victim; depending on where they think the majority of their constituency stands on issues like Iraq and now Afghanistan.

The President defined the Ends; and the military is the means the the president sent to address those ends. The military in turn came up with (surprise) a military solution to the President's Ends; and the Congress then resourced all of the above.

To Congress, please, stop being a detached cheerleader or victim either one, and stand up and take responsibility.

The Ends defined by the President are far too broad and far too tied to one specific region of he globe to be Feasible, Acceptable, or Suitable to the goals of promoting US interests in South Asia, or the more specific interest of protecting the US from AQ inspired acts of terrorism coming out of the greater Middle East.

The Ways derived and being implemented by the Military are wildly disconnected from the Ends identified by the President and for different reasons are equally infeasible, unacceptable and unsuitable to the larger goals as well.

I always have to stop and remind myself that it is the genius of our Constitution that ensures that the US government remains so wonderfully dysfunctional and inefficient so as to keep the President, the Congress and the Military from all deciding some day to gang up on "we the people." But damn, sometimes its frustrating.

Man up Congress. Stop watching the world go by while you wring your hands or wave your pom poms and write rubber checks to pay for it all. The power of the purse is in your hands, but only if you are willing to pull the strings. Instead you write a blank check to USAID and add it to the blank check already given to Defense. Is it any wonder this just keeps getting bigger? Cut some funds, and watch it get smarter instead. Rich people can afford to be wasteful and stupid; people on a budget have to get smart and efficient.

[RJ]

Looks like the majority agrees - No 5th Star for David Petraeus!

I agree. the stage is too small to support the weight that honor would grant.