Foreign fighters in Iraq & Syria

[davidbfpo]

A short, six minute CNN interview with Peter Neumann from ICSR and he is very pessimistic about teh impact of foreign fighters. This quote comes after his direct contact with fighters:

They are telling us that the Syrian people do not like them very much. They are telling us that they hate the idea that all this infighting is going on between different groups – they came to Syria in order to fight Bashar Assad; what they end up doing is killing other Sunni rebels. And so there are a lot of powerful messages. If governments paid more attention, these would be very powerful messages to deter people from going to Syria in the first place

Link:http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/0...stan-in-1980s/

[davidbfpo]

An update on the French scene:http://jihadology.net/2014/06/09/the...eers-in-syria/

For David Thomson, the French jihadists are leaving to assume a defensive jihad against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but also because they believe in the Muslim prophecies of the end times, the Apocalypse, to be held in Syria (land of Sham). There is no portrait type of French jihadist even if some are from disadvantaged neighborhoods of large cities, others come from the countryside and have never met a Muslim. Many are offenders, but not all, some being fully inserted into the social fabric. The only common denominator is the role of the Internet and social networks. These helped to streamline the message of jihad and extend it to a wider younger audience. Most of the jihadists become self-taught via the net

[davidbfpo]

Amidst a longer story, IMHO fear-mongering, is this passage:

Security officials estimate that about two-thirds of those have already returned.

Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...#ixzz36h0sNQoY

[davidbfpo]

One of the better press articles on why three Britons left for Syria. A complex and unpredictable mixture:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...randeep-ramesh

A shorter Canadian report:http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/07...dists-at-home/

[Bill Moore]

Light infantry and special operators will be very familiar with these battle drills. You can critique their tactics at the margins, but overall they appear to be well trained, some of the tactics/battle drills demonstrated include man down drills, react to contact, bounding overwatch, how to execute an ambush, etc.

These are reportedly foreign fighters being trained in Syria. Apparently using our books.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...st_group_i.php

Chechen-led jihadist group in Syria releases video of training camp

A new jihadist group known as the Jamaat Ahadun Ahad, or the Group of the One and Only, has released a video of its training camp in Syria. The group is led by a Chechen commander and includes fighters from Chechnya, Europe, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and several Arab countries.

[davidbfpo]

An unclassified Danish Security Service (PET) Center for Terror Analysis has published:

...a 6-page unclassified intelligence threat assessment on the danger posed by foreign fighters currently operating in Syria with various militant groups, especially ISIS.

The report discloses that more than 100 Danes are currently believed to be fighting with these militant groups in Syria, and that 15 have been killed. The report also notes that a small but growing number of Danes are now leaving home to fight with ISIS in Iraq.

Link:https://www.pet.dk/English/Centerfor...nFINALpdf.ashx

[Bill Moore]

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/res...d%20%20web.pdf

Be Afraid.
Be A Little Afraid:
The Threat of Terrorism from
Western Foreign Fighters in Syria
and Iraq

This paper first lays out the standard schematic view
of how and why some foreign fighters become dangerous
terrorists, drawing on the Afghanistan experience
in the 1980s to illustrate the arguments. The
second section discusses why many seasoned observers
believe the Syria conflict is likely to be particularly
dangerous. In the third section, we examine
why terrorism in Europe and the United States was
less than expected from previous jihads such as Iraq,
again drawing implications and lessons specific to
Syria, as well as examining factors unique to the Syrian
conflict itself. The fourth and final section identifies
policy implications and recommendations.