Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
With the deepest respect to Wilf who I have found in a different forum where he is up to his usual tricks.
Then in our discussions of a few years ago it was evident that much of the discussion comes from 'theorists' with no combat experience at that level.
Of course all this theorising ceases when war finally arrives and the first combat is experienced and the first casualties are taken.
It is then that one can look back at the futility of the time wasted on this theorising.
Certainly at the 'low level' it will be found that 'contexual insight' with be in short supply - except for those few who are destined for promotion up the ladder - and that is why 'drills' and 'encounter actions' are important - indeed critical - components of infantry training.Would it be a shortcoming inherent to the low level, as a result of insufficient contextual insight at that level? Or is it imposed through excessive form from higher levels? My guess, probably a bit of both.
This lack of contextual awareness increases in times of mobilisation of reserves and/or civilians to any conflict when fresh semi-trained or untrained people are radpidly processed.
Given the movies and the computer war-games it would be difficult to take the modern junior soldier's eye off what he sees/learns there.
I've used the scenario where you brief platoon level soldiers that they need to think like the enemy on how to take on troops who always move in single file, with the machine gun(s), command groups etc in predicable positions in the formation. With half acting as enemy and rotating it is very soon that they start to make the necessary adjustments themselves. The good thing about this is that they believe they saw the need rather than had it imposed on them. Psychology 101.
That's incredibly stupid *******.
You can play the veteran card as much as you want, this doesn't change the fact that it's excessively bloody to figure out everything new during a war only.
There wasn't enough theorizing prior to the First World War, and the Second World War showed the power of theorizing done well. Combat experience is no important ingredient; the combat experience was more often than not largely irrelevant to the new challenges, if not misleading.
The US Navy didn't figure out air-sea battles based on North Sea patrols of 1918, nor did the USMC figure out the need for forced landings based on its trench war experience. Guderian didn't figure out the employment of mechanised combined arms formations based on WWI barrages and infantry assaults. Bloch didn't serve ever, but still proved to be a better seer in regard to military affairs than generals and field marshals with decades worth of small wars on their resume.
Nobody ever said "Let's wait till WW3 before we make up our minds on how to deal with a nuclear battlefield" because that would be an extremely stupid and potentially fatal idea.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-21-2014 at 12:34 PM. Reason: one word edited, PM to author
In your opinion.
If you had any combat experience you would very quickly identify the nonsense spoken and the time wasted in speculation and guesswork by those who have none.You can play the veteran card as much as you want, this doesn't change the fact that it's excessively bloody to figure out everything new during a war only.
You are talking of high level so-called 'new challenges'. OK so let anyone who thinks he has all the answers speculate and pontificate on high level 'new challenges'... but leave the know aspects alone and to those who know through - sometimes bitter - experience.There wasn't enough theorizing prior to the First World War, and the Second World War showed the power of theorizing done well. Combat experience is no important ingredient; the combat experience was more often than not largely irrelevant to the new challenges, if not misleading.
The US Navy didn't figure out air-sea battles based on North Sea patrols of 1918, nor did the USMC figure out the need for forced landings based on its trench war experience. Guderian didn't figure out the employment of mechanised combined arms formations based on WWI barrages and infantry assaults. Bloch didn't serve ever, but still proved to be a better seer in regard to military affairs than generals and field marshals with decades worth of small wars on their resume.
Who said 'let's wait'?Nobody ever said "Let's wait till WW3 before we make up our minds on how to deal with a nuclear battlefield" because that would be an extremely stupid and potentially fatal idea.
Here's an area for the non-combat experienced to get invoved in - cyber warfare... but for heavens sake leave low level tactics alone.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-21-2014 at 12:35 PM. Reason: One word edited
The first problem the armies ran into in 1914 was actually a "low level" tactical problem; firepower either killed or pinned them down if they found no route for flanking, and there was no such route once defensive lines became continuous.
Theorists who knew about the Boer Wars made small notes in published works, pointing out that this was a yet unsolved question - and they did so years prior to the war. No practitioner came up with a solution from previous wars because the problem was new. At least none made a decisive impact. Obviously, his insight would have needed to be distributed through military theory / doctrine, as obviously the NCOs and junior officers who led the men in 1914 did not know how to cope.
A bit more theory progress and armies might have understood before 1914 that the advance to the enemy position not only had to be done with benefit of concealment, but that this actually required small unit manoeuvre instead of unit manoeuvres. This would have saved the bloodletting of the first half of the war, and the war might have ended much, much sooner.
Practitioners know what worked under certain conditions and what not - it takes a theorist to explore what works under different conditions and what not.
The problem isn't the theorizing, but the insufficient quality and quantity of it. Millions of men are employed by Western military forces, but only a few dozen add much to military theory.
Look at the theorist sub-forum; I asked for notable theorists on infantry and other combat arms, and the then still much more active forum knew almost no answers.
THAT is the problem.
Last edited by Fuchs; 02-16-2014 at 03:42 AM.
@JMA
If you check the official manuals for the years 1905-14 you find that the Boer war and the Russian/Japanese war had indeed an impact. However, only for aspects on side of the defender: Better field fortifications, hand granades, etc. ...
The crucial question, how could the attacking force overcome this improved defense was not answered, despite the fact that the war of 1904/5 already showed most of the problems the attacker faced when there were long fortified lines.
The impact of veterans depends on the relevance of their knowledge, if they provide the relevant stuff they are a kind of force multiplier, if their knowledge is not longer relevant they may even become a problem when being higher commanding officers.
Military history shows all facettes of this problem.
The BEF had 1914 IIRC a much higher percentage of officers and NCOs with combat experience compared to the French and German forces, did this translate into better performnace? To my best of knowledge the first attemps -after half a million KIA/WIA on each side - to develope small unit tactics that allowed attacking fortified enemies without crippling losses were made by French and German officers in 1915.
The nearby University of Birmingham has a Centre for War Studies, until recently it was the Centre for First World War Studies, has at least one post-graduate student is working on the themes raised here.
Aimee Fox-Godden - Beneath the Learning Curve: Inter-theatre Knowledge Management in the British army, 1914-1918. From her official bio:Link:http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research...-students.aspxMy research examines the British army’s use of knowledge as a force multiplier through the identification and examination of formal and informal processes for knowledge sharing between three operational theatres in the First World War: the Western Front, Gallipoli and Palestine. Underpinned by the concept of the ‘early information society’, the efficacy of these processes is examined through engagement with Knowledge Management theory, particularly the work of Ikujiro Nonaka, Gabriel Szulanski and Linda Argote, providing a framework within which the British army’s acquisition, exploitation and adaptation of knowledge can be measured and validated. Knowledge sharing will be considered with reference to key areas such as artillery, logistics and medical services, charting whether there is evidence of best practice from various theatres influencing their development.
Over the last twenty years, First World War scholarship has been driven by the broad concept of the ‘learning curve’ theory. Despite recent re-evaluations of other operational theatres and attempts to position them within the broader experience of the British army, the learning process still remains focused on the Western Front. Manpower and materiel constraints aside, there has been limited research into the relationships between theatres and even less about how knowledge and experience were exchanged between them. My research will address this gap by assessing how operational theatres shared best practice and, ultimately, whether they were successful in doing so. By considering these relationships, my research seeks to show how the British army developed a cross-theatre ‘learning network’ to increase its competitive advantage, thus enhancing its ability to cope with the changing nature of warfare.
davidbfpo
Yes in deed the Brits learned first hand many lessons from the Boer war.
Coming after the Sudan Campaign 1881-1899 a different enemy in different geography gave the Brits a wake up call.
I would suggest what is important is how the institution - in this case the British military - absorbs these lessons across the board. By who and why are changes resisted? To what extent and how rapidly are the lessons absorbed?
It would be interesting to know how many amendments have been brought into the basic training ciriculum for infantry soldiers (as one example) in the British and US basic training schools since Iraq and afganistan and are the instructors qualified - by experience - to conduct this new training?
So I suggest the 'relevance of veterans' depends on who they are. There are many who have value through their personal experience for as long as they serve... but are not able to transfer that knowledge and experience to those with little or no experience.
So once again it comes down to that select few capable of transfering the knowledge to others and converting it into policy and procedure.
I could go on...
Yes, but the problem is who are these so-called theorists? There are wat too many people claiming to have all the answers and expecting to be taken seriously.
Yes, I said that around here years ago. There are indeed very few who are able to contribute to the advance of military theory. That of course should not open the door for any all comers to demand to be heard and taken seriously.Millions of men are employed by Western military forces, but only a few dozen add much to military theory.
That is not the problem. It just confirms the true situation which you and I recognise that there are few competent people within the system who can contribute.Look at the theorist sub-forum; I asked for notable theorists on infantry and other combat arms, and the then still much more active forum knew almost no answers.
THAT is the problem.
BTW what qualifies you to be 'considered' to be a military theorist?
This is an interesting and important post in my opinion. I can understand the different views and think they all can be defended by cherry picking historical examples that fit a particular argument. Nonetheless I agree with Fuchs' assessment on the value of military theorizing, and that many valuable theorists didn't have combat experience. Seems the best theorists don't correlate to combat experience, but correlate instead with high intelligence, curiosity, and creativity (regardless of whether or not the theorist had combat experience). Famed and successful insurgent leaders often developed useful theories/strategies to pursue their ends without the benefit of even previous military experience, much less combat experience. Of course they adjusted their theories as they tested them in the lab of conflict. This is something Western leaders often fail to do, and years later those who blindly followed these theories of Mao, Lenin, etc. were often defeated, as were those who embraced theories to counter these approaches. The world always moves on, unfortunately our institutional thinking doesn't always keep pace.
In the U.S. military there was considerable military theorizing prior to entering WWII which included the use of air power, projecting power via amphibious assaults, the use of armor, etc. which ultimately contributed to victory despite some initial tactical set backs. On the other hand, there didn't appear to be much theorizing at the military level during the short gap between the end of WWII and the Korean War, and we sent an unprepared military that the nation underfunded due to the illusionary peace dividend post WWII. I'm not sure about Vietnam, we may have theorized (special warfare concepts and such), but the theories we applied as well as the way we approached special warfare wasn't relevant to achieving our desired ends. That indicates to me that while theorizing is essential, there is no one size fits all theory that we can build doctrine and strategies on. We clearly theorized after in depth after the Vietnam War and saw great success in both Desert Storm and the initial phase of what was later called ironically Iraqi Freedom based on those theories, to include the air-land battle, cyber, and information operations (smart weapons, not psychological or other influence operations). Yet, once we transitioned into an irregular conflict conventional military theories fell short, and our old (relabeled as new) COIN doctrines proved to be irrelevant. Interestingly enough, those with combat experience are both its biggest advocates despite its many failures and it biggest critics. It is the media in our nation that decides who is correct and they have labeled those opposed to our COIN doctrine as a group of anti-intellectuals who simply don't get it. Something appealing about the language of winning hearts and minds in our culture, the illogic behind it doesn't matter when we manage perceptions through sound bytes.
Getting to JMA's point about training, the U.S. Army in many ways was better trained before 9/11 (at least in our combat arms units), but of course once you start fighting you adapt your training quickly to meet the demands of the current fight (the adversary, the terrain, the ROE, etc.), so for executing our COIN doctrine we're better trained now, but today's Army probably isn't as well trained to conduct major combat operations like the ones that defeated Iraqi's conventional military forces. I don't think peacetime is the sole factor that degrades combat readiness, because in many cases we have ample evidence that our forces retained a high degrade of readiness through long periods of peace, but our readiness was impacted at certain times in our history by insufficient funding to sustain combat readiness (training, equipment, etc.) between the wars. Other factors also contribute to ill-preparedness like political correctness, social engineering, and embracing faulty theories (COIN doctrine).
In the end it is all relative, if we end up transitioning to another COIN/stability operation in the next five years the combat experience we have now will be relevant. If we get into a conventional fight, the combat experience we have now could actually be detrimental to our success, but the young bucks on point will quickly identify what isn't working and will once again challenge the wisdom of their irrelevant seniors and adapt at the tactical level.
When I consider readiness, I try to consider ready for what because the answer will be different. I still embrace what a former team sergeant told me, "we don't know where, who, or how we're going to fight in the future, but the basics will always apply. You need to be physically fit and tough (its different), know how to shoot expertly in all types of conditions, be able to navigate, and use your radios." After that it is identifying the right tactics at the grunt level where it counts. I think we sustain all the above during peacetime in the regular army. I have my doubts regarding the reserves and National Guard. Of course there are other things that must be trained to include collective exercises and joint interoperability, etc., but the basics are essential.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-21-2014 at 12:36 PM. Reason: grammar. One word edited
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-21-2014 at 12:37 PM. Reason: Edited one word
I made a partial text search for "theo" at the Gutenberg archive (there are too many results; sighting a full search might take hours).
The closest result was:(And this is how the entire book is written in the German original edition!)Wird eine verbesserte Theorie das Studium der Kriegfhrung erleichtern, den Geist und das Urteil der Mnner erziehen, die sich zu den hheren Stellen hinaufschwingen, so wird auch der Methodismus nicht mehr so weit hinaufreichen, und derjenige, welcher als unentbehrlich zu betrachten ist, wird dann wenigstens aus der Theorie selbst geschpft werden und nicht aus bloer Nachahmung entstehen.
Will an improved theory ease the study of warfare, train/nurture/raise/discipline the judgement of men, who rise to higher positions, so will the method(ism) reach not more so high up, and what was thought of as indispensable, will then at least be drawn from theory itself and not from mere imitation.
Clausewitz has also some candy for JMA:Daher kommt es, da der richtige Theoretiker wie ein Schwimmeister erscheint, der Bewegungen, die frs Wasser ntig sind, auf dem Trocknen ben lt, die denen grotesk und bertrieben vorkommen, die nicht an das Wasser denken; daher kommt es aber auch, da Theoretiker, die selbst nie untergetaucht haben oder von ihren Erfahrungen nichts Allgemeines zu abstrahieren wissen, unpraktisch und selbst abgeschmackt sind, weil sie nur das lehren, was ein jeder kann - gehen.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-25-2014 at 07:47 PM. Reason: Fix quotes
Chapter VIII
Concluding Remarks, Book I
Basically a headhunting operation to acquire the specific knowledge of competitiors without much regard to the nationality. It happened quite a lot back in past centuries, Clausewitz himself enrolled in the Russian army to continue fight the French and to work in his area of expertise. Perhaps too business-like for our age.Habituation to war no General can give his army at once; and the camps of manśuvre (peace exercises) furnish but a weak substitute for it, weak in comparison with real experience in war, but not weak in relation to other armies in which the training is limited to mere mechanical exercises of routine. So to regulate the exercises in peace time as to include some of these causes of friction, that the judgment, circumspection, even resolution of the separate leaders may be brought into exercise, is of much greater consequence than those believe who do not know the thing by experience. It is of immense importance that the soldier, high or low, whatever rank he has, should not have to encounter for the first time in war those things which, when seen for the first time, set him in astonishment and perplexity; if he has only met with them one single time before, even by that he is half acquainted with them. This relates even to bodily fatigues. They should be practised less to accustom the body than the mind to them. In war the young soldier is very apt to regard unusual fatigues as the consequence of faults, mistakes, and embarrassment in the conduct of the whole, and to become distressed by that. This would not happen if he had been prepared for that beforehand by exercises in peace.
Another less comprehensive but still very important means of gaining habituation to war in time of peace is to invite into the service officers of foreign armies, who have had experience in war. Peace seldom reigns over all Europe, and never in all quarters of the world. A State which has been long at peace should, therefore, always seek to procure some officers who have done good service at the different scenes of warfare; or to send there some of its own, that they may get a lesson in war.
However small the number of officers of this description may appear in proportion to the mass, still their influence is very sensibly felt. Their experience, the bent of their genius, the stamp of their character, influence their subordinates and comrades; and besides that, if they cannot be placed in positions of superior command, they may always be regarded as men acquainted with the country, who may be questioned on many special occasions.
Last edited by Firn; 02-25-2014 at 06:07 PM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Well, it's not common that officers serve different masters serially as if they were mercenaries, even collecting different noble titles from different monarchs.
What's common nowadays are fighting military advisers and military observers, as well as participation in small wars and peacekeeping instead of getting involved in conventional warfare.
I saw some hints that some countries appear to send otherwise implausibly small military observer teams to UN missions. This appears to be a kind of military experience gathering scheme.
Finland has seven such tiny missions now as far as I know, for example.
Quoting Clausewitz: The problem here is that this minority is often squeezed out or ignored through the jealousy of the inexperienced wannabees.
This is the 'drag' I mentioned in another post. War inexperienced self important types will seldom adopt the advice and guidence from others - especially of a lesser rank - with alacrity.
(this of course we know yet continue to place youthful advisors of lesser rank with local forces - Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.)
Last edited by JMA; 02-27-2014 at 08:00 AM.
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