Political War and Woolly Thinking

[TheCurmudgeon]

That said, it's also important to read old Carl in conjunction with Handel's masterful analysis of Carl, Sun Tzu, and other strategic thinkers. I have yet to see anyone tackle this subject in such an insightful and useful way.

Slap, thanks for the reference. Looks like a great book. Ordered a copy today.

I have too many irons in the fire at the moment to give this the justice it deserves, but I will keep plying away at it.

Funny, we complain that we don't have enough disruptive thinkers but we decry disruptive thinking.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I would like to add a quote to the conversation. This is from "The Changing Character of War"

So, the seminar series at the beginning of calendar year 2004, the first term of the programme's existence, was designed to address the big question of what is war, the better able to address the principal, but necessary second-order, issues. After a series of talks by subject specialists both in areas where the programme lacked research expertise as well as areas in which it possessed it, we agreed on fiver criteria. First, war involves the use of force, although there there can be a state of war in which active hostilities are suspended, and some would argue that the threat of the use of war (as in the Cold War - constitutes war. Fighting is what defines war, a point made by Clausewitz, and echoed in this book by Barkawi and Brighton. Second, war rests on contention. If one party attacks another, the other must respond for war to occur, or else what will follow will be murder, massacre, or occupation. The reaction means that possibly the most important feature of war is reciprocity: part of the problem much operational thought in the 1990's was that it had forgotten that the enemy has a vote and that his response might be 'asymmetrical' or even unpredictable. Third, war assumes a degree of intensity and duration to the fighting: scale matters, and skirmishes and border clashes are not necessarily war. Fourth, those who fight do not do so in a private capacity, and fifth, and consequently, war is fought for some aim beyond fighting itself. Both the last two criteria tend normative to be associated with states and there policies, but they do not have to be defined in these ways, and wars have been pursued -- for example, by Germany and Japan in 1945 -- beyond the point at which they seem able to deliver worthwhile results.

(Pages 6-7, emphasis added)

War does not have to be political. It only needs to serve a purpose beyond the violence alone (i.e. it is more than revenge for the murder of your brother - it is not a blood fued).

I would love to hear any thoughts on why this definition is wrong or incomplete.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I offer the following for your consideration.

Assuming that Clausewitz observation that war is used as an instrument of rational political policy is only half right; war can also be used as an instrument of irrational political (or non-political) policy.

If I define "Rational" as "the desire to live to see the policy goal come to fruition", or more simply, that life is more important than the policy goal and that life will only be risked where there is a reasonable expectation of achieving that goal, then I can make the following categorizations:

Rational actors will chose to use either conventional war (direct or proxy) or terrorism to achieve their purpose. This fits with the rational actors concept of bending the enemy to my will. If I have the power I will go directly against my enemy. If I lack the power I may chose to use a proxy, either though a proxy war or via terrorism to achieve my goal. In all of these cases there is the potential for a negotiated solution or even surrender of the policy goal if the rational actor sees his own death as the cost of continuing to military action.

Irrational actors can chose any of the above, but in addition to those they can chose asymmetrical warfare. This is because the ideological zealot is less interested in surviving the conflict than he is in seeing his goal come to fruition. He will continue to attack even when the outcome seems impossible. He will continue to fight until he loses his conviction or he dies. For the religious zealot, death may yield the ultimate reward making fighting, even where the odds of success are low or nil, still worth the effort. Asymmetrical warfare is a tactic unlikely to be chosen by the rational actor since it involves a risk that outweighs the reward. Other options are likely to be explored and asymmetrical warfare only chosen where no other reasonable option exists.

The distinction between rational and irrational policy also helps with another quagmire, enemy combatants. The idea of holding prisoners of war beyond the end of the conflict does not fit with our idea of war conducted by rational political actors but it does if the war is conducted by irrational actors. In a war pursued for rational purposes it is reasonable to expect that, at the end of the conflict all prisoners of war can be released to go home. There is no expectation that any of them will continue the fight. Not so with irrational actors. They will continue the struggle even where there is no hope of success. So they remain a threat even after the hostilities have ceased. In fact, in their minds the hostilities never cease. So they cannot be released.

[Firn]

The 'play of chance' of good old CvC should really be featured more in political science. The rational aspect has been traditionally covered very well, with highly useful tools, but chance is difficult to map into the models. Complexity and additions in general come at a price in science...

CvC worked of course out how war is linked to politics but tried to avoid to get too much into the internal processes. For the sake of simplicity he treated for his work the state/political leadership mostly as a black box, despite noting how private interests, vanity and so forth play a role in politics. The reasons are mostly the same as in science, you often need to black box stuff and keep it as simple as possible.

That policy unites in itself, and reconciles all the interests of internal administrations, even those of humanity, and whatever else are rational subjects of consideration, is presupposed, for it is nothing in itself, except a mere representative and exponent of all these interests towards other States. That policy may take a false direction, and may promote unfairly the ambitious ends, the private interests, the vanity of rulers, does not concern us here; for, under no circumstances can the art of war be regarded as its preceptor, and we can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests generally of the whole community.

Chaptor 8, War as an instrument of policy.

While the rational/irrational division can be helpful it is important to note that rational actors can have bad incentives to inflame a conflict which is clearly irrational for the country as a whole. History is full of examples, perhaps the Falkland invasion is a timely one, considering the current economic problems of the poor Argentines under the great leader Kirchner in her glorious victorious decade.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I received my copy of Handel's "Masters of War" and will start on it this weekend (along with five or six other pressing projects). I also ordered Beinhocker's book since perhaps my "Google deep" review of his ideas may not be sufficient to answer G Martin's infatuation with his theory.

I have expanded the ideas first presented to include a general lamentation of what has been lost in the last twelve years.

... a long time ago, in a doctrine far, far away, there was a FLOT and a FEBA, there was an identifiable rear area where "RACO" was conducted. We have lost all of that in this interminable decent from interstate war into intrastate conflict.

I have not firmed up my ideas, but I would love others thoughts on what we have lost in the last twelve years.