Do Metrics Matter?

[Bill Moore]

Carl and Slap,

Political Correctness is an illness in our society that needs to be aggressively eradicated to ensure our people remain free to think independently and state their opinions without being condemned by a leftist movement that leads an assault on anyone that disagrees with their views. That said, I don't think that is the root of our challenges.

Despite PC, America still has an attractive moral power that many, maybe even most, people around the world respect to include the majority of Muslims. We can forfeit that critical advantage if we act in a way that is perceived as a war on Islam instead of a war on extremists. The terrorists will not be deterred by economic development and democracy, in fact democracy actually inflames the situation for many fundamentalist Muslims who are not terrorists.

When we occupy Muslim lands and attempt to transform we generate the propaganda the extremists need to recruit those who find their narrative of interest. I really think, but of course can never know, it would have been a very different situation if we conducted a punitive expedition in Afghanistan and then left. We would have been respected my many Muslims for defending our honor while respecting their land. Even Clinton's weak cruise missile attack on Sudan resulted in Al-Qaeda being shown the door. Instead we fell for Al-Qaeda's publically stated objective of dragging us into a quagmire where they could attack our will to sustain the effort, and bleed out our economic power. I don't think they anticipated staying this long, but they're still achieving their stated ends, and they did so my targeting our will to fight instead of compete for who has influence over the population.

Al-Qaeda should have been defeated a long time ago, and I'm currently under the belief our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have played in their favor over time despite the core of Al-Qaeda being largely eliminated. Winning over the population and the metrics associated with doing so is not a substitute for strategy.

[carl]

Bill M:

A few days ago one of the Denver radio stations broadcast an alert to the listeners about some criminals who were engaged in some very violent activity, apparently hi-jacking cars in the mid-day. Denver PD had tweeted a description and an appeal for help in finding these guys before somebody got hurt. The description the station broadcast was 6 males in an old brown or tan Toyota. 6 males. Not six white males, black males, hispanic males, but just 6 males. I don't know if "6 males" was what the Denver PD tweeted or if that is what the radio station decided to broadcast but it was done because they were afraid that if they added a race somebody somewhere might have taken offense. In so doing they possibly delayed the sighting and apprehension of the "6 males" because the description given was basically no description at all. That could have gotten people hurt or killed, innocent people. And all because somebody could have taken offense if the apparent race of the suspects was stated.

Now would the radio station or the Denver PD been wrong if they had given the race in the description? No, they would not have been. They would have been acting reasonably and in good faith while attempting to protect innocents from criminals. If anybody had taken offense at an apparent race being added to the description they would have been wrong and the effect of their illegitimate hypersensitivity may have been to get some people hurt who didn't deserve it.

The people we are fighting in this aren't just extremists. They aren't the Red Army Faction nor Aum Shinrikyo nor the practice squad of the Miami Dolphins. They are religious extremists. And they are a particular sub-group of that religion. They are Sunni, wahabi/deobandi and takfiri. They aren't Sufi dervishes. We should make it clear, especially to ourselves, who it is that we must fight because they are trying to kill us. If that makes some Muslims with mouthpieces mad somewhere that's too damn bad. They are wrong for feeling that way. We aren't wrong for stating what is.

The Muslims who would take offense at our stating clearly who it is we are fighting because they are trying to kill us are predisposed to be hostile to us anyway. I have great confidence that a Malaysian shopkeeper will know that when we say we are fighting takfiri killers we don't mean him. Some Saudi Wahabi sub-prince who gets irate at that I don't care about since he probably leaning the wrong way anyway. You can't please everybody.

On our part this will take work and it will take character. It will be work to explain to people the difference between a takfiri killer and a Sufi dervish. And it will take character to withstand the PC attacks that will be launched when that is done. The big problem is the genii inside the beltway may not have the character and, despite their fancy educations, I don't think have the smarts to tell the difference between a takfiri killer and a Ahmadi.

We can't beat the religious interpretation that results in AQ and their ilk. The Muslims have to do that. What we can do is be forthright about the situation and keep killing the attackers until they stop coming for us. Sort of like Jeremiah Johnson just kept killing the braves who came for him until the Crows gave it up. (I stole that from another thread.)

I hear that argument about just doing a punitive expedition in response to 9-11 on occasion. In my view that is sort of simplistic nostalgia. 'Oh if only we had just kicked ass, taken names and gone home none of this would have happened.' We asked MO and the boys to turn over AQ. They wouldn't. If we had done a punitive strike they would have all gone to Pakistan to hide under the skirts of the Pak Army/ISI, which is what they did anyway, to come back when we left. Which is what they will try to do anyway, only they would have been there that much sooner and that much more certainly.

[Steve Blair]

First off, I tend to be of the opinion that you can't negotiate with a terrorist group once it's taken that final step. Most terrorist groups, if they last past their initial stages, evolve (or devolve, depending on how you look at it) into rather amorphous entities motivated by the cycle of violence and revenge more than any measurable (or attainable) goals. They may pay lip service to goals, but they are generally so fuzzy and indistinct that they're window dressing by that point. And once a group crosses the line into terrorism of that type, you can only eliminate them.

Punitive expeditions can work, provided you have a good understanding of the actual centers of gravity of your targets. Most of the actions in the Indian Wars could actually be classed as punitive expeditions, and they were successful (or not) based on the understanding particular commanders had of their opponents. Mackenzie's efforts during the Red River War (culminating with the Battle of Palo Duro Canyon) were successful because he understood that the key to breaking the power of the Comanche and Kiowa on the Plains could be found in their logistical systems (actual camp supplies and horse herds). If you took out those systems while minimizing actual casualties (he also seemed to understand the revenge requirement in most Plains cultures that could drive them into conflict) you could force the tribes onto reservations. Custer, on the other hand, never seemed to understand that. Crook also failed in that regard, although he was successful against other tribal groups with different environmental considerations. We have a mixed history with these kind of expeditions (Pershing's foray into Mexico is just one example), and I think it's mostly because we don't develop commanders who understand the situation they're going into and fail to adapt. We have perhaps been most successful when military force is used as an adjunct to State Department goals (the so-called Banana Wars), although even then our longer-term legacy is very uneven.

Metrics in my view are a convenient crutch for this lack of understanding. It's easier to construct a fancy Excel spreadsheet than it is to identify points of vulnerability in an organization that doesn't look like a fielded army. We saw this during the development of air target lists during the Vietnam War. Air Force planners looked at maps of North Vietnam and for some reason saw WW2 Germany and listed their targets as if NVN was a fully industrialized society with the same needs and dependencies as a European opponent. So the war became all about sorties flown and tons dropped and less about the actual value of the targets.

What we have likely done with AQ is a larger-scale version of what happened with the IRA and the PLO. We've caused it to multiply and divide, with smaller pieces motivated more by revenge and general bloodlust than actual measurable goals and objectives. Those pieces, IMO, can only be killed or otherwise neutralized, and even then it's a very long haul (David can speak better than I regarding the issues in NI, but even there it continues to rumble on at a very low simmer...peace talks and settlements aside).

[carl]

Steve:

It is a matter of semantics I suppose but an expedition that wipes out the logistical base of the opposition might be considered more than punitive. Regardless of the words used though, it worked and, as was your main point, was based on a good understanding of the enemy.

Do you think the winter campaigns against the Sioux might be put in the same class?

[Steve Blair]

Steve:

It is a matter of semantics I suppose but an expedition that wipes out the logistical base of the opposition might be considered more than punitive. Regardless of the words used though, it worked and, as was your main point, was based on a good understanding of the enemy.

Do you think the winter campaigns against the Sioux might be put in the same class?

The reason I called them punitive expeditions is that the campaigns were usually launched in response to a specific action or actions by the tribes, and the resources were often limited as well. Mackenzie also made the decision to target resources...it wasn't part of the overall plan for the campaign (at least in the specifics). Miles, for example, didn't specifically target resources in the same way. He did later, though, during his 1876-77 operations on the Northern Plains.

The winter campaigns were driven more by an understanding that the tribes were less mobile during the winter months. While resources were hit, they weren't the primary objective of the campaigns. In simple terms, those campaigns came down to "we can move during the winter, while the Indians really can't." The later campaigns, especially those conducted by Miles, did become more about targeting logistics. It's also worth noting that the one major success Crook had during the Great Sioux War was actually led and orchestrated by Mackenzie, and again targeted logistical assets (physical camp goods and horse herds).

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have been thinking a lot about the way we approach war and how our preconceptions make it impossible for us to defeat an enemy like AQ or the Taliban. Getting back to the threads main question, you can take the metric of killing [insert insurgent group name here] leadership to determine whether you are winning or losing the battle against the [insert insurgent group name here again (make sure they match)]. If you take the approach that killing insurgent leaders means that the group is now weaker, then killing more is good, killing less is bad. If you take the approach that killing insurgent leaders creates new insurgents, and then killing more is bad, killing less is good. The numbers mean little without a clear understanding of how they affect the enemy and the local population. Perhaps the numbers are totally meaningless as the benefit in temporarily disrupting insurgent operations is offset by the increase in insurgent ranks as well as creating a younger, more violent cadre.

Also on the top of how we see war is the oft cited maxim that "all war is political."* The objective of a punitive expedition may have little to do with reducing enemy capabilities.

The reason I called them punitive expeditions is that the campaigns were usually launched in response to a specific action or actions by the tribes, and the resources were often limited as well.

Like all other humans on earth, we American's seek revenge for acts perpetrated against us. Sometimes it is enough to just kick ass, take names, and go home. It was probably unlikely that the Afghan Taliban were going to invade New Jersey. Destoying them and allowing the Northern Alliance to take charge may (with some hesitation) have been enough. AQ is a different story.

* I firmly believe that the idea that "all war is political" leads us to attempt to interpret enemy insurgents and/or terrorists like AQ or the Taliban as rational actors (as opposed to religious fanatics) and therefore attempt to find centers of gravity, structures, or motivations to attack that we logically have, but they don't have or require.

[carl]

Curmudgeon:

The problem is we can't or won't go after the leaders. They are and have been hiding out in Pakistan under the protection of the Pak Army/ISI. Any 'metric' (I hate that word) that seeks to measure that is meaningless because of that fact. Which gets us to Steve's point about actually knowing the enemy.