Do Metrics Matter?

[Steve Blair]

First off, I tend to be of the opinion that you can't negotiate with a terrorist group once it's taken that final step. Most terrorist groups, if they last past their initial stages, evolve (or devolve, depending on how you look at it) into rather amorphous entities motivated by the cycle of violence and revenge more than any measurable (or attainable) goals. They may pay lip service to goals, but they are generally so fuzzy and indistinct that they're window dressing by that point. And once a group crosses the line into terrorism of that type, you can only eliminate them.

Punitive expeditions can work, provided you have a good understanding of the actual centers of gravity of your targets. Most of the actions in the Indian Wars could actually be classed as punitive expeditions, and they were successful (or not) based on the understanding particular commanders had of their opponents. Mackenzie's efforts during the Red River War (culminating with the Battle of Palo Duro Canyon) were successful because he understood that the key to breaking the power of the Comanche and Kiowa on the Plains could be found in their logistical systems (actual camp supplies and horse herds). If you took out those systems while minimizing actual casualties (he also seemed to understand the revenge requirement in most Plains cultures that could drive them into conflict) you could force the tribes onto reservations. Custer, on the other hand, never seemed to understand that. Crook also failed in that regard, although he was successful against other tribal groups with different environmental considerations. We have a mixed history with these kind of expeditions (Pershing's foray into Mexico is just one example), and I think it's mostly because we don't develop commanders who understand the situation they're going into and fail to adapt. We have perhaps been most successful when military force is used as an adjunct to State Department goals (the so-called Banana Wars), although even then our longer-term legacy is very uneven.

Metrics in my view are a convenient crutch for this lack of understanding. It's easier to construct a fancy Excel spreadsheet than it is to identify points of vulnerability in an organization that doesn't look like a fielded army. We saw this during the development of air target lists during the Vietnam War. Air Force planners looked at maps of North Vietnam and for some reason saw WW2 Germany and listed their targets as if NVN was a fully industrialized society with the same needs and dependencies as a European opponent. So the war became all about sorties flown and tons dropped and less about the actual value of the targets.

What we have likely done with AQ is a larger-scale version of what happened with the IRA and the PLO. We've caused it to multiply and divide, with smaller pieces motivated more by revenge and general bloodlust than actual measurable goals and objectives. Those pieces, IMO, can only be killed or otherwise neutralized, and even then it's a very long haul (David can speak better than I regarding the issues in NI, but even there it continues to rumble on at a very low simmer...peace talks and settlements aside).

[carl]

Steve:

It is a matter of semantics I suppose but an expedition that wipes out the logistical base of the opposition might be considered more than punitive. Regardless of the words used though, it worked and, as was your main point, was based on a good understanding of the enemy.

Do you think the winter campaigns against the Sioux might be put in the same class?

[Steve Blair]

Steve:

It is a matter of semantics I suppose but an expedition that wipes out the logistical base of the opposition might be considered more than punitive. Regardless of the words used though, it worked and, as was your main point, was based on a good understanding of the enemy.

Do you think the winter campaigns against the Sioux might be put in the same class?

The reason I called them punitive expeditions is that the campaigns were usually launched in response to a specific action or actions by the tribes, and the resources were often limited as well. Mackenzie also made the decision to target resources...it wasn't part of the overall plan for the campaign (at least in the specifics). Miles, for example, didn't specifically target resources in the same way. He did later, though, during his 1876-77 operations on the Northern Plains.

The winter campaigns were driven more by an understanding that the tribes were less mobile during the winter months. While resources were hit, they weren't the primary objective of the campaigns. In simple terms, those campaigns came down to "we can move during the winter, while the Indians really can't." The later campaigns, especially those conducted by Miles, did become more about targeting logistics. It's also worth noting that the one major success Crook had during the Great Sioux War was actually led and orchestrated by Mackenzie, and again targeted logistical assets (physical camp goods and horse herds).

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have been thinking a lot about the way we approach war and how our preconceptions make it impossible for us to defeat an enemy like AQ or the Taliban. Getting back to the threads main question, you can take the metric of killing [insert insurgent group name here] leadership to determine whether you are winning or losing the battle against the [insert insurgent group name here again (make sure they match)]. If you take the approach that killing insurgent leaders means that the group is now weaker, then killing more is good, killing less is bad. If you take the approach that killing insurgent leaders creates new insurgents, and then killing more is bad, killing less is good. The numbers mean little without a clear understanding of how they affect the enemy and the local population. Perhaps the numbers are totally meaningless as the benefit in temporarily disrupting insurgent operations is offset by the increase in insurgent ranks as well as creating a younger, more violent cadre.

Also on the top of how we see war is the oft cited maxim that "all war is political."* The objective of a punitive expedition may have little to do with reducing enemy capabilities.

The reason I called them punitive expeditions is that the campaigns were usually launched in response to a specific action or actions by the tribes, and the resources were often limited as well.

Like all other humans on earth, we American's seek revenge for acts perpetrated against us. Sometimes it is enough to just kick ass, take names, and go home. It was probably unlikely that the Afghan Taliban were going to invade New Jersey. Destoying them and allowing the Northern Alliance to take charge may (with some hesitation) have been enough. AQ is a different story.

* I firmly believe that the idea that "all war is political" leads us to attempt to interpret enemy insurgents and/or terrorists like AQ or the Taliban as rational actors (as opposed to religious fanatics) and therefore attempt to find centers of gravity, structures, or motivations to attack that we logically have, but they don't have or require.

[carl]

Curmudgeon:

The problem is we can't or won't go after the leaders. They are and have been hiding out in Pakistan under the protection of the Pak Army/ISI. Any 'metric' (I hate that word) that seeks to measure that is meaningless because of that fact. Which gets us to Steve's point about actually knowing the enemy.