Watching the IDF (catch all)

[RTK]

Good article.

However I have serious doubts about the contention that the US can learn from the IDF experience in relation to the West Bank and Gaza, and apply it in Iraq. The circumstances of each are simply too dissimilar.

Agreed. It's not an apples to apples scenario. It's more like an apples to Ford Mustang comparison.

[Rex Brynen]

I had a few problems with the study, to be honest.

First, as the author notes, "tactical success" (insurgents stopped/killed/etc) is far from being the same as "strategic success" (which is what counts in the end). In the IDF's case, it might well be argued that some of its tactical counter-terrorism measures, while enhancing immediate Israeli security, have fanned radicalism in the long term--for example, the election of a Hamas government in 2006, and its subsequent take-over of Gaza.

Second, I'm a little unclear whether the post-2005 data includes rocket attacks from Gaza. If it did, and the data were extended through to the end of 2007, the trend lines would look far more negative than Figure 1 suggests. It certainly doesn't include Israeli external operations related to Palestinian armed groups, notably the 1978 invasion of South Lebanon, or the 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon. (Also, given that the data is from terrorism database, it presumably should exclude attacks against the IDF and only include attacks against civilian targets.. which again may raise some questions about the utility of the data.)

Third, Figure 3 gives a rather particular view of settlement growth, suggesting that it flattened after the mid-1980s. This, however, is because the chart depicts numbers of "settlements" not the "number of settlers", and most settlement in the 1990s and subsequently has occurred by the expansion of existing settlements or the establishment of satellite settlements (or outposts) rather than "new ones," as the chart below shows:



(In fact, the numbers are higher than this, since CBS data excludes East Jerusalem.)

[Tom Odom]

I had a few problems with the study, to be honest.

First, as the author notes, "tactical success" (insurgents stopped/killed/etc) is far from being the same as "strategic success" (which is what counts in the end). In the IDF's case, it might well be argued that some of its tactical counter-terrorism measures, while enhancing immediate Israeli security, have fanned radicalism in the long term--for example, the election of a Hamas government in 2006, and its subsequent take-over of Gaza.

Second, I'm a little unclear whether the post-2005 data includes rocket attacks from Gaza. If it did, and the data were extended through to the end of 2007, the trend lines would look far more negative than Figure 1 suggests. It certainly doesn't include Israeli external operations related to Palestinian armed groups, notably the 1978 invasion of South Lebanon, or the 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon. (Also, given that the data is from terrorism database, it presumably should exclude attacks against the IDF and only include attacks against civilian targets.. which again may raise some questions about the utility of the data.)

Third, Figure 3 gives a rather particular view of settlement growth, suggesting that it flattened after the mid-1980s. This, however, is because the chart depicts numbers of "settlements" not the "number of settlers", and most settlement in the 1990s and subsequently has occurred by the expansion of existing settlements or the establishment of satellite settlements (or outposts) rather than "new ones," as the chart below shows:



(In fact, the numbers are higher than this, since CBS data excludes East Jerusalem.)

Same here. I also question his highlighting of Israeli development efforts after the 1967 War. From what I read those development efforts were targeted toward settlements and improvements for the Palestinians were side effects rather than objectives.

Overall it is a good article; it would have been a better article had he broadened his sources. I agree with Wilf's concerns that direct comparisons can be misleading and in all fairness I think the author sort of says that at the end.

Tom

[Rex Brynen]

Same here. I also question his highlighting of Israeli development efforts after the 1967 War. From what I read those development efforts were targeted toward settlements and improvements for the Palestinians were side effects rather than objectives.

I didn't get into that issue, but you're correct. The primary driver of Palestinian economic growth in 1967-93 was access to the Israeli economy (for both goods and labour), coupled with petrodollar remittances from the Gulf. It was not Israeli development expenditures--indeed, in most years Israel put few net resources into Palestinian development (these were largely financed by Israeli-collected Palestinian tax payments).

Through 1994-present, the economic costs of mobility restrictions more than offset international assistance, as the World Bank constantly reminds donors.

On another note, public opinion survey data shows that there is actually very little linkage between socio-economic conditions, or social class, and Palestinian political attitudes (especially in terms of support for militant groups).

[Rank amateur]

The study does suggest, however, that building fences around the population works: at least tactically and operationally. And - to address Rex's point - IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."

[RTK]

The study does suggest, however, that building fences around the population works: at least tactically and operationally. And - to address Rex's point - IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."

I disagree with your last sentence.

While I don't doubt that diplomacy has a lot to do with success, I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."

[Steve Blair]

I disagree with your last sentence.

While I don't doubt that diplomacy has a lot to do with success, I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."

Quite so. I could dredge up a number of historical examples to support this. If anything, the trend has accelerated many-fold based on "near real time media." A screw-up on the ground that comes out in almost real time puts higher-up in immediately reactive mode and can snowball into something that cannot be contained (or managed).

[William F. Owen]

I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."

...and there's the difference between the IDF and the US/UK/NATO Armed force. No one in an IDF platoon is even ever going to mention religion to the Arabs.

Some of the Platoon maybe Muslim, and a lot from families from Arab countries, with grand parents (or even Parents) who speak Arabic as a first language. Some of the platoon may even have been have been borne and grown up on the West bank. A proportion of the Platoon will speak Arabic to varying degrees (some will speak more than one dialect of Arabic), and psychological screening should have kept the fanatics out of the combat platoons.