Watching the IDF (catch all)

[SWJED]

Moderator's Note

This thread is the result of merged a small number of threads; it was originally about IDF COIN and now has included CT. There are other threads on the wider Middle East conflict and smaller matters (ends).



The attached article was submitted by a former IDF Lt who led an IDF Arab platoon and provides his perspective on Arab culture.

[Rex Brynen]

In a thread on British policy in Northern Ireland (and parallels or non-parallels to Iraq), Wilf made a passing comment that stuck with me today:

The real benefit of NI to other COIN environments was that the UK has developed a highly effective and professional approach to COIN that most other armies, (exception being the IDF) have lacked.

I think it is an interesting question how "effective" IDF COIN has been. In Lebanon (1982-2000) I would argue that it was a disastrous failure: the PLO survived, efforts to install a friendly government and blunt Syrian influence ultimately failed, and a relatively neutral Shi'ite population (many of whom were happy to see the armed Palestinian presence go) were transformed into one of Israel's bitterest and most effective foes: Hizbullah.

In the Palestinian territories, by contrast, the IDF (and Shin Bet) have clearly very successful at a tactical and operational level in containing and limiting armed activity by Palestinian factions, and indeed maintaining a foreign military occupation for more than forty years. The IDF has certainly shown professional skill, and this has been coupled with extremely effective intelligence collection (a product, I would argue, also of Palestinian vulnerabilities and poor organizational discipline and OPSEC). Whether this has translated into strategic success or failure, however, is rather less clear--in part because the nature of Israeli strategic goals is both unclear and has changed over time. Measured by efforts to blunt the growth of Palestinian nationalism and maintain the position of pro-Jordanian notables, it was a failure. Measured by efforts to disrupt planned attacks, it has been a success. Measured as part of an effort to maintain control over large areas of the West Bank (clearly an aim under Likud governments), its probably a failure. Measured as part of an effort to protect Israel pending a territorial compromise, it is a possible success (if you're Olmert). Measured as an effort to facilitate settlement activity, its a success--but then whether settlements are a national goal or a fundamental national security liability is much debated in Israel. And so forth. (I made an earlier comment of this sort here.)

This really cuts to a core COIN dilemma: COIN is, in FM3-24 terms, fundamentally political. Yet the political goals are not always clear. And, as a consequence, its very hard to know whether tactical and operational military successes contribute to, or may even undermine, strategic objectives.

On another note--which cuts closer to the original focus of Wilf's post on ROEs, professionalization, etc.--it is interesting to note the vast formal and especially informal differences in IDF rules and behaviour in Lebanon and the WBG. A friend and colleague, James Ron, has written about this in the broader context of state violence, an interest spurred in part by his experience as an IDF paratrooper in south Lebanon.

[William F. Owen]

The IDF view COIN as being a normal part of what they do everyday. The foundations of the IDF are in both insurgency and counter-insurgency. In 1948 the IDF had 8 tanks and 3 of those they stole from the British! They wanted to steal more but had no one who could drive tanks!

It was far harder for them to learn Combined Arms Armoured manoeuvre, (and still is) than it was to master guerilla or counter guerilla warfare. The IDF is founded entirely pragmatism. Do what works.

However this pragmatism has to be balanced against acceptable forms of conduct, which is further challenged by facing foes who tend to operate normal moral parameters. -EG: how do you conduct ATGM counter-fire into a village full of civilians?

...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

[Rex Brynen]

...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

Don't get me wrong--I'm not at all arguing that the IDF lacks operational or tactical skill (although I do think that there were a number of tactical and operational weaknesses evident in 2006). Rather, I'm arguing that tactical and operational successes have not always resulted in strategic success--which, in the end, is the purpose of military force. Indeed, they might mask and ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in fundamental political strategy.

The Israel's failure in 2006 was only partially the consequence of airpower doctrine. A shorter and more closely focused set of air strikes, and/or a limited, successful set-piece ground strike, might have delivered more political and strategic gains. An air/EBO campaign with only a belated and half-hearted ground campaign clearly was a strategic failure. A more substantial ground campaign could have been more successful, but at very high risk (and with good chance of also being a strategic failure).

The IDF's major failure COIN in Lebanon--in 1983-2000, following its impressive conventional and semi-conventional victory in 1982--was not the consequence of a reliance on air power, which played little role. It was a conventional COIN military campaign, in which the IDF won almost every small unit head-to-head engagement against Hizballah and other Lebanese resistance groups, but ultimately withdrew under fire and was therefore seen as having been dealt a defeat. (If you've seen the loss ratios from engagements during this period, you'll also know that Hizballah steadily narrowed the gap.)

In the case of the WBG, although neither would put it in these terms, the disengagement strategy of Sharon, as well as Olmert's current diplomatic position, are in many ways based on the notion that Israel was too good at "operational" occupation/COIN, delayed adopting appropriate diplomatic strategies, and as a consequence has placed itself in a position of grave strategic peril (with Olmert in particular pointing to the demographic and political challenges of ruling over a growing non-Jewish population).

[William F. Owen]

@ Rather, I'm arguing that tactical and operational successes have not always resulted in strategic success--which, in the end, is the purpose of military force. Indeed, they might mask and ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in fundamental political strategy.

@ The Israel's failure in 2006 was only partially the consequence of airpower doctrine. A shorter and more closely focused set of air strikes, and/or a limited, successful set-piece ground strike, might have delivered more political and strategic gains.

@ It was a conventional COIN military campaign.

@ In the case of the WBG, although neither would put it in these terms, the disengagement strategy of Sharon, as well as Olmert's current diplomatic position, are in many ways based on the notion that Israel was too good at "operational" occupation/COIN, ....

@ If tactical and operational success cannot gain strategic success, then it's probably something military force cannot solve.

@ Risk is the coin of warfare. Israel's risk-averse strategy gained far less than it should e.g.- failure! Thus Israel's "failure" is a consequence of on an objective that was not achievable by military means.

@ Show me another COIN campaign where a nation has partially occupied another sovereign nation who is in the midst of a civil war, to create a buffer from diverse and competing terrorist organisations, with external sponsorship (Syria and Iran) that that focussed on attacking a regime (Israel) that is not involved in the civil war that they are supposedly party to. The 1970 US invasion of Cambodia is the only thing I can think of that is even close.

@ It was expressly and explicitly put in those terms, and from talking to those I talk to, that is the consensus amongst the informed public in Israel.

[Tom Odom]

@ Show me another COIN campaign where a nation has partially occupied another sovereign nation who is in the midst of a civil war, to create a buffer from diverse and competing terrorist organisations, with external sponsorship (Syria and Iran) that that focussed on attacking a regime (Israel) that is not involved in the civil war that they are supposedly party to. The 1970 US invasion of Cambodia is the only thing I can think of that is even close

.

Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Been there and watched it happen up close and personal.

Problems in Lebanon in 2006 have roots going back to 56, 67, and 73. EBO probably did have a dire influence. In the macro sense, the IDF's offensive based strategy has always been based on the idea that they could ultimately intimidate their opponents into quitting. It works in the short term; has distinct issues in the longer term.

Best

Tom

[Granite_State]

.

Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Been there and watched it happen up close and personal.

Best

Tom

Would you say that COIN has to be based on a hearts-and-minds approach? Isn't "counter-insurgency" simply seeking to defeat the insurgents? What the Russians in Afghanistan or Israelis in the Territories did may have been brutal, and maybe ineffective, but how is it not COIN?

[William F. Owen]

.

Sorry Wilf,

The IDF does not do COIN. They do intimidation based operations. These may be counter-guerrilla counter-terror focused but they are not COIN. They do not seek to gain anyone's support.

Don't be sorry. You missed my point. The Lebanon was not COIN. It was a straight fighting buffer zone stuff. That was exactly my point.

In the occupied territories it's a different story and I'd submit that definitely qualifies as COIN, at least in the IDF mindset.

[William F. Owen]

.

In the macro sense, the IDF's offensive based strategy has always been based on the idea that they could ultimately intimidate their opponents into quitting.

How is that not the essence of creating defeat? What other mechanism exists? It worked against for the UK in every war we ever fought, and won.

[Granite_State]

...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

Van Creveld, for one, would argue otherwise.

[davidbfpo]

Having watched the transfer of knowledge from Northern Ireland to the mainland UK, for the police primarily, it is interesting to note the similar process from Israel - primarily I suspect from the IDF, not other bodies.

In the UK context and in the public domain is the methods around what we called Op Kratos, the response to suspected suicide bombers and the preparation to shoot to kill. Which came to the fore with the mistaken shooting of the Brazilian Mr Menendez shooting in London, July 2005.

There have been comments elsewhere on the IDF strategy or tactic of eliminating leaders and its adoption beyond Israel.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Van Creveld, for one, would argue otherwise.

...and Ron Tira and many other IDF members would disagree with Van Creveld. My own judgement is based on talking to members of the IDF who were there.

The idea that COIN operations degrades "war fighting" skills is only true if they never existed in the first place or where never practised. 3 Commando Brigade and 5 Brigade managed to fight the Falklands War having all served in Northern Ireland. 5 Brigade had problems because they came off public duties, not lack of knowledge of skills.

[Rank amateur]

Measured as an effort to facilitate settlement activity, its a success.

"The most pious among them believe that God wants them to have these rocky hills. History has shown that when God becomes involved in politics, guns are brought in while tolerance and compromise are left outside."


What you call failure, is the inevitable result of the most pious getting what they want.

[dave.anderson4]

This is a well-crafted, unique and insightful piece; unfortunately it is addressing an exhausted topic. It may still be worth publication based on the unique perspective of the author...would require the introduction to be cleaned-up--adding clarity to the situational background (stage setting).

[SWCAdmin]

Columbia University Press is pleased to announce the publication of The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism by Ami Pedahzur, professor of political science and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas.

The book questions Israeli strategy in fighting terrorism, criticizing the use of a "war model," which Pedahzur argues is motivate more by politics than sound strategy.

Please let me know if you would like a review copy of the book.

The author is also available for interviews and to contribute to your site.

Praise for the book:

"Replete with detail, vignettes, and insights, this book provides a unique inside account of the Israeli intelligence and security services' sixty-year-long struggle against terrorism. It is the most comprehensive and authoritative depiction and analysis of this struggle currently available in the English language." — Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism

Read more reviews.

About the book:

How successful has Israel's renowned intelligence operation been in stopping terrorist attacks?

While Mossad is known as one of the world's most successful terrorist-fighting organizations, Ami Pedahzur shows that Israel's strict reliance on the elite units of the intelligence community is fundamentally flawed and has not decreased the incidence of Palestinian terrorism. In fact, the diversion of funds and manpower to anti-terrorist activities has put Israel in greater danger from its enemies. The "War model" that Israel has employed, Pedahzur argues, should be replaced by a more defensive model.

An expert on terror and political extremism, Pedahzur analyzes and conveys in vivid detail Israel's past encounters with terrorists, specifically hostage rescue missions, the first and second wars in Lebanon, the challenges of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Hezbollah. He brings a rare transparency to Israel's counterterrorist activities, highlighting their successes and failures and the ways in which politics and in-fighting between various services shape Israeli policy toward terrorism. Pedahzur concludes by outlining a strategy for future confrontation that will be relevant not only to Israel but also to other countries that have adopted Israel's intelligence-based model.

"Ami Pedahzur has written an astute, well-documented, and compelling analysis of Israel's reliance on the 'war model' to combat terrorism. Israel's political and military leaders were consistently unable to resist the temptation of dramatic and costly uses of force when modest defensive or conciliatory measures were preferable. This lesson should not be lost on any national policymaker confronted by terrorism." — Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University

About the author

Ami Pedahzur holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Haifa where, from 2000 to 2004, he served as a senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center. In 2004 he was a Donald D. Harrington fellow at the University of Texas, and in 2005 became an associate professor in the departments of Government and Middle Eastern Studies. In 2007 Pedahzur joined The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and currently serves as associate editor of the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. His books include Suicide Terrorism and The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence: Defending Democracy.

[Steve Blair]

I'd be interested in this one as well, as I did some work on the West German terrorist groups back in the 1980s and it's always been an area of interest. Again, I'll defer to a more specific subject specialist if one wants to take on the book (Jed, for example....).

[SWJ Blog]

The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

Entry Excerpt:

Glory Restored?
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

By Dr. Russell W. Glenn, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions.

This study, sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, has been approved for public release. To the best of our knowledge, Small Wars Journal is the first organization to publish this study on the Internet. This material is based on work supported by USJFCOM and the JIWC under Contract No. N00140-06-D-0060/065. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJFCOM or the JIWC.

From the preface:

The closing of the July–August 2006 Second Lebanon War left the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) an introspective organization. Once an example looked to by much of the world for lessons on martial prowess, the nation’s military—indeed, the country at large—found its performance against the Hezbollah enemy a far more punishing and less effective experience than expected. Some of that outcome was attributable to the foe’s preparations. Yet there were also self-admitted deficiencies in the areas of leadership, intelligence, inter-arms cooperation, decisiveness, and other areas that political and military leaders alike recognized had to be addressed. It was more than a matter of pride. In a region none too friendly, reestablishing the reputation of the IDF was felt to be a deterrent against further assaults.

Twenty-eight months later, the IDF attacked into Gaza after rocket attacks on Israel originating there spiked late in 2008. It was an attack made after a number of adjustments over the two-plus years since the Second Lebanon War. Operation Cast Lead, the designation for the undertaking, demonstrated renewed confidence blended with improved tactics, leadership, and joint cooperation.

This document reviews those adjustments, analyzes their effectiveness, and considers Israel’s performance in Gaza more generally. The report concludes with 12 recommendations pertinent to future U.S. operations in what has emerged as an era of persistent conflict.

This document will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibilities include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, or other forms of stability operations in both the immediate future and longer term.

Glory Restored?: The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

During his 22-year career with the U.S. Army, Dr. Russell W. Glenn served in Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and locations throughout the United States in addition to a combat tour with the 3rd Armored Division during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Dr. Glenn was a senior defense analyst with RAND from 1997 to early 2009 after which he joined his current organization, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions. Dr. Glenn has a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and Masters degrees from the University of Southern California (MS, Systems Management), Stanford University (MS, Civil Engineering and MS, Operations Research), and the School of Advanced Military Studies (Master of Military Art and Science). He earned his Ph.D. in American history from the University of Kansas with secondary fields of military history and political science. His military education includes Airborne, Ranger, and Pathfinder qualifications. The author’s publications encompass some 50 books and reports in addition to over 20 articles regarding counterinsurgency, urban operations, counterterrorism, and other fields. This research was conducted within the Global Security Solutions division of A-T Solutions, Inc.



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[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Zenpundit for his new thread 'Alice’s Wonderland Battlespace', which potentially gives rise to several issues, including MOUT and intellectual issues of mapping for example:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4280

The article cites a 2005 academic article by an architect and opens with this citation (in part):

The maneuver conducted by units of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier General Aviv Kokhavi, as inverse geometry, the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions. During the battle, soldiers moved within the city across hundred-meter-long “overground-tunnels” carved through a dense and contiguous urban fabric. Although several thousand soldiers and several hundred Palestinian guerrilla fighters were maneuvering simultaneously in the city, they were so “saturated” within its fabric that very few would have been visible from an aerial perspective at any given moment. Furthermore, soldiers used none of the streets, roads, alleys, or courtyards that constitute the syntax of the city, and none of the external doors, internal stairwells, and windows that constitute the order of buildings, but rather moved horizontally through party walls, and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as “infestation”, sought to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares.

I have not linked the cited article due to SWC rules on Scribd.

I know MOUT was the springboard for SWC, but on a quick search could not find a suitable thread.

[davidbfpo]

In July 2009 on another thread I found Mike Innes referred to the author:

Eyal Weizman In Hollow Land: The Architectures of Israeli Occupation (Verso, 2007), he writes about the various spatial contortions that can be read into and physically observed of the Israeli-Palestinian experience. Terms like "prosthetic sovereignties" and "politics of verticality" feature prominently.

[Rex Brynen]

Hat tip to Zenpundit for his new thread 'Alice’s Wonderland Battlespace', which potentially gives rise to several issues, including MOUT and intellectual issues of mapping for example:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4280

To be perfectly honest, the piece(s) slightly annoy me because I think much of it falls into the perennial old wine/trendy bottles category.

First (as both Cameron and Weizman note) "mouse-holing" one's way through the three dimensions of urban terrain is as old as urban terrain itself. All the complicated words used by Weizman just obscure what is a fairly obvious process, and probably say more about the need to make obvious things sound clever than they reveal anything new about MOUT.

Indeed, I just watched my son undertake "reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions" some twenty minutes ago in a popular video game. He didn't know he was "involved a conception of the city as not just the site, but the very medium of warfare — a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux" ... he just thought it made sense not to walk out in the open where he would get shot, and to make best use of both the cover and fields of fire that an urban environment offers. He'll be pleased to discover, however, that his virtual "reversal of our normal understanding of space is both audacious and brilliant."

Second, while Weizman's writing on the politics of verticality in the occupied Palestinian territory is quite accurate, again i don't think it comes as any particular revelation. It's an interesting think-piece for those unfamiliar with the setting, but its well known by those who work there--and somewhat deficient in its focus on static spatiality with no reference to either the control of movement or the intricate network of intangible legal controls and overlapping jurisdictions.