To give the copout answer my students like to throw out like chaff, everything is "METT-TC dependent."Originally Posted by Ken White
Example is better than precept.
The truth...
A. Will set you free.
B. Is rarely obvious.
C. Is always obvious.
D. Is sometimes unpleasant to contemplate.
You should use the ploy the Tactics guys at Leavenworth use; "What we are about to tell you will work on a pleasant June day in gentle terrain and if you have all your personnel and equipment fully mission capable and will confront a mediocre enemy force. If any of those parameters change even slightly, you'll have to adapt."
I'm working on an essay that attempts to prove that in a multi factional insurgency with a weak government (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) strategic success is detached from tactical success: which is not the case in a traditional binary insurgency (like El Salvador.).
(The Israel/Palestinian situation sort of fits - and sort of doesn't - but in that particular case the idea of "strategic failure" assumes that the strategic objective is a political agreement, which is why I used the word diplomacy.)
Back on topic. If you can prove that I'm wrong - and show me why tactical success will lead to strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan- you'll save me a lot of work. It'd be much appreciate it too; the weather's beautiful and there's cold beer going to waste while I try to find time for the essay.
As usual, your quest to be contrarian overshadows your ability to read my post completely:
I never said tactical success leads to strategic success. You said that strategic success was "IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."" I think that viewpoint discounts the impact poor tactical operations can have on the strategic outcome and eventual success.
Let me put it this way. If you've never played darts, this won't work, though you could probably substitute blackjack for darts.
Say you and I are playing 501 on the dartboard. Whoever gets exactly 501 points first wins. There are literally millions of ways someone can get to 501 but there are many more ways to lose. Hitting the bullseye 11 times won't win the game; it will make you bust. Tactical indiscretions can be the 11th throw to the bull. My point was that poor tactical operations can define strategic failure sometimes even faster than diplomatic measures (ie. Abu Gharib, the Hit USMC shootings, the Jesus coin distributor, 1-8IN in Balad, etc...)
Either way, I don't have time to do your work or prove you wrong - I have 250 lieutentants I'm training in the next 3 months with 40% of them deploying by Christmas to try and win this thing.
Example is better than precept.
...and there's the difference between the IDF and the US/UK/NATO Armed force. No one in an IDF platoon is even ever going to mention religion to the Arabs.
Some of the Platoon maybe Muslim, and a lot from families from Arab countries, with grand parents (or even Parents) who speak Arabic as a first language. Some of the platoon may even have been have been borne and grown up on the West bank. A proportion of the Platoon will speak Arabic to varying degrees (some will speak more than one dialect of Arabic), and psychological screening should have kept the fanatics out of the combat platoons.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Brilliant!!!"What we are about to tell you will work on a pleasant June day in gentle terrain and if you have all your personnel and equipment fully mission capable and will confront a mediocre enemy force. If any of those parameters change even slightly, you'll have to adapt."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hey now,
I'd go with C: because its always obvious to someone, somewhereA. Will set you free.
B. Is rarely obvious.
C. Is always obvious.
D. Is sometimes unpleasant to contemplate.
You should use the ploy the Tactics guys at Leavenworth use; "What we are about to tell you will work on a pleasant June day in gentle terrain and if you have all your personnel and equipment fully mission capable and will confront a mediocre enemy force. If any of those parameters change even slightly, you'll have to adapt."
The catch is what it takes for it to become obvious to those involved in it
And as to the other, We do occasionally throw in a rainy day on concrete, with lunch served at three rather than 2
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
ANALYSIS / Two years on, IDF starting to look like an army that can fight a war, Haaretz, 12/07/2008.
The satisfaction on the faces of the senior officers who came to observe the training exercise of the 7th Brigade in the Golan Heights last week was unmistakable. The Israel Defense Forces is once again starting to look like an army that knows how to deal with a conventional war, a challenge that - due to more pressing troubles - it downplayed during the years between the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War, whose opening shots were fired two years ago tomorrow.
...
In Lebanon, says a senior Armored Corps officer, "a situation arose in which the whole chain of command didn't know what the true level of fitness was of all the forces. The philosophy was, 'We'll do our best with what we have.' There had been a prolonged erosion in the army's fitness, and we were all a party to it. When a battalion commander who has never been through a battalion-wide drill goes into a brigade-wide battle in Lebanon, how can anyone with a head on his shoulders expect him to succeed?"
"We're still seeing a lot of rust," said one of the senior officers after the exercise. "The difference is that, a year ago, people weren't even aware of what it was they didn't know. Now they know what they're lacking. But by the end of the exercise, a certain amount of experience is accumulated, capability is built up. It's still a process and it's happening very slowly." The regular units, in his assessment, are gradually returning to their level of fitness from 2000, on the eve of the intifada.
"The reserves are in less good shape. They have too few training exercises. I don't see any reserve brigade successfully completing a drill like the one the 7th Brigade just did, and there's no substitute for that kind of training. It's not the same as a simulation in an air-conditioned room. A tank battalion has to have the real experience of moving a column through the field in difficult circumstances, over the same small bridge. When you don't do it like the real thing, that will show when it has to be done in reality."
IDF new media (NY consulate counts on Twitter)
The Israeli consulate (@israelconsulate) of NY is holding a Twitter "citizen press conference" today between 1-3 EST.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...646948,00.html
NY consulate counts on Twitter
Israeli consulate uses social networking service as part of Gaza op PR campaign Ynetnews
Published: 12.30.08, 07:06 / Israel News <http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3082,00.html>
Between 1-3 pm (EST) Tuesday, the Consulate General of Israel in New York will hold a live Citizen "Press" Conference on Twitter in order to directly answer the public's questions regarding the current situation in Israel and Gaza in wake of the IDF's operation in the Strip.
Twitter is a fast-growing social networking service, and the consulate's intiative is the first time that a government is holding such a conference via the service
"We are constantly getting questions from the public regarding the situation in Israel and Gaza," David Saranga, Consul for Media and Public Affairs, said. "We are answering the public's call and holding a Citizen Press Conference on the social networking site, Twitter, to answer these questions directly."
Twitter users can take part in the Citizen "Press" Conference by going to: http://www.twitter.com/IsraelConsulate and directing their messages to @israelconsulate and including the tag #AskIsrael.
Questions will be answered on Twitter, with a link to IsraelPolitik if the answer exceeds Twitter’s maximum length of 140 characters.
Also: In addition to the above see www.youtube.com/user/idfnadesk
Harry Vann Phillips
Poet, Writer, Retired Soldier
Ahh yes, the Arab-Israeli conflict in less than 140 characters
Not exactly, but perhaps rather a way to get the Israeli side of the story out in short bursts?
Harry Vann Phillips
Poet, Writer, Retired Soldier
Here's some questions for them
Have they coordinated with the Palestinian sec forces in the west bank to be able to move in and establish security once they get done breaking down Hamas to a level where thats doable?
Are the Egyptians at least capturing those who seek to get away through the tunnels?
Whats the plan for establishing any sort of order in Gaza post Hamas?
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
I doubt that Hamas will damaged enough for any of that to happen. Moreover, for Fateh to reassume of Gaza "on the backs of Israeli tanks" would make them look like the worst kind of collaborators in the eyes of many Gazans.
The Egyptians are angling for Fateh/PA to reassume control of the Gaza border crossings. That *might* be possible.
The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism by Ami Pedahzur
Columbia University Press is pleased to announce the publication of The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism by Ami Pedahzur, professor of political science and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas.
The book questions Israeli strategy in fighting terrorism, criticizing the use of a "war model," which Pedahzur argues is motivate more by politics than sound strategy.
Please let me know if you would like a review copy of the book.
The author is also available for interviews and to contribute to your site.
Praise for the book:
"Replete with detail, vignettes, and insights, this book provides a unique inside account of the Israeli intelligence and security services' sixty-year-long struggle against terrorism. It is the most comprehensive and authoritative depiction and analysis of this struggle currently available in the English language." — Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism
Read more reviews.
About the book:
How successful has Israel's renowned intelligence operation been in stopping terrorist attacks?
While Mossad is known as one of the world's most successful terrorist-fighting organizations, Ami Pedahzur shows that Israel's strict reliance on the elite units of the intelligence community is fundamentally flawed and has not decreased the incidence of Palestinian terrorism. In fact, the diversion of funds and manpower to anti-terrorist activities has put Israel in greater danger from its enemies. The "War model" that Israel has employed, Pedahzur argues, should be replaced by a more defensive model.
An expert on terror and political extremism, Pedahzur analyzes and conveys in vivid detail Israel's past encounters with terrorists, specifically hostage rescue missions, the first and second wars in Lebanon, the challenges of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Hezbollah. He brings a rare transparency to Israel's counterterrorist activities, highlighting their successes and failures and the ways in which politics and in-fighting between various services shape Israeli policy toward terrorism. Pedahzur concludes by outlining a strategy for future confrontation that will be relevant not only to Israel but also to other countries that have adopted Israel's intelligence-based model.
"Ami Pedahzur has written an astute, well-documented, and compelling analysis of Israel's reliance on the 'war model' to combat terrorism. Israel's political and military leaders were consistently unable to resist the temptation of dramatic and costly uses of force when modest defensive or conciliatory measures were preferable. This lesson should not be lost on any national policymaker confronted by terrorism." — Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University
About the author
Ami Pedahzur holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Haifa where, from 2000 to 2004, he served as a senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center. In 2004 he was a Donald D. Harrington fellow at the University of Texas, and in 2005 became an associate professor in the departments of Government and Middle Eastern Studies. In 2007 Pedahzur joined The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and currently serves as associate editor of the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. His books include Suicide Terrorism and The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence: Defending Democracy.
I'd be interested in this one as well, as I did some work on the West German terrorist groups back in the 1980s and it's always been an area of interest. Again, I'll defer to a more specific subject specialist if one wants to take on the book (Jed, for example....
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict
Entry Excerpt:
Glory Restored?
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict
By Dr. Russell W. Glenn, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions.
This study, sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, has been approved for public release. To the best of our knowledge, Small Wars Journal is the first organization to publish this study on the Internet. This material is based on work supported by USJFCOM and the JIWC under Contract No. N00140-06-D-0060/065. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJFCOM or the JIWC.
From the preface:
The closing of the July–August 2006 Second Lebanon War left the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) an introspective organization. Once an example looked to by much of the world for lessons on martial prowess, the nation’s military—indeed, the country at large—found its performance against the Hezbollah enemy a far more punishing and less effective experience than expected. Some of that outcome was attributable to the foe’s preparations. Yet there were also self-admitted deficiencies in the areas of leadership, intelligence, inter-arms cooperation, decisiveness, and other areas that political and military leaders alike recognized had to be addressed. It was more than a matter of pride. In a region none too friendly, reestablishing the reputation of the IDF was felt to be a deterrent against further assaults.Twenty-eight months later, the IDF attacked into Gaza after rocket attacks on Israel originating there spiked late in 2008. It was an attack made after a number of adjustments over the two-plus years since the Second Lebanon War. Operation Cast Lead, the designation for the undertaking, demonstrated renewed confidence blended with improved tactics, leadership, and joint cooperation.This document reviews those adjustments, analyzes their effectiveness, and considers Israel’s performance in Gaza more generally. The report concludes with 12 recommendations pertinent to future U.S. operations in what has emerged as an era of persistent conflict.This document will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibilities include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, or other forms of stability operations in both the immediate future and longer term.Glory Restored?: The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict
During his 22-year career with the U.S. Army, Dr. Russell W. Glenn served in Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and locations throughout the United States in addition to a combat tour with the 3rd Armored Division during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Dr. Glenn was a senior defense analyst with RAND from 1997 to early 2009 after which he joined his current organization, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions. Dr. Glenn has a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and Masters degrees from the University of Southern California (MS, Systems Management), Stanford University (MS, Civil Engineering and MS, Operations Research), and the School of Advanced Military Studies (Master of Military Art and Science). He earned his Ph.D. in American history from the University of Kansas with secondary fields of military history and political science. His military education includes Airborne, Ranger, and Pathfinder qualifications. The author’s publications encompass some 50 books and reports in addition to over 20 articles regarding counterinsurgency, urban operations, counterterrorism, and other fields. This research was conducted within the Global Security Solutions division of A-T Solutions, Inc.
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Urban fighting: Israeli reflections
Hat tip to Zenpundit for his new thread 'Alice’s Wonderland Battlespace', which potentially gives rise to several issues, including MOUT and intellectual issues of mapping for example:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4280
The article cites a 2005 academic article by an architect and opens with this citation (in part):I have not linked the cited article due to SWC rules on Scribd.The maneuver conducted by units of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier General Aviv Kokhavi, as inverse geometry, the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions. During the battle, soldiers moved within the city across hundred-meter-long “overground-tunnels” carved through a dense and contiguous urban fabric. Although several thousand soldiers and several hundred Palestinian guerrilla fighters were maneuvering simultaneously in the city, they were so “saturated” within its fabric that very few would have been visible from an aerial perspective at any given moment. Furthermore, soldiers used none of the streets, roads, alleys, or courtyards that constitute the syntax of the city, and none of the external doors, internal stairwells, and windows that constitute the order of buildings, but rather moved horizontally through party walls, and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as “infestation”, sought to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares.
I know MOUT was the springboard for SWC, but on a quick search could not find a suitable thread.
davidbfpo
MOUT becomes spatial contortions?
In July 2009 on another thread I found Mike Innes referred to the author:Eyal Weizman In Hollow Land: The Architectures of Israeli Occupation (Verso, 2007), he writes about the various spatial contortions that can be read into and physically observed of the Israeli-Palestinian experience. Terms like "prosthetic sovereignties" and "politics of verticality" feature prominently.
davidbfpo
To be perfectly honest, the piece(s) slightly annoy me because I think much of it falls into the perennial old wine/trendy bottles category.
First (as both Cameron and Weizman note) "mouse-holing" one's way through the three dimensions of urban terrain is as old as urban terrain itself. All the complicated words used by Weizman just obscure what is a fairly obvious process, and probably say more about the need to make obvious things sound clever than they reveal anything new about MOUT.
Indeed, I just watched my son undertake "reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions" some twenty minutes ago in a popular video game. He didn't know he was "involved a conception of the city as not just the site, but the very medium of warfare — a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux" ... he just thought it made sense not to walk out in the open where he would get shot, and to make best use of both the cover and fields of fire that an urban environment offers. He'll be pleased to discover, however, that his virtual "reversal of our normal understanding of space is both audacious and brilliant."
Second, while Weizman's writing on the politics of verticality in the occupied Palestinian territory is quite accurate, again i don't think it comes as any particular revelation. It's an interesting think-piece for those unfamiliar with the setting, but its well known by those who work there--and somewhat deficient in its focus on static spatiality with no reference to either the control of movement or the intricate network of intangible legal controls and overlapping jurisdictions.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
A Wider Siege of Israel?
A Wider Siege of Israel?
Entry Excerpt:
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