Watching the IDF (catch all)

[Rex Brynen]

Questions will be answered on Twitter, with a link to IsraelPolitik if the answer exceeds Twitter’s maximum length of 140 characters.

Ahh yes, the Arab-Israeli conflict in less than 140 characters

[Harry Phillips]

Not exactly, but perhaps rather a way to get the Israeli side of the story out in short bursts?

[Ron Humphrey]

Not exactly, but perhaps rather a way to get the Israeli side of the story out in short bursts?

Have they coordinated with the Palestinian sec forces in the west bank to be able to move in and establish security once they get done breaking down Hamas to a level where thats doable?

Are the Egyptians at least capturing those who seek to get away through the tunnels?

Whats the plan for establishing any sort of order in Gaza post Hamas?

[davidbfpo]

Behind the story a Druze officer is to command the IDF's Golani brigade is a surprising aspect:

According to figures from the IDF, the number of young Druze who serve in the IDF stands at 83%, which is higher than the percentage among the Jewish population. The relative number of Druze officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers serving in the regular army is very high in proportion to the relative size of their community within the country’s total population. Most young Druze consider enlistment in the IDF as more than just an obligation and a necessary expression of their national loyalty. They see it as the sine qua non for advancement and integration into the country’s civil society.

There is a downside to this commitment:

While these young Druze have proved their loyalty to the state and fulfilled their responsibility with integrity, the state of Israel responds with ongoing prejudice, expressed mainly in discriminatory practices surrounding the distribution of development and infrastructure funding for their settlements.

Link:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...n-heights.html

This report cites a 2012 short IDF press release, which has more figures on senior officers:http://www.idf.il/1283-15853-en/Dover.aspx

I have long had an interest in the participation of minorities in civil-military service to a nation that is either not their own - in the imperial era - and today.

Somewhere I read that a large number of the Israeli Border Police, which has a national paramilitary role, are from minority groups and some recent footage showed a significant minority of black personnel (ex-Ethiopian Jews I expect).

[davidbfpo]

Taken from an email referring to an Israeli diplomat speaking:

Since Israel’s founding, Bedouin have tended to have better relations with the state than have their Arab brethren – every year 5 to 10% of the army-age male Bedouin population volunteer for the IDF.

This loyalty maybe under pressure, following Israeli government proposals for rehousing 40k Bedouin in formal settlements:

And yet the government’s relocation plan has provoked pushback – not just from some Bedouin, but from Israel’s other Arab citizens and from Palestinians, who see the move as a land grab and an infringement on the Bedouin’s herding lifestyle. Last week protests against the plan, some of them violent, erupted across Israel and in several capitals worldwide, including London.

(Added) A NYT report gives some background:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/wo...pagewanted=all

I do recall a few references to Bedouin IDF soldiers, IIRC when an American protester was shot / run-over.

[Firn]

It seems that elements of the specific skill-set of the Bedouin tribes have been highly attractive for the IDF, especially tracking. Manpower is also always scarce and was even more so in the past. It is also likely that the Bedouins see themselves as a quite distinct entity from other Arab groups which in turn made it possible for the Israeli state to initiate and conserve close military ties. Which has of course the additional benefit of denying the opponents to tap their potential.

In Italy as far as I recall the number of serving men from the ethnic minorities in the northern regions are low in propotion to their relative numbers. In general their standard of living is higher then the national average and they suffered under Italian nationalism so there are few incentives for them to volunteer. On the other hand considering the very small percentage of the minorities it was never deemed necessary to reach out to them. Overall the southern regions are greatly overreppresented in the lower ranks, which has of course to due with the economic circumstances in the last ten years.

For Italy the (military) integration of the immigrants should be a bigger topic, but military topics other than casualties suffered and spectacular hardware are hardly discussed in the Italian press. One might add the recent discussion about 'golden' retirements for senior figures to that list.

[davidbfpo]

Israel has attacked missiles in transit from Iran in Sudan before. This week's naval action in the Red Sea has yet to get mainstream media reporting here. IIRC it was an air strike last time in the Sudan.

Two IDF-sourced reports:http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Dat..._140612868.pdf and http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03...sile-shipment/

Even for covert transport crossing through Sudan, Egypt and into the Sinai is a logistical problem. Lots of questions arise.

[ShelaghD-B]

Unfortunately from what I have witnessed over time, is that the ONLY time Israel is every mentioned in the main stream press is when it is being vilified. Any mention of arms for Hamas or Iran, etc, is left out unless they can somehow twist the story to show either in the light of somehow being victimized by the evil Israel!
This piece of news, not looking good for Hamas or Iran will not make the rounds.

[Culpeper]

http://today.reuters.com/news/articl...src=rss&rpc=22

[SWJED]

Here is an excerpt from the 15 August Reuters article:

The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency has begun working with Israel to help find ways to counter enemy rockets, a much shorter-range threat than the "Star Wars" mission to block ballistic missiles for which is it known, the head of the agency said on Tuesday.

"We have been working with the Israelis ... as they go through with development of their own indigenous capabilities for that threat," Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry Obering told reporters after a speech at a missile-defense conference here.

"That is not mature. That is still in development," he said of the effort to defeat something he likened to mortar or artillery fire...

[Merv Benson]

This post suggest that may very well have happened.

...

The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions so that approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control.

...

Meanwhile the Russians who supplied the air defense system to Syria and sold a similar one to Iran are furiously trying to figure out what happened.

[Rex Brynen]

This post suggest that may very well have happened.

To be frank, I'm still rather doubtful at this stage that anyone in the press really knows what happened in eastern Syria.

[Rank amateur]

There is a reason why Israel is being so quiet. I'm inclined to think it's something new and high tech, but it could just be that after Lebanon they are employing a little ancient wisdom: all warfare is based upon deception.

[goesh]

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/914887.html

Last update - 16:29 19/10/2007

Report: Syria dismantling facility targeted by IAF

By Haaretz Service

Syria has begun dismantling the ruins of a site that was bombed by the Israel Air Force on September 6, the Washington Post reported Friday......"

[SWJED]

Moderator's Note

This thread is the result of merged a small number of threads; it was originally about IDF COIN and now has included CT. There are other threads on the wider Middle East conflict and smaller matters (ends).



The attached article was submitted by a former IDF Lt who led an IDF Arab platoon and provides his perspective on Arab culture.

[Rex Brynen]

In a thread on British policy in Northern Ireland (and parallels or non-parallels to Iraq), Wilf made a passing comment that stuck with me today:

The real benefit of NI to other COIN environments was that the UK has developed a highly effective and professional approach to COIN that most other armies, (exception being the IDF) have lacked.

I think it is an interesting question how "effective" IDF COIN has been. In Lebanon (1982-2000) I would argue that it was a disastrous failure: the PLO survived, efforts to install a friendly government and blunt Syrian influence ultimately failed, and a relatively neutral Shi'ite population (many of whom were happy to see the armed Palestinian presence go) were transformed into one of Israel's bitterest and most effective foes: Hizbullah.

In the Palestinian territories, by contrast, the IDF (and Shin Bet) have clearly very successful at a tactical and operational level in containing and limiting armed activity by Palestinian factions, and indeed maintaining a foreign military occupation for more than forty years. The IDF has certainly shown professional skill, and this has been coupled with extremely effective intelligence collection (a product, I would argue, also of Palestinian vulnerabilities and poor organizational discipline and OPSEC). Whether this has translated into strategic success or failure, however, is rather less clear--in part because the nature of Israeli strategic goals is both unclear and has changed over time. Measured by efforts to blunt the growth of Palestinian nationalism and maintain the position of pro-Jordanian notables, it was a failure. Measured by efforts to disrupt planned attacks, it has been a success. Measured as part of an effort to maintain control over large areas of the West Bank (clearly an aim under Likud governments), its probably a failure. Measured as part of an effort to protect Israel pending a territorial compromise, it is a possible success (if you're Olmert). Measured as an effort to facilitate settlement activity, its a success--but then whether settlements are a national goal or a fundamental national security liability is much debated in Israel. And so forth. (I made an earlier comment of this sort here.)

This really cuts to a core COIN dilemma: COIN is, in FM3-24 terms, fundamentally political. Yet the political goals are not always clear. And, as a consequence, its very hard to know whether tactical and operational military successes contribute to, or may even undermine, strategic objectives.

On another note--which cuts closer to the original focus of Wilf's post on ROEs, professionalization, etc.--it is interesting to note the vast formal and especially informal differences in IDF rules and behaviour in Lebanon and the WBG. A friend and colleague, James Ron, has written about this in the broader context of state violence, an interest spurred in part by his experience as an IDF paratrooper in south Lebanon.

[William F. Owen]

The IDF view COIN as being a normal part of what they do everyday. The foundations of the IDF are in both insurgency and counter-insurgency. In 1948 the IDF had 8 tanks and 3 of those they stole from the British! They wanted to steal more but had no one who could drive tanks!

It was far harder for them to learn Combined Arms Armoured manoeuvre, (and still is) than it was to master guerilla or counter guerilla warfare. The IDF is founded entirely pragmatism. Do what works.

However this pragmatism has to be balanced against acceptable forms of conduct, which is further challenged by facing foes who tend to operate normal moral parameters. -EG: how do you conduct ATGM counter-fire into a village full of civilians?

...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

[Rex Brynen]

...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

Don't get me wrong--I'm not at all arguing that the IDF lacks operational or tactical skill (although I do think that there were a number of tactical and operational weaknesses evident in 2006). Rather, I'm arguing that tactical and operational successes have not always resulted in strategic success--which, in the end, is the purpose of military force. Indeed, they might mask and ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in fundamental political strategy.

The Israel's failure in 2006 was only partially the consequence of airpower doctrine. A shorter and more closely focused set of air strikes, and/or a limited, successful set-piece ground strike, might have delivered more political and strategic gains. An air/EBO campaign with only a belated and half-hearted ground campaign clearly was a strategic failure. A more substantial ground campaign could have been more successful, but at very high risk (and with good chance of also being a strategic failure).

The IDF's major failure COIN in Lebanon--in 1983-2000, following its impressive conventional and semi-conventional victory in 1982--was not the consequence of a reliance on air power, which played little role. It was a conventional COIN military campaign, in which the IDF won almost every small unit head-to-head engagement against Hizballah and other Lebanese resistance groups, but ultimately withdrew under fire and was therefore seen as having been dealt a defeat. (If you've seen the loss ratios from engagements during this period, you'll also know that Hizballah steadily narrowed the gap.)

In the case of the WBG, although neither would put it in these terms, the disengagement strategy of Sharon, as well as Olmert's current diplomatic position, are in many ways based on the notion that Israel was too good at "operational" occupation/COIN, delayed adopting appropriate diplomatic strategies, and as a consequence has placed itself in a position of grave strategic peril (with Olmert in particular pointing to the demographic and political challenges of ruling over a growing non-Jewish population).

[William F. Owen]

@ Rather, I'm arguing that tactical and operational successes have not always resulted in strategic success--which, in the end, is the purpose of military force. Indeed, they might mask and ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in fundamental political strategy.

@ The Israel's failure in 2006 was only partially the consequence of airpower doctrine. A shorter and more closely focused set of air strikes, and/or a limited, successful set-piece ground strike, might have delivered more political and strategic gains.

@ It was a conventional COIN military campaign.

@ In the case of the WBG, although neither would put it in these terms, the disengagement strategy of Sharon, as well as Olmert's current diplomatic position, are in many ways based on the notion that Israel was too good at "operational" occupation/COIN, ....

@ If tactical and operational success cannot gain strategic success, then it's probably something military force cannot solve.

@ Risk is the coin of warfare. Israel's risk-averse strategy gained far less than it should e.g.- failure! Thus Israel's "failure" is a consequence of on an objective that was not achievable by military means.

@ Show me another COIN campaign where a nation has partially occupied another sovereign nation who is in the midst of a civil war, to create a buffer from diverse and competing terrorist organisations, with external sponsorship (Syria and Iran) that that focussed on attacking a regime (Israel) that is not involved in the civil war that they are supposedly party to. The 1970 US invasion of Cambodia is the only thing I can think of that is even close.

@ It was expressly and explicitly put in those terms, and from talking to those I talk to, that is the consensus amongst the informed public in Israel.

[Granite_State]

...and do not be lulled into the simplistic idea that somehow the IDF performance in the August War was because of a lack or operational or tactical skill as a product of over investment in COIN doctrine. The failure of the IDF was purely to do with Effects Based Operations, driven by airpower doctrine.

Van Creveld, for one, would argue otherwise.