The Darfur conflict has not lent itself to quick solutions. It has evolved from a rebellion with relatively defined political aims to a conflict increasingly overshadowed by shifting alliances, defections, regional and international meddling and a growing, complex tribal dimension. This is particularly true since the
signing of the DPA. The NCP is behind this transition and the continued tribalisation of the conflict; it has been deft at pulling strings to divide the rebels, empower Arab allies, generate mistrust, and minimise the space for Darfurians to unite around a common political vision and oppose the regime in upcoming elections. It has also expanded its control by institutionalising the demographic shifts and creating new localities.
The rebel factions have been unable to maintain a unified focus and have instead descended into a spiral of infighting and splintering, exasperating outside attempts to bring them together. They, like the NCP, have refused to adhere to previous ceasefires. Some have even tried to widen the conflict into the Kordofans, encouraging local uprising and insurgency. Many Arab groups, previously engaged in the conflict solely as elements of the counter-insurgency, have also entered the fray, as they have grown more frustrated with the NCP or have wanted to secure their gains in Darfur. The DPA signatories, despite signing up to a peace deal, have been a generally destabilising presence on the ground as well. The consequences of all of this have been felt the hardest by the millions of Darfurians who continue to be displaced, as well as by the humanitarian agencies that are increasingly under siege.
For some time, there was a lack of sustained international peacemaking engagement – beyond rhetoric – with most efforts focused on peacekeeping. Much energy was spent, commendably, to ensure that a hybrid operation would be able take over from the ailing AMIS but there is now the risk that the stronger
UNAMID force will arrive in Darfur with no peace to keep. Nevertheless, this is not a reason to rush; for the AU/UN mediation effort to be successful, it must avoid the trap of thinking there are quick fixes. Peace talks are the first step in a long process but they require broader participation, including that of women, to be successful.
International efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping must take advantage of the delay in the Libya talks and adapt to the changes in the nature and dynamics of the conflict. They must also effectively pressure the NCP to cease its devastating policies of demographic manipulation. To date, little has been done to hold the NCP accountable. Failure to respond appropriately would leave the international community as an unwitting accomplice to the beginnings of Sudan’s next civil war.
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