Sudan Watch (to July 2012)

[Tom Odom]

On another note, I cannot for the life of me understand why the lives of various Sudanese ethnic factions are worthy of protest and attention by the same elements of Western society who willingly advocate abandoning elements of Iraqi society to equally violent fates.... Guess it pays to belong to an 'at risk minority' that captures Hollywood's 'concern'.

regardless of reality, certain elements in the US insist on painting the Sudanese conflict as a religious struggle. that is how John Garang kept the SPLA going for so long. It has long been "cool" to look at Sudanese dissident groups as white hats versus Khartoum as black hats. The reality is of course much more complex.

Tom

[marct]

On another note, I cannot for the life of me understand why the lives of various Sudanese ethnic factions are worthy of protest and attention by the same elements of Western society who willingly advocate abandoning elements of Iraqi society to equally violent fates.... Guess it pays to belong to an 'at risk minority' that captures Hollywood's 'concern'.

regardless of reality, certain elements in the US insist on painting the Sudanese conflict as a religious struggle. that is how John Garang kept the SPLA going for so long. It has long been "cool" to look at Sudanese dissident groups as white hats versus Khartoum as black hats. The reality is of course much more complex.

LOL - too true, Tom! Mark, there's a mental game I play as a thought experiment that might prove useful in getting a handle on things like this. Basically, shift one of the axiomatic assumptions in the situation and see how it plays out. In the Darfur case, try shifting the ostensive "race" of the victim .

Tom, playing up the South as Christian has, as you noted, been a great way to keep groups like the SPLA going. The links become absolutely fascinating when you look at which particular evangelical groups have been, and are currently, operating in the area and then look at their ties in Western societies.

[Steve Blair]

LOL - too true, Tom! Mark, there's a mental game I play as a thought experiment that might prove useful in getting a handle on things like this. Basically, shift one of the axiomatic assumptions in the situation and see how it plays out. In the Darfur case, try shifting the ostensive "race" of the victim .

Interesting. I do this often as well. I suspect in my case it has to do with observing the currents of historical study and how they tend to flow to or around certain groups depending on what's in vogue or (perish the thought) fashionable at any particular time.

This isn't to say that some forms of history aren't worth studying. Far from it. But it is interesting to watch the popular emphasis shift depending on certain factors (sometimes race, sometimes gender, sometimes economics...you get the idea).

[marct]

But it is interesting to watch the popular emphasis shift depending on certain factors (sometimes race, sometimes gender, sometimes economics...you get the idea).

Yup. I started doing this systematically when I was studying social theory as an undergraduate. The key shift I used then, and still use in many cases, is assuming that reincarnation is absolutely real. Boy, does that cause changes in perception!

I used the "race" shift in the Darfur example, because there is an excellent analog with Zimbabwe and Mugabe's systematic, racists attacks on "white" farmers. Notice that the elements that are crying out about Darfur didn't make a peep when Mugabe brought out his "final solution" to "economic imperialism" . I mentioned this to one of my students who is quite active in the Darfur social movement here in Ottawa, and she hadn't even heard about it <sigh>.

[Rex Brynen]

But it is interesting to watch the popular emphasis shift depending on certain factors (sometimes race, sometimes gender, sometimes economics...you get the idea).

Agreed--although my preference is that we elevate all systematic human rights abuses to the same moral plane, rather than lowering them to the lowest common denominator.

Tom is right that Sudan is far from a good guys vs bad guys situation, and I've long argued that precisely because of that complexity NGO calls for a R2P Chapter 7 humanitarian intervention in northern Sudan were a recipe for disaster. That having been said, we should be clear that the Bashir regime is a particularly nasty one, and that Sudan's various civil wars rank the most tragic conflicts of recent decades.

[bourbon]

Interesting. I do this often as well. I suspect in my case it has to do with observing the currents of historical study and how they tend to flow to or around certain groups depending on what's in vogue or (perish the thought) fashionable at any particular time.

This isn't to say that some forms of history aren't worth studying. Far from it. But it is interesting to watch the popular emphasis shift depending on certain factors (sometimes race, sometimes gender, sometimes economics...you get the idea).

"History itself is an endlessly unfolding S&M novel. History is much more sick, bloody, and unjust than historians will ever let on. When they finally get around to writing some real history, we’ll all need medication. It’ll be too depressing."

- Jim Goad, The Redneck Manifesto: How Hillbillies, Hicks, and White Trash Became America's Scapegoats

[Norfolk]

The Rwandans will not put up with this crap. Look for a retaliation.

Tom

Rex wrote:

well, this would explain it...

This would certainly explain why Sudan might want to up the ante against UNAMID:

Sudan Leader To Be Charged With Genocide
Peace Efforts in Darfur Could Be Hampered, Some U.N. Officials Fear

[]

It will also be a massive test case for the ICC, with profound repercussions for its future.

It goes without saying of course that it is rather unlikely that the accused will ever appear before the ICC; possible, but exceedingly improbable. The bitter truth is that by taking a swipe at the Rwandans, the Sudanese may end up starting something they may not be able to handle. The next time rebels march on Khartoum, they just might be bringing a wringer with them.

Someone in Khartoum right now should be engaging in some sober second thought.

[Tom Odom]

Looks like is official on the charges against Bashir. On the Rwandans versus the Sudanese, I am probably the only westerner who has been inside both militaries. My experience with the Sudanese is dated (1984) but their military culture is probably unchanged. I'd bet on the Rwandans.

In any case, this charge will complicate life for Bashir. Perhaps it will make Chinese support to the regime more odious but I doubt it.

Tom

Sudanese president charged with genocide

CNN) -- The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has filed genocide charges against Sudan's president for a five-year campaign of violence in Darfur.


1 of 4 Luis Moreno-Ocampo on Monday urged a three-judge panel to issue an arrest warrant for President Omar Hassan al-Bashir to prevent the deaths of about 2.5 million people forced from their homes in the war-torn region of Darfur and who are still under attack from government-backed Janjaweed militia.

The five charges against al-Bashir include masterminding attempts to wipe out African tribes in the war-torn region with a campaign of murder, rape and deportation.

[Beelzebubalicious]

The Enough Project came out with a statement in support of the ICC's charge.

I also wanted to note that a friend working for the UNDP in Khartoum has been asked to take an early R&R just in case things get a bit hairy (hairier?). UN is overly cautious, I think, but then again, are there any reliable predictors of violence in places like Sudan?

[davidbfpo]

I am not convinced the attack on the UN / AU convoy by the Janjanweed is in anyway related to the ICC request for an arrest warrant for President Bashir.

Had the ICC indicated to outsiders, like the pernament five on the Security Council, it's intentions? I have a vague recollection that indictments in war crimes cases in Bosnia for example were "sealed" and very few knew they existed.

I am more persauded that the ambush was convenient for the Sudanese government, even if not ordered.

Secondly "back channel" communications with the Sudanese government exist, although going public on these will be difficult for awhile. The ICC indictment makes diplomacy rather difficult - not that it appears to have achieved much for so long in the conflict in Darfur.

From a faraway armchair.

davidbfpo

[Beelzebubalicious]

Saw this and thought some of you might be interested...

The ICC Indictments and What they Mean -
Conference Call, July 16, 2008, 1pm


You are invited to participate in a conference call to discuss International Criminal Court's prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo recently filed genocide charges against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

"Q and A: The ICC Indictments and What They Mean"

Moderator: Allyson Neville, Advocacy Associate, Genocide Intervention Network

Speakers: John Norris, Executive Director, ENOUGH Project
Colin Thomas-Jensen, Policy Advisor, ENOUGH Project

Date: July 16, 2008

Time: 1-2pm

Agenda
What is the current state of play/situation?
What are their implications?
What are/should be the policy/advocacy asks be?

RSVP: Meghna Raj at mraj@enoughproject.org

[Randy Brown]

This topic is outside my usual Priority Information Requirements, but I thought I'd relay this David Axe posting on Wired.com's "Danger Room." Eye-catchingly headlined "When Soft Power Backfires", and linked to an American Prospect article also penned by Axe, it discusses an French-Swedish-Polish-Irish-stew (given the recent deployment of a brigade of EUFOR peacekeepers) of challenges:

The Darfuri refugee camps in Chad are key. The U.S. and Europe fund layers of defense for the dozen large camps and their 250,000 residents. The defenses range from Chadian paramilitaries to a new E.U. peacekeeping force (pictured) with armored vehicles, helicopters and drones.

Problem is, the rebels fighting in Sudan use the Chad camps as bases, traveling in at night when the camps' defenses are down. Worse, they use the camp populations as recruiting pools, luring or forcing kids as young as ten to join the fighting, ensnaring the next generation of Darfuris in the cycle of violence.

I'd originally thought to post this to the peacekeeping or NGO thread, but instead ended up running toward the sound of the gunfire (or was that typing?) over here, where y'all seem more actively engaged on current-events implications for UN/AU in Sudan. I hope you find this germane ...

[Tom Odom]

This topic is outside my usual Priority Information Requirements, but I thought I'd relay this David Axe posting on Wired.com's "Danger Room." Eye-catchingly headlined "When Soft Power Backfires", and linked to an American Prospect article also penned by Axe, it discusses an French-Swedish-Polish-Irish-stew (given the recent deployment of a brigade of EUFOR peacekeepers) of challenges:



I'd originally thought to post this to the peacekeeping or NGO thread, but instead ended up running toward the sound of the gunfire (or was that typing?) over here, where y'all seem more actively engaged on current-events implications for UN/AU in Sudan. I hope you find this germane ...

There is very much a sense of deja vu for me regarding the Darfur situation and the relationships between refugees, assistance, and camps as they combine to add to unrest. The refugee camps in Zaire and elsewhere were my greatest headaches for the last 20 months of my time in Zaire and Rwanda.

But in tagging his article to "soft power" as expressed by SecDef Gates or over the past decade by Dr. Joe Nye, Axe is mixing apples and oranges. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are military applications and are by definition NOT elements of soft power. By joe Nye's defintion, soft power does not even include economic leverage--that he places as a hard power element.

I would add that the ultimate test for peacekeeping or even peace enforcement has to be what it seeks to accomplish as expressed in its mandate. If it is not getting the job done--and many do not--then it needs to go away. Rwanda and UNAMIR 2 provides a good case study for how a new government limited the role of a UN peacekeeping and ultimately forced its withdrawal.

Tom

[Tom Odom]

regardless of reality, certain elements in the US insist on painting the Sudanese conflict as a religious struggle. that is how John Garang kept the SPLA going for so long. It has long been "cool" to look at Sudanese dissident groups as white hats versus Khartoum as black hats. The reality is of course much more complex.

Tom

As an example of muddled agendas and analogies, consider the cartoon posted on SWJ Blog today:

[Tom Odom]

Rwanda Threatens Darfur Pullout if U.N. Removes GeneralUNITED NATIONS, July 23 -- Rwanda has warned that it will withdraw its 3,000 peacekeepers from a U.N.-backed mission in the Darfur region of Sudan if the United Nations refuses to retain an alleged Rwandan war criminal as its second-highest-ranking commander there, according to U.S. and U.N. officials.

The United Nations has sought to persuade the Rwandan government to replace Maj. Gen. Emmanuel Karake Karenzi, the deputy force commander of a joint African Union and U.N. peacekeeping mission in Darfur. A Spanish judge indicted Karenzi and 39 other Rwandan officers in February for alleged war crimes in Rwanda in the mid-1990s.

I know Karake about as well as any westerner can know a foriegn officer. Hei s brave, intelligent, and feared by his enemies. The Spanish charges are to my mind more of the Hutu reverse genocide information operation that has been ongoing since 1994. For that matter, I have been targeted by the same. As for the 2000 fight in Kisangani, I cannot say. It seems to me if the UN looked into it--as they did--then it should be a dead issue.

The UN and the Rwandan government do not "like" each other. This symptomaric of that dislike.

Tom

The pic is from the Iwawa clearing operation. I was on the island with Karake shown in this picture.

[Tom Odom]

PS

Reference Karake and operations in 1997, my second Ambassador Bob Gribbin singles out Karake for praise in his book on that time period. The insurgency was raging in western and northwestern Rwanda, complicated by RPA heavy handed sweeps that turned bloody. Then COL Karenzi took command of the sector and with former ex-FAR battalion commanders in his brigade changed operations and disciplined the troops. Some of that included summary executions of RPA soldiers found guilty of killing civilians. he restored control of the RPA and at the same time finished the Hutu insurgency as a force inside Rwanda.

[Tom Odom]

More on the Spanish case and General Karenzi

Judgment without borders
What we are seeing is the birth of a type of worldwide judicial anarchy.
By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey
October 6, 2008

'He may be a sonofabitch," President Franklin Roosevelt is supposed to have muttered, referring to a Nicaraguan dictator, "but he is our sonofabitch."

That is foreign policy realism in a nutshell -- straightforward, practical, pursuing the national interest regardless of ideology. Its counterpart, of course, is a foreign policy driven by idealism and conviction -- a credo often called Wilsonian, after President Woodrow Wilson, but most recently associated with the neoconservative movement. These days, the assumptions of both schools of thought are threatened by a new global actor in the form of international judicial activism.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 21 Oct 08: Sudan's Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?

.....The CPA partners have neglected an important aspect for achieving peace in Sudan. Overwhelmed by the Darfur crisis and Abyei and their mutual mistrust, they have allowed the situation in Southern Kordofan to reach a dangerous level. The Nuba and Misseriya have been used as pawns in a bigger game. Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, the NCP and SPLM have abandoned their war-time allies and instead of delivering on wartime promises – particularly desperately needed development – have pursued national agendas they hope will win them the elections in 2009 or 2010.

Nuba and Misseriya leaders have become increasingly intolerant and frustrated at their marginalisation by the centre and the lack of peace dividends. They could well resort to armed insurgencies if their needs are not met soon. If the NCP, SPLM and international community fail to pay the required attention to the divided region, their inaction could come back to haunt them in a way that threatens the stability of the already divided country. Prevention of a new conflict in Southern Kordofan needs to be placed prominently on both national and international agendas.

[Stan]

If there is anyone out there who is current on the Dyncorp story, i would be interested. And in anything else S Sudan.

Some of our current programs are being handled by Dyncorp and they are now in Georgia in various capacities (until this year I didn't have the pleasure of managing projects with them). Some tuning is indeed in order

Coincidentally, I have a good friend from the Swedish Rescue Services (SRSA) standing up a demining office in The Sudan as we speak. When he returns I'll get a gander at his AAR, which should prove an interesting read !

Regards, Stan

[Jedburgh]

CH, 9 Jan 09: Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement

This report is divided into four sections. The Introduction sets out the main provisions of the CPA and briefly assesses progress on these provisions. The second section highlights some of the main issues in the drafting and implementation of the CPA. The third section looks at existing trends towards fragmentation in Sudan, and tries to assess how they will play out in the next few years. The final section contains recommendations for international supporters of the CPA. One of the report’s main assumptions is that conflicts in Sudan arise from an unbalanced relationship between the centre and many of its peripheries. The report focuses on three or four areas of current or former conflict in Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Darfur. There are important lessons to draw from conflicts and peace processes in other areas, such as Eastern Sudan, Blue Nile and parts of the Northern Nile Valley affected by dams. Rather than giving a tally of progress in these different peripheries, the report focuses on the often overlooked problem of the centre.