Historians and small wars

[Steve Blair]

I would define COIN success as stabilizing the environment so that a functional government can exist and people can profit from the economy with a reasonable sense of personal safety. By that standard, Kenya was a success, but so was Ireland, Scotland, Canada, and a number of other places. To use other examples, Goa was a success for Portugal for many years, as was Angola (which, if memory serves, was a Portuguese colony for a time). But this points out the other aspect of COIN: what worked in the past may not work in the future, even in the same geographic region. The Great Mutiny is a good example of this.

[tequila]

Sorry Marct, some confusion on my part. I was mostly referring to the immediate conflict as regards to COIN. The British struggle post-WWII to maintain their position in India was a failure. The same goes for their attempt to maintain control over the whole of Ireland against the IRA in 1918-1921 and Cyprus in the 1950s. Agreed that Palestine was a different situation, but the British failed entirely in their attempt to crush the violent Jewish terrorist groups.

Kenya and Malaya are viewed generally as COIN successes because peace was restored on British terms through the destruction or fading into irrelevance of the targeted rebel organizations, largely due to political/military actions by British forces. The same goes for more ambiguous "victories" such as the suppression of the Iraqi revolt in 1920-22 and the Palestinian Arab revolt in 1936-39.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

Sorry Marct, some confusion on my part. I was mostly referring to the immediate conflict as regards to COIN. The British struggle post-WWII to maintain their position in India was a failure. The same goes for their attempt to maintain control over the whole of Ireland against the IRA in 1918-1921 and Cyprus in the 1950s. Agreed that Palestine was a different situation, but the British failed entirely in their attempt to crush the violent Jewish terrorist groups.

No worries, mate! Honestly, I think the Brits lost their sense of purpose after WW I - their ideological justification behind the empire. I know that we (Canadians) and the Aussies and New Zealanders came out of WW I with much less regard for the Empire . But for the Brits themselves, I think the war destroyed both the moral and ideological basis of the Empire. As I tell my students, it's had to argue that you are the peak of civilization when you have just finished slaughtering millions through stupidity. I think Seigfrid Sasson captured this in his later poetry wuite well.

Kenya and Malaya are viewed generally as COIN successes because peace was restored on British terms through the destruction or fading into irrelevance of the targeted rebel organizations, largely due to political/military actions by British forces. The same goes for more ambiguous "victories" such as the suppression of the Iraqi revolt in 1920-22 and the Palestinian Arab revolt in 1936-39.

True, but it's also interesting to note that they ended up independent. I think this is one of the reasons why I get so picky on defining "success". Even in the 1920's, it was pretty well accepted in Britain that India would become independent; it was really only an acceleration of the political program to decentralize the Empire into Dominions. WW I certainly accelerated the process and, by the end of WW II, Britain really could not sustain the Empire.

Marc

[Merv Benson]

The British did not march into India and conquer with an army. Their initial entry was for purposes of trade and the Indians found that they liked the way the British did business. Contracts would not only be honored, but enforced. For this reason many Indians wanted to be in the British sector and it expanded. It was decades before the government took over from the British East Indies Company. It was a cultural conquest before the military got heavily involved. It is doubtful the British had the military capacity at that time to conquer India even with superior weapons, because of its inferior numbers of troops to control such a vast space and population.

The British system of governing its possessions changed dramatically after it lost its American colonies. It gave greater autonomy and local control, both of which were critical issues in the American Revolution.

Thomas Sowell's Conquest and Culture is a great book on the cultural aspects of conquest starting with Roman influence in England and later with the influence of English culture on Scotland and the failure of that influence in Ireland. His tracing of the Scot Irish who left Scotland before the cultural conquest was achieved, gives an interesting look at how long it took the American culture to tame them. (One of my grandfathers was Scot Irish, but we are all pretty tame now.)

[wm]

If we are to believe Strawson, much of the British effort in India was due to a strategic effort to defeat the French by a process of forcible decolonization. That kept the ball rolling after Clive had established a foothold.

My read on the Mutiny is also rather different. The majority of the Indians did not mutiny. A select few got involved in what we called a "Right On" movement back in the 60's and 70's. A fairly large number of native Indian units were involved in quelling the rising.

Regarding Tom Odom's proposal to read up on the French, I heartily agree. I think we can learn a lot from their failures in Annam and Algeria. Douglas Porch's books are entertaining reading on the growth of the French north African empire. I am not as informed as I might like to be on the French experience in the former Ottoman Empire mandates, but I suspect that they made a lot of avoidable mistakes there as well.

Regarding the future Commonwealth states' loss of imperial ardor after WWI, I would suggest that the light may have dawned. They came to realize thart they were being used as cannon fodder to maintain a far away ruler who really did little for their well being. I think that insight began during the 2nd Boer conflict (I suggest the movie Breaker Morant as support for this position).

Neither Rome nor Victoria's Britain were really interested in rule. Instead they each wanted stability, which engendered trade. For Rome, much of the later empire's concern was keeping the mob iquiet. In order to do this, they needed a constant flow of food to hand out to the unemployed. Roman politics were, in Tip O'Neil's words, local. When unable to maintain stability, the Roman solution was fairly heavy-handed. For example, after the Bar Kochba revolt in the 130s, Hadrian used the Babylonian solution and had the Jews forcibly resettled from Palestine. I don't think we'd be able to pull that off today.

[Steve Blair]

I don't know if the Boer War had as much to do with the Commonwealth falling apart (Peter Weir's version aside) as the did the bloodletting in World War I. Marc can comment to Canadian attitudes here, but if memory serves they revised their entire military system (requiring that only volunteers be sent overseas) as a direct result of World War I.

In my view, both Rome and Britain were interested in control and stability, although not necessarily direct rule. Their logic was that if you controlled your local proxy rulers (albeit indirectly or through shadowed channels) you more or less guaranteed stability and thus good trade. Both the French and Dutch tried more direct leadership models, and didn't fare quite as well.

The Mutiny itself is a fairly complex affair, but it did lead to the Crown taking a more direct role in the administration of colonial territories. I don't know that we will ever really know how much popular support it did or didn't have, given the spin that such movements are susceptible to both from nationalist elements and those nostalgic for the Raj and the "good old days."

[wm]

I don't know if the Boer War had as much to do with the Commonwealth falling apart (Peter Weir's version aside) as the did the bloodletting in World War I. Marc can comment to Canadian attitudes here, but if memory serves they revised their entire military system (requiring that only volunteers be sent overseas) as a direct result of World War I.

I concur. I think , as we say here in Massachusetts, "the light started to dawn on Marblehead" during the 2d Boer War, but actions like the Gallipoli Campaign had much greater impact on the larger colonies' views of their place in the Empire.

I wonder what we ought to make of the German colonial presence in Africa. From my reading, it seems that they had more popular support in the WWI campaigns in East Africa than the British did. Anyone have any insights about the principles employed by German colonial rulers?

[Steve Blair]

It's also worth remembering that the Germans were still "new" to the colonial game and tended to view their colonies as either blocking positions against British expansion or possible coaling stations for their High Seas Fleet (which was also a block against British expansion). I don't know a great deal about their governmental policies in their (few) colonies, but they may have been more hands-off than the British, or at least less inclined to meddle outside their enclaves.

[tequila]

German policies in both East and Southwest Africa were very brutal when confronted with rebellion. I also wouldn't say that the Germans experienced any superior level of loyalty vice the French or the British in WWI. Both Allied nations used far larger numbers of colonial troops in sustained combat roles during the war than did the Germans. Perhaps German East Africa was more subdued because the Germans had more recently engaged in brutal suppression of a native uprising than the British had?

[Tom Odom]

I wonder what we ought to make of the German colonial presence in Africa. From my reading, it seems that they had more popular support in the WWI campaigns in East Africa than the British did. Anyone have any insights about the principles employed by German colonial rulers?

Tequila has it correct.

Depends on the theater and country. Keep in mind always that the Western view toward Africa was best described by King Leopold of Belgium when remarking on his intention to create the Congo Free State (his private versus Belgian colony), " I mean to miss no chance to get my share of this magnificent African cake."

In German Southwest Africa (now Namibia) the Germans practiced genocide as a matter of policy.

In German East Africa, neither side really cared whether the locals supported them or not: large scale impressment of porters and large scale denial of resources through burning of fields were key tools. Th net result of the East African campaign was large scale famine and depopulation.

Best

Tom

[marct]

I don't know if the Boer War had as much to do with the Commonwealth falling apart (Peter Weir's version aside) as the did the bloodletting in World War I. Marc can comment to Canadian attitudes here, but if memory serves they revised their entire military system (requiring that only volunteers be sent overseas) as a direct result of World War I.

I concur. I think , as we say here in Massachusetts, "the light started to dawn on Marblehead" during the 2d Boer War, but actions like the Gallipoli Campaign had much greater impact on the larger colonies' views of their place in the Empire.

I think you're correct, WM. The 2nd Boer war certainly had a fairly major impact on the colonial aristocracy of Ontario, many of whom held commissions. As far as the Canadians were concerned, I would say that Vimy Ridge and the conscription crisis of 1917 were much more important than Gallipoli where we had no troops.

Marc