Countering Lind-dinistas - if the mission is impossible, don't blame me

[slapout9]

Look at South Korea..... the Captain is in jail and the prime Minister resigned...we need that here. Look what happens when the Generals Phuc-Dup and loose and they did loose.... look what happens....... they get promoted and a gold plated pension.

Every General Officer should be fired and loose his pension if he looses a War. In fact ALL PENSIONS AND BENEFITS SHOULD STOP IMMEDIATELY. I participated in a study in the early 70's either Army or DOD don't remember which one but here was the NEW MILITARY DEAL 6 years you get 60 thousand when you ETS. 10 years 100k, 20 years 200k. No permanent pension and no medical benefits unless injured on active duty.

If you want to fight then you better win and at the end you get a bonus and a well deserved thank you. Accountability it works because it will help create Honor and Respect something that is sadly missing in Government Institutions including the Higher Ranks of the Military.

[Fuchs]

There is a critical problem in your proposal:

It would motivate the generals whose reputation is at stake to push harder and harder, again and again for some more Friedman unit in order to avoid punishment.

What you're proposing is essentially a bonus system, after all: The pensions turn into a bonus system the moment the general becomes responsible for the war. High performance - high bonus. Failure - no bonus.

I know a governmental agency tasked to support high tech start-ups with equity capital for loans or economic policy purposes.
Its management board also gets bonuses.
Some of the start-ups supported are zombies. They keep getting fresh money in order to avoid that the management board needs to write off previous investments in these failures.



I wrote reputation on top because they wouldn't necessarily lose money. Many flag rank officers (especially those who really lead a campaign) will later 'earn' money with books, speeches, 'consulting' or from the arms industry directly.

[slapout9]

There is a critical problem in your proposal:

It would motivate the generals whose reputation is at stake to push harder and harder, again and again for some more Friedman unit in order to avoid punishment.

What you're proposing is essentially a bonus system, after all: The pensions turn into a bonus system the moment the general becomes responsible for the war. High performance - high bonus. Failure - no bonus.

I know a governmental agency tasked to support high tech start-ups with equity capital for loans or economic policy purposes.
Its management board also gets bonuses.
Some of the start-ups supported are zombies. They keep getting fresh money in order to avoid that the management board needs to write off previous investments in these failures.



I wrote reputation on top because they wouldn't necessarily lose money. Many flag rank officers (especially those who really lead a campaign) will later 'earn' money with books, speeches, 'consulting' or from the arms industry directly.

1-It isn't my system, it was real a study that was done.

2-The time issues you bring up could be dealt with. Warden in particular teaches that there must be a limit on time as well as money and bloodshed.

3-I agree about the book contracts, speeches, etc. but at least that would not be Tax Payers money.

Bottom line until there is some form of accountability with some real sanctions nothing much will change IMO. Why should there be? It is a gravy train if you happen to be on it. We have created a Military 1%.

[wm]

I should like to point out here that those in command . . .had no right to exercise a decisive influence on the conduct of the war, but . . . [a senior commander], being responsible for the execution of orders, could make representations if he found the conditions imposed on him too disadvantageous . . . .

This is from the memoir of Admiral Reinhard Scheer, commander of the German High Seas Fleet at the Battle of Jutland in WW1. In the chapter from which this quotation is taken, he is discussing the German leadership's deliberations regarding unrestricted submarine warfare.

Sounds like he is advocating a remonstration by the military regarding the paucity of resources (ways and means) to achieve the required end, but he is also suggesting that commenting on the ends is not with the military's brief. But that was a senior officer from Imperial Germany, not from the US Army of the 21st century. Still, I submit that the principle of civilian control may be so ingrained in the US military that senior officers may well have a similar point of view as that expressed by Admiral Scheer.

Folks should be careful what they wish for. Without this deep seated respect for civilian control found in the US Military, the country's changes in government might not have been as stables as they have been.

[AmericanPride]

wm,

I appreciate your concern, however I wonder if the division in civil-military relations is either artificial or too stringently policed. Do civilians really control the military?

First, 32 of 43 presidents (74.4%) had military service prior to becoming president. Twelve (27.9%) were generals. While these experiences can be separated institutionally, I don't think they can be demarcated on a personal level, meaning that their military experiences, perspectives, skills influenced their policy decisions. On a lower level, the military already influences policy through political actions as a bureaucracy (i.e. the timely announcement of delaying a carrier's refit during the sequestration debate; selective intelligence reporting, etc) or through the revolving door of retiring officials, lobbyists, think tanks, and corporate executives. The military may not decide which country to attack next, but it exercises significant influence on nearly every other policy decision. Is that civilian 'control'?

Second, what about the 'insurgent' approach to influencing civil-military relations and policy decisions? I.e. social media mobilization of veterans to effect a political decision. I think it's now possible that this relationship can be usurped from the bottom-up given the right conditions; i.e. strong moral outrage and mass action mobilized through social media.

Third, it's in military action that the President exercises the most unrestrained executive power contingent only on the cooperation of the military leadership. In this sense, the designation of the President as a 'civilian' is really rather arbitrary insofar he simply does not hold a military rank, but for all other intents and purposes his power is as absolute as any king or dictator restrained only by the increasingly subjective constraint of "lawful orders". The President can invade a country without a declaration of war, detain and surveil US citizens without warrant, and even order their deaths -- all by military actions. By most accounts, the invasion of Iraq was illegal but the military did not object - so where does that leave the assignment of accountability and responsibility?

So, I question the practical realities of the extent of civilian control and wonder where it's boundaries ought to be drawn to optimize military effectiveness and protection of democratic integrity. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, did the protection of the norm of 'civilian control' exercise such a decisive impact on the senior leaders' incentives that they simply failed to object to bad policy and/or strategy? Or did they perceive opportunities for advancement from a parochial and/or institutional perspective when presented with the policy?

[wm]

wm,

I appreciate your concern, however I wonder if the division in civil-military relations is either artificial or too stringently policed. Do civilians really control the military?

First, 32 of 43 presidents (74.4%) had military service prior to becoming president. Twelve (27.9%) were generals. While these experiences can be separated institutionally, I don't think they can be demarcated on a personal level, meaning that their military experiences, perspectives, skills influenced their policy decisions. On a lower level, the military already influences policy through political actions as a bureaucracy (i.e. the timely announcement of delaying a carrier's refit during the sequestration debate; selective intelligence reporting, etc) or through the revolving door of retiring officials, lobbyists, think tanks, and corporate executives. The military may not decide which country to attack next, but it exercises significant influence on nearly every other policy decision. Is that civilian 'control'?

Second, what about the 'insurgent' approach to influencing civil-military relations and policy decisions? I.e. social media mobilization of veterans to effect a political decision. I think it's now possible that this relationship can be usurped from the bottom-up given the right conditions; i.e. strong moral outrage and mass action mobilized through social media.

Third, it's in military action that the President exercises the most unrestrained executive power contingent only on the cooperation of the military leadership. In this sense, the designation of the President as a 'civilian' is really rather arbitrary insofar he simply does not hold a military rank, but for all other intents and purposes his power is as absolute as any king or dictator restrained only by the increasingly subjective constraint of "lawful orders". The President can invade a country without a declaration of war, detain and surveil US citizens without warrant, and even order their deaths -- all by military actions. By most accounts, the invasion of Iraq was illegal but the military did not object - so where does that leave the assignment of accountability and responsibility?

So, I question the practical realities of the extent of civilian control and wonder where it's boundaries ought to be drawn to optimize military effectiveness and protection of democratic integrity. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, did the protection of the norm of 'civilian control' exercise such a decisive impact on the senior leaders' incentives that they simply failed to object to bad policy and/or strategy? Or did they perceive opportunities for advancement from a parochial and/or institutional perspective when presented with the policy?

As you note correctly, POTUS is the US military's Commander-in-Chief. From that perspective every US military member is a subordinate to the POTUS. At the GO/FO level, some are subordinate commanders, and some are staff officers. Staff officers' first rule of conduct is to do everything in their power to find the best course of action and then convince the boss to take that course. However, once the boss makes a decision, the next rule of conduct for the staff is to back that decision to the hilt and make sure it is executed as well as it can be. Subordinate commanders have a similar relationship with their next higher.

Should it turn out that officers are not able to support these two rules of conduct, then they ought not continue to serve. One would hope that they would end their service voluntarily, but sometimes, as in MacArthur's case, they must be removed. Some others may take what I call the Speer defense (after German Armaments Minister Albert Speer) and stay because they believe that their replacements would do even more damage.

The US military may not choose to override the decisions of the President. To do so would be to violate their oath to support and defend the Constitution. Military members may just like any other citizen try to convince those with that power to impeach the President They may testify before Congress as well. But they may not take the law in their own hands as we find in the book "Seven Days in May."

Two things about your discussion of prior Presidents' military service:
1. The fact of their service should have made them aware of the principle of civilian leadership (which they could have used to their advantage as President--I'm not sure that any did however).
2. I find your assertions about the military service of past Presidents to be largely a red herring. Only 3--Washington, Grant and Eisenhower--had experience at a level that I would consider as developing a meaningful understanding of the skills required by the country's chief executive. Of the rest of those who reached GO rank--Arthur, Garfield, both Harrisons, Hayes, Jackson, Johnson, Pierce, and Taylor--only Jackson and Taylor demonstrated significant independent command leadership with continued success. WH Harrison had some success against Indians but failed miserably during the War of 1812. With the possible exception of Benjamin Harrison, the rest were either largely undistinguished in their service or served only at a relatively low level of tactical command (regiment or 19th century brigade). Of this last group, all but one (Pierce) served in the Civil War, a war notable for the number of inept "political" generals.

[AmericanPride]

wm,

My point is there is more than one dimension in analyzing the conditions of civil-military relations and the appropriate boundaries for the behaviors of senior military officers.

Should it turn out that officers are not able to support these two rules of conduct, then they ought not continue to serve. One would hope that they would end their service voluntarily, but sometimes, as in MacArthur's case, they must be removed. Some others may take what I call the Speer defense (after German Armaments Minister Albert Speer) and stay because they believe that their replacements would do even more damage.

They 'should' but why don't they? As it appears, they attempted to fulfill your two 'rules of conduct' without regard for the consequences. And with the exception of a few senior officers relieved for one reason or another, they all benefited handsomely from their activities irregardless of the outcomes. Is this a question of incentives? Opportunities?

[wm]

wm,

My point is there is more than one dimension in analyzing the conditions of civil-military relations and the appropriate boundaries for the behaviors of senior military officers.

Should it turn out that officers are not able to support these two rules of conduct, then they ought not continue to serve. One would hope that they would end their service voluntarily, but sometimes, as in MacArthur's case, they must be removed. Some others may take what I call the Speer defense (after German Armaments Minister Albert Speer) and stay because they believe that their replacements would do even more damage.

They 'should' but why don't they? As it appears, they attempted to fulfill your two 'rules of conduct' without regard for the consequences. And with the exception of a few senior officers relieved for one reason or another, they all benefited handsomely from their activities irregardless of the outcomes. Is this a question of incentives? Opportunities?

AP:
Your initial sentence speaks to more than one dimension in analysis. What are the dimensions you have in mind? Your ultimate paragraph seems to suggest that "it is all about the Benjamins" for these senior folks, which is a single dimension.

I am willing to acknowledge that this may be true for some of them. However, based on my experiences with many senior leaders, a variation of the Speer Defense that I mentioned before seems much more the case. If it were really just about money and power, then I submit that most of these leaders would have left before the magic 10 year mark, when many officers realize they are half way to a chance to get a pretty nice pension. Or, they would not have joined at all because they could have made much more in the private sector. BTW the pension piece , in my day, was still iffy until 18.5 years of service. You could be bounced at 18yrs, 5 months and get nothing after a third passover for promotion.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am a horrible example, but I don't think you can find a single answer. There were those who stayed for the Benjamins, and there were those who stayed based on the Speer defense. Many of us simply stayed because we knew the nation needed leaders and the bench was not deep. We knew that many of those on the bench sucked. We may not have been the best players on the field, but we had the interests of those who worked for us and those at home who paid our salaries at heart.

But I don't think that answers the question. It might be best if we move further comments to the "William S Lind and the US Officer Corps" thread on how to deal with the problems our current system presents to the officer corps.

Moderator adds: discussion thread referred to is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=20590

[AmericanPride]

wm,

I don't think it's "all about the benjamins" for all of them (maybe not even most of them). Some may be driven by your so-called "Speer effect" - others because they perceive they have no other options within or outside the Army. Some might genuinely agree with the prescribed policy despite significant public or institutional criticism. In the specific case of Iraq, I think after Shinsheki was fired, a combination of passivists and opportunitists subordinated themselves to Rumsfeld's wizardry about a fast, quick, and cheap war.

If something is known to be 'impossible' beforehand by the technical experts designated to implement it, and the cost of implementation is measured in human lives, is there not an ethical responsibility to protest?