Countering Lind-dinistas - if the mission is impossible, don't blame me

[davidbfpo]

For those who do not read everything published by Small Wars, of late William Lind has appeared on the following:

1) The Continuing Irrelevance of William Lind - a SWJ article, with two comments and is on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...f-william-lind

2) Our Debating Military - a SWJ Blog notice, with no comments and on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/our-debating-military

3) Mr. Lind, May We Focus Our Rage Please?- a SWJ Blog notice, with four comments and on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mr-...ur-rage-please

4) Gardening in a “Barren” Officer Corps- a SWJ notice, with three comments and on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gar...-officer-corps

Yes there are other, older items which mention Mr Lind, these appear to be those that are relevant.

These two SWJ Blog notices appear relevant: COIN's funeral an FP article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/coin%E2%80%99s-funeral and Next COIN Manual Tries to Take Commanders Beyond Iraq, Afghanistan on:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nex...aq-afghanistan

[Fuchs]

A widely defined negative is impossible to prove, so it's impossible to prove that the mission was impossible.
This means it's faulty to use this assertion as a cornerstone of a case.

On the other hand, the burden of proof falls on the other party - but it's impossible to prove that the mission was possible.


The disagreement is no fertile ground for a debate, as both parties are logically unable to prove even only their assumptions. This leaves a huge playing field for unfounded assertions, and basically no potential for a conclusive, decisive argument.


It's much easier to argue that a political effort should be carried by political forces, not by military forces. It's hardly possible to make a conclusive case for the assumption that military forces should execute a political effort that cannot succeed by disarming the opposition alone.
State Dept. 'lost' the Iraq occupation by not throwing its weight into the conflict.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A widely defined negative is impossible to prove, so it's impossible to prove that the mission was impossible.
This means it's faulty to use this assertion as a cornerstone of a case.

On the other hand, the burden of proof falls on the other party - but it's impossible to prove that the mission was possible.


The disagreement is no fertile ground for a debate, as both parties are logically unable to prove even only their assumptions. This leaves a huge playing field for unfounded assertions, and basically no potential for a conclusive, decisive argument.


It's much easier to argue that a political effort should be carried by political forces, not by military forces. It's hardly possible to make a conclusive case for the assumption that military forces should execute a political effort that cannot succeed by disarming the opposition alone.
State Dept. 'lost' the Iraq occupation by not throwing its weight into the conflict.

I will work in probabilities. How does a 1 in 1,725 chance of success based on the known socioeconomic factors in play in Iraq in 2004. So, yes, I can't prove an impossibility, I can assert that it was highly improbable.

Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq.

In fact, there was almost no known factor in favor of democracy in Iraq. This quote is from a 2004 article:

Iraq lacks any of the preconditions academics generally accept as being necessary for democratization to succeed. It has no middle class to speak of independent from the state; oil revenues, the life-line of any Iraqi regime, are notorious for their ability to centralize rather than democratize power; the country has no tradition of limited or responsible government; national identity is weak in the face of rival religious or ethnic loyalties; regional neighbors will do what they can to undermine whatever democratizing movements exist; and the democrats themselves lack a figure such as Nelson Mandela or Kim Dae Jung who could give them leadership.

I think I am safe to make the assertion I will make.

[Fuchs]

After the fact. Our perceptions are now tainted by experience.
This clouds our vision for what was actually in the realm of possibilities.

I suppose a "pre-1982 Lebanon"-style republic was possible. It would have required a balancing of powers, and enough commitment to the folly that the powers in-country believe in the persistence of the balancing.

[TheCurmudgeon]

After the fact. Our perceptions are now tainted by experience.
This clouds our vision for what was actually in the realm of possibilities.

The factors that were missing were well known in 2004. They were based off a 1959 research paper. They were ignored by the political leadership who choose to believe the "end of history" crowd like Larry Diamond and Francis Fukiyama. The fact that it did not come about meant that it was, for all intents and purposes, outside the realm of probability.

[Fuchs]

Probability.

I remember some probability estimates, though only vaguely.
They were about the probability of the commies winning the Cold War because of the softness and defensiveness of the West.

I think I read those in the mid-80's. Those probability figures were rather high.

[davidbfpo]

Curmudegeon's first post cited in part:

My basic argument I have. Three points:

1. The requisites for democratization did not exist in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

2. Attempting to create a democracy where one was not possible created instability perpetuating the conflict

3. COIN could not overcome 1 and 2. Pop-Centric COIN is correct, but it cannot create legitimacy. It must adapt to the desires of the population.

Now a few years ago I attended a conference on the Middle East and a number of Arab speakers stressed to them 'democracy' did not mean first and foremost 'representative democracy'. To them accountability was far more important whether by the rule of law, less corruption etc.

My "armchair" understanding of Afghanistan is that in the rural areas there was a form of direct democracy, mainly exercised by elders and in jirgas. I suspect it helped that the state had very little power or functions beyond the cities - long before Soviet or allied intervention. Carter Malkasian's book covers this well.

I wonder what are 'the requisites for democracy'. One thing for sure in either Afghanistan or Iraq they are not what we have or thought they should have.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Probability.

I remember some probability estimates, though only vaguely.
They were about the probability of the commies winning the Cold War because of the softness and defensiveness of the West.

I think I read those in the mid-80's. Those probability figures were rather high.

I never saw any probability estimates of success of creating a democratic Iraq or Afghanistan. If you find any, let me know. All the ones I have found, dating back to 2004, say it was not possible.

If you find anything saying that it was possible, I would love to see it.

Essentially, what I am finding is that every academic said it was not possible, but the administration ignored that and gave the military their marching orders. If you find anything counter to that let me know.

[Dayuhan]

State Dept. 'lost' the Iraq occupation by not throwing its weight into the conflict.

I can't agree with that. State has no more capacity for "nation-building" than the military does. As far as I can determine the US Government has no such capacity, which is why the job got dropped on the military.

Slap, while Lind is my current target, he is simply a representative of a wider group of civilians who want to place the blame for the failures of the last 12 years squarely on the military. I don't care if they choose to blame us for their failures. Just don't tell me I need to fix what is not broken.

We have problems, don't get me wrong. But looking at why we failed to create a democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan is not our problem. It was beyond the capabilities of the resources and time put against the problem.

I couldn't agree more, been chanting this mantra for over a decade: asking an army to build a nation is like asking an engineer to perform surgery. Trying to remake the army into a nation-building force is going to get you an inadequate nation-building force and is also likely to compromise the army's ability to perform its core functions, which could be a real problem if we ever actually need an army.

Even the best hammer in the world makes a very lousy screwdriver. That's not the fault of the hammer, it's the fault of those who choose to deploy the hammer because they forgot that they don't have a screwdriver in their kit.

As you say, none of this means the army has no flaws: every institution has flaws and problems, and every institution can improve. Blaming the failure of "nation-building" on flaws in the army, though, is to me both irrational and dangerous, the danger being that efforts to reshape the army to correct those hypothetical "flaws" could render the army less able to perform the functions for which it is actually intended.