The Russian economy (catch all)

[AmericanPride]

From Igor Yurgens, Chairman of the Management Board of the Institute for Contemporary Development and Vice President of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs:

"The West vs Russia" at the National Interest:

Most importantly, beginning a new chapter is not the same as ending one—and it by no means preordains the final pages of the book. Perhaps ironically, the harder the West tries to isolate Russia, the more Western actions will strengthen forces inside the country that welcome isolation. This will make it increasingly difficult to find necessary cooperative solutions to current differences, and it is likely to increase costs on all sides.

[Firn]

A voice of smart reason - sadly following Putin's logic. It is the West who should strech out it's arm and just forget that Putin's aggression has ripped the poltical landscape and post-war consensus of Europe. What have all those offers and understanding got from Russia's side? At best united with the Ukrainian resistance they made a deeper invasion less likely and reduced the level of violence for the time being.

Making the oligarchs of Putin's circle and the common people suffer economically and weakening the Russian ability to built up it's military further is perhaps the least worse outcome given Putin's actions. That there is some infighting within the circle for a bigger slice of the cake which is no longer growing is a just a bonus.

As written by a important Russian economist Putin dominates more the Katharia the Great. This means that the 'moderates', which supported openely his policies of aggression have at best a limited influence the foreign realm if more so in the economic sphere. Actually the isolationists, which seem to be used in part as a spectre would help a great deal to wreak the Russian economy. They already are working hard on it. That has also risks but lower ones then the alternatives. IMHO, of course.

It might be tempting to believe that the Russian government is stock full of 'irrational criminals' living in an 'altered state of reality' but the truth is that decision-making in Moscow is really a function of a factional process in which the combat between competing voices produces sub-optimal policy outcomes (not unlike in the U.S.).

Quite unlike the US, in which one man doesn't dominates personally or through proxies the media, all the three branches and the economy. The infighting is within his circle not between quite indipendent political forces...

[AmericanPride]

Firn,

. It is the West who should strech out it's arm and just forget that Putin's aggression has ripped the poltical landscape and post-war consensus of Europe.

Except for some of the hardliners in Russia, I don't think anyone is saying this at all. I think the majority of the criticism towards Washington's policy is that it's not considering long-term consequences to the conflict's continuation or escalation. Sure - the U.S. can punish Russia economically, but as I've asked Outlaw repeatedly, how does that impact other U.S. security and economic interests? And since the sanctions are in response to Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory, how do the sanctions reverse that specific action? Historically speaking, sanctions are ineffective in that regard, and considering the other foreign policy consequences of a confrontational U.S.-Russian relationship, there needs to be more consideration of how to de-escalation the conflict at its source.

Quite unlike the US, in which one man doesn't dominates personally or through proxies the media, all the three branches and the economy. The infighting is within his circle not between quite indipendent political forces...

We can debate the extent that this is true, but recent research shows that U.S. policy decisions effectively align with the preferences of American elites, and that the specific outcomes and contours of policies are often subject to heated bureaucratic infighting (i.e. invasion of Iraq, several major intelligence programs, Affordable Care Act, etc). That the specifc mechanisms of power and elite relationships differ to some degree does not in my view invalidate the argument that this process of bureaucratic infighting occurs and shapes policy rather than policy being designed and driven by one man or a monolithic agency.

[AmericanPride]

Some more reasons why Russia is unlikely to alter its course in Ukraine in response to sanctions:

In a poll conducted Sept. 19-22 among 1,600 respondents in 46 Russian regions, 71 percent of Russians believe that the main purpose of Western sanctions is “to weaken and humiliate Russia.”

Sixty-eight percent of the respondents believe Russia should “continue its policy” in retaliation against the sanctions, almost a fifth (22 percent) call for “seeking a compromise and making concessions in order to stop the sanctions” and 10 percent are undecided.

So essentially it appears that as of September, Western sanctions have strengthened not weakened the Russian public's resolve.

[Firn]

So essentially it appears that as of September, Western sanctions have strengthened not weakened the Russian public's resolve.

So it might appear of September. Which might weaken it's resolve considerably more down a long bleak economic road as it enables in the short run more policy stupidity. Or maybe not. Early times, still after months early times.

In any case this isn't the only aspect of a weaker Russian economy. For example increasing it's military strenght will also require more effort or more sacrifice in other areas as the cake doesn't grow bigger and Western tech will be harder to come by. It's economic 'lever' over some countries will likely become weaker. Supporting the occupied territories in economic turmoil like the Crimea will be harder even if they don't screw it up as badly as they do currently.

[mirhond]

https://www.opendemocracy.net/sean-g...shock-doctrine

While a crisis of faith, of sorts, has resounded in western discourse on the economic effectiveness of austerity, this scepticism, rather ironically, dissipates when you cross over into the remnants of the Iron Curtain.

Neoliberalism’s flagellants reside east of the Elbe. There, ideological purity remains, if not redoubled. Former patients of shock therapy are now its most devoted converts. This was not only demonstrated by Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Slovak, and Polish officials’ unyielding support for ‘tough reforms’ in Greece, but the general lack of sympathy among their populations for the Greek people. Past shock therapies have left them numb, docile, and inured to the calamities of neoliberal logics.

The neoliberal faith is expanding further eastward as well. The Ukrainian leadership have shown their unbridled readiness to exchange one master, Russia, for another: western finance and corporate capital. Even in light of the Troika’s ‘fiscal waterboarding’ of Greece and the utter failure of austerity as economic policy, the Ukrainian government is willing, even enthusiastic, to implement reforms prescribed by the IMF not only with the blind faith that they will stimulate economic recovery, but also in the name of ‘European values’, which are now subject to much scrutiny.

[kaur]

mirhond, if you don't live in "gas station", then you have to drag yourself out from the "end of golden age" somehow. Show me the other way than neoliberal. State railways fallen king turned academics (after ambassador episode Yakunin has shown his way https://www.project-syndicate.org/co...akunin-2015-10 This is also theory at the moment. In Russia there is another professor called presidential advisor Sergei Glazyev. His solution to revival of Russia and Eurasian project is working in Ukraine at the moment.

[mirhond]

mirhond, if you don't live in "gas station", then you have to drag yourself out from the "end of golden age" somehow. Show me the other way than neoliberal.

Your faith is strong and steadfast, I see, Thatcher bless you and Reagan smiles on you

[kaur]

mirhond, show me the working alternative and I'm glad. After reading this discussion even Russia's own bright heads can't see it.

И все же: сколько понадобится снова времени, чтобы слезть с волны самодержавия и несвободы?

Гуриев: Я остаюсь оптимистом — все будет нормально, но не в ближайшие несколько лет. Завтра будет хуже, чем сегодня, но послезавтра будет совсем хорошо.

Аузан: Я думаю, что при нашей жизни начнутся изменения, но это будет очень длительный процесс. В России были только одни длинные реформы — реформы царя Александра II. Вот я бы очень хотел, чтобы мы опять вошли в длинную волну реформ. Потому что с короткой волной мы все время будем повторять одну и ту же картинку. Если мы это сделаем, то шанс на успех — 10–12%, если ничего не будем делать — ноль.

http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/103328

[kaur]

mirhond, it seems you share the thoughts mentioned here.

One of the main conclusions of the workshop is that political liberalism as an ideology and as a political thought in Russia has been largely discredited. Western countries and international organizations have probably underestimated the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which instilled in a significant part of the Russian public a distrust toward liberalism, there understood as an ideological justification to destroy the Soviet Welfare state. This disqualification of political liberalism, associated by the Russian public opinion with neoliberal economic practices responsible for huge socioeconomic inequalities, contributes largely, today, to the call within Russia for a return to a Great Power status.

We need to remember that a large part of the Russian society has been calling for Russia’s international prestige and a comeback to some Soviet practices and conservative values since the early 1990s – with the electoral successes of the Communist Party for instance – long before “greatpowerness” and conservatism became the flagship of Putin’s third mandate. Indeed, for part of the public opinion, Russia’s greatpowerness is synonym for a strong state domestically, capable of reinstating a paternalistic social-economic order.

http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022596

[mirhond]

mirhond, show me the working alternative and I'm glad. After reading this discussion even Russia's own bright heads can't see it.

http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/103328

You know, I almost always laugh when venerable economists talk about history: for many of them the real world is a subcase of some crackpot economic theory, they really don't bother with facts and data. But thanks, anyway, I'll put this in my collection.

mirhond, it seems you share the thoughts mentioned here.

We need to remember that a large part of the Russian society has been calling for Russia’s international prestige and a comeback to some Soviet practices and conservative values since the early 1990s – with the electoral successes of the Communist Party for instance – long before “greatpowerness” and conservatism became the flagship of Putin’s third mandate. Indeed, for part of the public opinion, Russia’s greatpowerness is synonym for a strong state domestically, capable of reinstating a paternalistic social-economic order.

http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022596

Captain Obvious rescued us again, but this stuff does not belong to this thread, actually. Copy this to the relevant thread, please.