Could D-Day have been in 1943?

**davidbfpo** · 06-07-2014

Ganulv raises a question about strategy in WW2, prompted by his reading, so this new thread has been started. His post will appear 1st in a moment.

**ganulv** · 06-07-2014

A friend passed along a link yesterday to an article in the Ithaca (N.Y.) Journal by Cornell University history professor John H. Weiss. [LINK]

Among the points outlined by Weiss:

That it should be said that it was Soviet and not American military action which was responsible for the defeat of the Germans.
- Weiss gives the surrender of the German forces at the Battle of Stalingrad as the politically decisive event of the war and the Battle of Kursk as “the militarily decisive engagement.”
- Weiss does go to pains to point out the importance of the American Lend-Lease program to Soviet war efforts, especially after the Battle of Stalingrad.
That many historians are now of a mind that Operation Overlord could have been undertaken in 1943.

I would be interested in hearing from members of the forum as to whether this is pure hindsight or if any of the Allied generals and admirals were also advocating for the same at the time. Weiss states that the resources used in the Italian Campaign and the strategic bombing of German cities could have been put to better use.

Again, pure hindsight?

**davidbfpo** · 06-07-2014

Long ago the late British historian / writer John Grigg published a book asking this question, without apparently using official archives. It was called '1943: The Victory That Never Was', published in 1980 and here is a very short review:http://www.historytoday.com/paul-add...tory-never-was

The book appears to be still available and six reviews are here:http://www.amazon.com/1943-victory-t.../dp/0809073773 In the UK it available too:http://www.amazon.co.uk/1943-The-Vic.../dp/041339610X

**omarali50** · 06-08-2014

considering that decisive air superiority was NOT established until 1944 (and even the battle of the Atlantic was in doubt till 1943) this sounds like so much revisionist nonsense. EVEN in 1944 it was touch and go for a while. Without absolutely decisive air superiority, even 1944 would have failed.

**Red Rat** · 06-08-2014

Kursk was when the Germans lost the strategic initiative, but arguably Stalingrad was the strategic culmination of German fighting power on the Eastern front. The loss of their strongest Army was catastrophic and never made good.

On the Western front I have not seen any scholarly work that suggests an invasion of NW Europe in 1943 was possible, mostly because the logistics would tend to say it wasn't. If the Mediterranean & N Africa theatre offences (Operations Torch, Husky and Avalanche) had not taken place than materiel for an invasion on a reduced scale would have been available, but Torch & Husky are also where the Allies learnt to conduct joint ops & the US Army learnt to fight & blooded its senior command element. Without this experience D-Day is likely to have been a very different tale.

**ganulv** · 06-08-2014

Originally Posted by Red Rat

On the Western front I have not seen any scholarly work that suggests an invasion of NW Europe in 1943 was possible, mostly because the logistics would tend to say it wasn't. If the Mediterranean & N Africa theatre offences (Operations Torch, Husky and Avalanche) had not taken place than materiel for an invasion on a reduced scale would have been available, but Torch & Husky are also where the Allies learnt to conduct joint ops & the US Army learnt to fight & blooded its senior command element. Without this experience D-Day is likely to have been a very different tale.

Did experiences in the South Pacific campaigns contribute to the planning for the Normandy invasion in any significant way?

**Steve Blair** · 06-17-2014

Originally Posted by ganulv

Did experiences in the South Pacific campaigns contribute to the planning for the Normandy invasion in any significant way?

Not that I'm aware of, honestly. Quite a bit of the landing bombardment doctrine had been worked out (or at least drafted) before the war.

**Ulenspiegel** · 06-08-2014

Originally Posted by Red Rat

Kursk was when the Germans lost the strategic initiative, but arguably Stalingrad was the strategic culmination of German fighting power on the Eastern front. The loss of their strongest Army was catastrophic and never made good.

In series "Germany and the Second World War" the authors come to the conclusion that Stalingrad was the point of no return for the German forces in the east and was the battle in which Germany lost the strategic initiative.

However, they clearly doubt that after December 1941 there was a realistic chance for Germany to win the war against the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was a horrible battle but not an decisive one.

For me it is hard to imagine how the 250000 men of the 6th Army would have made a difference when the Red Army would have had additional 700000 men more at Kurks, for example.

Germany had in 1942 simply not enough motorized units to achieve something similar to the results of summer and autum 1941.

**davidbfpo** · 06-09-2014

ganulv posted (cited in part) earlier:

Weiss states that the resources used in the Italian Campaign and the strategic bombing of German cities could have been put to better use.

Having just read a book that covered the Italian campaign it is worth mentioning several times major components were removed to fight elsewhere, the French (North African) Corps to southern France (after D-Day) and the Canadian Corps to the UK to participate in the D-Day landings.

So in some respects Italy enabled Allied formation to learn how to fight against a respected, capable enemy and the move on to fight another day. I would expect individuals were moved too, way below Eisenhower and Montgomery's level.