Russian Unconventional Strategy

[Dayuhan]

I have no doubt that the Russians see these "color" and "spring" revolutions as threats, both because their preferred autocrats are among those being threatened and because they set an uncomfortable precedent for their own population.

I expect that at least at the leadership level they know quite well that the US is not creating these revolutions, though of course the US will try to exploit them, just as the Russians will try to exploit any revolution against an autocrat allied with the US.

Of course the Russians will blame any revolution against one of "their bastards" on US-sponsored subversion, just as the US once blamed any revolution against "our bastards" on Soviet subversion. That doesn't mean they believe the propaganda, it's just a convenient and sometimes even effective propaganda angle.

[OUTLAW 09]

I have no doubt that the Russians see these "color" and "spring" revolutions as threats, both because their preferred autocrats are among those being threatened and because they set an uncomfortable precedent for their own population.

I expect that at least at the leadership level they know quite well that the US is not creating these revolutions, though of course the US will try to exploit them, just as the Russians will try to exploit any revolution against an autocrat allied with the US.

Of course the Russians will blame any revolution against one of "their bastards" on US-sponsored subversion, just as the US once blamed any revolution against "our bastards" on Soviet subversion. That doesn't mean they believe the propaganda, it's just a convenient and sometimes even effective propaganda angle.

Dayuhan---the outer messaging matches the internal messaging---it is designed to drive their foreign policy for a global end user but it is specifically designed to "radicalize" their own internal population which in the case of the Crimea worked massively well based on Putin's numbers.

The external messaging is designed to reinforce the idea that Russia is back as an international player and the world is no longer unipolar.

Russia wants to be a super power after feeling that they were relegated to a regional power after 1995.

[Bill Moore]

Whether you believe the accusation that the U.S. promotes these uprisings or not isn't the most important point. It is a fact that some actors in the U.S. definitely promote these uprisings, but they don't appear to be associated with the U.S. government. Regardless, what I think we need to focus on is this:

“The Russians, by announcing this new doctrine in such clear terms, are announcing their intent to counter this activity [of destabilizing governments by popular uprising] by conducting additional research and analysis, ultimately coming out with counter policies,” he said.

What are the implications of this? Are we going to see a new type of confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR (oops I mean Russia), where Russia is engages states and the US engages populaces? Obviously the Russians desire to limit and even turn back the scale of U.S. influence globally, as does China. Will they form a coalition? Should the U.S. defense strategy change based on this?

[kaur]

I have not noticed that anyone has mentioned that this is already Russia's second attempt to fight "revolutions". Last time they used non-violent methods.

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ceelbas/worksh...lson_paper.pdf

This time Russians answered with arms, which must be new level. Was this because of Arab spring or Bolotnaya square meetings?

[OUTLAW 09]

Whether you believe the accusation that the U.S. promotes these uprisings or not isn't the most important point. It is a fact that some actors in the U.S. definitely promote these uprisings, but they don't appear to be associated with the U.S. government. Regardless, what I think we need to focus on is this:



What are the implications of this? Are we going to see a new type of confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR (oops I mean Russia), where Russia is engages states and the US engages populaces? Obviously the Russians desire to limit and even turn back the scale of U.S. influence globally, as does China. Will they form a coalition? Should the U.S. defense strategy change based on this?

Bill---some interesting questions that require so thought before answering.

Here is another take by a Russian editorial that came out today concerning the stoppage of the South Stream pipeline which was critical in the eyes of the Russians for a number of reasons---when one reads through it is becomes almost a list of accusations against the US from the last 40 or so years.

http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_06_10/...gy-mafia-5346/

One thing I have learned when dealing with Russians---they wear their emotions on their sleeves for all to see so what is released as a "political editorial" does in fact reflect the ruling elites thinking.

And if one then looks at the recently released UW strategy and their 2010 nuclear strategy notice how the doctrine now matches the rhetoric both regionally and globally.

Russia feels now capable of a full court press against the US/NATO/EU---politically, militarily, and economically---the question becomes have they through their own rhetoric and the missteps by the West in pushing back "mis-lead" themselves on their actual abilities.

Will provide answers to the questions later after thinking it through.

[Dayuhan]

Whether you believe the accusation that the U.S. promotes these uprisings or not isn't the most important point. It is a fact that some actors in the U.S. definitely promote these uprisings, but they don't appear to be associated with the U.S. government.

I think there needs to be a distinction between "promotes" and "causes". Certainly in some cases the US Government has encouraged revolutions, as have independent players within the US, but no amount of encouragement is going to conjure up a revolution where the conditions to support one do not exist. In other cases the revolutions have been entirely spontaneous with little effort or knowledge on the US side. After all the talk of how the Arab Spring caught US intel agencies napping it's a bit ironic to hear that those same agencies allegedly caused the revolutions.

I don't think there's been a single "color" or "spring" revolution that could be reasonably claimed to have been caused by external intervention. I think that on the decision making level the Russians are well aware of that, though there is always the risk of falling for one's own propaganda.

Are we going to see a new type of confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR (oops I mean Russia), where Russia is engages states and the US engages populaces?

That's ironic in some ways... during the Cold War the US often found itself supporting autocrats and claiming that rebellion against those autocrats was caused by Soviet subversion. Now the roles seem to be reversed. I guess it's always easier to blame an ally's troubles on foreign subversion than to concede that your ally is an A-hole.

Obviously the Russians desire to limit and even turn back the scale of U.S. influence globally, as does China. Will they form a coalition? Should the U.S. defense strategy change based on this?

Russia and China cooperate, but it seems well short of a coalition, and they will go their own way as they see fit. Just for one example, Russia's relationship with China does not stop the Russians from selling fairly advanced weapons systems to Vietnam, which is not exactly on friendly terms with China. It's actually interesting that the Chinese have so little to say about those sales.

Despite the cooperation, there remain areas of serious strategic competition between Russia and China, notably in Central Asia.

Not sure the Russia/China relationship requires a change in US strategy, but it would certainly be wise for the US to be prepared for potential changes and evolutions in that relationship. Any number of things could happen and I don't think anyone can really predict how it will turn.

[OUTLAW 09]

Bill---to answer the following questions---these two paragraphs are to the point and go a little further than your questions.

"Still, this will be a different cold war than the last one. For all its tough rhetoric, the Soviet Union of the Brezhnev era was a tired, conservative power. Putin's Russia is different. It is bursting with negative energy, hatred of the outside world and enthusiasm for confrontation.

It's a throwback not so much to the cold war diplomacy of missile treaties and international alliances, as to the Soviet Union's revolutionary birth, when the new Bolshevik government in Moscow actively undermined its enemies in the West."

The comments are actually very to the point.

1. After the poor performance of the Russian Army in 2008 in Georgia there was a massive investment into the Russian military as a whole and today through their 2020 plans they are far better trained, equipped with new weapon systems that are superior to ours in many ways, have a professional fulltime standing expeditionary army backed by a draftee army.
1a. They have become far more aggressive towards US military units in neutral zones---far more aggressive than under the Cold War days.
2. They developed their new UW strategy for this force.-and it is clear and concise.
3. They have completely modernized their nuclear forces and will add two heavy ballistic missiles in 2016 to the inventory and have violated the standing INF. US has an aging fore that is in need of modernization but Congress has shown an unwillingness to fund.
4. They have a new 2010 nuclear use doctrine to support this force-and it is clear and concise.
5. The have over the last 20 years used natural gas/oil as an economic force/weapon and built the pipeline delivery systems to support this economic weapons system. they are trying to get the EU to recognize their form of state run economics vs the EU free competition.
6. They are now expanding their naval forces and acquiring berthing rights around the world.
7. They are now flying into areas they never flew in during even the Cold War days and in a more aggressive manner.
8. These Russian steps are actually being matched by the same type of military/political/economic moves by the Chinese who are especially focused on Africa.
9. Both Russia and the Chinese are actively reinterpreting older treaties and agreements and are actually now simply declaring them null and void if it fits their interests something neither would have done 10 years ago---an interesting question would be why now? I think they both view the US as a waning power that has not backed up a single red line they have placed in the last 20 years

Yes the Russians are approaching the rest of the world from a state to state perspective and the US from a population perspective---but does the rule of law and good governance outweigh cheap gas and the perspective on investing in Russian and Chinese economic development opportunities for economically less powerful but influential countries in say the ME or in the Far East. Or does Russian and Chinese investment in say Africa and the ME appear to be more attractive than western investments---yes it does.

In some aspects while the rule of law and good governance resonate with populations in the end it still is all about economic development, employment, and personal security ---so yes the Maidan echoes those demands--but when implementing say the IMF and EU economic restructuring in exchange for billions of USDs those same populations will suffer and suffer badly until they adjust so in the end does the Russian/Chinese state economic systems appear more attractive to a state or the population or actually to both?

I would argue they do especially in the ME and Africa.

I would also argue that since both the Russians and Chinese view especially the US in the same light and with the same distrust they will in effect be nudged by world politics to work together which is why the initial gas deal between them is so important---it is about image/politics, and not about economics.

I would though take it a step further and say Russia is also interested in neutralizing both the EU/NATO for different reasons that are not the same as with the US.


What are the implications of this? Are we going to see a new type of confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR (oops I mean Russia), where Russia is engages states and the US engages populaces? Obviously the Russians desire to limit and even turn back the scale of U.S. influence globally, as does China. Will they form a coalition? Should the U.S. defense strategy change based on this?[/QUOTE]

[davidbfpo]

A short FT article, the full edition is behind a registration "wall", that appears on a NATO website and starts with:

In more than a dozen interviews, planners, security officials and members of the intelligence community have spoken of Moscow with universal, if grudging, praise.

Tactically, they say, Russia has waged a dexterous and comprehensive campaign, and has been one step ahead at every turn. The Kremlin's operations on the ground have been "masterly", said one.

Rightly the author ends with:

With that in mind, it is ironic that for all of its accusations against Russia, it is Nato that is looking like it is stuck in the Iron Curtain era, as it tries to fly more planes, exercise more troops and sail more ships ever closer to Russia.

Link:http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...1s4skM.twitter

[kaur]

davidbfpo used word "masterly". I'd like to ask if this Crimea operation was easy to accomplish in military terms or was it hard? If you have located there your Black Sea Fleet since late 18th century. You had troops, GRU, military CI (KGB/FSB) present all the time. You knew a lot about Ukrainian officers, lot of them retired from Soviet fleet and joined Ukrainian. Crimea was favourite place to go retirement among Soviet officers, which means that best cadre (with Soviet nostalgia) was present. This means at least that you have quite nice overview what was going on there. Those smart and active young military pensioners are still capable to play the game. Then you bring in suitcases with cash to right people (like that Aksjonov guy, who got 4% votes with his party during last elections in Crimea), support with small group of special forces, bring in some thousand to close possible bridgeheads etc, etc, etc. Could it be "masterly" operation to occupy Guantanamo?

[OUTLAW 09]

Bill M---based on your questions that is something that is often overlooked in all of this.

We will be voting for a new President in 2016, Putin will easily get reelected and he is then in power until 2024.

So what would a US Russian strategy look like under this WH and would it then be carried forward in a solid fashion or would Putin rightly assume it would not be and he could then force the US into a new strategy to his liking.

Secondly ---any US strategy on Russia must be multifaceted as the current Russian foreign policy is developed and implemented by playing the four legs of a stool approach.

There are four key players in the Russian FP game that we somehow tend to ignore; 1) Russian military and their industrial complexes, 2) the Russian security services, 3) the oligarchs, and 4) Russian criminal gangs ie Russian mafia.

Layered over this is then the Russian Orthodox church.

Russian foreign policy and doctrine can be modified in any way using any combination of these players---we the US have our own players but we cannot seem to develop the adaptiveness that Putin has been showing in recent months.