Bill,
I have long been of the opinion that there are no absolute right or wrong answers. We run the risk of loosing our way trying to find those absolutes, or trying to defend them as such,[
As for ISIS in Libya, the problem is significant not only as it relates to Derna, but the entire span of terrain running from Algeria, through the Nile Delta, across the Suez and Gulf of Aquaba, and over to the intersection of Jordan, Syria and Iraq.
I read portions of three Egyptian online newspapers just about daily, and there is a great concern over the possibility (more like likelihood) of ISIS fusing with militants in the Sinai and in turn squeezing Egypt between malign actors there and in Libya.
Back some 6-7 years ago I used to discount the knuckleheads who claimed allegiance with Al Qaeda, and believe most of them to be localized elements who never even understood what AQ's ideology, method, and endstate was. They merely knew that AQ was a thorn in the side of the US and so they felt it necessary to "be down with AQ", whether it be AQI, AQAP etc.
ISIS is something different. Same level of showmanship, but it has something AQ hasn't been able to produce for at least the past five years--results. I'm am still cautious when I hear the media state that militant forces at "X" location are loyal to ISIS. What defines loyalty? Is it earned? Given freely? IS there a code to follow like the Masons or is it just a matter of assuming the brand name and riding its coat tails? Unless the loyalty brings manpower, weapons, financing and logistical support its just a bumper sticker and not really a big deal. Millions of people around the word subscribe to various ideologies that are inimical to US interests, but we haven't taken to hunting them down to deal with the via kinetics yet. Heck, for many of them we don't bother to think of their dramas at all.
ISIS and the elements of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis have begun this alliance dance in the Sinai, so the issue of ISIS influence is broader than Libya. I don't believe they have the ability to do more at the moment than attack a border outpost or two, and will not be able to grow to any effective size because of the pressure Egypt's security forces are applying, the fact that Egypt is considerably more stable (despite the media sound bytes) than Libya and Sudan combined, and the fact that counterinsurgent effort is about to be applied around the region to a degree not seen before.
That could change with the right spark though.
What we will have, without a doubt, are pretty solid 5-10 years of instability in the region that will require all instruments of national power to deal with. There will be flare-ups fairly regularly, and we are going to have to decide how we want to suppress them. That whole finite resources thing is kinda a big deal.
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