Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[OUTLAW 09]

Wow, my computer gets broken by my baby cousin and when I come back here everything has gone to hell.

Anyway, the days of Nouri al-Maliki's premiership are coming to an end. Maliki attempted to repeat his strategy from 2010 which was to drag out the government formation process and outlast his opponents. This time it backfired as not only did State of Law fracture but even his own Dawa Party did. Those splits allowed for the nomination of Haidar Abadi from Dawa to be the next premier. It's not known what Abadi will be like but it does offer the opportunity for a new start for Iraqi politics which is crucial if it wants to reverse the security situation. Here's my article on the whole affair.

Joel--this whole refugees in the mountains and the defeat of the Peshmerga is being from what I understand driven by no more than 350 IS fighters with light trucks? Their field maneuver ie swarming and the use of mortars as artillery coupled with very good snipers is an interesting tactical development not previously seen in Iraq from 2003-2010.

Secondly---IS had moved a large number of their personnel into the south of Baghdad and east/west of Baghdad---then silence.

Why the quiet?---actually it is too quiet as everyone is looking north but IS is sitting quietly around Baghdad and strengthening weekly.

Was the dam security control recovered by the ISF as of yet or still in IS control?

[davidbfpo]

Two different viewpoints from London. One by a Kings War Studies academic, who also lectures to Qatar's military, so may have extra value; entitled 'How to best externalize the R2P in Iraq?':http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2014/08/how...e-r2p-in-iraq/

Personally I think his option for regaining support from disaffected Sunni tribes is long past. Nor are regional 'powers' that willing to commit.

As the UK sends Tornado recce aircraft, Chinooks and Hercules transports, all ostensibly for humanitarian purposes Shashank Joshi, from RUSI, examines 'British Options in Iraq: Capabilities, Strategies, and Risks':https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commen.../#.U-t10aORcdW

His sub-title is:

Pressure is building for the government to recall parliament over the crisis in Iraq and consider intervening alongside US forces. But what are the options for Britain, and what risks do they carry?

I am not sure where this pressure is coming from - beyond Whitehall. Given this government's stance on supporting the USA, it is likely to be Washington that is applying pressure.

In anticipation of these choices, we should therefore ask – of ourselves, and of ministers – what is Britain’s strategy in any intervention? A non-exhaustive list would include:

1. One-off degradation of ISIS’ offensive capabilities;
2. One-off humanitarian relief;
3. Indirect support to Kurdish forces;
4. Indirect support to Iraqi government forces;
5. A longer mission to contain ISIS, until those local forces gain strength;
6. A direct and sustained aerial campaign to destroy ISIS – or even more broadly, 'the defeat of jihadism';
7. Some combination thereof.

[davidbfpo]

To look for the "root cause" of Isis is to miss the point. The group represents all the subterranean barbarism that every so often is apt to crawl, blinking into the light, out from the depths of the human subconscious.

Certainly an interesting POV and a reminder that ISIS is not new, nor just an extreme form of Islam IMHO:http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/...h-9664506.html

[KingJaja]

Davidbfpo,

Please what is the West's strategy for Iraq/Syria? It clear what Russia and Iran hope to accomplish & who they've pitched their tents with, but the West is all over the place - appeasing Saudi Arabia, Turkey & Qatar while trying to keep Iraq together - then there's the strategic funk in Syria.

Other than preventing the rise of terrorism (which you cannot do without taking a side in the Iraqi/Syria conflict - which the West doesn't want to do), what does the West hope to do, what are its interests?

[AmericanPride]

KJ -

According to a speech by President Obama in 2013, the core U.S. interests in the ME are:

o “We will ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world."

o “We will dismantle terrorist networks that threaten our people."

o "we reject the development of nuclear weapons that could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime"

Secondary interests:

o "we will build the capacity of our partners"

o "respect the sovereignty of nations"

o "work to address the root causes of terror"

In practice, there are many contradictions in U.S. policy in the region as you mentioned. I think one of the major concerns of the Obama administration is becoming roped into another commitment (or the perception of commitment to Iraq). Yes - this is a new phase of the conflict, but the American public does not have a nuanced understanding of the situation; combined with the approaching mid-term election after what continues to be many years of highly bitter partisan politics, there's a heightened sensitive towards these problems.

[Bill Moore]

Certainly an interesting POV and a reminder that ISIS is not new, nor just an extreme form of Islam IMHO:http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/...h-9664506.html

From the enclose article David kindly posted

despite the SS repeatedly reaffirming at its death camps that "here there is no why", for much of the left there was always a "why".

This underscores much of the debate in SWJ circles. We have those who believe the reason is failed government, economics, etc. Root causes that we can somehow address, and then the world will be all rainbows and unicorns again.

We have others, closer to my school of thought, that often there are no root causes that we can address. We waste our time and money with our various development programs when they're directed to weaken AQ and other extremists.

The left hates to hear this, but sometimes it really does come down to killing those who are trying to kill you. Alternative approaches against sadistic killers have failed us repeatedly. To those who say we can't shoot our way out of this, I offer that the collective we can and we must. BUT, and this is an important but, we must do so in a discriminate manner, and in a way that doesn't mobilize the neutrals to turn against us. The extremists are a greater threat to the majority of Muslims than they are to us, so calls to go war with Islam are frankly unethical and misguided. However, aggressively pursuing and eliminating ISIS is a necessity if value our security and way of life. In Iraq they have formed an Army, if they choose to fight us semi-symmetrically they will make our work that much easier.

These thoughts are directed towards AQ, those who embraced Al-Qaedaism, and their associates and affiliates. Those the author would call fascists. The above is not an approach to deal with insurgents that have valid political issues they're trying to fix.

But let us be clear: the "root cause" of fascism (and what Isis is practicing us clerical fascism) is an absolute rejection of a plural and democratic society. It is our existence, rather than the subtleties of how we behave, that is intolerable to Isis, hence current attempts to exterminate "un-Islamic" religious minorities in Iraq – a genocide-in the making thankfully being thwarted by the United States.

[KingJaja]

From the enclose article David kindly posted



This underscores much of the debate in SWJ circles. We have those who believe the reason is failed government, economics, etc. Root causes that we can somehow address, and then the world will be all rainbows and unicorns again.

We have others, closer to my school of thought, that often there are no root causes that we can address. We waste our time and money with our various development programs when they're directed to weaken AQ and other extremists.

In Nigeria, where I come from, Western analysts are all over the place about Boko Haram & how poverty and alienation are its root causes - but when you ask them about local Christians who are even poorer and more alienated (because the power structures the British left behind empowered the Muslims in Northern Nigeria) - they are blank.

I suspect Iraqi Christians and Yazidis would feel the same way as African Christians about the way the Western academic elite has chosen to explain away violent Islamism.

In the Middle East, the West can comfortably ignore religious minorities as they aren't likely ever have any political power (all US presidents do so; whether Republican or Democrat). In Africa, the Christians aren't likely to be politically insignificant, but as far as the West is concerned, Africa is a strategic backwater.

So the liberal narrative of Islamist terrorism is likely to persist - as these movements will never be an existential threat to the West like Hitler & Nazis.

[JWing]

Outlaw

Totally forgot IS did launch an operation in Diyala and captured Jalawla from the Pesh. They are launching counter attacks to try to re-take it.

Should also be mentioned that Syrian Turkish and Iranian Kurdish militias are all now involved or were in the fighting in Ninewa.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw

Totally forgot IS did launch an operation in Diyala and captured Jalawla from the Pesh. They are launching counter attacks to try to re-take it.

Should also be mentioned that Syrian Turkish and Iranian Kurdish militias are all now involved or were in the fighting in Ninewa.

Joel---had seen that---the Pesh lost 170 KIA and over 500 WIA--Jalawla is an interesting Pesh lost as they controlled this through out the entire US period in Iraq and drove out virtually all Sunni opposition during that period.

PKK is having from what I am hearing an equally tough time of it but on the whole are fighting equally well as IS is--that is an interesting development as it indicates they learned a lot in their Turkish Army fighting days and their internal fights with other Kurdish groups.

Since the Syrain Kurds have entered the fight ---just wondering when IS will apply pressure on the Syrian Kurdish front to relieve the pressure in Iraq.

[JMA]

In Nigeria, where I come from, Western analysts are all over the place about Boko Haram & how poverty and alienation are its root causes - but when you ask them about local Christians who are even poorer and more alienated (because the power structures the British left behind empowered the Muslims in Northern Nigeria) - they are blank.

Good you raise this. Prevalent in the NGO community are the preconceived ideas expats arrive in Africa with. They then go on to screw things up further as they control how and where the money is spent. Many NGOs - certainly the Brit ones - have a far left ideology and use their projects to push their agenda rather than empower the people in the areas they work. It is also true that some of the NGO workers are smart enough to see where they are going wrong but are powerless and are swept along by the ideological aims of their organisation. Most don't care as they live a lifestyle they could not dream of back at home and just go with the flow.

In the military it is much the same, as at a point officers commit to a career and subordinate their intellect to doing what they are told regardless of how ridiculous it may be. In the US this was seen in Vietnam and now again in Afghanistan. A military - with its weapons - operating off-track causes more devastation than all the misguided NGOs together.

I certainly don't forgive the NGOs or foreign militaries that have contributed to screwing Africa up to the extent it is... but the world hears no solutions coming out of Africa itself. Even yourself... much criticism but no solutions offered.

All we get coming out of the recent African leaders summit is this crap:

African leaders vote to give themselves immunity from war crimes prosecutions

This group includes the Arab states in North Africa and together make "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves" look like choir boys.

[JWing]

1st week of August turned out to be the deadliest week in Iraq of 2014. Over 1800 casualties. Insurgents launched offensives in Sinjar west of Mosul and in Qaraqosh area to the east in Ninewa, took Jalawla in eastern Diyala as well. Both situations were only stabilized with the arrival of Kurdish forces from Syria, Turkey and Iran. If not for them the peshmerga might have broken like the ISF did before. Insurgents also laid siege to Haditha, Anbar in attempt to take dam there. In Baghdad IS launched latest car bomb wave as militias continued to kidnap, kill and dump bodies of their victims. Babil ISF launched 10th sec op of the year to clear northern section and will probably fail again. Week showed that two months after the fall of Mosul militants still hold the initiative and are choosing the time and place for engagements in Iraq. Baghdad and Irbil completely on the defensive. Here's a link to my article with extensive charts and figures.

[AmericanPride]

This underscores much of the debate in SWJ circles. We have those who believe the reason is failed government, economics, etc. Root causes that we can somehow address, and then the world will be all rainbows and unicorns again.

I'm in this school of thought. But I also believe this:

sometimes it really does come down to killing those who are trying to kill you.

There are definitely problems beyond our capabilities (whether in type, scope, or scale) to solve. And frankly, violence is a legitimate tool of state policy, even within the measured and sometimes narrow parameters we have established for ourselves in the West. I do not look favorably upon the last Iraq war, but I think it's important from a strategy perspective to recognize that situations are dynamic and the status quo is always changing. It may not be politically appealing to re-commit to Iraq's internal security but that does not mean it has not become necessary given current conditions.

This is one of the legacies of the War on Terrorism, and it's not something that can be ignored.

[JWing]

Outlaw

Haven't seen any numbers on how many insurgent forces were deployed in Sinjar but would not be surprised if it was just a few hundred. They have not been using more than that in any of their other ops of this size.

There are still on going ops in northern Babil which continue to fail. The 9th sec op of this year was started in Jurf al-Sakhr in mid-July. 1 day after it was finished and everyone claimed success Babil prov council official said IS had moved right back in. Around 3 days later the 10th sec op started, which is still on-going. Fighting in Diyala is actually pretty low level.

With all the press getting caught up on the attacks upon Sinjar & the Yazidis the insurgents main thrust was actually in Salahaddin which had the most casualties in the first week of August.

Finally Mosul Dam which was under Pesh protection is still under IS control. Was a report that it has asked the workers there to continue with their work and that they'll be paid. Even brought in some engineers from Syria to help!

[JWing]

Bill

I think of the Surge strategy of those you can reconcile with and those that you can't. IS is one of the latter and you have to kill them. At the same time there are plenty of Sunnis and some insurgent groups that you can turn and those are the ones that you need to reach out to with political reconciliation, development projects, etc. That can also hopefully turn away more people from joining IS. I don't think it's an either or.

[JWing]

Here's a link to my latest article on the origins of the ethnosectarian quota system in Iraq. The country is going through a political as well as a security crisis right now. A new candidate for premier has been named Haider Abadi from Dawa/State of Law and many are wondering how much different or the same he will be from Maliki. That ignores the large structural barriers that the Iraqi govt faces one of which is the ethnosectarian quotas which divide up the govt not by competence but by loyalty to parties. Many blame the U.S. and specifically the CPA for creating these quotas, but their origins are actually with the anti-Saddam opposition movement in the 1990s that created this system.

[KingJaja]

Here's a link to my latest article on the origins of the ethnosectarian quota system in Iraq. The country is going through a political as well as a security crisis right now. A new candidate for premier has been named Haider Abadi from Dawa/State of Law and many are wondering how much different or the same he will be from Maliki. That ignores the large structural barriers that the Iraqi govt faces one of which is the ethnosectarian quotas which divide up the govt not by competence but by loyalty to parties. Many blame the U.S. and specifically the CPA for creating these quotas, but their origins are actually with the anti-Saddam opposition movement in the 1990s that created this system.

Thank you very much for your wonderful article, but if you overlay ancient societies with a very recent artificial state - this is what you get, no "ifs", no "buts".

A nation is like a family, you cannot just group random people, insist they adopt a common flag & anthem - and then expect them to behave like a nation. That is the problem with a lot of the "nations" that were created post WW2 (after the fall of European empires).

Iraq's fundamental problem is this; it is not a nation. Saddam could have held it together by extreme violence (or another dictator could), but absent that, there was never going to be a basis for nationhood. Shias were smarting under decades of oppression by Sunnis and Sunnis weren't going to take lightly to their diminished status. Kurds had a long-term project - and it wasn't Iraq, it was an independent Kurdish state.

This kind of ethno-sectarianism isn't limited to the Middle-east - it is one of Africa's primary problems - a consequence of poorly thought out "states". You'll see how Boko Haram (and other Sahelian terror groups) bring out the same ethno-sectarian tensions you noticed in Iraq to the open - keep tuned.

Let me add that the great advantage the Far East had over Africa and the Middle East is this - colonial borders coincided more or less with ancient/related societies - there was a historical continuum, not a "disjunction" - not the kind of "cut and join" states one sees in the Middle East/Africa - for example; the Vietnamese had a strong identity, the French didn't create a "Vietnamese identity".

[Bill Moore]

Bill

I think of the Surge strategy of those you can reconcile with and those that you can't. IS is one of the latter and you have to kill them. At the same time there are plenty of Sunnis and some insurgent groups that you can turn and those are the ones that you need to reach out to with political reconciliation, development projects, etc. That can also hopefully turn away more people from joining IS. I don't think it's an either or.

Of course it is, but we fail to pursue killing IS with an adequate level of aggression due to the points KingJaja brings up. Maybe more appropriately borrowing a phrase from a friend of mine, it is "strategic miscalculation" on our part.

Begin with the end in mind, that is a condition we want after we destroy IS, and that requires political engagement before, during, and after the fight. However, it doesn't mean sidelining the fighting effort and making it secondary to economic development when the adversary hasn't been defeated, which has been our default position.

The liberals and neocons have beautiful theories, but theories that tend to fall apart rapidly when they confront reality.

[davidbfpo]

Well The Guardian is now reporting "boots on the ground" on Mount Sinjar, for humanitarian purposes, both US & UK SOF:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...e-yazidis-iraq

I knew Sinjar refered to seized AQ Iraq records, not this - which explains some of the recent aerial activity:

The US ran a military and intelligence base on a now disused airfield at the top of Mount Sinjar for much of the Iraq war and the terrain of the rugged 45 mile ridgeline is well known to special operations units.