Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[JWing]

Just published my new security report for second week of Nov. 2014 in Iraq. Attacks were at the lowest of any week of the year but casualties were unchanged. In Anbar IS continued executions of Albu Nimr tribe while tribes & ISF were preparing for big operation there. In Diyala ISF freed another irrigation system from IS. Biggest news was ISF entering Baiji district in northern Salahaddin in effort to free refinery there and cut off Tikrit. Overall, ISF was making advances during the week against the insurgency. Here's a link.

[jcustis]

If modern COIN concepts seem to hold very little power as a model for action at the moment--or at least rely so heavily on the right mix of balanced strategic objectives and achievable policy goals that it is proving very hard to formulate an effective and sustainable response to ISIS--I'm wondering if Wilf's old prescription for "killing one's way to control" should come to the fore.

This is partially rhetorical, but I've been thinking about it a lot lately

[Bill Moore]

We can't solve their underlying problems, they have to do that. Development has done little to decrease the level of conflict in the majority of conflict zones where development was implemented as a line of effort. Capacity building only works if those we're training have the will to fight (they believe in what they're fighting for). If we believe ISIL is a real threat to our national interests, then killing on a larger scale would seem appropriate. Historically higher levels of violence have worked for non-Western countries in many cases. I don't dismiss an enduring political solution, but I do question our ability to facilitate or impose one, so again if it is in our national interest to degrade ISIL as a threat to our interests, killing them on a larger scale than they can recover from would seem appropriate. We may be able to shape what comes next, we won't be able to control it.

[Bob's World]

It seems to me that in the post WWII era, with a noted escalation in the post Cold War era, we fight far more often for national emotion than for national interest .

Fear, pride, anger, ego, false duty, etc. It rarely ends well when we confuse emotion for interest. To make matters worse we have even morphed our national security strategy in this same era to codify an emotion-based approach to interests.

We need a return to the practical pragmatism we practiced more as a rising nation. We've lways been driven by emotion, be it our decision to fight the Barbary pirates while everyone else paid tribute, or the constant string of "remember the xxxxx" battle cry's that work so well to motivate Americans to war - but it has gotten worse in this era of self-determination, shifting balances of power and our own strategic confusion over all of the above.

Clint Eastwood once said the best acting advice he ever received was "Don't just do something, stand there. Gary Cooper was never afraid to do nothing."

Our foreign policy is not Eastwoodesque or Cooperesque in any way. Certainly not Wayneesque, and in no way George Washingtonesque. We need to just stand there and think about that.

[JWing]

Just wrote a piece on the insurgent networks in Iraq. Many initially thought it was the Baathists and then the Islamists that were the backbone of the insurgency. Neither was quite true. Iraqi Sunnis used multiple identities and experiences from their history to organize the insurgency. An example could be a cleric that came from a traditional religious family, was a former Baathist, had a relative in Iraqi intelligence, and came from an important tribe. All of those connections would be used to organize and recruit for the insurgency. Explains how you have so many former Baathists who were supposed to be seculr within IS's leadership today. Read more here.

[OUTLAW 09]

It seems to me that in the post WWII era, with a noted escalation in the post Cold War era, we fight far more often for national emotion than for national interest .

Fear, pride, anger, ego, false duty, etc. It rarely ends well when we confuse emotion for interest. To make matters worse we have even morphed our national security strategy in this same era to codify an emotion-based approach to interests.

We need a return to the practical pragmatism we practiced more as a rising nation. We've lways been driven by emotion, be it our decision to fight the Barbary pirates while everyone else paid tribute, or the constant string of "remember the xxxxx" battle cry's that work so well to motivate Americans to war - but it has gotten worse in this era of self-determination, shifting balances of power and our own strategic confusion over all of the above.

Clint Eastwood once said the best acting advice he ever received was "Don't just do something, stand there. Gary Cooper was never afraid to do nothing."

Our foreign policy is not Eastwoodesque or Cooperesque in any way. Certainly not Wayneesque, and in no way George Washingtonesque. We need to just stand there and think about that.

Wonder why we are so involved in countering the IS when it does not threaten any waters towers anywhere inside the US.

"More people with American citizenship have been killed by Palestinian terrorists in the lst year than have been killed by ISIS"

[ganulv]

"More people with American citizenship have been killed by Palestinian terrorists in the lst year than have been killed by ISIS"

I know you’re trolling, but I can’t resist. Do you have any statistics on how many Palestinians have been killed by holders of American citizenship in the last year? Because I would be curious as to the ratio.

[davidbfpo]

Ganulv,

I don't want to pre-empt Outlaw 09, but the BBC reported after today's attack in Jerusalem that three victims were Americans:

The victims were Rabbi Moshe Twersky, 59, head of the seminary, Arieh Kupinsky, 43, and Kalman Levine, 55, all of whom also held US passports. The fourth victim, Avraham Goldberg, 68, is also a UK citizen.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30092720

[OUTLAW 09]

I know you’re trolling, but I can’t resist. Do you have any statistics on how many Palestinians have been killed by holders of American citizenship in the last year? Because I would be curious as to the ratio.

Excluding the Iraq war as IS was then AQI and not in it's current configuration-----I would go back even further and state more American passport holders have been killed by the PLO and it's various affiliates from the Black Sept 1970 event onwards than IS has killed since it has become the IS.

Why question has been since the Ukraine--why are we then if US citizens are not directly being threatened by the IS why are we so over bearing in our military response when in fact Putin has threatened the entire US in ways not even seen during the Cold War?

[Bill Moore]

It seems to me that in the post WWII era, with a noted escalation in the post Cold War era, we fight far more often for national emotion than for national interest .

Fear, pride, anger, ego, false duty, etc. It rarely ends well when we confuse emotion for interest. To make matters worse we have even morphed our national security strategy in this same era to codify an emotion-based approach to interests.

We need a return to the practical pragmatism we practiced more as a rising nation. We've lways been driven by emotion, be it our decision to fight the Barbary pirates while everyone else paid tribute, or the constant string of "remember the xxxxx" battle cry's that work so well to motivate Americans to war - but it has gotten worse in this era of self-determination, shifting balances of power and our own strategic confusion over all of the above.

Clint Eastwood once said the best acting advice he ever received was "Don't just do something, stand there. Gary Cooper was never afraid to do nothing."

Our foreign policy is not Eastwoodesque or Cooperesque in any way. Certainly not Wayneesque, and in no way George Washingtonesque. We need to just stand there and think about that.

What I find interesting during debates is I can make a seemingly rational argument for multiple options. Take ISIL for example, I can make a rational argument on why we should engage and why we should ignore it. I can throw emotion into either argument to motivate the bulk of the people who are motivated by emotion (emotion equates to motivation, which is why those promoting change, action, etc. play to emotion).

The point is, I wonder if that reflects strategic confusion, or simply a reflection of strategic reality where there are no absolute right or wrong answers, only educated and non-educated opinions. We have four enduring national interests, and you can logically argue we should be involved in most conflicts by making links to them. Ultimately we need to accept that democracy is messy, and emotion is part and parcel of the package. Acting on emotion can result in stupid decisions, but failing to act on emotion in other cases (for example, preventing mass atrocities) can be devalue what we claim to stand for as a nation. I think our national identity is in our national interests, but understandably many disagree.

Enduring interests (regardless of political party in power)

1. Protect the U.S. and U.S. persons. (security)

2. Economic interests (prosperity)

3. International order that promotes our interests

4. Values (human rights, democracy, etc.)

[Bill Moore]

Once again the saying that all politics are local proves to fall short. For those that think ISIL is a local movement, they have now expanded to Libya. Foreign fighters returning home to select locations can clearly be a threat to one's national security.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/world/...html?hpt=hp_t2

ISIS comes to Libya

Fighters loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria are now in complete control of the city of Derna, population of about 100,000, not far from the Egyptian border and just about 200 miles from the southern shores of the European Union.

The fighters are taking advantage of political chaos to rapidly expand their presence westwards along the coast, Libyan sources tell CNN.

[jcustis]

Bill,

I have long been of the opinion that there are no absolute right or wrong answers. We run the risk of loosing our way trying to find those absolutes, or trying to defend them as such,[

As for ISIS in Libya, the problem is significant not only as it relates to Derna, but the entire span of terrain running from Algeria, through the Nile Delta, across the Suez and Gulf of Aquaba, and over to the intersection of Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

I read portions of three Egyptian online newspapers just about daily, and there is a great concern over the possibility (more like likelihood) of ISIS fusing with militants in the Sinai and in turn squeezing Egypt between malign actors there and in Libya.

Back some 6-7 years ago I used to discount the knuckleheads who claimed allegiance with Al Qaeda, and believe most of them to be localized elements who never even understood what AQ's ideology, method, and endstate was. They merely knew that AQ was a thorn in the side of the US and so they felt it necessary to "be down with AQ", whether it be AQI, AQAP etc.

ISIS is something different. Same level of showmanship, but it has something AQ hasn't been able to produce for at least the past five years--results. I'm am still cautious when I hear the media state that militant forces at "X" location are loyal to ISIS. What defines loyalty? Is it earned? Given freely? IS there a code to follow like the Masons or is it just a matter of assuming the brand name and riding its coat tails? Unless the loyalty brings manpower, weapons, financing and logistical support its just a bumper sticker and not really a big deal. Millions of people around the word subscribe to various ideologies that are inimical to US interests, but we haven't taken to hunting them down to deal with the via kinetics yet. Heck, for many of them we don't bother to think of their dramas at all.

ISIS and the elements of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis have begun this alliance dance in the Sinai, so the issue of ISIS influence is broader than Libya. I don't believe they have the ability to do more at the moment than attack a border outpost or two, and will not be able to grow to any effective size because of the pressure Egypt's security forces are applying, the fact that Egypt is considerably more stable (despite the media sound bytes) than Libya and Sudan combined, and the fact that counterinsurgent effort is about to be applied around the region to a degree not seen before.

That could change with the right spark though.

What we will have, without a doubt, are pretty solid 5-10 years of instability in the region that will require all instruments of national power to deal with. There will be flare-ups fairly regularly, and we are going to have to decide how we want to suppress them. That whole finite resources thing is kinda a big deal.

[Bob's World]

What I find interesting during debates is I can make a seemingly rational argument for multiple options. Take ISIL for example, I can make a rational argument on why we should engage and why we should ignore it. I can throw emotion into either argument to motivate the bulk of the people who are motivated by emotion (emotion equates to motivation, which is why those promoting change, action, etc. play to emotion).

The point is, I wonder if that reflects strategic confusion, or simply a reflection of strategic reality where there are no absolute right or wrong answers, only educated and non-educated opinions. We have four enduring national interests, and you can logically argue we should be involved in most conflicts by making links to them. Ultimately we need to accept that democracy is messy, and emotion is part and parcel of the package. Acting on emotion can result in stupid decisions, but failing to act on emotion in other cases (for example, preventing mass atrocities) can be devalue what we claim to stand for as a nation. I think our national identity is in our national interests, but understandably many disagree.

Enduring interests (regardless of political party in power)

1. Protect the U.S. and U.S. persons. (security)

2. Economic interests (prosperity)

3. International order that promotes our interests

4. Values (human rights, democracy, etc.)

The list Bill has provided above goes to my point. Not only does the NSS list these as our vital interests, it declares them to be "enduring." Certainly these things are important, the list has become so broad and vague as to strip it of much value, and worse, to validate virtually any situation, any place, any time as being "in our interests" to employ military power to shape in some way. T\

The result of everything being validated as being in our interest, is that we ultimately make decisions to act more often than not based on emotion.

One of the better works on interests was the Harvard study published in 1996.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/..._interests.pdf

The timing of that study is critical. We were well into an era of post-Cold War floundering, but were not yet into a period of post-9/11 floundering. The sense was that we had lost our focus as a nation on what was truly important, so this very qualified team took on the task of identifying what a proper focus should be.

Not only did the commission focus on what was important, they then prioritized those interests into four levels of importance. Many on this site have probably seen this document at some point, but given the list Bill provided above, it is worth showing the truly vital interests developed by this this commission:

U.S. vital national interests are to:
1) Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) weapons attacks on the United States.
2) Prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia.
3) Prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in
control of the seas.
4) Prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems: trade, financial
markets, supplies of energy, and environmental.
5) Ensure the survival of U.S. allies.


This provides a pragmatic focus sorely lacking in the much more ideological and emotional list of today. One can see they are similar, but that they are different in very important ways. Protecting US persons in the US and preserving the right of the US to continue to have the form of government and values for ourselves that we desire is crucial. Protecting every American everywhere and promoting American positions on values and governance for others is not.

Ensuring survival of critical allies is vital, working to shape the governance of those allies through UW or COIN is to put our desires between the those of the populations and governments of those countries and probably none of our business. If we would not intervene in their legal politics, we should not intervene in their illegal politics. Illegal politics usually occur when no effective legal means exist. In other words, they serve a critical purpose, one that is clearly recognized in our own declaration of independence.

Equally important, not everyone we partner with is an ally. We cast far too broad of a net of responsibility when we promise to protect too much. It simply isn't in our interest.

[Bob's World]

North Africa is going through another political revolution, and that will take time to sort out. It won't be settled until the extremists are purged.

I respect the hell out of Bill Moore, and we see many things in very similar ways, but this quote above highlights a fundamental difference in perspective. Our policies of the past several years are more in line with how Bill sees this as stated above, I, on the other hand do not believe that "extremists" cause political revolution, rather that political revolution is caused by certain conditions of governance coupled with the denial of adequate legal means for the aggrieved population to express and address their concerns legally.

There will always be those who take extreme positions far outside the mainstream of the societies they live within, and even when effective legal means exist, these small minorities will at times act out in extreme ways. But that is not what we are dealing with in Africa and the greater Middle East.

We would be far better served by a policy that focuses on helping to solve governance issues rather than to defeat extremism. And by help solve, I mean as much more of a mediator than an arbitrator, and being willing to step back entirely when we have done what we can within the realm of what is perceived as appropriate by those affected and simply let them sort it out. Governments of allies like Saudi Arabia or Turkey might fall to internal illegal politics, as occurred in Egypt. But Insurgency does not destroy a nation, it simply puts it under new management. We should not manipulate legal changes of government to suit what we think is best for us, nor should we manipulate illegal changes of government. We are better served assuming a bit of risk in that change, and being more open to working with new leadership as it emerges.

There are a lot of systems out there that are completely out of balance and in dire need of change. Our very efforts to protect the status quo of those systems is what is empowering extremists to emerge as the leaders of change. We have surrendered the high ground to the lowlifes. That wasn't very smart. How can we be de oppresso liber when we are more often dedicated to the preservation of the oppressor? That bothers me.