Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09 View Post
Even now the Iraqi Army has been unable to retake Fulluja after four weeks of heavy street to street fighting.

Actually the Iraqi Army does not like MOUT fighting and shy away from it and ISIS knows it.
In all honesty, no armed force like MOUT, well training or not. MOUT requires slow and methodological advances, and more importantly, inflict disproportionally heavier casualties on the attackers.

Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09 View Post
The second serious mistake and this goes to the US COIN problem---no one instilled pride of Iraq, the Iraqi flag, and military service into the Iraqi Force---the old term of nationalism does wonders for a Army under attack---but with the army being just an employment agency where was that to come from? IE look at say the current Ukrainian National Guard with three months of training and limited personal protective equipment that all Iraqi wear as a given--and they are dealing with combat experienced irregulars who have a passion similar to ISIS---they have not run and yes they die but at lest for a cause and keep on joining.

http://news.yahoo.com/humiliation-ro...201712326.html

This article confirms the first article --referencing the failures of Malaki.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...y.html?hpid=z1
It is not just the purely military part of COIN. The policy on the political process following the invasion only deepened division. Who is going to bleed for the flag if he knows that his tribe got cut out of the political pie? Tribal identity in the ME is still strong enough that no amount of US trainers can change.

A big enough shape charge will always kill a tank, even with DU inserts. If those ATGMs are big crew served types, I'm not surprised.