Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[CrowBat]

David, sigh... I can't talk about the source, but consider this 'first hand': more than 300 Kurds were recruited for the Daesh alone in Evin Prison, in Tehran, in 2013.

So, somebody talking about '70'.... that's as silly as declaring majority of Kurds for 'secular'. Vast majority of Kurds are Sunni Moslems (even Wikipedia 'knows' this).

That is: except your source meant, '70 from specific village/minor town', of course.

*************

EDIT: the Austrian Ministry of Interior has published its data on Austrians that joined the Daesh so far.

154 went there, 64 came back, some 20+ are known to have been killed so far.

Anybody there seriously attempting to sell the story there are less Kurds fighting for the Daesh than Austrians...?

[Bill Moore]

There have always been Kurds in al-Qaeda in Iraq, so this shouldn't be a surprise. Of course we prefer the simple answers, Arabs bad, Kurds good. There are Sunni, Shia, and Christian Kurds, and who knows there are probably a few Buddhist converts. In all seriousness though we need to avoid over generalizations.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Crowbat (in part):

more than 300 Kurds were recruited for the Daesh alone in Evin Prison, in Tehran, in 2013.

I am aware that Iran has a Kurdish community, although not one noted to my knowledge for being a violent insurgency. So there are Kurds in the Iranian prison system, whether for criminal or political reasons. IIRC Evin Prison is for political prisoners, Wiki states only a 'wing' is so used:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evin_Prison

So Kurds were covertly recruited in the prison, that I can follow as few prisons have total control - though a political wing can be different (as Israel has shown). I am wary about such a prison allowing 'radical' Islamists to flourish. Those recruited presumably hate the Iranian regime and have cause to wage war upon release - making their way to Iraq / Syria to join Daesh.

[davidbfpo]

A pessimistic analysis from Jane's, on both Sunni and Shia opponents of Daesh:http://www.janes.com/article/45284/s...-islamic-state

Here is one passage:

...neither the Peshmerga nor Shia militias have either the means or legitimacy to assert authority over the substantial swaths of predominantly Sunni territory that the Islamic State currently controls in conjunction with local Sunni insurgents.

In short, the current array of Sunni groups and forces opposed to the Islamic State across Iraq is too weak and too localised, and is lacking in the wider credibility required to constitute an effective fighting force.

[JWing]

The main group affiliated with Al Qaeda pre-2003 in Iraq was Ansar al-Islam which was a Kurdish Islamist group. Zarqawi later set up camp with them and they were folded into his organization. It should be no surprise then that there are still Kurdish Islamists involved in the Islamic State.

[JWing]

In eastern Salahaddin is Tuz Kharmato district. It was abandoned by the ISF in June and parts of it were taken over by the peshmerga but just the KUrdish regions. IS surrounded a Shiite Turkmen town called Amerli there, which was later relieved by a joint ISF, militia & peshmerga force. Afterward the militias set about cleansing the entire district of Sunnis by killing civilians, looting and blowing up and burning their homes. Now militias and Kurds are fighting for control of area which has led to more and more confrontations with minor skirmishes and casualties. Read more here.

[OUTLAW 09]

English translation of the new speech of Islamic State leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi here:
https://ia601403.us.archive.org/21/i...english.pdf%20 … …
pic.twitter.com/pHekh6tGsG

[CrowBat]

David,

Citing Crowbat (in part):

I am aware that Iran has a Kurdish community, although not one noted to my knowledge for being a violent insurgency.

Iran has a large minority of Kurds, and even a province named Kurdistan. One of 'classics' about Iran is that any government in Tehran is in serious trouble only once there is (usually Kurdish-led) demo/protest/unrest/violence in Tabriz - one of areas densely populated by Kurds. That's, just for example, how the affair that ended with downfall of the Shah began. Immediately afterwards, the first major crisis of the then newly-born Islamic Republic of Iran was a major uprising of Kurdish separatists in the same part of Iran. This ended only because of Iraqi invasion of Iran, in September 1980....

And re. 'not one noted...for being a violent insurgency': permit me to remind you of the Kurdish terrorist group named PJAK, which is launching attacks into Iran since years.

Just because Tehran says they're supported by Israel, this shouldn't mean we all ought to 'suddenly forget' about them.

So there are Kurds in the Iranian prison system, whether for criminal or political reasons. IIRC Evin Prison is for political prisoners, Wiki states only a 'wing' is so used:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evin_Prison

So Kurds were covertly recruited in the prison, that I can follow as few prisons have total control - though a political wing can be different (as Israel has shown). I am wary about such a prison allowing 'radical' Islamists to flourish.

...according to not only one source that enjoyed the hospitality of Evin, the guards are scared to death of the crucial figure behind recruiting activity in question. So much so, nobody even knew his name. That character was eventually left to go - together with all of his newly-won followers.

I always say - indeed: I often insist on - 'connect/ing the dots'. Now, couple such reports with those like this one:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Leb...Qaeda in Syria

......Iran is assisting key Al-Qaeda figures to transfer Sunni fighters into Syria, the Obama administration charged Thursday.

The accusation, detailed in new sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury department targeting Iranian terror links, indicates Iranian officials are backing opposing sides in the Syrian civil war.

Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov, described by the Treasury Department as an Iran-based Islamic Jihad Union facilitator who “operates there with the knowledge of Iranian authorities,”...

...and I think everybody should get the picture.

Namely, while not directly related to each other, these two 'reports' are at least circumstantial evidence of Tehran at least ignoring the activities related to, if not outright co-working in, creation of the Daesh.

...and from that standpoint it's on hand that the super-wise pres - meanwhile renowned for completely ignoring every single advice - is all the time working into the hands of Khamenei, Vahid & clique:
Obama Wrote Secret Letter to Iran’s Khamenei About Fighting Islamic State

...Presidential Correspondence With Ayatollah Stresses Shared U.S.-Iranian Interests in Combating Insurgents, Urges Progress on Nuclear Talks
...

Sigh...

[Bill Moore]

Articles that follow show how ISIL is adapting to the air campaign, although if the breaking news today that ISIL leadership convoy was targeted turns out to be correct that may change the game, at least for the near term.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/wo...ref=world&_r=0

ISIS Wave of Might Is Turning Into Ripple

This title is very misleading, but if its purpose was to draw a reader in, it worked on me. What the author points out is that ISIL is adapting to current conditions, which does not mean they are being defeated. In other parts of the article the author does make a good point, if it is accurate, that ISIL has been unable to expand outside Sunni dominated areas.

Across the territories the Islamic State holds, the group has overhauled its operations. Bases and hospitals have been evacuated and moved to civilian homes that are harder to identify and bomb, Iraqi officials said. Fighters who used to cross the desert in convoys now move in small groups or by motorcycle.

Its fighters now move in small groups, making them less vulnerable to air power. And instead of storming into towns with overwhelming force, the group has begun establishing sleeper cells in areas it wants to seize.

“It used to be that a force would come from the outside and attack a city,” Mr. Alhashimi said. “Now the forces rise up from inside the city and make it fall.”

http://america.aljazeera.com/article...ttlefield.html

ISIL brings more than just brutality to the battlefield

But according to a new analysis from the Soufan Group, a New York-based security and intelligence consultancy firm, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) headline-grabbing brutality has obscured the other factors behind its emergence as a formidable challenger to regional powers. Under the guidance of veteran Saddam-era Iraqi commanders, ISIL has morphed from an underground terror cell into a dynamic and well-oiled military force that defies the conventional definition of an insurgent group.

“In Baghdad, it's still a classic terror group. In Fallujah, it's a light infantry unit. It’s whatever it needs to be,” said Patrick Skinner, the lead author of Soufan’s November report, which collated open-source information and analysis from other experts.

Interesting perspective on how complex the fight is from our perspective. The time it takes to develop consensus with our multinational partners gives the adversary the ODAA loop advantage. I doubt that advantage will be decisive in the long run, but it certainly impedes our ability to apply force effectively.

Kobane is just one battle, and waging it has exposed the steep costs involved in simply stopping ISIL from advancing on a single front. It took a herculean effort of diplomatic engineering led by the U.S., coupled with massive protests by Turkish Kurds, to convince a reluctant Ankara merely to allow those reinforcements through its gates. Even with the backing of coalition strikes, all they've managed is a stalemate.

Here is the link to the Soufan Report, which is quite detailed. The authors all seem to have very good credentials. Just skimmed the report so far (66 pages), but initial impression is positive.

http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/up...tate-Nov14.pdf

[ganulv]

In other parts of the article the author does make a good point, if it is accurate, that ISIL has been unable to expand outside Sunni dominated areas.

That’s interesting in light of some of what Joshua Landis was saying in a CNN interview yesterday: http://cnn.it/1Ef74tT

[Bill Moore]

Another we need a political solution speaker that ignores the reality of human passion and hatred. We'll just draw a line on the map, you guys can have this area, and you guys can have that area. This problem will ultimately be solved weapons and force, and unless ISIL is put under significant more pressure than they are now why would they seek a political solution? Unless they the speaker thinks they're happy with the current boundaries of Caliphate? Does he assume Turkey and Iraq will be content with these proposed boundaries? Iran? Seems overly simplistic to me.

[JWing]

Just published my new security report for second week of Nov. 2014 in Iraq. Attacks were at the lowest of any week of the year but casualties were unchanged. In Anbar IS continued executions of Albu Nimr tribe while tribes & ISF were preparing for big operation there. In Diyala ISF freed another irrigation system from IS. Biggest news was ISF entering Baiji district in northern Salahaddin in effort to free refinery there and cut off Tikrit. Overall, ISF was making advances during the week against the insurgency. Here's a link.

[jcustis]

If modern COIN concepts seem to hold very little power as a model for action at the moment--or at least rely so heavily on the right mix of balanced strategic objectives and achievable policy goals that it is proving very hard to formulate an effective and sustainable response to ISIS--I'm wondering if Wilf's old prescription for "killing one's way to control" should come to the fore.

This is partially rhetorical, but I've been thinking about it a lot lately

[Bill Moore]

We can't solve their underlying problems, they have to do that. Development has done little to decrease the level of conflict in the majority of conflict zones where development was implemented as a line of effort. Capacity building only works if those we're training have the will to fight (they believe in what they're fighting for). If we believe ISIL is a real threat to our national interests, then killing on a larger scale would seem appropriate. Historically higher levels of violence have worked for non-Western countries in many cases. I don't dismiss an enduring political solution, but I do question our ability to facilitate or impose one, so again if it is in our national interest to degrade ISIL as a threat to our interests, killing them on a larger scale than they can recover from would seem appropriate. We may be able to shape what comes next, we won't be able to control it.