Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[JWing]

The Pesh are not in Mosul anymore. They are deployed to the east and north of the city. The ISF completely collapsed in Mosul last night and now ISIS is heading back towards Salahaddin province. It is repeating the same strategy that Zarqawi laid out before his death. To take Anbar, then urban centers, surround Baghdad, and then start fighting within the capital itself. Here are a couple reports you might be interested in to explain the current situation in Iraq:

Iraq's deteriorating security situation interview with Alexandre Massimo

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Storm Samarra In Salahaddin

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...ant-storm.html

Beginning of June 2014 Deadliest In Iraq

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...t-in-iraq.html

Islamic State of Iraq Launches Battle of Ninewa In Mosul

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...es-battle.html

[davidbfpo]

Joel,

Thanks I knew you would have been watching events unfold.

Yassin Musharbash is a German SME and has a rapid commentary on what might come next:http://abususu.blogspot.de/2014/06/d...scenarios.html

Various Tweets indicating Black Hawk helicopters possiblty taken; just under 3k prisoners released (terror suspects and ordinary crimianls), US$425m in the banks seized (in local currency), Humvees and no doubt more.

[JWing]

ISIS has quickly moved south after taking Mosul last night. They have taken northern Salahaddin and reached the outskirts of Tikrit. Also taken areas of western Kirkuk. Seems like a total collapse of the ISF. Many reports that few are putting up a fight and are simply fleeing as soon as ISIS shows up. Baghdad in its infinite wisdom said they will hold a special session of parliament Thursday to discuss the crisis! ISIS is also posting lots of pictures of people in Raqqa, Syria celebrating the fall of Mosul. ISIS's ideal of creating a state is becoming a reality stretching from Syria into central Iraq.

[JWing]

ISIS took a major army base and air force base in Mosul and also the Baiji repair/supply depot of the army. Has captured 2 helicopters and hundreds of humvees, trucks, etc. Also just took the Baiji refinery and power station two of the largest in northern Iraq.

[davidbfpo]

[jcustis]

ISIS took a major army base and air force base in Mosul and also the Baiji repair/supply depot of the army. Has captured 2 helicopters and hundreds of humvees, trucks, etc. Also just took the Baiji refinery and power station two of the largest in northern Iraq.

What an absolute sh*t show.

[JWing]

Here's my latest on ISIS advance south from Mosul into Salahaddin and Kirkuk and the collapse of the security forces

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...-uprising.html

[JWing]

ISIS was claiming that it took Baiji refinery and power plant yesterday but now it appears that is contested. The peshmerga has also pushed to the outskirts of Mosul and gotten into some firefights with ISIS.

[OUTLAW 09]

The Pesh are not in Mosul anymore. They are deployed to the east and north of the city. The ISF completely collapsed in Mosul last night and now ISIS is heading back towards Salahaddin province. It is repeating the same strategy that Zarqawi laid out before his death. To take Anbar, then urban centers, surround Baghdad, and then start fighting within the capital itself. Here are a couple reports you might be interested in to explain the current situation in Iraq:

Iraq's deteriorating security situation interview with Alexandre Massimo

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Storm Samarra In Salahaddin

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...ant-storm.html

Beginning of June 2014 Deadliest In Iraq

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...t-in-iraq.html

Islamic State of Iraq Launches Battle of Ninewa In Mosul

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...es-battle.html

I fully agree with these comments---the QRBJ, then the AQI, then the ISIS and actually the first true Iraqi Sunni Salafist grouping the Islamic Army in Iraq which was the largest group before Zarqawi/AQI came in 2004 all followed the same campaign plan and there never has been a second one. The IAI had by the end of 2003 had established major cells in all the major cities and rural areas in the Sunni triangle especially Mosul and Baqubah.

The ISIS stated in mid 2013 their newest campaign plan which had two single points 1) raiding prisons and releasing prisoners to join the fight and 2) taking territory and cities. By the end of 2013 they declared victory in point one and stated they were moving onto point two. During point one ---they attacked five prisons and released over 1400. They freed over 1500 just from the Mosul prison this week as well.
They were so successful at prison breaks and were on the move in Fallujah-- it even forced Malaki to close Abu Ghraib and move the prisoners there something even we were unable to do--shut down Abu G.

After Mosul comes Salahaddin, then Baqubah/Diyala---it is all about the Sunni triangle and then into the Sunni districts of Baghdad. Exact to the 2003 campaign plan which was released for all to see but no one believed it possible.

All captured HMMV 114s have been sent immediately into Syria to be used against the Syrian Army as well as some of the heavier weapon systems they were after---looks like they are rearming themselves with US weapons systems especially anti tank and heavy AAA.

This was taken out of an article in today's The Daily Beast about the loss of Mosul which was a major defeat of a US trained, supplied, and mentored 300K man army.

General Najim al-Jabouri, a former mayor of Tel Afar, which is a little more than 31 miles from Mosul, told The Daily Beast the bases seized by ISIS this week would provide the group with even more heavy weapons than they currently control. “The Iraqi army left helicopters, humvees, cargo planes and other heavy machine guns, along with body armor and uniforms,” the general, who is now a scholar at the National Defense University, said. He said he was able to learn about the equipment from soldiers and other politicians in and around Mosul with whom he keeps in touch.

General Najim is not alone in this assessment. Jack Keane, a retired four-star Army general who was a key adviser to General David Petraeus during the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 known as the surge, said ISIS has now established itself as a formidable military force.

Malaki is in military trouble for the simple reason the two main Shia insurgent groups capable of going toe to toe with the ISIS were all packed up and were sent off by Malaki to support the Syrian Army/Hezbollah and the Iraqi Army while trained in our image never was trained to fight for the "flag" thus the high desertion rates---there were rumors of over 10,000 alone just in the Fulluja campaign.

[OUTLAW 09]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

[OUTLAW 09]

This makes it worse now for Malaki---the Turks are getting involved thus indirectly NATO/US as reported by the Russian Voice of Russia from today.

Militants stormed the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on Wednesday and kidnapped 48 people including the head of the diplomatic mission, a Turkish government official said. "48 Turks including the consul, staff members, guards and three children were abducted," the official told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. "All are doing well," the official said. The kidnappings came a day after the Mosul consulate said fighters from the powerful jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized 28 Turkish truck drivers.

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_0...qs-Mosul-3074/

[OUTLAW 09]

This makes it worse now for Malaki---the Turks are getting involved thus indirectly NATO/US as reported by the Russian Voice of Russia from today.

Militants stormed the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on Wednesday and kidnapped 48 people including the head of the diplomatic mission, a Turkish government official said. "48 Turks including the consul, staff members, guards and three children were abducted," the official told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. "All are doing well," the official said. The kidnappings came a day after the Mosul consulate said fighters from the powerful jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized 28 Turkish truck drivers.

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_0...qs-Mosul-3074/

This appeared today in the German Der Spiegel concerning the Turks being pulled into Iraq--the article alludes to the possibility that this was a payback for Turkey supporting other Islamist groups in Syria.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-974618.html

[carl]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

That's silly. It has been years since we left and years since we had much influence on how the Iraqi gov handled things both politically and militarily. From what I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.

[JWing]

That's silly. It has been years since we left and years since we had much influence on how the Iraqi gov handled things both politically and militarily. From what I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.

As soon as the U.S. withdrew its military the Iraqi security forces reverted to the same kind of strong arm tactics Saddam carried out and the Americans did pre-Surge. That being raiding and then leaving areas, mass arrests, taking families hostage of people on wanted lists, indefinite detention, abuse and torture of prisoners, etc. The positives of U.S. style COIN never sunk in with Iraqis and they went back to what they were used to doing once we departed.

[JWing]

If you want a backgrounder on the Iraqi insurgency, the Islamic State and the other groups, their ideology and where operate please read my interview with Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...interview.html

Also must recommend my interview with Alexandre Massimo again on how the security situation deteriorated after 2011 in Iraq. How the insurgency was able to rebuild itself and how the Iraqi forces became ineffective.

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

[carl]

As soon as the U.S. withdrew its military the Iraqi security forces reverted to the same kind of strong arm tactics Saddam carried out and the Americans did pre-Surge. That being raiding and then leaving areas, mass arrests, taking families hostage of people on wanted lists, indefinite detention, abuse and torture of prisoners, etc. The positives of U.S. style COIN never sunk in with Iraqis and they went back to what they were used to doing once we departed.

Joel:

When I said "...I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.", I should have added that I read it at your site, Musings On Iraq. You do a brilliant job.

[JWing]

Thanks Carl!

It looks like as ISIS is mobilizing and marching towards Baghdad so is Iran. it is sending in advisers, special forces, weapons and money and recruiting throughout central and southern Iraq to form new militia units to fight the insurgency. This is what they did during the previous Iraqi civil war with the Mahdi Army and Special Groups, and what it did on an even larger scale in Syria. Tehran is not going to let a friendly government go do to Sunni Islamists.

[OUTLAW 09]

Joel:

When I said "...I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.", I should have added that I read it at your site, Musings On Iraq. You do a brilliant job.

Carl---here is the reasoning behind my comment and JWing actually indirectly confirms my comments to be accurate.

Where in the entire new and even in the old FM 3-24 is it in bold letters on the first page stated "Beware if the host nation does not follow the intent and goals of COIN to the exact letter the US Army follows it it is doomed to failure".

Basically JWing is admitting that even with all the mentoring, COIN classes for their troops and officers, even being trained in our COIN image and armed as we were--nothing was absorbed as JWing admits.

So looking back --what was exactly wrong and why was that failure not mentioned anywhere in the COIN manuals old and new?

Interesting we as a Force always talk as if COIN was a magic potion that will always succeed-but nowhere in all the COIN chatter and FMs is discussed the possibility that in the end the target population and their governance may just not want COIN to succeed for whatever reasons---or did I miss that discussion and or did I miss that paragraph in the new FM?

Not so silly was my comment after 4.6 KIAs and over thousands wounded not to count the maimed for life.

The comments concerning just why AQI was not eliminated in Mosul is interesting especially after the 2/3ACRs took beatings in calming it down and since JSOC was constantly targeting AQI members in Mosul?

Go back and read all media reporting during and after the surge---those narratives talk about "successes" not failures in driving AQI out --even the JSOC narrative is along the same lines.

So did we start believing our own PR as by 2008 the Force/National Command Authority wanted a way out?

Lastly we are talking a lot about ISIS but the largest by member count Sunni insurgency group was the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) who would often clash with AQI but in the end often worked together with them---they have not/never did "disappear"---they did come out under a new name and were by 2009 undergoing a fairly robust paramilitary training program which if one looks closely maybe the reason for the new effectiveness of the ISIS successes as ISIS has effectively made the transition from a so called "terrorist" group to fighting effectively as a army---almost Mao like.

I have always when in Iraq said to anyone who would listen but actually not many did---whoever trains the Iraq's to fight for a "flag" will be dominant-ISIS is fighting for a "flag" whether we like it or not.

[TheCurmudgeon]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

Iraq was a failure of policy at the executive level. Failed Presidential policy of regime change followed by rapid democratization lead to instability and insurgency. As long as the policy was a democratic Iraq, no amount of doctrine was going to make the impossible possible.

COIN was never the problem.

However, in fairness, it was never going to be the solution either.

[jcustis]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

I quote this not because I agree or disagree with your query, but because it is a good jumping off point for my rambling brain this morning.

I haven't thought long and hard enough to make a judgment on whether COIN failed in Iraq, but I would agree with others' points that the strategic policies and actions set the stage for events which had terrible implications: disbanding the army; fast-tracking CPA schemes under people who had no idea what they were doing; rebuilding an imbalanced ISF.

What is important is that the Taliban are watching the game reel of this, and they are taking notes. Make no mistake that Iraq and Afghanistan are not the same, and the conditions are very different. US actions in the wake of events in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah will very much factor into the calculus Afghans use to look at Dec 31, 2014 and beyond.

Considering the wide capability gaps between the ISF and GIRoA security forces, I would bet a couple paychecks that the ANA and the ridiculous alphabet soup of other paramilitary units (which really just results in a disjointed, non-cohesive force) will certainly fair no better than Mosul's forces if the Taliban mobilize the pickup truck and motorcycle army upon our main body departure.

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.