Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[Bill Moore]

I think it is worth adding that no one is turning towards China, Russia, or any country to provide global leadership, so while our relative power may be decreasing using the conventional measures of military might and economic power, we still are viewed as the global power that other nations and international organizations turn to when there are serious problems that need to be addressed. We still have the power of our ideas, and moral power that is far from perfect, but is still attractive compared to alternatives.

[AmericanPride]

To add to Bill's commentary, U.S. capabilities are still miles ahead of the next competitor. Sure, the U.S. has its structural problems and a strong argument can be made that U.S. power relative to other states is declining, but there still is a long ways to go for other states to become peers. Much of the problem in the U.S. is self-imposed (political dysfunction, financial constraints, etc).

As for Iraq - well, unfortunately Bill is correct that some kind of action is required and that the Obama administration is trapped in the past. It's hard to see any other way to address the problem of ISIS without further commitments to Iraq's security. I see ISIS as the culmination of an escalation cycle of Al Qaeda, starting with the initial pre-9/11 spectacular attacks, and now with a movement that is relatively well-organized and disciplined. This is a problem two decades in the making and it will be some time, and will take more than just airstrikes, to resolve it.

[OUTLAW 09]

To add to Bill's commentary, U.S. capabilities are still miles ahead of the next competitor. Sure, the U.S. has its structural problems and a strong argument can be made that U.S. power relative to other states is declining, but there still is a long ways to go for other states to become peers. Much of the problem in the U.S. is self-imposed (political dysfunction, financial constraints, etc).

As for Iraq - well, unfortunately Bill is correct that some kind of action is required and that the Obama administration is trapped in the past. It's hard to see any other way to address the problem of ISIS without further commitments to Iraq's security. I see ISIS as the culmination of an escalation cycle of Al Qaeda, starting with the initial pre-9/11 spectacular attacks, and now with a movement that is relatively well-organized and disciplined. This is a problem two decades in the making and it will be some time, and will take more than just airstrikes, to resolve it.

The former QJBR then AQI then ISIL and now IS while initially looking towards the AQ mothership during the founding years and Zarqawi having been in AFG ---even Zarqawi was on the outs with UBL/AQ by 2006, and was "disowned" if one takes the time to go back and read all of the edicts/fatwas that flew back and forth between Iraq and Pakistan/AFG during that period.

IS has been "disowned" as well by AQ in 2014, and in fact has become a competitor of the first order and virtually the richest "terrorist" group in the world right now--AQ is nowhere close on the financial side.

It has a far greater recruiting pull that does AQ in general and has received the allegiance oaths to the new Caliphate/al Baghdadi from virtually all of the branch AQ groups.

IS does not need nor will it need in the future to have ties with or be associated with AQ.

IS is a new breed of insurgency, radical Takfiri in nature and aggressive.

It is displaying a remarkable adaptability ---meaning they changed within hours their ground tactics after being bombed, they are in fact using an excellence mission command that the current Army cannot match---actually if one takes the time to read the JCoS's Mission Command article from 2012 one might in fact notice al Baghdadi is copying it to the letter.

Military tactics on the ground---swarming attacks in a fashion not seen in the ME coupled with a complete understanding of maneuver.

One can see the insurgency learning curve experience gained in Iraq coupled with the battlefield experience gained in Syria.

The key though while engaging IS---do not attack Islam as the supposed problem---this is a radical Takfiri ie terrorist group---attack instead the concept of terrorism.

By focusing say on the supposed Islamic side of the problem just creates a better recruiting narrative. Meaning the message to the youth--see the West is attacking Islam thus you must strike back and protect it. This message is pulling extremely well now especially when they can show battlefield successes against the enemies of the IS---meaning anything other than a Takfiri.

Why the hesitation right now might be explained in the simple fact---no one can seem to explain their sudden military tactics, their battlefield successes and what drives them. No one can quite see the interrelationship between IS and the Sunni coalition headed by al Duri and no one can foresee just how/why the Sunni tribes are now an unknown factor.

As an example---the Christians surrounded in the mountains are being circled by no more than 350 fighters in light trucks that are just driving in circles at the base of the mountain range---350 fighters clashed with the Peshmerga and basically defeated the myth that the Psehmerga are the great northern fighters.

Problem is ---it was all there to be seen from 2002 to 2010 and past 2010--we in our hurry to declare a COIN victory did not want to take the time to understand what we were seeing.

Example---why was Baghdadi parked in Bucca which was reserved for Wahhabi's and the more radical types--yet released and never sent to trial by the US or the Iraqi's. I have not seen any info on his arrest, his internment first in Abu Ghraib and then why he was placed in Bucca--anyone sent to Abu G and Bucca even if not guilty of anything attended for a period of time one of the finest insurgency training centers in the ME and the US did nothing to stop it.

Understanding the rise of al Baghdadi is the critical piece-ie he is displaying a serious sign of being a solid religious leader, a solid battlefield tactician/commander, he is a solid group leader, and an astute understander of the West--not Islam- not the IS is the problem---understanding al Baghdadi is the issue.

Thus the hesitancy in the US as they cannot "figure out" al Baghdadi and his end state game.

[KingJaja]

I think it is worth adding that no one is turning towards China, Russia, or any country to provide global leadership, so while our relative power may be decreasing using the conventional measures of military might and economic power, we still are viewed as the global power that other nations and international organizations turn to when there are serious problems that need to be addressed. We still have the power of our ideas, and moral power that is far from perfect, but is still attractive compared to alternatives.

That might be true - but having seen how a combination of Russia & Iran are opportunistically providing leadership in Syria & then Iraq (they lead, then US reluctantly follows their lead), people will increasingly pay more attention to regional powers (in spite of the fact that US will still be the World's dominant power).

Iraqi Christians have figured out that while US was quick to intervene on behalf on Yazidis - it basically ignored when Christians were evicted from Mosul. It was even France who took the lead on offering them asylum.

The US might pride itself on leading the charge against terrorism in the Sahel - but everyone knows France is calling the shots here (strategically) - with US providing important logistics. The Nigerian govt (which has traditionally been skeptical of France has been forced into a closer relationship with Paris).

Too many contradictions have accumulated in US policy over the years - and it will take a very serious politician (not an Obama who is passing time or a Clinton who will say anything to get elected) to take the important first step of drafting a coherent foreign policy.