Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[OUTLAW 09]

I quote this not because I agree or disagree with your query, but because it is a good jumping off point for my rambling brain this morning.

I haven't thought long and hard enough to make a judgment on whether COIN failed in Iraq, but I would agree with others' points that the strategic policies and actions set the stage for events which had terrible implications: disbanding the army; fast-tracking CPA schemes under people who had no idea what they were doing; rebuilding an imbalanced ISF.

What is important is that the Taliban are watching the game reel of this, and they are taking notes. Make no mistake that Iraq and Afghanistan are not the same, and the conditions are very different. US actions in the wake of events in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah will very much factor into the calculus Afghans use to look at Dec 31, 2014 and beyond.

Considering the wide capability gaps between the ISF and GIRoA security forces, I would bet a couple paychecks that the ANA and the ridiculous alphabet soup of other paramilitary units (which really just results in a disjointed, non-cohesive force) will certainly fair no better than Mosul's forces if the Taliban mobilize the pickup truck and motorcycle army upon our main body departure.

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.

The reason for the comment is as follows---if one takes the view that yes the US military implemented as correctly as they could the tenets of COIN in the host country Iraq as per say and we can argue about it all day-- as per the FM.

Robert Jones would argue as I do that the game is really all about the rule of law and good governance and the populations perception of both--not our the US's perception of both.

What the FM does not talk about as many in the senior leadership positions do not want to talk about is yes we can implement COIN approaches, yes we can train host nation forces on the rule of law and good governance until we are blue in the face, we can build schools, hospitals, and military bases and we can arm and supply-but what are we seeing now in Mosul---success or failure of that approach?

But I mentioned this yesterday---the current Iraqi Army is mainly Shia and they are tired of fighting multiple wars since 2003 mentally and physically.

When a army reaches this point if one is not fighting for the flag on the shoulder of his BDUs with full vigor then all is in fact lost. While we might have done a good job on the training, mentoring and equipping side we never did nor could we "instill" the virtues of fighting and dying for your own country because one feels personally invested in that country for a lot of reasons and that was not in the FM. The American military always shy's away from deep discussions with the host nation about the concept of nationalism-that is not in their political DNA.

Actually Iraqi's in the military simply viewed it as a job to earn easy money and not be unemployed as simple as that---had nothing to do with national pride.

That is not in the FM, nor should it be there---that is for the host country governance to instill. So did Malkai attempt to instill it?

Here is where Robert would jump in a say--it is the governance side that should be instilling this desire into the target population.

There was a single moment recently that Malaki had when the entire Iraq stood up and voiced anger at the ISIS to include Sunni's of all shades---when ISIS ambushed a Division Commander and his staff---but what did Malaki do he turned around and raided a Sunni protest camp with the resulting loss of life. ISIS turned that move into a massive social media campaign.

Then we were back off to the races and Malaki has never recovered from that single stupid decision but being a Shia it was in his eyes not a stupid decision---he just never gave a thought to the perception of the Sunni target population.

Now here is a simple question-- would you as a 24 year old Iraqi Shia stationed in Mosul---fight and die for Sunni's in Mosul against AQI/ISIS? Simple answer is no.

Check why the Kurds fight or why ISIS is fighting for their respective "flags".

Then as an opposite view check the current Ukrainian Army and their fight with well armed, and battle tested irregulars out of Russia---they do fight even with less protective equipment than we would even think of doing, they slug it out over and over and take loses but still they have not run and they still fight-and all with really less training than Iraqi's received from us. Another simple question ---why do they do it when they could simply run away from the irregulars?

Would argue they have something to fight for, they had at least for the Ukraine recently really fair elections, they see a way forward through their new governance , the new governance is trying to say the right things, and they have in their minds a common enemy that is trying to destroy their
country and they had the Maidan which was a deep expression of their desires.

Iraq never had a Maidan. The US military "gave" them a Maidan event---the Iraqi's themselves did not have to fight for it.

IMO---the core problem with the new FM is that it was focused on COIN when in fact four weeks after we arrived in Baghdad we were in a Mao defined phase two guerrilla war and what we are now seeing in Mosul is a full fledged Mao defined phase three guerrilla war-COIN is not about guerrilla warfare.

No COIN FM can instill something into a target population unless the host governance is ready to build the necessary bridges into that population--and Malaki as a Shia bent on never doing that.

In the end it is all about perceptions---and it has cost us dearly in blood and treasure for this mistake.