Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[jcustis]

Dunno anymore, but when I was in N. Iraq in 2008-09, it was clear that the Kurds Pesh forces and the Kurdish-heavy Iraq Army echelons were maneuverable, well-armed, and professional compared to other forces in the kettle.

[JWing]

The Pesh are not in Mosul anymore. They are deployed to the east and north of the city. The ISF completely collapsed in Mosul last night and now ISIS is heading back towards Salahaddin province. It is repeating the same strategy that Zarqawi laid out before his death. To take Anbar, then urban centers, surround Baghdad, and then start fighting within the capital itself. Here are a couple reports you might be interested in to explain the current situation in Iraq:

Iraq's deteriorating security situation interview with Alexandre Massimo

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Storm Samarra In Salahaddin

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...ant-storm.html

Beginning of June 2014 Deadliest In Iraq

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...t-in-iraq.html

Islamic State of Iraq Launches Battle of Ninewa In Mosul

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...es-battle.html

[davidbfpo]

Joel,

Thanks I knew you would have been watching events unfold.

Yassin Musharbash is a German SME and has a rapid commentary on what might come next:http://abususu.blogspot.de/2014/06/d...scenarios.html

Various Tweets indicating Black Hawk helicopters possiblty taken; just under 3k prisoners released (terror suspects and ordinary crimianls), US$425m in the banks seized (in local currency), Humvees and no doubt more.

[JWing]

ISIS has quickly moved south after taking Mosul last night. They have taken northern Salahaddin and reached the outskirts of Tikrit. Also taken areas of western Kirkuk. Seems like a total collapse of the ISF. Many reports that few are putting up a fight and are simply fleeing as soon as ISIS shows up. Baghdad in its infinite wisdom said they will hold a special session of parliament Thursday to discuss the crisis! ISIS is also posting lots of pictures of people in Raqqa, Syria celebrating the fall of Mosul. ISIS's ideal of creating a state is becoming a reality stretching from Syria into central Iraq.

[JWing]

ISIS took a major army base and air force base in Mosul and also the Baiji repair/supply depot of the army. Has captured 2 helicopters and hundreds of humvees, trucks, etc. Also just took the Baiji refinery and power station two of the largest in northern Iraq.

[davidbfpo]

[jcustis]

ISIS took a major army base and air force base in Mosul and also the Baiji repair/supply depot of the army. Has captured 2 helicopters and hundreds of humvees, trucks, etc. Also just took the Baiji refinery and power station two of the largest in northern Iraq.

What an absolute sh*t show.

[JWing]

Here's my latest on ISIS advance south from Mosul into Salahaddin and Kirkuk and the collapse of the security forces

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...-uprising.html

[OUTLAW 09]

The Pesh are not in Mosul anymore. They are deployed to the east and north of the city. The ISF completely collapsed in Mosul last night and now ISIS is heading back towards Salahaddin province. It is repeating the same strategy that Zarqawi laid out before his death. To take Anbar, then urban centers, surround Baghdad, and then start fighting within the capital itself. Here are a couple reports you might be interested in to explain the current situation in Iraq:

Iraq's deteriorating security situation interview with Alexandre Massimo

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Storm Samarra In Salahaddin

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...ant-storm.html

Beginning of June 2014 Deadliest In Iraq

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...t-in-iraq.html

Islamic State of Iraq Launches Battle of Ninewa In Mosul

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...es-battle.html

I fully agree with these comments---the QRBJ, then the AQI, then the ISIS and actually the first true Iraqi Sunni Salafist grouping the Islamic Army in Iraq which was the largest group before Zarqawi/AQI came in 2004 all followed the same campaign plan and there never has been a second one. The IAI had by the end of 2003 had established major cells in all the major cities and rural areas in the Sunni triangle especially Mosul and Baqubah.

The ISIS stated in mid 2013 their newest campaign plan which had two single points 1) raiding prisons and releasing prisoners to join the fight and 2) taking territory and cities. By the end of 2013 they declared victory in point one and stated they were moving onto point two. During point one ---they attacked five prisons and released over 1400. They freed over 1500 just from the Mosul prison this week as well.
They were so successful at prison breaks and were on the move in Fallujah-- it even forced Malaki to close Abu Ghraib and move the prisoners there something even we were unable to do--shut down Abu G.

After Mosul comes Salahaddin, then Baqubah/Diyala---it is all about the Sunni triangle and then into the Sunni districts of Baghdad. Exact to the 2003 campaign plan which was released for all to see but no one believed it possible.

All captured HMMV 114s have been sent immediately into Syria to be used against the Syrian Army as well as some of the heavier weapon systems they were after---looks like they are rearming themselves with US weapons systems especially anti tank and heavy AAA.

This was taken out of an article in today's The Daily Beast about the loss of Mosul which was a major defeat of a US trained, supplied, and mentored 300K man army.

General Najim al-Jabouri, a former mayor of Tel Afar, which is a little more than 31 miles from Mosul, told The Daily Beast the bases seized by ISIS this week would provide the group with even more heavy weapons than they currently control. “The Iraqi army left helicopters, humvees, cargo planes and other heavy machine guns, along with body armor and uniforms,” the general, who is now a scholar at the National Defense University, said. He said he was able to learn about the equipment from soldiers and other politicians in and around Mosul with whom he keeps in touch.

General Najim is not alone in this assessment. Jack Keane, a retired four-star Army general who was a key adviser to General David Petraeus during the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 known as the surge, said ISIS has now established itself as a formidable military force.

Malaki is in military trouble for the simple reason the two main Shia insurgent groups capable of going toe to toe with the ISIS were all packed up and were sent off by Malaki to support the Syrian Army/Hezbollah and the Iraqi Army while trained in our image never was trained to fight for the "flag" thus the high desertion rates---there were rumors of over 10,000 alone just in the Fulluja campaign.

[OUTLAW 09]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

[OUTLAW 09]

This makes it worse now for Malaki---the Turks are getting involved thus indirectly NATO/US as reported by the Russian Voice of Russia from today.

Militants stormed the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on Wednesday and kidnapped 48 people including the head of the diplomatic mission, a Turkish government official said. "48 Turks including the consul, staff members, guards and three children were abducted," the official told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. "All are doing well," the official said. The kidnappings came a day after the Mosul consulate said fighters from the powerful jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized 28 Turkish truck drivers.

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_0...qs-Mosul-3074/

[OUTLAW 09]

This makes it worse now for Malaki---the Turks are getting involved thus indirectly NATO/US as reported by the Russian Voice of Russia from today.

Militants stormed the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on Wednesday and kidnapped 48 people including the head of the diplomatic mission, a Turkish government official said. "48 Turks including the consul, staff members, guards and three children were abducted," the official told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. "All are doing well," the official said. The kidnappings came a day after the Mosul consulate said fighters from the powerful jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized 28 Turkish truck drivers.

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_0...qs-Mosul-3074/

This appeared today in the German Der Spiegel concerning the Turks being pulled into Iraq--the article alludes to the possibility that this was a payback for Turkey supporting other Islamist groups in Syria.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-974618.html

[carl]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

That's silly. It has been years since we left and years since we had much influence on how the Iraqi gov handled things both politically and militarily. From what I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.

[JWing]

That's silly. It has been years since we left and years since we had much influence on how the Iraqi gov handled things both politically and militarily. From what I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.

As soon as the U.S. withdrew its military the Iraqi security forces reverted to the same kind of strong arm tactics Saddam carried out and the Americans did pre-Surge. That being raiding and then leaving areas, mass arrests, taking families hostage of people on wanted lists, indefinite detention, abuse and torture of prisoners, etc. The positives of U.S. style COIN never sunk in with Iraqis and they went back to what they were used to doing once we departed.

[JWing]

If you want a backgrounder on the Iraqi insurgency, the Islamic State and the other groups, their ideology and where operate please read my interview with Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...interview.html

Also must recommend my interview with Alexandre Massimo again on how the security situation deteriorated after 2011 in Iraq. How the insurgency was able to rebuild itself and how the Iraqi forces became ineffective.

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

[carl]

As soon as the U.S. withdrew its military the Iraqi security forces reverted to the same kind of strong arm tactics Saddam carried out and the Americans did pre-Surge. That being raiding and then leaving areas, mass arrests, taking families hostage of people on wanted lists, indefinite detention, abuse and torture of prisoners, etc. The positives of U.S. style COIN never sunk in with Iraqis and they went back to what they were used to doing once we departed.

Joel:

When I said "...I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.", I should have added that I read it at your site, Musings On Iraq. You do a brilliant job.

[TheCurmudgeon]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

Iraq was a failure of policy at the executive level. Failed Presidential policy of regime change followed by rapid democratization lead to instability and insurgency. As long as the policy was a democratic Iraq, no amount of doctrine was going to make the impossible possible.

COIN was never the problem.

However, in fairness, it was never going to be the solution either.

[jcustis]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

I quote this not because I agree or disagree with your query, but because it is a good jumping off point for my rambling brain this morning.

I haven't thought long and hard enough to make a judgment on whether COIN failed in Iraq, but I would agree with others' points that the strategic policies and actions set the stage for events which had terrible implications: disbanding the army; fast-tracking CPA schemes under people who had no idea what they were doing; rebuilding an imbalanced ISF.

What is important is that the Taliban are watching the game reel of this, and they are taking notes. Make no mistake that Iraq and Afghanistan are not the same, and the conditions are very different. US actions in the wake of events in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah will very much factor into the calculus Afghans use to look at Dec 31, 2014 and beyond.

Considering the wide capability gaps between the ISF and GIRoA security forces, I would bet a couple paychecks that the ANA and the ridiculous alphabet soup of other paramilitary units (which really just results in a disjointed, non-cohesive force) will certainly fair no better than Mosul's forces if the Taliban mobilize the pickup truck and motorcycle army upon our main body departure.

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.

[OUTLAW 09]

I quote this not because I agree or disagree with your query, but because it is a good jumping off point for my rambling brain this morning.

I haven't thought long and hard enough to make a judgment on whether COIN failed in Iraq, but I would agree with others' points that the strategic policies and actions set the stage for events which had terrible implications: disbanding the army; fast-tracking CPA schemes under people who had no idea what they were doing; rebuilding an imbalanced ISF.

What is important is that the Taliban are watching the game reel of this, and they are taking notes. Make no mistake that Iraq and Afghanistan are not the same, and the conditions are very different. US actions in the wake of events in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah will very much factor into the calculus Afghans use to look at Dec 31, 2014 and beyond.

Considering the wide capability gaps between the ISF and GIRoA security forces, I would bet a couple paychecks that the ANA and the ridiculous alphabet soup of other paramilitary units (which really just results in a disjointed, non-cohesive force) will certainly fair no better than Mosul's forces if the Taliban mobilize the pickup truck and motorcycle army upon our main body departure.

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.

The reason for the comment is as follows---if one takes the view that yes the US military implemented as correctly as they could the tenets of COIN in the host country Iraq as per say and we can argue about it all day-- as per the FM.

Robert Jones would argue as I do that the game is really all about the rule of law and good governance and the populations perception of both--not our the US's perception of both.

What the FM does not talk about as many in the senior leadership positions do not want to talk about is yes we can implement COIN approaches, yes we can train host nation forces on the rule of law and good governance until we are blue in the face, we can build schools, hospitals, and military bases and we can arm and supply-but what are we seeing now in Mosul---success or failure of that approach?

But I mentioned this yesterday---the current Iraqi Army is mainly Shia and they are tired of fighting multiple wars since 2003 mentally and physically.

When a army reaches this point if one is not fighting for the flag on the shoulder of his BDUs with full vigor then all is in fact lost. While we might have done a good job on the training, mentoring and equipping side we never did nor could we "instill" the virtues of fighting and dying for your own country because one feels personally invested in that country for a lot of reasons and that was not in the FM. The American military always shy's away from deep discussions with the host nation about the concept of nationalism-that is not in their political DNA.

Actually Iraqi's in the military simply viewed it as a job to earn easy money and not be unemployed as simple as that---had nothing to do with national pride.

That is not in the FM, nor should it be there---that is for the host country governance to instill. So did Malkai attempt to instill it?

Here is where Robert would jump in a say--it is the governance side that should be instilling this desire into the target population.

There was a single moment recently that Malaki had when the entire Iraq stood up and voiced anger at the ISIS to include Sunni's of all shades---when ISIS ambushed a Division Commander and his staff---but what did Malaki do he turned around and raided a Sunni protest camp with the resulting loss of life. ISIS turned that move into a massive social media campaign.

Then we were back off to the races and Malaki has never recovered from that single stupid decision but being a Shia it was in his eyes not a stupid decision---he just never gave a thought to the perception of the Sunni target population.

Now here is a simple question-- would you as a 24 year old Iraqi Shia stationed in Mosul---fight and die for Sunni's in Mosul against AQI/ISIS? Simple answer is no.

Check why the Kurds fight or why ISIS is fighting for their respective "flags".

Then as an opposite view check the current Ukrainian Army and their fight with well armed, and battle tested irregulars out of Russia---they do fight even with less protective equipment than we would even think of doing, they slug it out over and over and take loses but still they have not run and they still fight-and all with really less training than Iraqi's received from us. Another simple question ---why do they do it when they could simply run away from the irregulars?

Would argue they have something to fight for, they had at least for the Ukraine recently really fair elections, they see a way forward through their new governance , the new governance is trying to say the right things, and they have in their minds a common enemy that is trying to destroy their
country and they had the Maidan which was a deep expression of their desires.

Iraq never had a Maidan. The US military "gave" them a Maidan event---the Iraqi's themselves did not have to fight for it.

IMO---the core problem with the new FM is that it was focused on COIN when in fact four weeks after we arrived in Baghdad we were in a Mao defined phase two guerrilla war and what we are now seeing in Mosul is a full fledged Mao defined phase three guerrilla war-COIN is not about guerrilla warfare.

No COIN FM can instill something into a target population unless the host governance is ready to build the necessary bridges into that population--and Malaki as a Shia bent on never doing that.

In the end it is all about perceptions---and it has cost us dearly in blood and treasure for this mistake.

[carl]

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.

And the show isn't going to stop until at least 2017 when a new administration gets in, if then. The show will go on not only in Iraq but in Af-Pak therefore maybe the entire sub-continent, eastern Europe, Syria, Nigeria and everywhere off the coast of Red China, and those are only the places I can think of.

What I hope you professional military guys are trying to figure out is how bad things are going to be by then and what will be possible, then, not before, with continued force reductions and equipment cuts. It is a very hard problem.