Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[OUTLAW 09]

The Pesh are not in Mosul anymore. They are deployed to the east and north of the city. The ISF completely collapsed in Mosul last night and now ISIS is heading back towards Salahaddin province. It is repeating the same strategy that Zarqawi laid out before his death. To take Anbar, then urban centers, surround Baghdad, and then start fighting within the capital itself. Here are a couple reports you might be interested in to explain the current situation in Iraq:

Iraq's deteriorating security situation interview with Alexandre Massimo

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Storm Samarra In Salahaddin

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...ant-storm.html

Beginning of June 2014 Deadliest In Iraq

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...t-in-iraq.html

Islamic State of Iraq Launches Battle of Ninewa In Mosul

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...es-battle.html

I fully agree with these comments---the QRBJ, then the AQI, then the ISIS and actually the first true Iraqi Sunni Salafist grouping the Islamic Army in Iraq which was the largest group before Zarqawi/AQI came in 2004 all followed the same campaign plan and there never has been a second one. The IAI had by the end of 2003 had established major cells in all the major cities and rural areas in the Sunni triangle especially Mosul and Baqubah.

The ISIS stated in mid 2013 their newest campaign plan which had two single points 1) raiding prisons and releasing prisoners to join the fight and 2) taking territory and cities. By the end of 2013 they declared victory in point one and stated they were moving onto point two. During point one ---they attacked five prisons and released over 1400. They freed over 1500 just from the Mosul prison this week as well.
They were so successful at prison breaks and were on the move in Fallujah-- it even forced Malaki to close Abu Ghraib and move the prisoners there something even we were unable to do--shut down Abu G.

After Mosul comes Salahaddin, then Baqubah/Diyala---it is all about the Sunni triangle and then into the Sunni districts of Baghdad. Exact to the 2003 campaign plan which was released for all to see but no one believed it possible.

All captured HMMV 114s have been sent immediately into Syria to be used against the Syrian Army as well as some of the heavier weapon systems they were after---looks like they are rearming themselves with US weapons systems especially anti tank and heavy AAA.

This was taken out of an article in today's The Daily Beast about the loss of Mosul which was a major defeat of a US trained, supplied, and mentored 300K man army.

General Najim al-Jabouri, a former mayor of Tel Afar, which is a little more than 31 miles from Mosul, told The Daily Beast the bases seized by ISIS this week would provide the group with even more heavy weapons than they currently control. “The Iraqi army left helicopters, humvees, cargo planes and other heavy machine guns, along with body armor and uniforms,” the general, who is now a scholar at the National Defense University, said. He said he was able to learn about the equipment from soldiers and other politicians in and around Mosul with whom he keeps in touch.

General Najim is not alone in this assessment. Jack Keane, a retired four-star Army general who was a key adviser to General David Petraeus during the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 known as the surge, said ISIS has now established itself as a formidable military force.

Malaki is in military trouble for the simple reason the two main Shia insurgent groups capable of going toe to toe with the ISIS were all packed up and were sent off by Malaki to support the Syrian Army/Hezbollah and the Iraqi Army while trained in our image never was trained to fight for the "flag" thus the high desertion rates---there were rumors of over 10,000 alone just in the Fulluja campaign.

[OUTLAW 09]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

[OUTLAW 09]

This makes it worse now for Malaki---the Turks are getting involved thus indirectly NATO/US as reported by the Russian Voice of Russia from today.

Militants stormed the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on Wednesday and kidnapped 48 people including the head of the diplomatic mission, a Turkish government official said. "48 Turks including the consul, staff members, guards and three children were abducted," the official told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. "All are doing well," the official said. The kidnappings came a day after the Mosul consulate said fighters from the powerful jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized 28 Turkish truck drivers.

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_0...qs-Mosul-3074/

[OUTLAW 09]

This makes it worse now for Malaki---the Turks are getting involved thus indirectly NATO/US as reported by the Russian Voice of Russia from today.

Militants stormed the Turkish consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on Wednesday and kidnapped 48 people including the head of the diplomatic mission, a Turkish government official said. "48 Turks including the consul, staff members, guards and three children were abducted," the official told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. "All are doing well," the official said. The kidnappings came a day after the Mosul consulate said fighters from the powerful jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized 28 Turkish truck drivers.

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_0...qs-Mosul-3074/

This appeared today in the German Der Spiegel concerning the Turks being pulled into Iraq--the article alludes to the possibility that this was a payback for Turkey supporting other Islamist groups in Syria.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-974618.html

[carl]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

That's silly. It has been years since we left and years since we had much influence on how the Iraqi gov handled things both politically and militarily. From what I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.

[JWing]

That's silly. It has been years since we left and years since we had much influence on how the Iraqi gov handled things both politically and militarily. From what I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.

As soon as the U.S. withdrew its military the Iraqi security forces reverted to the same kind of strong arm tactics Saddam carried out and the Americans did pre-Surge. That being raiding and then leaving areas, mass arrests, taking families hostage of people on wanted lists, indefinite detention, abuse and torture of prisoners, etc. The positives of U.S. style COIN never sunk in with Iraqis and they went back to what they were used to doing once we departed.

[JWing]

If you want a backgrounder on the Iraqi insurgency, the Islamic State and the other groups, their ideology and where operate please read my interview with Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...interview.html

Also must recommend my interview with Alexandre Massimo again on how the security situation deteriorated after 2011 in Iraq. How the insurgency was able to rebuild itself and how the Iraqi forces became ineffective.

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...situation.html

[carl]

As soon as the U.S. withdrew its military the Iraqi security forces reverted to the same kind of strong arm tactics Saddam carried out and the Americans did pre-Surge. That being raiding and then leaving areas, mass arrests, taking families hostage of people on wanted lists, indefinite detention, abuse and torture of prisoners, etc. The positives of U.S. style COIN never sunk in with Iraqis and they went back to what they were used to doing once we departed.

Joel:

When I said "...I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.", I should have added that I read it at your site, Musings On Iraq. You do a brilliant job.

[JWing]

Thanks Carl!

It looks like as ISIS is mobilizing and marching towards Baghdad so is Iran. it is sending in advisers, special forces, weapons and money and recruiting throughout central and southern Iraq to form new militia units to fight the insurgency. This is what they did during the previous Iraqi civil war with the Mahdi Army and Special Groups, and what it did on an even larger scale in Syria. Tehran is not going to let a friendly government go do to Sunni Islamists.

[Ray]

Iraq is like any Islamic country.

The social and the governance model is shaped by the norms of the religion.

The religion is very clear where the rules are inflexible and 'detours' are practically unacceptable.

In the rigid matrix of the religion, only a rigid iron hand (if you will) can succeed.

Take any Islamic country and it will be noticed that whenever democracy has been tried it has failed. Even Pakistan is seesaw in democracy and military dictatorship. Its current democracy is in turmoil with the fundamentalist holding the nation at ransom.

Egypt is back to a military leadership in the guise of democracy.

Syria is in turmoil.

Turkey is hardly a democracy.

Therefore, it is better to let them live the way they want and not superimpose what others feel is 'right'.

The happenings in Iraq and Syria only indicates that we are making it fair grounds for the fundamentalists to run a riot.

Watch this space for what happen in Afghanistan and the experiment in democracy.

[OUTLAW 09]

Joel:

When I said "...I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.", I should have added that I read it at your site, Musings On Iraq. You do a brilliant job.

Carl---here is the reasoning behind my comment and JWing actually indirectly confirms my comments to be accurate.

Where in the entire new and even in the old FM 3-24 is it in bold letters on the first page stated "Beware if the host nation does not follow the intent and goals of COIN to the exact letter the US Army follows it it is doomed to failure".

Basically JWing is admitting that even with all the mentoring, COIN classes for their troops and officers, even being trained in our COIN image and armed as we were--nothing was absorbed as JWing admits.

So looking back --what was exactly wrong and why was that failure not mentioned anywhere in the COIN manuals old and new?

Interesting we as a Force always talk as if COIN was a magic potion that will always succeed-but nowhere in all the COIN chatter and FMs is discussed the possibility that in the end the target population and their governance may just not want COIN to succeed for whatever reasons---or did I miss that discussion and or did I miss that paragraph in the new FM?

Not so silly was my comment after 4.6 KIAs and over thousands wounded not to count the maimed for life.

The comments concerning just why AQI was not eliminated in Mosul is interesting especially after the 2/3ACRs took beatings in calming it down and since JSOC was constantly targeting AQI members in Mosul?

Go back and read all media reporting during and after the surge---those narratives talk about "successes" not failures in driving AQI out --even the JSOC narrative is along the same lines.

So did we start believing our own PR as by 2008 the Force/National Command Authority wanted a way out?

Lastly we are talking a lot about ISIS but the largest by member count Sunni insurgency group was the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) who would often clash with AQI but in the end often worked together with them---they have not/never did "disappear"---they did come out under a new name and were by 2009 undergoing a fairly robust paramilitary training program which if one looks closely maybe the reason for the new effectiveness of the ISIS successes as ISIS has effectively made the transition from a so called "terrorist" group to fighting effectively as a army---almost Mao like.

I have always when in Iraq said to anyone who would listen but actually not many did---whoever trains the Iraq's to fight for a "flag" will be dominant-ISIS is fighting for a "flag" whether we like it or not.

[carl]

Carl---here is the reasoning behind my comment and JWing actually indirectly confirms my comments to be accurate.

Where in the entire new and even in the old FM 3-24 is it in bold letters on the first page stated "Beware if the host nation does not follow the intent and goals of COIN to the exact letter the US Army follows it it is doomed to failure".

Basically JWing is admitting that even with all the mentoring, COIN classes for their troops and officers, even being trained in our COIN image and armed as we were--nothing was absorbed as JWing admits.

So looking back --what was exactly wrong and why was that failure not mentioned anywhere in the COIN manuals old and new?

Interesting we as a Force always talk as if COIN was a magic potion that will always succeed-but nowhere in all the COIN chatter and FMs is discussed the possibility that in the end the target population and their governance may just not want COIN to succeed for whatever reasons---or did I miss that discussion and or did I miss that paragraph in the new FM?

Well if you teach somebody to wash their hands after using the latrine and they don't do it and get sick, that doesn't mean washing your hands after using the latrine isn't a damn good idea.

[TheCurmudgeon]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

Iraq was a failure of policy at the executive level. Failed Presidential policy of regime change followed by rapid democratization lead to instability and insurgency. As long as the policy was a democratic Iraq, no amount of doctrine was going to make the impossible possible.

COIN was never the problem.

However, in fairness, it was never going to be the solution either.

[jcustis]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

I quote this not because I agree or disagree with your query, but because it is a good jumping off point for my rambling brain this morning.

I haven't thought long and hard enough to make a judgment on whether COIN failed in Iraq, but I would agree with others' points that the strategic policies and actions set the stage for events which had terrible implications: disbanding the army; fast-tracking CPA schemes under people who had no idea what they were doing; rebuilding an imbalanced ISF.

What is important is that the Taliban are watching the game reel of this, and they are taking notes. Make no mistake that Iraq and Afghanistan are not the same, and the conditions are very different. US actions in the wake of events in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah will very much factor into the calculus Afghans use to look at Dec 31, 2014 and beyond.

Considering the wide capability gaps between the ISF and GIRoA security forces, I would bet a couple paychecks that the ANA and the ridiculous alphabet soup of other paramilitary units (which really just results in a disjointed, non-cohesive force) will certainly fair no better than Mosul's forces if the Taliban mobilize the pickup truck and motorcycle army upon our main body departure.

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.

[OUTLAW 09]

I quote this not because I agree or disagree with your query, but because it is a good jumping off point for my rambling brain this morning.

I haven't thought long and hard enough to make a judgment on whether COIN failed in Iraq, but I would agree with others' points that the strategic policies and actions set the stage for events which had terrible implications: disbanding the army; fast-tracking CPA schemes under people who had no idea what they were doing; rebuilding an imbalanced ISF.

What is important is that the Taliban are watching the game reel of this, and they are taking notes. Make no mistake that Iraq and Afghanistan are not the same, and the conditions are very different. US actions in the wake of events in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah will very much factor into the calculus Afghans use to look at Dec 31, 2014 and beyond.

Considering the wide capability gaps between the ISF and GIRoA security forces, I would bet a couple paychecks that the ANA and the ridiculous alphabet soup of other paramilitary units (which really just results in a disjointed, non-cohesive force) will certainly fair no better than Mosul's forces if the Taliban mobilize the pickup truck and motorcycle army upon our main body departure.

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.

The reason for the comment is as follows---if one takes the view that yes the US military implemented as correctly as they could the tenets of COIN in the host country Iraq as per say and we can argue about it all day-- as per the FM.

Robert Jones would argue as I do that the game is really all about the rule of law and good governance and the populations perception of both--not our the US's perception of both.

What the FM does not talk about as many in the senior leadership positions do not want to talk about is yes we can implement COIN approaches, yes we can train host nation forces on the rule of law and good governance until we are blue in the face, we can build schools, hospitals, and military bases and we can arm and supply-but what are we seeing now in Mosul---success or failure of that approach?

But I mentioned this yesterday---the current Iraqi Army is mainly Shia and they are tired of fighting multiple wars since 2003 mentally and physically.

When a army reaches this point if one is not fighting for the flag on the shoulder of his BDUs with full vigor then all is in fact lost. While we might have done a good job on the training, mentoring and equipping side we never did nor could we "instill" the virtues of fighting and dying for your own country because one feels personally invested in that country for a lot of reasons and that was not in the FM. The American military always shy's away from deep discussions with the host nation about the concept of nationalism-that is not in their political DNA.

Actually Iraqi's in the military simply viewed it as a job to earn easy money and not be unemployed as simple as that---had nothing to do with national pride.

That is not in the FM, nor should it be there---that is for the host country governance to instill. So did Malkai attempt to instill it?

Here is where Robert would jump in a say--it is the governance side that should be instilling this desire into the target population.

There was a single moment recently that Malaki had when the entire Iraq stood up and voiced anger at the ISIS to include Sunni's of all shades---when ISIS ambushed a Division Commander and his staff---but what did Malaki do he turned around and raided a Sunni protest camp with the resulting loss of life. ISIS turned that move into a massive social media campaign.

Then we were back off to the races and Malaki has never recovered from that single stupid decision but being a Shia it was in his eyes not a stupid decision---he just never gave a thought to the perception of the Sunni target population.

Now here is a simple question-- would you as a 24 year old Iraqi Shia stationed in Mosul---fight and die for Sunni's in Mosul against AQI/ISIS? Simple answer is no.

Check why the Kurds fight or why ISIS is fighting for their respective "flags".

Then as an opposite view check the current Ukrainian Army and their fight with well armed, and battle tested irregulars out of Russia---they do fight even with less protective equipment than we would even think of doing, they slug it out over and over and take loses but still they have not run and they still fight-and all with really less training than Iraqi's received from us. Another simple question ---why do they do it when they could simply run away from the irregulars?

Would argue they have something to fight for, they had at least for the Ukraine recently really fair elections, they see a way forward through their new governance , the new governance is trying to say the right things, and they have in their minds a common enemy that is trying to destroy their
country and they had the Maidan which was a deep expression of their desires.

Iraq never had a Maidan. The US military "gave" them a Maidan event---the Iraqi's themselves did not have to fight for it.

IMO---the core problem with the new FM is that it was focused on COIN when in fact four weeks after we arrived in Baghdad we were in a Mao defined phase two guerrilla war and what we are now seeing in Mosul is a full fledged Mao defined phase three guerrilla war-COIN is not about guerrilla warfare.

No COIN FM can instill something into a target population unless the host governance is ready to build the necessary bridges into that population--and Malaki as a Shia bent on never doing that.

In the end it is all about perceptions---and it has cost us dearly in blood and treasure for this mistake.

[carl]

As I am inclined to say, what a sh*t show.

Best to get past fixing blame and start developing a policy, goals, and fixing the problem. Now.

And the show isn't going to stop until at least 2017 when a new administration gets in, if then. The show will go on not only in Iraq but in Af-Pak therefore maybe the entire sub-continent, eastern Europe, Syria, Nigeria and everywhere off the coast of Red China, and those are only the places I can think of.

What I hope you professional military guys are trying to figure out is how bad things are going to be by then and what will be possible, then, not before, with continued force reductions and equipment cuts. It is a very hard problem.

[TheCurmudgeon]

And the show isn't going to stop until at least 2017 when a new administration gets in, if then. The show will go on not only in Iraq but in Af-Pak therefore maybe the entire sub-continent, eastern Europe, Syria, Nigeria and everywhere off the coast of Red China, and those are only the places I can think of.

What I hope you professional military guys are trying to figure out is how bad things are going to be by then and what will be possible, then, not before, with continued force reductions and equipment cuts. It is a very hard problem.

Actually, what I am trying to figure out is at what point I start to care. So far I see no reason to get involved. In fact, I would like to see ISIS attempt to take and hold territory. They are likely to get more resistance from the regional neighbors, some of which we have an interest in weakening.

Perhaps the enemy of my enemy may not be my friend, but I am not inclined to spill blood and waste treasure on this at the moment. Lets see how much damage the various players do to each other first.

[carl]

Actually, what I am trying to figure out is at what point I start to care. So far I see no reason to get involved. In fact, I would like to see ISIS attempt to take and hold territory. They are likely to get more resistance from the regional neighbors, some of which we have an interest in weakening.

Perhaps the enemy of my enemy may not be my friend, but I am not inclined to spill blood and waste treasure on this at the moment. Lets see how much damage the various players do to each other first.

Threat to Europe. Threat of nuke war in the sub-continent. Threat of war between Japan and Red China. Expansion of takfiri killers all over the place. Inevitable spillover to involve Israel. I'd say there is plenty of reason to care enough to start thinking on what can be done from a badly handicapped position in the beginning of 2017.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Threat to Europe. Threat of nuke war in the sub-continent. Threat of war between Japan and Red China. Expansion of takfiri killers all over the place. Inevitable spillover to involve Israel. I'd say there is plenty of reason to care enough to start thinking on what can be done from a badly handicapped position in the beginning of 2017.

I suppose all that depends on where things stand in 2017. I was thinking more along the lines of summer, fall, and winter of 2014.

I am not sure how ISIS/Iraq/AQ/Iran struggle turns into a threat of war between Japan and China, I am not willing to rule out the possibility of some strange involvement. My gut is that Uighurs may become embolden by ISIS, but I don't see how Japan plays into it. Stranger things have happened.

Still, in the short term, I am all for a wait and see attitude.

[ceg1000]

So can we all here at SWJ now finally declare COIN dead and buried--because the last time I checked a "total failure" in a delivered doctrine tends to in fact signal the doctrine was not valid?

Sounds similar to what was observed from 2007 to mid 2011. Accept responsibility for nothing and portray the conventional forces as conducting COIN. Let's not forget what actually occurred. The primary emphasis by the conventional forces was 'whack a mole' and the primary metric was SIGACTS. The primary training emphasis was training the ISF in a like image to the US conventional forces.

There was zero understanding of the realities on the ground, the conventional forces always had AQI/ISI 'on the run' and any deviation from the 'party line' coming from USF-I was ignored.

COIN was never implemented. The conventional forces treated it as a conventional fight. They were/are poorly trained, poorly disciplined, and poorly motivated for this type of fight. They did not/do not possess the intellectual capacity to grasp the situation and simply ignored indicators that did not fit the 'party line'.

What the situation indicated as far back as 2007 is do not attempt to implement a strategy with forces incapable of execution. I would expect more of the same (i.e. the US military attempting to shift any responsibility for the current situation) away from themselves and onto anything they believe the US public will buy.