Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[Ulenspiegel]

In my opinion, the importance lies in the nature of ISIS/ISIL. They are not, as often portrayed, strictly radical Takfiri fighting a religious war. They are pragmatists who know how to use the idea of being a Takfiri group to their advantage. They are organized, networked, and have the assistance of other groups to administer the territory their fighters gain.

I was pretty amazed that a small group of less than 20,000 could hold the territory they had. Occupation numbers usually run in the 20 to 1000 ratio. For a city of 600,000 like Mosul you would have to leave 12,000 insurgents behind to administer/maintain/defend the city. They simply do not have those numbers. So the population must be either so in fear of them as to not react, or see them as a legitimate alternative to Maliki. It is easier to do that if others in the community who already have legitimacy with the population (or their own terror networks) are playing a public role once the territory is taken.

The fact that very likely less than 12000 fighter can occupy many cities and towns indicated IMHO that they worked with the active support of locals, i.e. former army and Sunni tribes. ISIL provides the cover and effective propaganda, this includes crimes. The real power and the brain is very likely provided by others which can, as long as the ugly side of the war is linked to ISIL, seperate themselves from ISIL in future without damage.

For me the really interesting question is whether the alliance of three different groups with only a very narrow common interest survives long enough to create a stable state or whether most of the current achievements are lost in infighting.

[OUTLAW 09]

The fact that very likely less than 12000 fighter can occupy many cities and towns indicated IMHO that they worked with the active support of locals, i.e. former army and Sunni tribes. ISIL provides the cover and effective propaganda, this includes crimes. The real power and the brain is very likely provided by others which can, as long as the ugly side of the war is linked to ISIL, seperate themselves from ISIL in future without damage.

For me the really interesting question is whether the alliance of three different groups with only a very narrow common interest survives long enough to create a stable state or whether most of the current achievements are lost in infighting.

What is interesting is---is in fact there a very narrow common interest among the groups---I for one have argued since 2005 the common interest is far deeper than we in the West would like it to be.

Often during complex attacks 3 or 4 different groups would plan, fund and carry out the attacks and the groups were vary different and yet they indeed had a common cause---throwing out the US and Iran---that binds for a long time.

[OUTLAW 09]

Why the WH/Obama thinks we still need Russian support for other things than the Ukraine ie Syria, Iran, and NK---here is an Interfax press release from today---balance that against the supposedly Iraq/Malaki for the US to start bombing the ISIS.

Maybe Malaki needs to talk to Putin and ask the Russians to bomb ISIS but then Putin would more than likely say no since they are no ethnic Russians involved to be "protected" and I seriously doubt he would go to the UN because then the sending of Russian fighters and weapons into say the Ukraine would in theory viewed "as force" used in another country and would that not require UN approval?

16:07 Moscow: U.S. air strike on Iraq and any other use of force must be authorized by UN

[TheCurmudgeon]

Can anyone independently confirm this, or is it a hoax?

ISIS Launches Its Own Satellite Channel from Mosul - ISIS launched their On satlite channel from mosul Frequency is 12341 on Nilesat

http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2014...el-from-mosul/

[OUTLAW 09]

Can anyone independently confirm this, or is it a hoax?

http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2014...el-from-mosul/

It exists and is up and broadcasting if one can get the Nilsat which covers the ME regions---comes and goes---not sure of the broadcasting times though.

The look and feel is the same as their informational CDs (had the TV news program feel--just on a CD) that circulated under the counters in video shops throughout the Sunni triangle from 2005 onwards so it looks like they have progressed up the media ladder in their infowar abilities since 2005.

[OUTLAW 09]

How much more did the US military "know" about Malaki and the Shia militias that we the US military did not make public when it could have been "applied" to get reconciliation going and WHY did we not support the actually winner of the 2010 elections before we left ---which would have made a major impact on what is now ongoing?

So as a provocative statement is the US military also behind the ISIS successes because we failed when we had excellent opportunities to actually force reconciliation?

Another question was in fact Bremer and the US civilians in Iraq at fault for allowing the 2005 elections when the question of reconciliation had never even been discussed---we simply "assumed" it would occur? Was actually the 2005 election in fact to early?

http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...s-winning.html

[TheCurmudgeon]

It would seem to me that ISIS next move would be to begin overtures to the Kurds for a truce with the ultimate intent of seeking independence from their common enemy, Maliki. Anyone hearing rumors of such negotiations taking place?

I may have to eat my words about ISIS not being in control of the territory one year from now.

[TheCurmudgeon]

In the context of my last post, and assuming Turkey is backing ISIS, this story begins to make much more sense:

ERBIL, Iraq -- In a statement that could have a dramatic impact on regional politics in the Middle East, a spokesman for Turkey's ruling party recently told a Kurdish media outlet that the Kurds in Iraq have the right to self-determination. The statement has been relatively overlooked so far, but could signal a shift in policy as Turkey has long been a principal opponent of Kurdish independence, which would mean a partitioning of Iraq.

"The Kurds of Iraq can decide for themselves the name and type of the entity they are living in," Huseyin Celik, a spokesman for the Justice and Development Party, told the Kurdish online news outlet Rudaw last week.

The Kurds have been effectively autonomous since 1991, when the U.S. established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. Turkey, a strong U.S. ally, has long opposed the creation of an independent Kurdistan so that its own eastern region would not be swallowed into it. But Celik's statement indicates that the country may be starting to view an autonomous Kurdistan as a viable option -- a sort of bulwark against spreading extremism within a deeply unstable country.

"The Kurds, like any other nation, will have the right to decide their fate," Celik told Rudaw, in a story that was picked up by CNN's Turkish-language outlet. "Turkey has been supporting the Kurdistan region till now and will continue this support."

Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have recently forged a strong bond over oil, much to the chagrin of Iraq, which claims that Baghdad has sole authority over oil in Kurdistan. Turkey recently signed a 50-year energy deal with Iraqi Kurdistan’s semi-autonomous government to export Kurdish oil to the north, and Kurdistan has increased its exports this week despite the insurgency by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

[davidbfpo]

A long profile of PM Maliki by Dexter Filkins in The Newyorker (hat tip to a "lurker" recommendation). Note published in April 2014:http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2...urrentPage=all

One associate's description:

His secret? He is a very intelligent tactician—all politics is short term. He doesn’t have any vision for the state.

Emma Sky, once a senior British civilian adviser to US forces in Iraq:

Did we just get it wrong with Maliki and Karzai—were we that unlucky? No. Maliki wasn’t like that in the beginning. The whole point of these places—of Iraq especially—is that the leaders need to do political deals. We make them so strong that they no longer need to do political deals. So we undermine any chance at stability. It’s destroying Iraq. We’re strengthening the guy who is creating the problem.

What a great choice made for Iraq in 2006!

[davidbfpo]

Professor John Schindler, a historian and observer of events adds his viewpoint. Always worth reading IMHO:http://20committee.com/2014/06/19/fa...ilure-in-iraq/

A taster:

When you wind up with your least-bad option being partnering with the Pasdaran, Iran’s feared Revolutionary Guards Corps, listed as a state sponsor of terrorism by our own government, you’ve been doing strategy wrong for some time.

[davidbfpo]

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies and has a short article in The Spectator, which ends with:

Western countries and their regional partners should work together to prevent extremist groups like ISIS from establishing long-lasting states. But they also need to recognise this growing boom-and-bust pattern of instability, and work to address it. Not claiming victory too soon might be a start.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/...comeback-kids/

[TheCurmudgeon]

Professor John Schindler, a historian and observer of events adds his viewpoint. Always worth reading IMHO:http://20committee.com/2014/06/19/fa...ilure-in-iraq/

Dave, I must disagree with both of your last two articles, but it is Schindler’s that I take the greatest umbrage with. Not his assessment of history. I believe he is dead on. But his assessment that events could have been other than what they were. If we made a mistake, it was not backing Maliki, it was not backing someone even more dictatorial who could have held on to the country.

The article still lives under the illusion that power sharing in a sectarian society can work. I would think that, if we have learned anything from recent history in places like Africa, strong ethnic and religious identities and free and fair elections do not mix. I have said it elsewhere:

[A] partial democracy, is the most volatile and least predictable form of government known. When all the factors that can be associated with political instability are ranked, being a partial democracy is number one. Certainly elections in Iraq were a triumph of democracy, but elections alone don’t create democracy. Iraqis have voted in large numbers in the past and will certainly do so again in the near future, but as Professor Bruce E Moon observes “… history shows that it has never been the unwillingness to vote that prevented democracy, but rather the failure to honor the results of those elections.” This is particularly true when factionalism — a political system dominated by ethnic or parochial groups that regularly compete for influence — is present. Factionalism tends to limit an interest in power-sharing. You might think that factionalism in any system would be divisive, but it is not necessarily destabilizing. As Professor Jack A. Goldstone and his associates noted in their research on political instability “It is only when factionalism is combined with a relatively high level of open competition for office … that extremely high vulnerability to instability results …”

There are no good options in Iraq. Either we back a dictator who can keep a lid on sectarian violence, ala Saddam Hussein, or you break up the country along sectarian lines … because if you don’t, someone more vicious is going to do it for you.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dave, I must disagree with both of your last two articles, but it is Schindler’s that I take the greatest umbrage with. Not his assessment of history. I believe he is dead on. But his assessment that events could have been other than what they were. If we made a mistake, it was not backing Maliki, it was not backing someone even more dictatorial who could have held on to the country.

The article still lives under the illusion that power sharing in a sectarian society can work. I would think that, if we have learned anything from recent history in places like Africa, strong ethnic and religious identities and free and fair elections do not mix. I have said it elsewhere

The issue I have with US policy is as follows--check the 2010 Iraqi election winner who was in fact a secular Shia supported massively by the Sunni and we were still in Iraq.

Who then took the "win"---Malaki--who stood by and did nothing--we did--when did we leave--- 2011--who could have placed the reconciliation on track in 2010 --we could have but walked away and now we have this mess.

[OUTLAW 09]

Finally former General P get's it right somewhat late but right nevertheless.

http://news.yahoo.com/us-must-not-ir...094421950.html

[JWing]

My newest piece "Background To The Fall Of Mosul, Insurgents’ Relentless Attacks Upon Security Forces Set Stage For The Taking Of City" ISIS' Soldiers' Harvest campaign launched in July 2013 said that it would relentlessly attack the ISF to weaken them and allow the Islamic State to regain territory it had lost during the Surge. Ninewa was one of the most violent provinces in Iraq and there the ISF were targeted more than in other provinces. Helped set the stage for the ISF collapse in June.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The issue I have with US policy is as follows--check the 2010 Iraqi election winner who was in fact a secular Shia supported massively by the Sunni and we were still in Iraq.

Who then took the "win"---Malaki--who stood by and did nothing--we did--when did we leave--- 2011--who could have placed the reconciliation on track in 2010 --we could have but walked away and now we have this mess.

I wish it was that simple, but I don't think that it really would have made a difference. If anything, I think the results of those elections demonstrate that less than one-third of the population of Iraq believed that a Sunni-Shiite coalition was possible. (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2...iddleeast&_r=0)
But I suppose we will never know.

Today, I don't think that kind of reconcilliation is possible.

[Firn]

I just stumbled over The Monster of Mosul: How a Sadistic General Helped ISIS Win while looking up other stuff.

From 2006 to 2008, U.S. military lawyers and commanders pressed Maliki to support sending Al Gharawi to trial, to prove he was serious about weeding out sectarianism in the ranks of his security forces. Those efforts failed. A 2006 diplomatic cable released by wikileaks shows then-U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilizad explaining Maliki’s intransigence. “Mahdi has proven valuable enough to Maliki,” Khalilizad wrote, “that he rebuffed our request that he execute an Iraqi warrant for Mahdi’s arrest.”

A unit called the Major Crimes Task Force, consisting of both American and Iraqi lawyers and investigators, built a strong case against Mahdi. The unit compiled dozens of witness statements about his participation in the systematic torture of detainees along sectarian lines at the height of the violence between Sunni and Shia factions in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. (In 2007, as an American officer in Baghdad, I assisted the Major Crimes Task Force in their efforts to pursue General Mahdi’s arrest and trial.) This investigation augmented a previous Iraqi warrant from 2006. Twenty brave witnesses delivered statements that he ordered the systematic torture of detainees and often supervised it himself.

...

Heated exchanges followed between U.S. and Iraqi officials when Al Gharawi’s charges were dropped. Both U.S. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus tried to convince the Iraqi government that it had to show its skeptical Sunni citizens that a Shiite government was willing to arrest senior Shiite security officials for sectarian violence. Instead, the predominantly Shia government decided to let Al Gharawi go. Once the accused war criminal was free, the Iraqi government then put him in charge of the largest Sunni Arab majority city in the country, Mosul, where Al Qaeda was still actively resisting the government.

The way Maliki acted there and then fits sadly all-too well into other information about the lenghts he went to purge all which didn't fit into his drive to built up his power. He certainly helped much to make the terrain fertile for ISIS and their deals.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The way Maliki acted there and then fits sadly all-too well into other information about the lenghts he went to purge all which didn't fit into his drive to built up his power. He certainly helped much to make the terrain fertile for ISIS and their deals.

Firn,

I think that is a narrow interpretation of events and a misreading of the nature of the communal/tribal social dynamics. If Maliki did act against prominent members of his own sect he would have been questioned as to his dedication to the tribe and his legitimacy. He would have been thought too weak and not worthy of loyalty. Support amongst his own people would have evaporated and he would have been replaced, usually by someone more sectarian.

[JWing]

Everything that is happening appears to be very fluid.

What will be the outcome?

Any guesses with rationale?

We, out here, are a bit concerned since there are Indian nurses and ancillary workers out there and some are said to have been taken hostage.

A very long and bloody war of attrition

[JWing]

It would seem to me that ISIS next move would be to begin overtures to the Kurds for a truce with the ultimate intent of seeking independence from their common enemy, Maliki. Anyone hearing rumors of such negotiations taking place?

I may have to eat my words about ISIS not being in control of the territory one year from now.

There is on going fighting between ISIS and peshmerga in Diyala and Kirkuk.