Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Ppl r reporting #Syria regime s evacuating AbuDhour airbase Idlib to Hama base. Fear of Wadi Aldaif scenario.
#SAA, captured after attempting to flee in #Idlib..
http://youtu.be/gBbMecvoosE
Supporters of the #Syria|n dictatorship are pushing their #Aleppo hopes very hard. It's propaganda for the "freeze".
pic.twitter.com/h813gjEaat
The entire regime withdrawal got stuck at this point.
All tanks, apcs left behind.
RAN OUT OF FUEL??!!
Syrian rebels narrowly miss an #Assad regime tank north of #Aleppo with the #TOW.
http://youtu.be/Qz48pgBaHdI
A Syrian rebel TOW destroys a fleeing regime T-62 near #Maarat_al_Numan (probably 1 or 2 days ago).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTodbmn-XbE …
The #Assad regime gave up on #Shaykh_Maskin and rains barrel bombs on the city.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgCAAy0dCR0 …
#Assad regime forces in #Khan_Shaykhun run for their lives after column destroyed.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFTP7nEuSXE …
Syrian rebels destroy regime position in #Handarat piece by piece with the hell cannon.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HsXqqZYVQfQ …
Some #Assad troops die in a Syrian rebel TOW attack on their position in #Handarat,north of #Aleppo.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUvI8njO-Xc …
This #barrel_bomb stroke close to #Bayanoun's white mosque.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTn3867pbo4 …
Ppl r reporting #Syria regime s evacuating AbuDhour airbase Idlib to Hama base. Fear of Wadi Aldaif scenario.
And Syria is not having a manpower problem?
Rebels have captured a shia child soldier 14 years on the front of Sayfat in #Aleppo #Syria
pic.twitter.com/lysYkC1sm2
Aymenn J Al-Tamimi @ajaltamimi
Bear in mind re. #pt Kata'ib Hezbollah & other #Iran proxies in particular considering 'Great Satan' cause of #Iraq's recent troubles.
Notice the Iraqi's seem to blame others for their current security issues with IS.
Very proud to present this collaborative piece I was able to orchestrate featuring 24 Iraq observers on whether the unity of Iraq will survive the current crisis. Those participating include:
Ahmed Ali is senior research analyst and Iraq Team lead at the Institute for the Study of War
Dr. Liam Anderson is a political science professor at Wright State University
Dr. Amatzia Baram is professor emeritus at the Department of the History of the Middle East and Director of the Center for Iraq Studies at the University of Haifa, Israel
Kamal Chomani is the co-founder of the Kurdish Policy Foundation and a journalist
Dr Eric Davis is professor of political science at Rutgers University
Steve Donnelly is a former member of the Salahaddin Provincial Reconstruction Team and served in the State Department
Dr Johan Franzen is a senior lecturer in Middle Eastern History at the University of East Anglia
Fanar Haddad is a research fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
Sarhang Hamasaeed is senior program officer for the Middle East and Africa at the United States Institute of Peace
Haider Hamoudi is an associate professor of law and associate dean of research and faculty development at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
Faleh Jabar is the director of the Iraq Studies Institute, Beirut, Lebanon
Sajad Jiyad is a research fellow and associate member of the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform
Dr. Abbas Kadhim is a senior policy fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University
Ibrahim al-Marashi is an assistant professor of Middle East History at California State University San Marcos
Ramzy Mardini is a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council
Dr. Harith Hasan al-Qarawee is a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies, Harvard University
Dr Babak Rahimi is associate professor of communication, culture and religion at the University of California San Diego
Colonel Joel Rayburn is an active duty army officer, a senior military fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and contributor to the Hoover Institute’s Working Group on Islamism and the International Order
Dr. Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Thabit Abdullah is associate professor of History at York University
Christine van den Toorn is the director of the Institute of Regional and International Studies at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani
Reidar Visser is an independent Iraq researcher who writes the blog Iraq and Gulf Analysis
Judith Yaphe is visiting professor of International Affairs, Institute for Middle East Studies, Elliott Schoo, George Washington University
Akiko Yoshioka is a senior researcher at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
Here's the article
Interestingly in the last few days a lot of new TOW ATGM videos have been posted online, including from the Hazzms
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qz48pgBaHdI …
Summary of Ma'arat al-Numan Wadi Deif battle :
http://www.agathocledesyracuse.com/archives/193 pic.twitter.com/BOabEFWueC
The War Next Door pt 1. Find out how Israeli soldiers treat Syrian rebels in our exclusive footage on @vicenews
https://news.vice.com/video/the-war-next-door-part-1 …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 12-17-2014 at 06:18 PM.
Not the least: it's your picture that's incomplete.
Since IRGC is in control of regime's forces again (October this year), the renewed practice of squandering re-trained units (which we could monitor through the summer), ceased, and 'economy of force' was re-introduced. Means, the regime is holding out in most of places, while only one major offensive operation and one major besieging operation are undertaken at time.
Per province, the situation is something like this:
- Idlib: JAN + Ahrar ash-Sham kicked out SRF and Hazzm, but nothing changed about regime's position (indeed, a major JAN offensive on regime in Idlib City collapsed with heavy loss)
- Lattakia: regime's position stabile (it remains in control over more than 95% of this province)
- Aleppo: regime on advance, about to cut off remaining IF and FSyA insurgents in eastern part of the city; JAN is squandering own units, time and resources for pointless attacks on Nubol and az-Zahra
- Raqqa: under Daesh control since months, with minor pockets held by insurgents in between
- Hassakah: partitioned between Daesh and Kurds, with few minor regime garrisons holding out
- Dayr az-Zawr: regime smashed a major Daesh offensive with help of chemical weapons (see 'chlorine') and stabilized the situation; means, everything is back to positions from October
- Tartus: undisputedly under regime control
- Hama: JAN and Ahrar forced remnants of the former 11th Armoured Division to withdraw from Wadi ad-Dayf to Moarek; this is praised as a 'big victory', but is actually changing very little (it's a very bleak 'revenge' for the loss of Moarek); besides, about 1,000 regime troops managed to escape together with a significant quantity of intact armour (the latter is particularly important because the regime is meanwhile short on operational armour)
- Homs: under firm regime control bar the pocket between ar-Rastan and Talbiseh now controlled by the JAN, and a Daesh-held pocket near T.4, which is now jeopardised because of regime's victory in Dayr az-Zawr.
- Damascus and Rif Dimashq: Jobar nearly overrun by regime, about 800 insurgents boxed into an area less than 1km in diameter; rest of Eastern Ghouta should be much easier to overrun; this is continuation of defeats of insurgents in this part of Syria
- Quneitra: no major insurgent advances since months
- Dera'a: this is the only province where regime is losing lately, and the only majority of which is still held by insurgents not Jihadists or the Daesh. But, capital of Dera'a is still under regime's control, and the regime is able to supply it down the highway from Damascus. Recent insurgent capture of Sheikh Miskin was an important victory, but foremost a morale bolster: it was stopped by a strong regime counterattack. Overall, even should the insurgents breach-through in direction of Damascus, they would run into a chain of major military bases surrounding the city, and I do not see them having the strength to take even one of these. Furthermore, the SF and JAN are increasingly at odds, especially because of creation of first Daesh cells, and this is no good sign: usually, such disputes end with collapse of moderates.
- as-Suwayda: thin area along its western border to Dera'a held by insurgents, rest under firm control of pro-regime Druze.
Overall:
No matter what happened at Wadi ad-Dayf, I do not see regime really 'losing' anything important. With the decline of oil prices, even possession of the Sha'er gas field is not as important. On the contrary, the IRGC will see to complete the siege of Aleppo and its methodical advance in Eastern Ghouta (Rif Dimashq province), and I do not see a trace of hope of either situation changing any time soon.
With these two exceptions, nothing really changed for most of this year. Foremost: since the Daesh squandered its offensive capability by fruitless attacks on Ayn al-Arab and Dayr az-Zawr, the regime (i.e. IRGC and Hezbollah) is now the only force with proven capability to advance and then hold the territory it occupied.
AND again you failed to answer the direct question---if the manpower is not an issue then why Shia child soldiers? Which by the way is being denied.
#Iran-ian "Yasir" drone are now used in #Iraq by #Harkat_Al_Nujaba, part of "popular committees".
pic.twitter.com/jL8F1iqmsQ
I answered your question about supposed lack of manpower by the regime already two posts ago.
It's solved through renewed influx of IRGC-recruited units.
Propaganda by side, but the three IRGC- and two Hezbollah brigades spear-heading the offensive into Aleppo, the two NDF units in Dayr az-Zawr, and four IRGC units running the show in Eastern Ghouta are not staffed by 'Shi'a child soldiers'. Call them 'criminal gangs recruited in Iranian prisons', or whatever else if you like/prefer/must call them that way: that would be closer to truth.
Especially Eastern Ghouta is a complex battlefield in densely built-up urban areas, separated by orchards, walls etc. It's another 'bocage' there and one can monitor deployment of corresponding - and increasingly sophisticated - tactics developed by the IRGC for this purpose since 2013, supported by complex and specialized pieces of machinery; anything but supposed 'child soldiers'.
And BTW: I would say that 25-30 years after the Iran-Iraq War, it's about the time to realize that all the (Iraqi launched) stories about 'human-wave attacks', 'plastic keys to heaven' and similar were of the similar quality like this about 'child soldiers' now.
Is Turkey helping Peshmerga with providing them with HJ-8 ATGM for their fight against the #IS? pic.twitter.com/LF0ZaOd8Hx
Not that I know.
And it would greatly surprise me to hear Turkey is now arming Peshmergas in any fashion - or even letting any other armament but that strictly controlled by Turkish military pass Turkish territory underway to Kurds in northern Iraq.
NEW MAP: Situation in #Qalamoun Region | #RifDimashq Province, for December 19, 2014.
#Syria
pic.twitter.com/DQ4Wag612t
I have often pointed out Putin's past history as a KGB officer in the GDR as a key element of his "world vision" and it is now FSB and former KGB members who compose his inner circle after the "liberals" were forced out.
I also took hits here for bringing up the term "Russian fascism" a number of times and we are now seeing more articles "starting" to notice that in fact the term "fascism" can be currently applied to Putin's inner circle and his form of governance that is being created every day in Russia especially picking up stream since the Maidan which he views as the more serious threat to him and Russia.
Russia's turning point, when Putin implemented his innate KGB values. http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com...ing-point.html …
Bottom line...
pic.twitter.com/ggJVn2YGE2
Once one understands his mindset then one can understand the Russian support for Assad and Iran.
Looks like the KSA oil campaign is starting to affect Iran as it has Russia.
Exclusive: #Iran's support for #Syria tested by oil price drop http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0JX21420141219 …
#SaudiArabia is playing chicken with its oil -- to punish #Russia and #Iran. My piece for @ReutersOpinion: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debat...-with-its-oil/ …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 12-19-2014 at 09:15 PM.
Interesting development---so is Iraq going to ask the US for funding to now support the Shia militias.
http://news.yahoo.com/iraqs-shiite-f...061752938.html
For those that have really understood the QJBR/AQI/IS battlefield tactics we are seeing it work again--they have a unique way of spreading the battlefield, staying on the move and using swarming tactics--and yet their opponents never seem to "see".
Out of the IS trolls came recently a comment that in fact Kobane was a diversionary move for a number of reasons then we hear the Shia are winning over all BUT then this ----
#BREAKING; #Iraq; #ISIS launched an assault on Baiji at dawn. Heavy clashes currently ongoing as ISIS attacked from several different axis.
First time I have heard this--wonder where they did come form--there has been talk on the street about illegal German weapons shipments but no evidence. Maybe over Turkey as a member of NATO?
German machine gun MG3 used by #IS were available even before Germany delivered them to Peshmerga. Origin unclear.
pic.twitter.com/wGcG7WFSJF
Dagestani insurgency leaders swear loyalty to ISIS:
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/254364/ …
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