Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[JWing]

Here's my lastest story on Musings on Iraq. More ISF collapses in Fallujah and other places. Fighting in outskirts of Baghdad plus Shiite and Iranian mobilization are covered.

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...-security.html

[ganulv]

Just think - Iranian Quds troops could be fighting to gain control of terrain in Iraq with air support provided by US Drones.

I find it difficult to imagine that that would ever occur in a coordinated fashion. If word were to get out – and it would – the political leaders of both sides would have a whole lotta ’splaining to do to their citizens.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I find it difficult to imagine that that would ever occur in a coordinated fashion. If word were to get out – and it would – the political leaders of both sides would have a whole lotta ’splaining to do to their citizens.

The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend ... or Jihad/ Counter Jihad makes strange bedfellow ...

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw 09

Assad is an Alawite and despite press reports that is not Shiite. That's like saying Shiite are really Sunnis because they are just an offshoot. Syria was also one of the main supporters of the insurgency for years so saying that Shiite rule in Iraq after 03 created this united Shiite arc from Iran to Iraq to Syria is incorrect. Maliki only decided to back Assad when the civil war started and Islamists started fighting the government. Maliki hated Assad but made an alliance of convenience because ISIS and others were seen as worse, Enemy of my enemy stuff going on.

JWing

Correct me if I am wrong but yes Alawites are in fact a sect element of Shiaism--even "normal Shia" recognize the sect as Shia, but have a different name for them the last time I checked---and yes both Sunni and Shia did stem from the same Koran and Mohammad until 1400 years ago when they clashed over the successor question and the destruction of Ali. Historically though in say India many Shia thinkers might have been thought to be Sunni and vice versa as they shared similar ideas and world visions, and surprisingly both honor Jesus but simply do not accept him as a prophet. And yes we are infidels but at the same time "people of the book".

So based on 1400 years of infighting and yes using the same Koran they are in fact two different religious groups under the banner of Islam. In some aspects Episcopalians and Catholics are a similar example while both stemming from Catholicism are in fact two different groups after clashing on the question or priests marrying but share a large number of Catholic religious similarities.

If I am also correct yes Syria initially accepted Baathists fleeing Iraq when we arrived based on the Syrians also being Baathists but of a different sect than Saddam Baathists in Baghdad were. I would never argue that the Assad Security Service did allow the Iraqi insurgent open and free movement inside Syria---as long as they maintained a low profile they were "allowed" to exist but it had to be under the radar.

Iraqi's always had to fight to get permits to reside in Syria and usually via corrupt Syrian officials and many did not get them and had to constantly dodge police raids for Iraqi's who would then be pushed back into Iraq---Iraqi refugees that were Sunni had it hard---Iraqi Shia on the other "seemed" to get residence permits/work permits and were not pushed back to Iraq. On the whole Iraqi Sunni refugees and insurgency members did not have it easy in Syria so the yes it "appeared" Assad supported them but the reality on the ground was far different.

Major Iraqi Baathist military officers/State Security types were "allowed" to exist a tad over the radar but that was due to the large amounts of money they had in the Syrians banks and what was flowing to them from other Iraqi supporters and from Jordan.

AQI developed an extensive smuggling system with multiple cutouts inside Syria until they got their fighters to the border and yes if discovered they did end up in prison and torture was not unusual for them. There was no love lost between the then QJBR--AQ in the Land of Two rivers and Assad's security forces.

I would argue Assad "supported" the Sunni insurgency for the core reason- They kept the US busy and off his back as he was not that warm and fuzzy with the idea of the US Army siting on his borders--he and also this perception "they supported Israel" and were boxing in Syria from three sides if one counts the NATO member Turkey.

But Syria while "tolerating" the Sunni insurgency that was tied to the Iraqi Baathist military/state security side was not all that "tolerant" of the QJBR then AQI side even in 2004 and their smuggling through Syria of foreign fighters.

There were in fact a number of AQI members released from Syrian prisons by Islamists when the civil war started---would not call that being "tolerant" towards QJBR/AQI.

Notice Saddam's daughter though did not flee to Syria---rather to Jordan where she has been the guest of the King since her arrival and he has refused to extradite her regardless of US requests which were many.

Understand the enemy of my enemy but global power politics has played a far bigger role in all of this.

[JMA]

I wonder what - if any - warning the US Administration were given by that Keystone Cops outfit known as the CIA?

FP has it here: Jihadist Gains in Iraq Blindside American Spies

Of course if the Administration was given warning of the build-up to this invasion then it reinforces the pattern of indecisiveness observed over a number of years.

[OUTLAW 09]

I wonder what - if any - warning the US Administration were given by that Keystone Cops outfit known as the CIA?

FP has it here: Jihadist Gains in Iraq Blindside American Spies

JMA--anyone with an internet connection and a mouse and a little understanding of key jihadi websites saw this coming since the raids on the Sunni protect camp.

What they did not see was the redevelopment of the Islamic Army in Iraq now the Military Council of the Iraqi Revolutionaries and their linking into the Sunni tribes.

And yes they seem to have again not understood the game being played on the ground by the Sunni resistance. There was during the entire Iraq time a myth that stated insurgent cells would not talk to each other due to OPSEC especially insurgent cells from different insurgent groups and the second myth was that the Sunni insurgent groups rejected working with AQI.

First myth---heck they chatted all the time on their prepaid cells simply because they had friends in the other cells and other groups and had at one time or another prayed together.

Second myth---AQI had the funds along with IAI---AQI would fund the attacks and operations, IAI would plan them and then Ansar al Sunnah would be the lead attack element with the Revolutionary Brigades 1920 being the foot soldiers. Yes AQI did kill some IAI cell leaders over religious politics, but when IAI threatened to go to war with AQI --AQI backed off.

What you are seeing in the Sunni triangle is the interaction between ISIS, The Military Council and the main Sunni tribes---and yes the CIA should have seen it coming. I saw it over two years ago and that was all on open source.

The Sunni's simply now believe they must fight for their rights and that was a given even in 2011.

What is more interesting is the role Turkey will have---they have supported ISIS in Syria and now their Consulate is raided by ISIS.
So I guess even the NSA is not as good as the Snowdon hype makes them out to be.

[JMA]

The current administration will do nothing but wait and see.

In this case the normal paralysis of indecision might not be a bad thing.

The US should recognise that the Iraq 'adventure' ended badly - for everybody (except maybe the Kurds and Iran) - and question whether there any point reopening that can of worms?

Samantha Power will of course be freaked-out by the unfolding humanitarian crisis - for which I some sympathy - and calling for intervention in that regard.

Not sure a drone fleet can provide the fire-power required to neutralise ISIS/ISIL ... but certainly some carefully targeted cruise missiles could do some real damage

[carl]

In this case the normal paralysis of indecision might not be a bad thing.

A broken clock is perfectly accurate at two moments during each day but you still don't want to buy one.

In this case if inaction was the result of reasoned thinking, that would be one thing. It isn't in my view. It is just more deer in the headlights indecision, that's another thing altogether which does nothing to get the international opportunists out there to stop thinking that they can get away with just about anything until the beginning of 2017.

[JMA]

JMA--anyone with an internet connection and a mouse and a little understanding of key jihadi websites saw this coming since the raids on the Sunni protect camp.

Well then that leads to the deduction that the Administration was once again caught out 'sitting on it's hands' paralysed through indecision.

[carl]

Carl, your point is valid. Unfortunately most military and policy types are taught to look at problems locally within defined area, or focus on specific groups. It is the weakness in our center of gravity approach to planning where we conveniently ignore the whole and how the pieces interact intentionally and unintentionally.

Our military on the other hand only sees terrorists and wonder what they can accomplish with air power. Bomb ISIS until it hurts, but please do so in a way that is advantageous to our long term strategic interests.

Good. That is the kind of thinking I am talking about. You have identified a weakness in the training of the people we may be charging with thinking about these things. So people who haven't had their minds locked in a box by training had better get to cogitating and we should start listening to them.

Your point about airpower highlights is another bit of thought that is useful. We have been airplanes this airplanes that for too long.

[JWing]

Outlaw 09

Most of the Iraqi Shiites I have talked to do not consider Alawites a Shiite sect but rather a distinct group. Sunnis on the other hand tend to lump them together, and the more sectarian they get will say in political discourse that both Shiites and Alawites aren't even Arabs because of their religion but rather "Persians."

As for Syria and the insurgency. They let in the entire Baathist group. There were two main factions after 2003 and both resided in Syria. Izaat Ibrahim al-Duri Saddam's success resides in Syria and heads the Naqshibandi insurgent group. Plus Syrian intelligence was actively involved in helping foreign fighters and their networks operate so that they could get to Iraq and that included AQI. Remember in 2008 when the U.S. made a raid into Syria and killed an AQI commander there? Winter of 03 US was complaining that the Syrian security forces were letting foreign fighters through their country and into Iraq.
Late 2004 there were reports that Zarqawi was setting up cells in Syria as well. Ties were improving a bit and then August 09 after big bombings in Baghdad Maliki openly accused the Assad government of supporting both Baathist and AQI insurgents. Wasn't until 2010 when relations really started to improve between Baghdad and Damascus that things started to change somewhat. Also don't forget the defection of the Syrian Amb to Iraq in July 2012 who said Assad had helped AQI immediately after the 2003 invasion.

Ultimately agree that Syria's motivation was to keep the U.S. busy though.

[JMA]

I would like to believe that the US military have a range of contingency plans and are awaiting instructions/authority to act.

Where I dovetail in outcome with the Administration's indecision is that I am not persuaded that the US should get involved even to prevent the billions of $ of equipment they gave to Iraq falling into the hands of either ISIS or the Iranians.

Not sure I understand your reference to 2017.

A broken clock is perfectly accurate at two moments during each day but you still don't want to buy one.

In this case if inaction was the result of reasoned thinking, that would be one thing. It isn't in my view. It is just more deer in the headlights indecision, that's another thing altogether which does nothing to get the international opportunists out there to stop thinking that they can get away with just about anything until the beginning of 2017.

[carl]

I disagree with your base assumption that the current administration will do nothing. I actually believe the current administration is acting far more prudently than the previous administrations that, arguably, are directly responsible for ISIS having a slice of Iraq.

Over the next 2.5 years we will see what will happen. I judge that whatever comes along, this administration will react with prolix inaction. I figure all the Putins, takfiri and Red Chinese killers of the world judge the same.

Most of us are always contiplating what can be done. That is not the real question. The question is what SHOULD be done. We can kill AQ or Taliban leadership with drones. The question is, should we? What is the result? Who comes next? Is that better, or worse, than the previous option?

Could or should, I don't care what you chose to call it. I would be pleased if you guys start thinking hard about how things will look in 2017, because nothing much will be done by us till then. Answer all those questions you posed.

Your opinion of the efficacy of drones in killing leadership is wildly optimistic I think. In Iraq for example, how are we going to find the targets? Before the end of 2011 we had multitudes of people on the ground working closely with multitudes of Iraqis to find targets. That structure isn't there now. Besides the ISIS captured helos and AAA which means no Pred ops. Reapers might do ok but again how will they find targets? MO and the current AQ top guy still live on year after year.

At this point a number of entities that I would like to see weakened are fighting amongst themselves. While I am obviously interested in the situation, I do not see any reason to alter the dynamics, particularly if we really want a long-term presence in Iraq. My guess is that we will use Drones. I sincerely hope that we do not get involved at all at this point.

One of those sides is going to win, or both sides will come to an accommodation. That accommodation may be a de-facto takfiri killer state encompassing part of Syria and Iraq. Do we want that? You don't see any reason to alter the dynamics. That's fine, for now. But how about in 6 months, a year?

We can fly drones around but they won't have a clue what to shoot at.

Yes, this is a bit of a game of chicken, but I am still in favor of watching things unfold for a bit longer before taking any action.

Fair enough. How much longer? What kind of action? It will be 2017 before anything can be done, what will be needed then?

I am still of the opinion that it is easy to lead a jihad, it is harder to govern a large territory. That we can do more to weaken ISIS by letting them try to hold and govern a swath of Syria/Iraq than we can by giving them the moral victory of being engaged directly by the Great Satin (ops, wrong group).

Particularly when the stories leak out of how life really is in an ISIS controlled area. My guess is that fewer people in the Levant will be interested in coming under their control once they see how they actually rule.

You underestimate the power of well run police states to establish power and endure. They kill enough people and suddenly life under them isn't so bad anymore. History is filled with examples of long lived regimes whose people lived really stinko lives.

[ganulv]

Most of the Iraqi Shiites I have talked to do not consider Alawites a Shiite sect but rather a distinct group. Sunnis on the other hand tend to lump them together, and the more sectarian they get will say in political discourse that both Shiites and Alawites aren't even Arabs because of their religion but rather "Persians."

Is the history of Shi'ism in Iraq and Iran ultimately tied to the Buyid dynasty?

[carl]

I would like to believe that the US military have a range of contingency plans and are awaiting instructions/authority to act.

Where I dovetail in outcome with the Administration's indecision is that I am not persuaded that the US should get involved even to prevent the billions of $ of equipment they gave to Iraq falling into the hands of either ISIS ot the Iranians.

Not sure I understand your reference to 2017.

Nothing will be much will be done anywhere in the world by us until 2017 because that is when the term of the current President ends. It doesn't matter what kind of plans the US military has because it will not get any instructions to act, not just in Iraq but anywhere. The evil ones of the world know they have a window of opportunity that lasts at least until then.

That is why I think the US pro soldier types had better start thinking about what the world will look like in 2017 because that will almost certainly be the first opportunity we will have to do something about it.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw 09

Most of the Iraqi Shiites I have talked to do not consider Alawites a Shiite sect but rather a distinct group. Sunnis on the other hand tend to lump them together, and the more sectarian they get will say in political discourse that both Shiites and Alawites aren't even Arabs because of their religion but rather "Persians."

As for Syria and the insurgency. They let in the entire Baathist group. There were two main factions after 2003 and both resided in Syria. Izaat Ibrahim al-Duri Saddam's success resides in Syria and heads the Naqshibandi insurgent group. Plus Syrian intelligence was actively involved in helping foreign fighters and their networks operate so that they could get to Iraq and that included AQI. Remember in 2008 when the U.S. made a raid into Syria and killed an AQI commander there? Winter of 03 US was complaining that the Syrian security forces were letting foreign fighters through their country and into Iraq.
Late 2004 there were reports that Zarqawi was setting up cells in Syria as well. Ties were improving a bit and then August 09 after big bombings in Baghdad Maliki openly accused the Assad government of supporting both Baathist and AQI insurgents. Wasn't until 2010 when relations really started to improve between Baghdad and Damascus that things started to change somewhat. Also don't forget the defection of the Syrian Amb to Iraq in July 2012 who said Assad had helped AQI immediately after the 2003 invasion.

Ultimately agree that Syria's motivation was to keep the U.S. busy though.

JWing---agree then with Sunni lumping Alawites together but that does not explain the willingness to spill tons of Shia blood in the defense of a non theoretical Shia government or call in Hezbollah and or send JAM/SG to Syria does it?

If JAM/SG is back out of Syria and they are fighting in Anbar then they have lost a large amount of their fighting capacity in Syria as they are not dislodging ISIS nor the tribes from Ramadi or Fulluja.

Izaat Ibrahim al-Duri great to hear that name again---he definitely did not die of cancer but have not heard anything about him in the last few years-but again he could be the de facto head of the Military Council. His home stomping safe houses where by the way in Diyala thus the importance of Diyala as a center of gravity.

The Naqshibandi were in fact the follow on group name from the Islamic Army in Iraq--now morphed into the Military Council-they started a massive paramilitary training program in 2009 onwards and became literally the supreme HME manufacturers in all of Iraq---sheer numbers in the tons range and of good quality and they were behind the development of a IR "Cat eye" IED that was extremely dangerous. JSOC was tasked to kill or capture this specific bomb maker but never succeeded.

Notice his name is still not in play.

Assad helping AQI in 2003---not so sure--- as Zarqawi did not call out the Islamic State of Iraq until mid 2004 on the steps of the Green Dome in Baqubah--when he left Iran in 2002 it was though he came in via Jordan which makes sense and the IAI had been up and fighting four weeks after we arrived in Baghdad---by the way they used the first RCIEDs against us two months after we arrived. Again wonder why he was killed near Baqubah---it was his pull back safe area during the whole time he was being hunted. One of my walk-ins I worked was in the inside circle and no one from the national IC/JSOC wanted to believe the individual but through that person we rolled up over six related cells tied to him who had been in Baqubah since 2003.

[JMA]

OK I thought as much.

I appreciate your concern about your country's future but the bad news appears to be that it will go from bad to worse when Hilary takes over. (This is how it is seen from outsider's view). What will you do then?

Nothing will be much will be done anywhere in the world by us until 2017 because that is when the term of the current President ends. It doesn't matter what kind of plans the US military has because it will not get any instructions to act, not just in Iraq but anywhere. The evil ones of the world know they have a window of opportunity that lasts at least until then.

That is why I think the US pro soldier types had better start thinking about what the world will look like in 2017 because that will almost certainly be the first opportunity we will have to do something about it.

[carl]

OK I thought as much.

I appreciate your concern about your country's future but the bad news appears to be that it will go from bad to worse when Hilary takes over. (This is how it is seen from outsider's view). What will you do then?

Because it can change in 2017 and after of course does not mean that it will.

What will we do then if that happens? I don't know. Suffer the consequences I guess.

[JMA]

Because it can change in 2017 and after of course does not mean that it will.

What will we do then if that happens? I don't know. Suffer the consequences I guess.

Whatever happens it will be self inflicted through the democratic process... no one else to blame.

[Bill Moore]

Does anyone know why the Iraqi military didn't resist? Maliki claims it was a conspiracy, and in this case that makes sense, but who were the conspirators and why?

Wild spectulating on my part.

- this ties into the Arab coalition trying to oust Assad. Supposedly Maliki has been helping Assad with his Iranian buddies.

- a state actor out of the region enabled ISIS and paid off Iraqi military leaders to not resist to put Iraqi oil at risk to strengthen their position in the global market, which makes boycotting them impractical.

I have absolutely no supporting evidence for either hypothesis, but for the better equipped and trained Iraqi army to just drop weapons and flee due to a irregular force advance doesn't add up.