Rules of Engagement for Conscience and Sense

**SWJED** · 01-30-2007

From Democracy Project - Rules of Engagement for Conscience and Sense. H/t ZenPundit.

There comes a time in combat when split second choices are made. Tactical rules of engagement training condition one to those choices, and may make sense to the situation or to the overall mission, or not. But, inescapable in the choice is whether to die for a rule that doesn’t apply to the immediate threat. That reality is ignored only if one feels that another’s life is more important than one’s own, that the primary mission of a soldier or Marine is to die for their country rather than make others die for theirs. Front line life and death are that clear and brutal.

In today’s asymmetrical wars, the home front faces the same choices, life or death as the threats can extend here, but do have more time to reflect. But, the moment of choice is still near instant. Rumination is the same, in effect, as not acting, and letting the foe act and exploit weakness and hesitation.

I’ve heard those conservatives or to-now Iraq war supporters express their misgivings about the “surge.” Those misgivings, that lack of confidence, have strong grounds in the too often vacillating and confused course of our engagement.

Still, not only is there no alternative that doesn’t promise even worse outcomes, but the misgivings ignore the unavoidable problems of any war.

No, the “surge” is not a magic bullet. Indeed, far more is needed, all up and down the line from military to diplomatic force. But, it is having some important results, even now when just starting. We should be demanding the far more that is needed...

**goesh** · 02-01-2007

ROE perhaps will become more flexible with Pretereus in charge. I make reference to a Post by M. Yon in his blog recently about some apartment buildings that insurgents/terrorists are repeatedly using as a base of operations. I asked myself why they were still standing, much like a strong bunker on high ground with the only goal being to repeatedly chase the occupants out each time they return. Since our civilian population is really not feeling much fear of our enemies 'out there and over there' , it is impossible for them to make any kind of connections to the reality of fact that civilians are the insurgents prime assets for support and protection. In other words, in the minds of our civilians and their perceptions of engagement and tactical necessity, it is better to allow insurgents the use of a structure than to prevent some Iraqi family the use of it by destroying it, despite the fact said Iraqis may well be coereced into said arrangement with insurgent forces. Civilian perception and opinion polls should have no bearing on ROE but this is indeed happening. Can and will Pretereus break the mold? Mr. Pretereus, bring down those huts.

**120mm** · 02-02-2007

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

During one of our daily ROE changes, I actually looked at one of the cards. The fact that they ROE was changing, and it was done casually, and through an e-mail, led to the Troops proclaiming that the ROE was "all ####ed up." and they therefore felt justified in ignoring it.

A checklist-style ROE is not the answer, imho. We had a guy waste some kids stealing trash, and he was completely ROE-compliant. We also had a female E-5 who sat there and endured a mortar barrage from some insurgents that she could see and could've engaged, but was prevented from doing so by the "ROE of the day" as well as direction from the TOC.

I would prefer a Horatio Hornblower "Strategic Corporal" to an ROE, but lacking that, a leadership chain that puts some serious effort into communicated the "why" aspect of ROE.

**Stan** · 02-02-2007

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

120's got a painful point ! Just how would we go about explaining to the E5 taking mortar rounds, that although you can see them and they're in you sights, you can't fire. What ?

Regards, Stan

**SWJED** · 02-02-2007

Originally Posted by Stan Reber

120's got a painful point ! Just how would we go about explaining to the E5 taking mortar rounds, that although you can see them and they're in you sights, you can't fire. What ?

Regards, Stan

In some cases the adversary is shooting and scooting and all you will do is ensure collateral damage that creates 10 insurgents for any 1 you might get lucky and kill. Like I said, in some cases, everything is situational dependent - but to just make a blanket statement that anyone taking mortar rounds should return in kind - all the time - defeats much of what we have learned over the last several years - and forgot over the last several decades.

**Stan** · 02-02-2007

In some cases the adversary is shooting and scooting and all you will do is ensure collateral damage that creates 10 insurgents for any 1 you might get lucky and kill. Like I said, in some cases, everything is situational dependent - but to just make a blanket statement that anyone taking mortar rounds should return in kind - all the time - defeats much of what we have learned over the last several years - and forgot over the last several decades.

Thanks Colonel !
I spent some time reading your recent interview, and I agree collateral damage in the E5's case would have merely created another 10 insurgents, and maybe one dead.

I didn't mean, she should have gone full auto and sprayed the surrounding area, but then how would one write the ROE regarding the use of "semi-auto, carefully-placed rounds" while being showered in mortar fire ?

Point well taken !
Regards, Stan

**jcustis** · 02-02-2007

Originally Posted by 120mm

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

During one of our daily ROE changes, I actually looked at one of the cards. The fact that they ROE was changing, and it was done casually, and through an e-mail, led to the Troops proclaiming that the ROE was "all ####ed up." and they therefore felt justified in ignoring it.

A checklist-style ROE is not the answer, imho. We had a guy waste some kids stealing trash, and he was completely ROE-compliant. We also had a female E-5 who sat there and endured a mortar barrage from some insurgents that she could see and could've engaged, but was prevented from doing so by the "ROE of the day" as well as direction from the TOC.

I would prefer a Horatio Hornblower "Strategic Corporal" to an ROE, but lacking that, a leadership chain that puts some serious effort into communicated the "why" aspect of ROE.

120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

**120mm** · 02-06-2007

Originally Posted by jcustis

120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

The E-5 in question was a COSCOM soldier attached to V Corps Rear Headquarters. The ROE changed daily for us, mostly little changes, which I am sure never percolated down "to the troops" due to incessant and finicky nature of the changes.

Both of those incidents happened in the space of a week, and were partially the result of a well-publicized video of some "farmers" fired up by some 4ID Apaches, as well as complaints by the local sheik that we were killing too many farmers, who happened to be working at night.

A significant number of those farmers were carrying AKs and RPGs, as well as mortar rounds, verified by BDA photos, but for some reason we couldn't engage anyone from the towers anymore, without direct permission from the Corps Rear TOC.

The net result was tower soldiers not reporting engagements, several of which were actually against unarmed farmers. Training and trusting soldiers to execute the ROE is also an issue, here.