Rules of Engagement for Conscience and Sense

[goesh]

ROE perhaps will become more flexible with Pretereus in charge. I make reference to a Post by M. Yon in his blog recently about some apartment buildings that insurgents/terrorists are repeatedly using as a base of operations. I asked myself why they were still standing, much like a strong bunker on high ground with the only goal being to repeatedly chase the occupants out each time they return. Since our civilian population is really not feeling much fear of our enemies 'out there and over there' , it is impossible for them to make any kind of connections to the reality of fact that civilians are the insurgents prime assets for support and protection. In other words, in the minds of our civilians and their perceptions of engagement and tactical necessity, it is better to allow insurgents the use of a structure than to prevent some Iraqi family the use of it by destroying it, despite the fact said Iraqis may well be coereced into said arrangement with insurgent forces. Civilian perception and opinion polls should have no bearing on ROE but this is indeed happening. Can and will Pretereus break the mold? Mr. Pretereus, bring down those huts.

[120mm]

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

During one of our daily ROE changes, I actually looked at one of the cards. The fact that they ROE was changing, and it was done casually, and through an e-mail, led to the Troops proclaiming that the ROE was "all ####ed up." and they therefore felt justified in ignoring it.

A checklist-style ROE is not the answer, imho. We had a guy waste some kids stealing trash, and he was completely ROE-compliant. We also had a female E-5 who sat there and endured a mortar barrage from some insurgents that she could see and could've engaged, but was prevented from doing so by the "ROE of the day" as well as direction from the TOC.

I would prefer a Horatio Hornblower "Strategic Corporal" to an ROE, but lacking that, a leadership chain that puts some serious effort into communicated the "why" aspect of ROE.

[Stan]

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

120's got a painful point ! Just how would we go about explaining to the E5 taking mortar rounds, that although you can see them and they're in you sights, you can't fire. What ?

Regards, Stan

[SWJED]

120's got a painful point ! Just how would we go about explaining to the E5 taking mortar rounds, that although you can see them and they're in you sights, you can't fire. What ?

Regards, Stan

In some cases the adversary is shooting and scooting and all you will do is ensure collateral damage that creates 10 insurgents for any 1 you might get lucky and kill. Like I said, in some cases, everything is situational dependent - but to just make a blanket statement that anyone taking mortar rounds should return in kind - all the time - defeats much of what we have learned over the last several years - and forgot over the last several decades.

[Stan]

In some cases the adversary is shooting and scooting and all you will do is ensure collateral damage that creates 10 insurgents for any 1 you might get lucky and kill. Like I said, in some cases, everything is situational dependent - but to just make a blanket statement that anyone taking mortar rounds should return in kind - all the time - defeats much of what we have learned over the last several years - and forgot over the last several decades.

Thanks Colonel !
I spent some time reading your recent interview, and I agree collateral damage in the E5's case would have merely created another 10 insurgents, and maybe one dead.

I didn't mean, she should have gone full auto and sprayed the surrounding area, but then how would one write the ROE regarding the use of "semi-auto, carefully-placed rounds" while being showered in mortar fire ?

Point well taken !
Regards, Stan

[SWJED]

Thanks Colonel !
I spent some time reading your recent interview, and I agree collateral damage in the E5's case would have merely created another 10 insurgents, and maybe one dead.

I didn't mean, she should have gone full auto and sprayed the surrounding area, but then how would one write the ROE regarding the use of "semi-auto, carefully-placed rounds" while being showered in mortar fire ?

Point well taken !
Regards, Stan

Stan - that was me - Dave, not John Nagl, but glad you agree

[Stan]

Stan - that was me - Dave, not John Nagl, but glad you agree

Sorry Dave !
I am not trying to take sides RE - ROE. I know how to place single shots from a model 1911 (the same Colt Commanders model I carried when I was Tom's NCO in Africa) and I also know who is the most important in a mortar team, should I need to take one or two out without wasting ammo.

I am having a relatively hard time thinking as an NCO, how I would now explain 120's situation to that very same E5.

Yes, I was also an E5 once (thank God).

Regards, Stan

[jcustis]

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

During one of our daily ROE changes, I actually looked at one of the cards. The fact that they ROE was changing, and it was done casually, and through an e-mail, led to the Troops proclaiming that the ROE was "all ####ed up." and they therefore felt justified in ignoring it.

A checklist-style ROE is not the answer, imho. We had a guy waste some kids stealing trash, and he was completely ROE-compliant. We also had a female E-5 who sat there and endured a mortar barrage from some insurgents that she could see and could've engaged, but was prevented from doing so by the "ROE of the day" as well as direction from the TOC.

I would prefer a Horatio Hornblower "Strategic Corporal" to an ROE, but lacking that, a leadership chain that puts some serious effort into communicated the "why" aspect of ROE.

120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

[120mm]

120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

The E-5 in question was a COSCOM soldier attached to V Corps Rear Headquarters. The ROE changed daily for us, mostly little changes, which I am sure never percolated down "to the troops" due to incessant and finicky nature of the changes.

Both of those incidents happened in the space of a week, and were partially the result of a well-publicized video of some "farmers" fired up by some 4ID Apaches, as well as complaints by the local sheik that we were killing too many farmers, who happened to be working at night.

A significant number of those farmers were carrying AKs and RPGs, as well as mortar rounds, verified by BDA photos, but for some reason we couldn't engage anyone from the towers anymore, without direct permission from the Corps Rear TOC.

The net result was tower soldiers not reporting engagements, several of which were actually against unarmed farmers. Training and trusting soldiers to execute the ROE is also an issue, here.

[jcustis]

Roger...I thought it would be those little things.

[120mm]

I think the most important thing to bring out of this is for commanders to train and trust their soldiers. The current checklist system of ROE is a crutch; we should be able to produce a soldier that will know when and how to engage an enemy so as to not assist the insurgency.

Walking over the ground, later, it was obvious that not only would the E-5 been justified in engaging the mortar crew, she would've damaged the insurgency in doing so. On the other side, the E-4 who killed the kids was absolutely in the wrong, though it was determined he was in compliance with the ROE. (They were penetrating the perimeter to steal trash)

Unfortunately, in a top-down "directed" system, you get Yugos. It is a "hard sell" in the current environment to get commanders to accept risk in order accomplish "soft" missions and to actually trust the enlisted man/woman. If our soldiers have to spend 8 hours a year training on "grill safety", how can we expect them to function in a COIN environment?

As an aside, to really p.o. the reading audience, the E-5 who took the mortaring was reprimanded for being "sharp" with the O-4 "Battle Major" who denied her requests to engage the mortar team.

[Stan]

Thanks 120 ! I had a feeling this was coming.

I now, more than ever, thank whomever for having refined officers such as LTC Odom (with his wit and wisdom) at my side when things got difficult and arduous decision making was the last thing I needed to hear.

Tom, like most of my professional officers used his common sense in such scenarios and took an ass chewing later. He would still laugh and I often had to wonder if this was doing his career any favors. I already had 20 plus in, so there were no longer academics involved, just saving the skin on my behind.

Unfortunately, in a top-down "directed" system, you get Yugos. It is a "hard sell" in the current environment to get commanders to accept risk in order accomplish "soft" missions and to actually trust the enlisted man/woman. If our soldiers have to spend 8 hours a year training on "grill safety", how can we expect them to function in a COIN environment?

As an aside, to really p.o. the reading audience, the E-5 who took the mortaring was reprimanded for being "sharp" with the O-4 "Battle Major" who denied her requests to engage the mortar team.
8 Hours Ago 02:40 PM