A Case Against Battle Drill Six

[slapout9]

Here is a link to some good videos on the use of a ballistic shield.


http://www.bakerbatshield.com/video.asp#tactical

[Stan]

Hey Slapout,
Thanks for the videos ! Just sent the link to our Central Criminal Folks. Their shields are big enough for three to crowd in, complete with lights and window.

Stan

[Jimbo]

Having done this stuff in Iraq, and trained National Guardsmen in it at their mobilization stations, a couple of thoughts. Battle Drill 6 came out of Bragg, not Law Enforcement. When the 39th eSB was training at FT Hood, the cops were the hardest to get to understand how to execute it. They wanted to treat like law enforcement, but it wasn't. As far as shields go, where are you going to transport it, and who is going to lug it around. It isn't very practical in that sense. J Custis summed up the pro's as to why it is trained. Team Leaders can run it. J Custis also summed up the cons, in that the ability to train with vehicles is somewhat lacking. Battle Drill 6 is a single team single room concept. For that, it is highly effective. Implied in that task, is that the rest of the squad/platoon is providing some level of external security/shaping op in order to enable the team to execute the battle drill.

Convoy life fire, CSS units tend to have the highest density of crew served weapons, but are allocated the least amount of ammunition to train with, and the least amount of communications for command and control. The lessons of the 507th and others has driven Convoy Live Fires to be very important. Having rolled on plenty of these with the Iraqis, the "collateral damage" issues happen, but they aren't indescriminate. Convoys usually open up only when engaged by direct fire. Escort vehicles usually do most of the shooting, usually at vehicles, and usually with rifle fire in accordance with ROE when locals fail to stop and clear out.

[slapout9]

Jimbo, I understand about training LE folks, they are hard headed aren't they? I don't have AKO access so I have not read the article, how ever I have seen FM 7-8 and under Battle Drill Six right after figure 4-10 is a note which states that if the room is occupied by civilians or non combatants than the normal ROE may change and normal combat power may not be available. Maybe there should be a battle drill 6 and 6a one for dealing with a known enemy and one for an unknown enemy. According to the manual the two situations are to be handled differently.

[Uboat509]

I just finished the article and I have to say that I disagree with most of what the author says. As I understand this, and please correct me if I am wrong, the author is calling for us cordon off the building, and then wait while the interpretors try to convince the non-combatants to come out and the bad guy to give up. And then, after some unspecified time, the commander can choose to send in troops to attack. This all assumes, of course, that the bad guy is at the house, that we are surrounding the right house, that the house does not have tunnels or connections to other buildings that will allow the bad guy to escape while we are outside shouting at the building, that the "non-combatants" aren't being armed and/or booby trapped before being sent out, that any actual non-combatants have a choice to come out even if they want to, that bad guy isn't using the extra time now that he has been awakened and alerted to our presence to barricade/booby trap himself inside to await our assault. And that is just what I came up with off the top of my head. A lot of times when we go into a building there are no shots fired, either because the bad guy wasn't really a bad guy (wrong guy, wrong house, wrong Intel etc.), he wasn't prepared to resist, or by the time he woke up and shook the cobwebs out there was a barrel chested freedom fighter standing on his neck pointing his M4 at him. You would waist a hell of a lot of time setting up a cordon and then calling out the non-combatants every time and worse yet you would be giving up the initiative. The article actually reminds of the air force article on COIN which basically put forth the idea that you can safely and surgically kill the enemy from a distance without putting boots on the ground and we have already proved that this is not the case.

SFC W

[120mm]

I don't object to training convoy live fire, I object to spending up to half your training time on it as a "gate" to get out of mob station. Especially when you're looking at guys who aren't going to EVER go on a convoy.

Frankly, it's something even the most rock-headed O-6 and above can comprehend.

As an aside, if you think the 507th Maintenance Co. problem was a convoy marksmanship issue, we need to talk. It was a leadership issue. It was a mindset issue and it was a map-reading issue.