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Thread: A Case Against Battle Drill Six

  1. #61
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by sladethesniper View Post
    There was some good natured discussion afterwards (after a full day of fun, including one night iteration) which basically boiled down to "don't attack a well defended position with SWAT tactics"

    SWAT stuff is nifty and a very acceptable TTP IF certain other criteria are met. Simply doing it because that is the only thing you know is the wrong answer.
    My understanding is that SWAT = Special Weapons and Tactics, was implicitly developed for the minimum use of force, so it is ROE dependant, and that was explicit in the original concept.

    The UK developed a "Red- Amber- Green," scale to define the use of force in the Urban environment. Red was basically LE-SWAT, and Green was "ceiling hits the floor," stuff.

    For sure, all the "Shoot house," stuff is basically garbage, against someone who knows you are coming.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  2. #62
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Stay out of the house

    Citing Wilf:
    The UK developed a "Red- Amber- Green," scale to define the use of force in the Urban environment. Red was basically LE-SWAT, and Green was "ceiling hits the floor," stuff. For sure, all the "Shoot house," stuff is basically garbage, against someone who knows you are coming.
    Some years ago I asked our local SWAT equivalent what happens if the "bad guys" do not stay still i.e. in a premises and go mobile. There was a pained reaction and invocations of "Trust us, we know they will". Bearing in mind the 24/7 capability was six firearms officers, so I asked will front and rear entrances be covered? "Trust us, we practice a lot". I assume "bad guys" have learnt, "stay still, you lose".

    Then of course along came the Mumbai attack and all the comments worldwide on whether capability matched that risk.

    davidbfpo

  3. #63
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Then of course along came the Mumbai attack and all the comments worldwide on whether capability matched that risk.
    ...and remember Hungerford?
    Mumbia was nothing new, but it does show how utterly un-prepared most folks are for existing and well-understood threats.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  4. #64
    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    If anyone could post a copy or send it to an official email address that I can supply, that would be great.

    We've been wrestling with this stuff as well. Our Infantry School - the COE for Urban Ops - focuses on "Badgers, Panthers, and Doves" and four man stacks. End result is a confusing array of lingo and overstacking which leads to big clusters of guys. Don't get me wrong - dominating urban spaces and knowing angles is awesome small unit stuff, but when you get guys off of an Urban Operations Instructor course with "Subject Matter Expert" status it can be hard to challenge their conceptions of what is tactically sound.

    We've managed to kill the petting zoo and really have to enforce rules on having more than 2 dudes in a small space.

  5. #65
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I can't help with a copy Infanteer, as I am on the hunt as well, but I did want to share this quote from a poster on another board. I believe he was on Takur Ghar Mt. during Operation ANACONDA, fighting to recover SEAL Neil Roberts' body.

    Your Experience is right there and spot on, its just the verbage that was getting us all tripped up.

    I didn't want your comments to get wasted because a grunt in here read them and said "What is he talking about? TL's are absolutely supposed to lead from the front"...

    ...The GWOT might have brought up everyone's game, but we are stil talking about skill level one (active duty) soldiers. After an entire rotation deployed and a 9-12 months at home station prior to their next deployment, if they were worth a sh*t, shouldn't they be getting close to becoming a TL at that point?...

    ...Since we are all disucussing MOUT TTPs. I think that you were all taught that the key to a good assault is a successful breach. If the breach and the decisions made upon entering that breach are f**ked up, the whole assault is at risk of failure...

    ...And not to get too much into the specifics of our TTPs, but Battle drill 6A is a good way to lose a lot of guys for nothing.

    Going back to Sinisters comments about having tools and not know why they were created is an absolute truth.

    I see the hours and DAYs that GPF BCTs train on this trying to get this right and it hurts me.

    Those TTPs are designed to limit loss of life of non-combatants while RAPIDLY securing a target. The lives of the assaulting element come a distant second to the above mentioned factors.

    Now take your deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Is there ANYTHING in ANY house that you ever stepped foot into that is worth dying over?

    Short of the answer "an American Hostage", your answer should be negative.

    So why in the hell are you leading with flesh? stun grenades/flash bangs...blah blah blah.

    If you are in a BCT you and I both know you don't have the assets to lead into every room with a stun grenade.

    I have literally observed THOUSANDS of entries by various units in the GWOT and the reality is that lack of munitions and a false sense of security lead to more humans going through doors than dogs, bangers, or anything else.

    So what is so important in these houses that you are unwilling to set containment and sort that sh*t out from the outside??????????????

    Callout is the future in OIF/OEF. Partner forces are the future in these places too. A house must always be cleared with boots on the ground, that does not mean that it needs to be YOU or YOUR soldiers. Its their country, make them earn their freedom, one doorway at a time.

    ... STOP trying to do CQB in a mud house on the side of a mountain! There is NOTHING inside worth losing your life over.

    Find other TTPs and enablers that are safer and more effective.
    Last edited by jcustis; 09-29-2009 at 09:40 PM.

  6. #66
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Jon, I presume most of that rant is a quote and those are not your thoughts.

    I have a comment on only three items in it, cleaning up the language a bit:
    I see soldiers doing things today that absolutely amaze me, but I also see them f***k up a guard roster, drive under NODs like s***, and not take care of their equipment too!
    Since the person that stated this is apparently an NCO, my questions are why did he allow those things to happen and what did he do about it?
    How many of you here have ever made breach into a hallway with a sand bagged machinegun at the end?
    If we're still here, obviously none of us was stupid enough to try that.
    You REALLY want to trust an E-2 with making the decision on how best to seek cover and supress this threat ?
    I've had several E2s, even more E3s and a slew of SPCs that were more capable of doing that than their team leaders of the time were...

    We have an Army that rewards time in service and time in grade -- the cream doesn't rise because the system is skewed against it.

    Lot of nonsensical bluster and noise in that post. He may be a gem and a super soldier but in my observation most of the kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out / hooray for me types are more noise than competence and substance. The really good guys don't need to do that stuff. Most won't tolerate those that do it.

    P.S.

    Got so busy sneering at the 'Gee Look at me' business I forgot to say that I broadly agree with his point which was, I think, after removing all the not beneficial to him or the Army and unnecessary chatter:

    Room clearing and SWAT techniques are dangerous and misapplied, don't establish a pattern, use host nation forces where possible and take sensible care of your troops.
    Last edited by Ken White; 09-29-2009 at 08:01 PM. Reason: Addendum

  7. #67
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Great point Ken. I made some edits to get to the heart of that poster's points. And yes, he is a blowhard, but he has a good point.

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