Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[JMA]

JMA,

My comments on the Rhodesian military and advice to Prime Minister Ian Smith are based on conversations with several Rhodesian officers. IIRC some books also refer to this, but I cannot cite sources - except didn't Ken Flowers mention it? For the new to Rhodesia readers Ken Flowers was the ex-policeman who headed Rhodesia's external agency, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and somewhat controversial.

The comment on the Kissinger presentation in 1976 is based on wider conversations with politicians and the military, plus an academic who watched the situation. Again IIRC I think the reaction is shown in some books.

You refer to:.

My recollection is that the USA did not pay great SIGINT attention to the region, although more after Portugal's exit and after the Soviet-Cuban arrival in Angola. What surprised the Rhodesian military was the extent of US understanding of their problems, for examples the exit dates for serving career officers and who was who in operations from monitoring car parking at headquarters. Some Rhodesians thought some, if not more of the information came from "insiders", traitors and elsewhere. The other snag was that much of the information and analysis was known about within parts of the military, but had not been given to the politicians.

I left alone what happened to the Kissinger involvement as that was peripheral to SWJ and my interest in Rhodesian history is not all embracing.

Later on, with the Lancaster House Agreement, I recall the reporting on the emergence from the "bush" right across Rhodesia of thousands of guerillas and followers into the assembly points etc. This was also commented upon in the open literature by the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and others which I read in 1980 and shortly after - including articles in UK Army publications.

I fully accept that many of the guerillas remained in the "bush" to ensure that the rural voters cast their votes for ZANU and that many of those in the assembly points (BBC cites 22,000) were not guerillas.

I would suggest that it was a surprise to Rhodesians as to why the US was bothering to show that degree of interest in situation in their little country. So what was the implied threat of holding this knowledge? That Kissinger would pass it on to the Soviets (in 1976)? Or pass it on to the insurgents?

I suppose you heard of the arrest in June 1979 of three CIA agents? (Smith's book "The Great Betrayal" pg 308) And how Carter promised to lift sanctions against (then) Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in exchange for the release of the spies who had also been operating in Kenya and South Africa. Sadly the idiot Muzorewa agreed to release the spies on Carter's word. Big mistake. The rest is history.

As to information being passed to foreign governments during the war. We were never concerned with (nor should we ever have been) stuff classified as "Restricted" ending up anywhere from the CIA to MI6 to the insurgents.

Of concern to us was the fact that at one point operational intel was being passed on. For example on one camp attack into Zambia when we were going through the paperwork in their ops room we found a fresh signal they had received that morning saying "You will be attacked at 12h00 today". Then there were the numerous cases where attempts were may to kill/assassinate Nkomo and Mugabe but on arrival they were never at home. A number of other examples. It was a war and we were aware that everyone was out there with their spies and sources. Everyone trying to be more clever than the next.