Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[jcustis]

When I was a snot-nosed sophmore in college, I wrote a paper about the Rhodesian crisis, as I thought there was an amount of cognitive dissonance going on with the African peoples within the borders. I was specifically delving into rationale behind the recruitment, employment, and retention of African troops, fighting for a government that was viewed by most of the world as racist. I was curious about the perspective of the African soldier fighting under the Rhodesian flag. What drove him to do it, considering the years of public outcry against the Rhodesian government after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence against the Crown. Did he belive that the government was subjugating his people, but also believe that the fabric of his society was at risk and thus necessitated his service? Or was it something more primitive and tribal, Shona vs. Ndebele?

I've since studied the situation more closely, and realize that there were so many more dynamics involved that the picture is not clear. The matter of advisors is, however, an interesting one if you step back and look at the situation of certain units (e.g. Rhodesian African Rifles and Selous Scouts). The RAR was a predominantly all-African formation, with Anglos serving as the officers. A book titled The War Diaries of Andre Dennison is an excellent insight into the world of a white who serve as the OC of one of the companies.

I look at what I've read about Rhodesia since my sophmore days and now begin to wonder. We've had previous threads about "turning terrorists" and developing indigenious forces in the image of insurgent groups, so that they may fight them at their own game. We can look to the Selous Scouts for lessons on the snoop and poop aspect, but can we also learn something from the more conventional Rhodesian units, and the white OIC/leader issues then to the current advisor issues we face today?

Just some fodder for discussion.

[jcustis]

Also, South Africa did play a significant role during the waning days of White Rhodesian rule, and it wasn't solely in the form of military support. IIRC, much of the pressure that Smith faced stemmed from S. Africa's political game, and Johannesburg saw the writing on the wall. Rather than have a violent overthrow of the Rhodesian govt., it saw accomodation as a means to an end, and expended considerable effort driving the point home that a transitional government, followed by majority rule was in Rhodesia's best interest. In fact, many argue they were looking to cover their own rear ends.

[marct]

In fact, many argue they were looking to cover their own rear ends.

I would certainly agree with that! It would be interesting to look at who is doing the same in Iraq right now.

I'd like to go back to an earlier comment you made and "muse" on it for a bit.

can we also learn something from the more conventional Rhodesian units, and the white OIC/leader issues then to the current advisor issues we face today?

One of the "lessons" coming out of Rhodesia was that the conflict operated at a whole series of different levels: military, political, ethnic and, most important to my point at the moment, how a "state" is perceived. Is a "state" going to be equivalent to an ethnic/tribal group, or is it going to be composed on multiple ethnic/tribal groups in some form of a powersharing relationship?

I think that discussions of exactly what the state is / will be are important if for no other reason that you have to have an acceptable reason for fighting for a state. It is usually fairly easy to develope that mind state of "why to fight" in a monocultural state which is, after all, the basis of modern nation states. It it much harder to do so when you have multi-cultural states where core cultural values may be in direct opposition to each other.

Marc

[Tom Odom]

I think that discussions of exactly what the state is / will be are important if for no other reason that you have to have an acceptable reason for fighting for a state. It is usually fairly easy to develope that mind state of "why to fight" in a monocultural state which is, after all, the basis of modern nation states. It it much harder to do so when you have multi-cultural states where core cultural values may be in direct opposition to each other.

The interesting thing about this point and this discussion in general is that for the most part all elements in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe war could agree that they were fighting for a state (the definition of which was the center piece issue of the war). The same held true in Rwanda: defining that state centered on defining the Tutsi as either an alien race (the Hutu Power position) or an integral part of the Rwandan ethnic quilt (the RPF position). The aftermath of both conflicts is still unfolding. In the case of Zimbabwe, I spent a little time there in 84 and heard the stories of American mercs who had fought on the losing side, lost their citizenship, and stayed in the newly consolidated military. Their stories were NOT happy ones; one was a parapalegic who had been an SF engineer sergeant, fought as a merc, and then was used--literally--to clear mines until his luck ran out. I sponsored a Zimbabwean officer at Leavenworth in 85; he was Ndebele. It took several months but he finally started talking about how his future looked in the Shona dominated government. I believe that Zimbabwe is going to hit bottom soon; the results will not be pretty.

As for Rwanda, I gave a 2-3 hour lecture the other day on COIN in Rwanda 94-98; key discussion point in that lecture was amnesty/reconciliation/and integration of the 2 militaries. My overall point in raising those issues was that the RPA could win on the battlefield but could not win the peace until those issues were addressed. That was very hard to do after genocide killed 14% of a state's population, most of whom were from an ethnic group constituting less than 20% of the pre-war population. (The return of long term Tutsi exiles effectively offset the losses of the geoncide in numerical terms; that does not mean in any fashion that their return lessened the social impact of the genocide.) Two critical things had to happen: a. an end to impunity in ethnic killings to satisfy genocide survivors and b. reconciliation (especially integration of the militaries). The first condition was achieved with the first public executions after trials in 98. The second actually began in 94 when the RPA opened the reintegration program for ex-FAR officers at Gako. By 97 and 98, graduates of the Gako program, Hutu (and former ex-FAR) officers were commanding RPA battalions and brigades in the COIN campaign in western Rwanda. They proved absolutely critical in defeating the insurgency that year. I admit freely that in 1994 I was very sceptical about the Gako program; the Rwandans proved me wrong.

Finally I would hold up the Congo as an example of the other extreme: where a state does not really exist and a Congolese "people" do not really exist. It has been a problem since King Leopold carved out his private empire in the 19th century; independence in 1960 brought all the tensions to the fore for the next 5 years. Mobutu more or less (actually less given that foreign interventions became almost common place) held it together from 65 to 97 when the Rwandans showed him the door. In Congo-like conditions, it is VERY difficult to establish a military that has the state as its center of gravity.

best
Tom