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Thread: Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

  1. #281
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days.
    I suggest that one takes baby steps on this. Identify one battalion (Ranger/Marine/Airbourne/whatever) and task them to set up a QRF starting in Helmand/Kandahar/whatever. Weld together with this unit the air effort required and do the training at all levels. It is important that the chopper air-crews stay with/train with/rotate with the soldiers - as in one big happy family under a non-negotiable unified command structure. More difficult with fixed wing support but efforts must be made to develop a cooperative relationship with them (best done over a few beers).

    Of course such an approach will need unwavering support from the theatre commander... otherwise don't waste your time.

    Once there is a record of success other units will cut each others throats to get a chance get assigned to any new QRF (Fire Force) that may be established. The first success will be when they arrive (like the cavalry of old) to pull some callsign out of the sh** and in the process dispatching a bunch of bad guys for good measure.

    I think it's a bit off course to reference holding rural territory in the title of article. The Rhodesian Security Forces in the form of the Scouts/RLI/RAR were not holding territory as much as they were interdicting the infiltration of the terr gangs coming from across the border. Once they got far enough, the difficulties of countering and killing them became magnified by a significant factor. For some reason, I remember a reference or statement somewhere that it became 4x harder to make kills once the gang had made it to certain regions of the TTLs.
    Yes, the use of the word 'holding' seems a bit strange.

    For the pseudo thing to work one needs local population to interact with and 'fool' into believing they are the real deal. It was all about the real time intel. If you had it and you acted upon it immediately you got results no matter where they were located. Once done that 'team' would generally be compromised in that area and would have to be redeployed elsewhere.

    Of course the best time to hit them is before they cross the border (in their supposed sanctuary).

    The sparsely populated flat areas as found in the south-east (for example) that were used as transit areas were better suited to the Grey Scouts (mounted infantry) to cross grain for spoor and if found have the FF position closer for a quick response to exploit the results of any contact they may have. (The Grey's Scouts came into their own too late in the war to have a real impact but the potential was there.)

    One of the problems (as it were) that we experienced was that as the FF got busy (like called out everyday) we were unable to sleep out and conduct aggressive follow-ups of those who escaped. There were not always suitable follow-up troops available to hand over to so the survivors unlike in the earlier days when the remnants of the CT group contacted could sustain more losses in subsequent contacts. So it became the norm to recover all troops at night, feed them steak, eggs and fries (I kid you not) washed down by a few 'frosties' (cold beers) and a good nights sleep and ready for the next days fun. (If we were lucky and were able to deal with the CTs quickly we were often back in time for tea and a game of football or baseball (or even run around the airfield if the day was not too tiring) at the airfield before dinner.)

    But essentially you are correct in that the longer the CTs were in the country the easier they found it to get lost among the population.

    Insurgent mobility is widely different between gangs of ZIPRA/ZANLA coming across the borders, and how Afghan insurgents move and operate, so that has to be considered as well.
    Yes, its an enemy and terrain issue.

    Finally, as strange as it may sound the guys who may have the best grasp of what is required for FF type operations are the the Air Force Search & Rescue guys. Think about what they need to do and how they put troops on the ground to extract downed airmen while covering them from the air.
    Last edited by JMA; 08-14-2011 at 05:49 PM.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Thinking about quick reaction forces in blocking positions and so on (emphasis on quick) ... doesn't this provoke a lot of friendly fire on pursuing forces by the QRF whenever IFF becomes difficult?

    The QRF - especially in the Rhodesian example - can't have strong enough teams for asking first and shooting second, after all.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Thinking about quick reaction forces in blocking positions and so on (emphasis on quick) ... doesn't this provoke a lot of friendly fire on pursuing forces by the QRF whenever IFF becomes difficult?

    The QRF - especially in the Rhodesian example - can't have strong enough teams for asking first and shooting second, after all.
    If I understand you correctly you ask whether there was a blue-on-blue risk as the sweep line closed in on the stop group positions?

    If so yes.

    Believe you me the stop groups made sure they were in a position where they could duck. But essentially it was the FFC (commander) who would warn the various 'sticks' of the location and approach of others. The RLI commanders had this aspect under control.

    Only time I had a problem was at Chimoio (Op Dingo) when the Airborne Commander was from the SAS (who had virtually no FF experience) and as the sweep lines converged on the target there was more than a comfortable number of 'friendly' rounds flying past or into other sweep lines. Two of our wounded were in this manner.

    But essentially, yes, there was a real risk that had to be managed. But then in those days there was a lot more emphasis on fire control and fire discipline and the troopies were more experienced through time spent on FF so less likely to blaze away especially when approaching a stop group (or a stop group open fire on an approaching sweep line).

    Well done. Good that you spotted this risk
    Last edited by JMA; 08-14-2011 at 07:03 PM.

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Australian paper

    Try 'Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)' a conference paper delivered in Australia in late 2010:http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent...%20campaign%22


    Abstract:
    Pseudo gangs form the steely side of Hearts and Minds and were used with great effect in counter-insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952-60) Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Although the use of pseudo gangs was not new to counter-insurgency tactics, with the British using a similar tactic in the Boer war (1899-1902), the use of such gangs was certainly perfected during these later campaigns producing good results. The Kenya Police Special Branch re-instigated this concept, developing its use during the ‘Emergency’.

    The principal concept was to ‘turn’ or co-opt insurgents through a series of inducements to change sides and join the counter insurgency as part of the Government forces but not as regular forces. Rather the co-opted kept their actual identities or their ‘assumed’ identities and return to the conflict areas as part of a ‘gang’, which would be made to appear as if it is still fighting for the insurgents. This ‘pseudo’ gang would then rejoin or flush out the opposition and either capture, gain further intelligence or eliminate them. Based on my ongoing PhD research into these three campaigns, this paper will briefly outline an alternative model that could be developed for current conflicts against insurgents.
    davidbfpo

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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Try 'Hearts and Minds, Psuedo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)' a conference paper delivered in Australia in late 2010:http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent...%20campaign%22


    Abstract:
    Great find David. FWIW I will pass that around my network of the O&B (old and bold) and see if any significant comments emerge.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Great find David. FWIW I will pass that around my network of the O&B (old and bold) and see if any significant comments emerge.
    ...and this paper is also a valuable contribution:


    PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
    LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

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    Default Dr Paul Meshen the True Pseudo Ops Author

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    ...and this paper is also a valuable contribution:


    PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
    LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
    Oh JMA! Please watch the references...might have to bring up the "P" word concerning that author but the duty expert on Pseudo Ops is Dr Paul Melshen at the Armed Forces Staff College. student2010 - Dr Melshen will be glad to talk to you, if you are serious.
    "If you want a new idea, look in an old book"

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    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    Oh JMA! Please watch the references...might have to bring up the "P" word concerning that author but the duty expert on Pseudo Ops is Dr Paul Melshen at the Armed Forces Staff College. student2010 - Dr Melshen will be glad to talk to you, if you are serious.
    What are you on about?

    Melshen's book on the subject is:

    Pseudo operations: the use by British and American Armed Forces of deception in counter-insurgencies 1945-1973

    Marked as Currently unavailable.

    Just a small point. student2010 was specifically looking at the Selous Scouts and Rhodesia. Melshen's book covers upto 1973 so therefore would not cover the Rhodesian pseudo operations at all.
    Last edited by JMA; 08-25-2011 at 05:23 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    Oh JMA! Please watch the references...might have to bring up the "P" word concerning that author but the duty expert on Pseudo Ops is Dr Paul Melshen at the Armed Forces Staff College. student2010 - Dr Melshen will be glad to talk to you, if you are serious.
    Yes, I am very interested and I am very serious.

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    Smile Great!

    Quote Originally Posted by student2010 View Post
    Yes, I am very interested and I am very serious.
    Then...Your Welcome!
    "If you want a new idea, look in an old book"

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    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    Then...Your Welcome!
    It would be interesting to hear what Melshen's credentials are in relation to the Selous Scouts and Rhodesian pseudo operations.

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    Default Book info

    I have this document... it is not a book. However it does cover Rhodesia and the Selous Scouts in detail in an appendix.

    Cheers,
    Troy


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    What are you on about?

    Melshen's book on the subject is:

    Pseudo operations: the use by British and American Armed Forces of deception in counter-insurgencies 1945-1973

    Marked as Currently unavailable.

    Just a small point. student2010 was specifically looking at the Selous Scouts and Rhodesia. Melshen's book covers upto 1973 so therefore would not cover the Rhodesian pseudo operations at all.
    “There is no hunting like the hunting of man, and those who have hunted armed men long enough never care for anything else thereafter.”
    *** Ernest Hemingway ***


    “Officers Making Simple $hit Hard Since 1775” ~~Anonymous~~

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    Quote Originally Posted by trippmccullar View Post
    My thesis partners and I wrote a thesis on "Pseudo Operations & Deception in Irregular Conflict" in 2009 for John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate School. I'd be glad to send you a copy to review our bibliography for source info. If you like, send your email address via PM to enable an exchange.
    I have a copy of the McCullar et al thesis and recommend those interested in this subject to request a copy from him to add to their libraries. It an excellent contribution to the subject.

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default The greatest pseudo terrorists of all time

    This link came via the BSAP History group, it appears to be a short introduction to the book 'Only My Friends Call Me Crouks' by Dennis Croukamp

    Referring to a question from an American:
    'What were your rules of engagement?' I told him I'd never heard of that term in my life until I saw the film of the same name. We only had one rule. Kill The Enemy.”
    Link to article, which appears undated:http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-g...?Contentpage=1

    Note this book was originally published in 2005 as 'Only My Friends Call Me Crouks (The Bush War in Rhodesia)' and was reprinted as "THE BUSH WAR IN RHODESIA - The Extraordinary Combat Memoir of a Rhodesian Reconnaissance Specialist" by Paladin Press in the United States.

    Link to Amazon UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Only-Friends.../dp/0620293926

    Link to Amazon.com:http://www.amazon.com/Bush-War-Rhode...1320788262&sr=
    davidbfpo

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    Default 1967 ANC -v- Rhodesian forces

    Hat tip to a BSAP History Group email directing attention to South African History Online (SAHO), whose purpose is to be:
    a non-partisan people's history project. It was established in June 2000 as a non-profit Section 21 organisation, aiming to address the biased way in which the history and cultural heritage of South Africans was represented in our educational and cultural institutions.

    SAHO's mission is to break the silence of our past and to create the most comprehensive online encyclopedia of South African history and culture.
    Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/

    Prelude over.

    There is a small collection of articles around 'The Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie campaign, July-September 1967', the ANC's first military operation; known as Operation Nickel by the Rhodesians, which makes interesting reading as it is before the insurgency really began in earnest.

    Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/wankie-campaign

    How did the Rhodesians and South Africans experience this operation? What light, if any do these archival documents shed on the Wankie campaign? What did the Rhodesians-South Africans learn from their experiences with the ANC-ZAPU guerrillas? I also examine the controversial issue of South Africa's military assistance to Rhodesia. Do the archival documents shed more light on the South African government's assistance to Rhodesia? What resources did South Africa commit to Rhodesia?
    The debrief at the end is IMO the best part; partly as I've met some of those involved and one is an old friend.

    Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/...ecurity-forces
    davidbfpo

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    Default To laugh or to cry?

    The Military Review published a paper by one Marno de Boer in its November / December 2011 English edition: Rhodesia's Approach to Counterinsurgency: A Preference for Killing'.

    One wonders how he was able to defend such drivel first at thesis stage and then manage to slip it past the editorial committee of the Military Review. Quite appalling. This reflects very badly on the Military Review of course.

    It would be interesting to hear from anyone who takes the time to read the paper whether they believe he 'proved' anything.
    Last edited by JMA; 01-26-2012 at 10:05 AM.

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    JMA,

    I have read the paper and agree with you.

    There are numerous critical points, for two examples the author refers to the poor quality of SB intelligence, when it was the SB who were the key personnel in the Selous Scouts intelligence unit. Secondly, the emphasis on the killing of enemy wounded - which I am sure did happen at times - is in contrast to the ability of the Selous Scouts to "turn" captured guerillas.
    davidbfpo

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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    JMA,

    I have read the paper and agree with you.
    Yes David, its full of nonsense which we can list... but the biggest nonsense is the last sentence of the paper:

    What this article shows is that it is an unrestrained preference for killing on the part of soldiers that can imperil the war effort.
    de Boer showed this?

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    Default Review of MR Article - part 1

    From the article's lede (emphasis added):

    In the 1970s, a bloody insurgency took place in Rhodesia, now present-day Zimbabwe. African insurgents faced a settler-state determined to keep power in white hands. The government adopted a punitive and enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Many Rhodesian soldiers embraced the punitive approach to such an extent that they overextended the rules of engagement.
    Based on the author's background,

    Marno de Boer is currently studying for an L.L.M. in public international law at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, after finishing an M.A. in the history of warfare at the War Studies Department of King’s College, London. This article is based on the thesis he wrote for his B.A. at University College, Utrecht, the Netherlands.
    I expected more than what I got.

    First, a statement as to factual accuracy (and my use of "DKI"), starting with an assertion by the author:

    The penchant to kill resulted in the frequent execution of prisoners, which hampered Rhodesia’s intelligence effort, something existing studies of the war often overlook.[85]

    85. Cilliers, 218-35. For a discussion of Rhodesia’s intelligence effort without reference to the issue of prisoners; Godwin and Hancock, The Rhodesian War, 284 refers to Cocks (236) to show how the war brutalized white society; Moorcraft does not mention the execution of prisoners.

    (1) J.K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (Beckenham: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985); (2) Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die - The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, c. 1970-1980 (Harare: Baobab Books, 1995, first published 1993 by Oxford University Press); (3) Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A Military History (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2008).
    Throughout this review, I've expanded the author's citations (in the qotes) to present the full citation (which he presents the first time he cites the source).

    DKI as to Godwin, Cocks and Moorcraft; but the author (de Boer) states that those sources do not refer to the "issue of prisoners" or "the execution of prisoners".

    DKI means generally ("Denies Knowledge or Information sufficient to affirm or deny the truth of the claim made; and therefore leaves the claimant to proof of the claim"); here it means that I don't have the book and am left only with addressing the author's assertions. I do NOT assume that those assertions are true; nor do I claim they are false with respect to the sources he claims.

    I have and have read Cilliers (typed manuscript). It does not contain any mention of "the execution of prisoners". Thus, de Boer's assertion ("The penchant to kill resulted in the frequent execution of prisoners...") is unsourced. To what extent, his other assertions hold up is beyond my materials and the amount of time I want to spend on this.

    ---------------------------

    One might expect (from an LLM candidate in I Law) somethiung of a legal discussion of Rhodesian ROEs. In that, de Boer disappoints. He does set out something of a "statement of facts" in his section "Violence Toward Civilians" (p. 8 pdf).

    Violence against civilians also supports the thesis that soldiers adopted and extended the punitive approach to counterinsurgency. About 19,000 African civilians died in the war. Partly this was a result of insurgent actions. They used force against uncooperative civilians, used them as cover, and targeted the rural health and veterinary services. This later caused a surge of malaria, rabies, and tsetse flies. As the war intensified, the government allowed more violence against black civilians. This punitive approach had started in 1973 with the imposition of fines on communities that aided insurgents. Brutalities against civilians were not yet accepted, but in the late 1970s Rhodesia used the term “killed in crossfire” rather liberally.[72]

    72. Moorcraft, 38, 129-35. For a detailed account of ZANLA coercion in peasant communities, see Norma J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War Peasant Voices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
    DKI as to the sources; esp. as to de Boer's bottom line: "Brutalities against civilians were not yet accepted, but in the late 1970s Rhodesia used the term “killed in crossfire” rather liberally." Cilliers does give just over 5K in "civilian KIAs" for 1973-1978 (p.242 type; p.143 pdf; snip attached)

    There was never a clear and uniform policy targeting civilians though. Actually, the cabinet always pushed for a tougher approach, while General Walls, Rhodesia’s most senior military official, tried to limit the freedom Ian Smith wanted to give him. At one point Smith, supported by several cabinet members, even proposed to abandon the “Queensbury Rules of waging warfare” and impose nationwide martial law. Walls retorted that if the cabinet really wanted that, it should resign and let him rule the country at the head of a military junta.[73]

    73. Flower, 211. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly - An Intelligence Chief on Record - Rhodesia into Zimbabwe - 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987)
    DKI as to the source.

    The term “Queensbury Rules of waging warfare” is legally meaningless - as well as militarily meaningless, for that matter. Based on two of the quotes below ("regular police work", "the Rule of Law applied"), we might equate “Queensbury Rules" to the "Rule of Law" (using that somewhat ambiguous term as shorthand for the rules set by domestic law for peacetime law enforcement).

    That situation is quite different from "nationwide martial law". Setting up a debate between "nationwide rule of law" and "nationwide martial law" is a strawman. An insurgency can be handled indigenously where the "Rule of Law" applies generally, but where the indigenous "Laws of War" apply locally. An example, of course, is our Civil War (the 1863 Lieber Code), and the consequent periods of Reconstruction and Redemption.

    cont. in Part 2.
    Attached Files Attached Files

  20. #300
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Read it and agree it's specious.

    Too many instances of "it was said," "it seems," "it appears that..." My impression is that he took a predetermined position and cherry picked to support it.

    His 'conclusion' is flawed at best, arguable in the case of every war and certainly not proven for the one he discusses.

    I don't agree that the article necessarily reflects badly on Military Review. They publish a lot of articles of real merit and as many with no merit with an almost equal number of mediocrities. I think that sort of goes with the mission of the magazine. Been my observation over 50 plus years that about a third of the magazine on average has some worth and I've found that others agree -- where we sometimes differ is on which articles were worthwhile...

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