Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[JMA]

Come on, your view on Rhodesia is excessively uncritical. I did not expect any other view and that's why I jumped in in the first place.

My remarks about the analogies stand and I do not feel that your attempts at refuting them have any weight. Rhodesia fought against Nazis? So what? So did the Stalin. This doesn't exclude the possibility of having a horrible regime.

Hitler's plan for East Europe was one with Germans settling there as the exploiting, warlike masters with the exploited Slavs working in the agricultural sector and mines.
The Spartan model was similar, with an intermediate caste.

Rhodesia may not have had such a strong intermediate caste ("coloured people", Asians) as did South Africa, but the Blacks could easily be understood as Slaves to the state, to be employed at far below fair wage by the Whites and they clearly didn't get the same quality or quantity of services from the state.

Maybe you should do some research yourself, since your idea of what Rhodesia was like is obviously tainted by being a White and by having developed a lot of sentimentality.

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/000...1/016163eo.pdf

Now guess what level of discrimination was Hitler planning for the separation of Slavs and Germans.

He would basically have copied this link.
Well, maybe he would have preferred less involvement of Germans in agriculture, for he really, really disliked rural environments and agriculture personally.

So yes, since "Nazis" is nowadays a rather wide description that does not necessitate them being Germans, I can easily and correctly describe the Rhodesia as a historical Nazi state. You were effectively fighting for a Nazi regime.
The excuse that said regime did fight against original Nazis a generation earlier does help ####, for the same did not keep Stalin from being among mankind's top three mass murderers and leading one of mankind's worst-ever regimes either.

Last but not least; the idea that Rhodesians could have coped well with quality opposition is almost entirely without base. They sucked in WW2.
The ability to mop up marginal quality opposition does not mean anything about one's ability to cope with quality opposition, and little to nothing is to be learned from the former for the latter. That's what my Abbessinians-Italians-British-Germans story was meant to show.

P.S.: The East German military was in many regards better (more serious and disciplined) than the West German one.

I understand your German preoccupation with race... there seems to be little Germans can do about it.

None better evidenced than the continued innuendo of superior qualities of German soldiers. This is clearly not supported by the facts of history. What is supported by history is that the German military has been better organised and structured and in many cases better led than most other nations but the man for man comparison of the fighting men with the racially superior outcome for Germans is not only nonsense but the dangerous perpetuation of the myth of German racial superiority.

There is no shortcoming in the individual fighting ability or the levels of courage and bravery of the British or American soldiers just (as at last count 70 years ago) the individual German soldier acquitted himself well. You cling to some fantasy of the East German military as you know that both the Brits and Americans know from the Cold War experience that the (West) German army was a pathetic shadow of its former stature. Hence the need to place the East Germans on a pedestal. Doesn't work.

I would offer another more balanced source for a history of the Rhodesian war from the following book:

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare - Daniel Marston & Carter Malkasian

... with the applicable chapter being:

COUNTERING THE CHIMURENGA: The Rhodesian Counterinsurgency Campaign 1962–80

It remains laughable that where the settlers and colonizers were of European origin their conquer and domination is somehow worse than the inter tribal wars/massacres/genocides that preceded the arrival of settlers in any given country.

In the case of the area called Rhodesia the Matebele (Ndebele) arrived a mere 60years before the Europeans and were in the process dealing with the Shona people through a continuing series of raids against them. European and North-American - so-called human rights activists, academics and assorted other useful idiots - completely ignore the obvious hypocrisy of their racially biased position.

Such politics are complicated and one appreciates that some will seek a simple explanation to a complex situation - like Rhodesians Bad, 'Nationalists' Good.

Simple people seek simple answers.

I still wait for someone to draw a comparison between the fate of the Africans (blacks) under European domination in Rhodesia and the fate of Tibetans under Chinese domination in Tibet.

Then the question you will not and can not answer... which is to provide proof that the people you placed on a pedestal - on the supposed moral high ground - the so-called 'Nationalists' were indeed the human rights activists and democrats they presented themselves as and not the thugs/mass murderers/thieves they to a man turned out to be once they were given the country.

Yes I know the admission of having been used as a 'useful idiot' by thugs and killers masquerading as human rights activists and democrats would be too painful. More black Zimbabweans have been killed after the bush war by the regime than were killed during the war. To Rhodesians this outcome was obvious... to the useful idiots this was met with (embarrassed) silence (and lamely blamed on the legacy of colonialism).

I am amazed that 32 years after the current regime was handed the country on a plate there are still those - you included - that believe the bush war was fought to suppress African people as opposed to an attempt to secure an orderly and controlled transition to majority rule.

[Fuchs]

I understand your German preoccupation with race... there seems to be little Germans can do about it.

None better evidenced than the continued innuendo of superior qualities of German soldiers.

Serious question: What do you smoke?
(Yes moderator, I am honestly interested in what he smokes. Gotta be something exotic.)

I am amazed that 32 years after the current regime was handed the country on a plate there are still those - you included - that believe the bush war was fought to suppress African people as opposed to an attempt to secure an orderly and controlled transition to majority rule.

I am always amazed anew at the naivet and gullibility of people in face of blatant propaganda.

[JMA]

The Bleed

John R Cronin has published a book on Kindle about his service in the USMC and Rhodesia. I served with John in the RLI and enjoyed his coverage of his service in the RLI and the Selous Scouts immensely. At $5.15 it is certainly a must read for those with an interest in the Rhodesian bush war.



"These memoirs are a 35-year window into the life of someone who walked silently on patrol with Marine Recon in the jungles of Vietnam, jumped into action with the Rhodesian Light Infantry's Fire Force, infiltrated guerrilla groups on counterinsurgency operations with the Selous Scouts, navigated the teeming streets of Cairo, was kidnapped by Hizbollah in Beirut, and then left this life behind for a completely different, though no less highly competitive atmosphere of a doctoral program at the University of London.

It's not just a war story - though there are stories of two wars embedded in this narrative - but rather it's an account of what it was like as an American, as a total stranger, living across several continents and what people had to endure just to make it from one day to the next. It's a story of survival."

.

[JMA]

The Bleed

John R Cronin has published a book on Kindle about his service in the USMC and Rhodesia. I served with John in the RLI and enjoyed his coverage of his service in the RLI and the Selous Scouts immensely. At $5.15 it is certainly a must read for those with an interest in the Rhodesian bush war.



"These memoirs are a 35-year window into the life of someone who walked silently on patrol with Marine Recon in the jungles of Vietnam, jumped into action with the Rhodesian Light Infantry's Fire Force, infiltrated guerrilla groups on counterinsurgency operations with the Selous Scouts, navigated the teeming streets of Cairo, was kidnapped by Hizbollah in Beirut, and then left this life behind for a completely different, though no less highly competitive atmosphere of a doctoral program at the University of London.

It's not just a war story - though there are stories of two wars embedded in this narrative - but rather it's an account of what it was like as an American, as a total stranger, living across several continents and what people had to endure just to make it from one day to the next. It's a story of survival."

.

Extract from the ebook:

... Enter moi in the middle of August of 1976. I reported in to the RLI the same day 3 Commando, my assigned unit, had returned from its 10 day R&R in preparation to be deployed the following day. I walked over from the BOQ across the parade deck to meet the rest of the officers and senior NCOs as they arrived to pre-pack up some equipment and I could see them studying me as I made my way to the offices.

It was the same look I had received the day I walking into Third Force Recon that day and I could feel the eyes on my back as I went down the corridor. Everyone had heard that a new officer was due in, and a Yank officer at that, and they were keen to see what kind of impression the new face would leave with them. They all had a ton of combat experience behind them, and as I grew to know them and the men of the other commands, I would be struck by how closely they resembled in temperament and bearing the Marines I had just left. Funny. profane. tough, violent, tactically and strategically savvy, innovative and not afraid to take some of the most awful risks you can imagine, they were solid in the bush and could be relied on to take care of one another out there without one doubt of hesitation, which is what made them so aggressive and ideally suited for Fire Force.

...

[JMA]

Who Dares Loses?
Assessing Rhodesia’s Counter-Insurgency Experience
Greg Mills & Grahame Wilson

Pound for pound, the Rhodesian security forces may have been the most effective fighting force of the last century. Numbering at their peak 15,000 troops, pitted against an opposition likely at least three times as strong within and without the country by the war’s end, and employing increasingly aggressive tactics taking them into the neighbouring countries, they were able to keep in check their numerically superior guerrilla opponents, despite having to operate across a country larger than Germany, and over terrain practically impassable in many locations. But still, the war was lost with the advent to power of Robert Mugabe’s regime in 1980 – or was it? This article revisits the Rhodesian strategy, assesses what mistakes were made and the conduct of the war, and identifies lessons for contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

Good catch the RUSI Journal 2007 article, via your link and the final paragraph says it all:

Rarely do insurgents, in Rhodesia as elsewhere, lose the political aspect of their struggle in spite of their performance in the field, the latter often a function of superior equipment, training, technology, mobility and operational coherence of those countering the insurgency. Thus the
Rhodesian experience should teach us, above all else, that what is required to counter insurgency are superior political tactics and strategy, from the local to the global level

[JMA]

Officially known as the Transitional Shoot was an essential part of the ongoing shooting training for trained soldiers.

RHODESIAN TRANSITIONAL SHOOT
(aka Drake Shoot)

INTRODUCTION

1. During most contacts a low rate of kills is being achieved to the number of rounds fired. For example after one engagement it was reported that a platoon fired approximately eleven hundred rounds and achieved no kills or hits despite the fact that the contact took place at a range of less than thirty yards. Examination of the contact area later revealed that the majority of shots fired by the security forces were high, this was borne out by the amount of damage to trees in the vicinity. Most rounds had struck foliage three to four feet above ground level.

2. From those observations it would appear that whilst it is possible to train a soldier to a high standard of shooting on the range it does not necessarily follow that he is automatically able to apply the lessons learnt when he comes under fire in battle.

This lack of application can be put down to two basic reasons:

a. A failure to relate his weapon training lessons to fieldcraft.

b. A natural nervousness due to stresses created by battle conditions.

AIM

3. The aim of this range practice is to teach soldiers to relate field craft and ground appreciation to good shooting under realistic conditions.

METHOD

4. The basic faults to overcome are:

a. A tendency to fire high. This is a result of firing range practice at comparatively large figure targets mounted approximately six feet above ground level. The terrorist will usually be at ground level and will present a target no higher than twelve inches.

b. Failure to fire at potential enemy cover. Soldiers nust appreciate the ground, and fire at likely enemy positions, WHETHER THEY CAN SEE MEN THERE OR NOT. Logs, bushes, tree trunks and folds in the ground all provide likely cover, the high velocity 7,62mm round will penetrate most natural cover at close range!

c. Tendency to concentrate fire on the most likely position. If a terrorist is visible or isolated cover suggests more likely position, there is a tendency for all to fire in one direction. This results in the arc to the front not being fully covered and although one terrorist may be well and truly dealt with, several others in less obvious fire positions will remain unscathed and potentially dangerous.

5. To summarise, a soldier must be taught and practised to:

a. Fire low, no higher than 9 - 12 inches above the estimated ground level.

b. Select and fire at likely enemy fire positions remembering to relate his field craft to his shooting.

c. Fire at the enemy within his own particular arc to his front and not to be drawn to fire at obvious targets already covered by others within his fire unit.

RESULT

6. This dootrine has been tried and proven. A platoon trained on the lines described above engaged terrorists in three separate contacts in one day, resulting in:

a. Four terrorists killed.

b. Two seriously wounded (one suffered 10 hits).

c. Five captured.

d. A total ammunition expenditure during the whole day of 250 rounds and one grenade.

PRACTICES

7. The following practices are best fired on field firing ranges or in jungle lane areas but can be adapted to classification or transitional ranges by the provision of artificial cover.

8. This shoot should be fired by all soldiers at the completion of recruit training and Practice 3, with variations, by trained soldiers at every available opportunity.