Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[davidbfpo]

Prompted by a recent discussion I have added two lengthy quotes. The first is from an interview of a Selous Scouts intelligence officer conducted thirty years ago and a more recent commentary on that interview.

The Scouts activities have been controversial, but is the tactical mix they developed that intrigues me. In particular the ability to "turn" captured Nationalist guerillas and have them fighting their comrades within days. Above all they were a reconnaissance unit or recce in the mainly African countryside, who identified targets for others to follow-up.

[davidbfpo]

Below are my interview notes and I have added in italics some comments. The officer was genuine and had been recommended to me by a Rhodesian Army officer who knew his role.

1. Around 1977 moral doubts started, as did the corruption
2. We were not prepared to win, our terms of reference dictated that in the last eight or nine years. Referred to Taber’s ‘War of the Flea’.
3. Politically, including Ian Smith, majority rule was not ruled out – they were searching for a suitable black role. But they did not understand the African mind, the majority will always support the violent man and unless you are tough you will lose.
4. They (the guerrillas) never needed to win a contact, the economic aspect of the war, which accounted for 50%, was lost they just keep on coming in and spread us about, thereby increasing the costs.
5. The Africans knew that somebody was always watching them.
6. We, the Rhodesians, just did not realise the signs were there. The choice was quite literally to win make the country a desert.
7. Reid-Daly’s concept was a stroke of genius, a fusion of brains and brawn. He was an ideal W.O.1, but he believed he was an “all rounder”. The brains were provided by Chief Superintendent Mac McGuiness, with about seven others, of the (Police) Special Branch who formed S.B.S.S. (A Google search found the SB officers were called Liaison Officers). It was devised as a tracking unit and became one to terrorise the other side.
8. The unit was 60% captures in the field, about 800 Africans, who were turned within a week and put on operations. There was total trust between us; I personally can recall one “fire fight” where I was the only one with ammunition left, they stayed and did not run. The entire staff at Inkomo Barracks (Google shows this as 40km from Harare near Darwindale) were similar in composition, but they were not combat fit. (This is the only reference I can easily find to the extent of recruitment from captured guerrillas, an interesting topic in itself).
9. (Their motivation?) Sometimes they perceived as the strong guys, but most were dupes really only concerned with their living conditions.
10. Such was the terror we instilled our main camp was never attacked (Google refers to Inkomo Camp as a major ammunition dump was sabotaged in 1981 by the South Africans and ex-Rhodesians).
11. What happened was that our credibility failed, I remember articled clerks at Price & Waterhouse (multi-national and global accountancy practice) saying in 1977-78 ‘All you’ve got to do is win the war”.
12. Our primary role was an intelligence gathering unit – 80% of our time was devoted to reconnaissance. I was a de-briefing officer for all returning “sticks” from each contact.
13. We adapted the ‘Supersonic’ radio so scouts could speak into the speakers (I think this implies the users were covert and within the population. This radio was in widespread use in the TTL or communal areas and would not stand out).
14. We did our job so well, in a professional manner – when we went into the “bush” de-bussing, back tracking and remaining stationary once in place. So much so that the Air Force had near total confidence in targeting a “Fire Force” without our actual seeing opponents. It was applied behavioural science, why did an old lady go for a “pee” at 0900hrs and counting kraal usage (This is lost on me now and I suspect refers to unusual behaviour being spotted).
15. There was a $50 per head reward; many of the regiment became quite wealthy.
16. For our opponents it was the “life of Riley”, drinking beer, getting girls from the kraals, the occasional shooting – let alone a “contact”.
17. Personally I weighed up the balance for Rhodesia, debits and credits – it was overwhelmingly in favour.
18. I personally was driven mad by the rejection that we should paralyse neighbouring economies; remember Mao’s dictum “Maximise the enemies losses, minimise yours”. We needed a “handle” on their sources of supply and finance. For example we distributed ultra-violet marked bank notes and with the banks help established relationships.
19. The cross-border operations i.e. attacking camps was not in the national interest.
20. We infiltrated their supply chain. I’m not saying who did this though. Their clothing was poisoned or defective equipment introduced, for examples half-second grenade fuses or plastic explosive AK47 rounds. All this had a potent effect the guys who were poisoned would attack those who had last fed them!

(Google search on poisoned clothing + Rhodesia finds many references to this activity; accounts appeared later in Rhodesian memoirs and became very controversial, for example view http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508 and http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html )

1. A shocking blind spot in our effort was counter-intelligence; given the fact any African could be a spy. For example in the attack on Chimoio we found sheaf’s of papers and plans of the Armoured Car Regiment Barracks – what they could not believe was that the ammunition was stored in a squash court, they thought it was behind the rifle butts.
2. I began to doubt whether personal sacrifice was warranted and started to ensure my personal safety.
3. The attitude evolved that politicians were not to be trusted and especially since we knew any war-winning strategy was unacceptable.

[davidbfpo]

The comments were made many years after my interview:

One of the keys to understanding why many terrorists were turned so easily is found in their cultural make up.


The answer may also be found within your notes, where in effect your source suggested that the African will follow those who show themselves to be strong (for this read "more ruthless, more violent, more powerful" etc), and will as a general rule vote for them. Setting the tribal niceties aside, mentally the captured terrorists often fell from their perceived positions of power i.e. God with an AK47 who commanded all he wanted - beer and women etc, to a frightened, defeated nobody on his way to see a Judge and a rope. In the African mindset, having been captured, bettered and effectively defeated by "his own people" would, I have little doubt, have been a particularly sobering psychological experience. (I am not sure if this means Rhodesians, of whatever colour, or black Rhodesians).

The Selous Scout upper command were also very careful not to promote any suggestion that they were fighting for "Rhodesia" or "Smith" or any other institute that the terrorists would have a disliking for, or been taught to hate. The Scouts slogan "Pamwe Chete" effectively means "Together Only" and conveys the idea of brothers fighting for each other, not for a system.


For a captured terrorist to be offered the chance to join a unit with an extremely fearsome (i.e. strong) reputation, carefully cultivated via propaganda, enabled the African to avoid the Judge, and regain his position of power once again. (For sometime the Rhodesian COIN included criminal prosecutions, with the death penalty and I suspect this time-consuming practice lessened as the war expanded).


I know of instances where terrorists captured in the morning were handed their AK47`s back to them in the afternoon (after a carefully orchestrated chat and assessment), and off they went happily hunting down their old friends as a member of the "strong." It probably seems bizarre to a westernised mindset, and I’m afraid it does not portray the African in a particularly favourable light, but the turning methods frequently worked. I know of only one incident where an "ex" terrorist turned on his new associates, and this was his intention all along.

It should be added that the intelligence community frequently used the terrorist propaganda against them. The terrorist High Command would spend as much time, if not more, pushing propaganda into the heads of their men as they did on military training. (Hence the frequent comments that ZANLA were poorly trained compared to ZAPU).


Consequently your average terrorist was expecting all sorts of nasty things to occur if they were captured. The Scouts, as part of the turning technique, made certain that the captive was treated respectfully, and provided with any medical assistance he required (delivered by pretty African nurses).

Basically he was treated the absolute opposite as to how he had been told he would be, without the fact that he was still deep in trouble going away. The effect of this was to add to their confusion, and in the end self preservation will swing the person for you.

The Scouts were effectively the armed wing of a larger intelligence organisation. As the interviewee suggests the entire exercise was intelligence driven, and as an Intelligence Officer his liaison with SB (Rhodesian Police Special Branch) would have been frequent. It perhaps could be argued that he was more SB than Scout. It is certain that in some quarters the line between SB and Scouts would have blurred.


Usually SB men were involved in the investigation of incidents, i.e. weapons collection (for forensic examination where the weapon would be traced to various previous activities etc); and all the other intelligence gathering methods.

On the issue of dirty tricks, discovered ammunition dumps were frequently sabotaged so that the AK47 rounds would explode in the barrels. Grenades were certainly tampered with in terms of fuse timing, and RPG7 rockets were rigged to detonate on triggering, as this weapon was usually the first fired in ambush situations. The detonation obviously killed the launcher and his nearby associates, and gave away the ambush position.


I also know of Scouts who attacked Rhodesian targets in order to "prove" their credentials to the real terrorists.


The radios, manufactured by the Rhodesian Company Supersonic (one of our answers to sanctions) could be rigged in a number of ways. The first was to have it blow up after a number of activations (15?), and these would be passed on through various contacts within the tribal areas to the guerrillas who would be interested in listening to propaganda broadcasts from Mozambique etc. Another use was to have the radio emit a beacon that a “Fire Force” helicopter could home in on. There was suggestion that this beacon transmitted when the radio was actually turned off, as once the Lynx or Trojan spotter (the first stage of a “Fire Force” operation) was airborne the terrorists would switch the radio off to listen to the air activity, thus effectively giving their position away.


There is a lot of stuff on the web about the heroics of the Selous Scouts. They are (were) a particularly tough bunch, but it remains true that while it was their job to find the terrorists, it was the RLI who killed them.

The poisoning allegations; it appears however that someone, or rather some group within SB may have in fact gone down this road as a progression from sending out dodgy radios etc. For obvious reasons it is not really likely that anyone will confess to involvement in operations of this kind particularly in today’s world.


I am certain however that there was South African (intelligence) involvement in the process, and this has been aired during the Truth and Reconciliation hearings after the change down there.


To be blunt, the general consensus from those I have discussed the matter with over the years was, "a dead terrorist is a dead terrorist." They do not regard the supply of poisoned camouflage uniforms to terrorists, as anything remotely approaching the deliberate and indiscriminate use of chemical/or other weapons on a civilian population. It should also be added that we frequently used Frantan (Napalm) and white phosphorus grenades/bombs on terrorist targets, and when a four man “stick” are challenging anything up to thirty opponents, a phosphorous grenade was frequently a life saver.

Could the turning techniques used in Rhodesia be used in our war today with Moslem extremists? Perhaps there are similarities in the extremists poor self esteem, driven by anger to fight against a powerful opponent that always "wins" (beginning with the Crusades.) I believe the sense of power it gives these deluded individuals, to be part of a system fighting "unbelievers" with guarantees of heaven etc as a reward, makes them an interesting opponent. Does their penchant for feeling "strong" come from plotting against and killing the innocent?